Sanai v. Kruger

1

2

3

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6

7 CYRUS SANAI, Case No. 23-cv-01057-AMO

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART EX

9 v. PARTE EMERGENCY MOTION TO

ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT AND

10 LEONDRA KRUGER, et al., DENYING EX PARTE MOTION FOR

INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL

Defendants.

11

Re: Dkt. Nos. 37, 40

12

13 Before the Court are Mr. Sanai’s “Ex Parte Emergency Motion to Alter or Amend

14 Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or for Relief from Order and Judgment Pursuant to

15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b),” ECF 37, and (2) “Emergency Ex Parte Motion for Injunction Pending

16 Appeal,” ECF 40. The Court finds the motions suitable for disposition without oral argument

17 pursuant to Civil L.R. 7-1(b). Having considered the papers filed in this matter, the relevant legal

18 authority, and good cause appearing, the Court GRANTS IN PART the motion to alter or amend

19 judgment and DENIES the motion for injunction pending appeal.

20 I. BACKGROUND

21 On March 9, 2023, Mr. Sanai commenced this action for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

22 declaratory and injunctive relief against the Justices of the California Supreme Court. ECF 1 at 2-

23 3, 18-25. Following the Clerk’s entry of default, ECF 20, on July 10, 2023, Mr. Sanai filed an

24 amended ex parte motion for entry of default judgment and an ex parte motion for leave to file an

25 overlength motion for default judgment. ECF 32, 33. On July 11, 2023, Mr. Sanai filed an

26 emergency ex parte motion for temporary restraining order, declaratory judgment, and preliminary

27 injunction in connection with state bar disciplinary proceedings. ECF 34.

1 Mr. Sanai, and denied all pending motions as moot. ECF 35, 36. Mr. Sanai moved to alter or

2 amend judgment, or alternatively, for relief from judgment, on August 3, 2023. ECF 37. He filed

3 an ex parte motion for injunction pending appeal on August 14, 2023. ECF 40.

4 II. LEGAL STANDARDS

5 A. Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

6 Rule 59(e) to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to file “[a] motion to alter

7 or amend a judgment . . . no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8 59(e). “There are four grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: 1) the motion is

9 ‘necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based;’ 2) the

10 moving party presents ‘newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence;’ 3) the motion is

11 necessary to ‘prevent manifest injustice;’ or 4) there is an ‘intervening change in controlling

12 law.’” Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

13 McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1254 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original)). Rule

14 59(e) allows courts only to address “matters properly encompassed in a decision on the

15 merits,” and “will not address new arguments or evidence that the moving party could have raised

16 before the decision issued.” Banister v. Davis, 140 S. Ct. 1698, 1703 (2020) (quotation marks and

17 citation omitted). “The motion is therefore tightly tied to the underlying judgment.” Id.

18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) likewise authorizes a party to seek relief from a

19 judgment or order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “The moving party under Rule 60(b) is entitled to relief

20 from judgment for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

21 (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse

22 party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; or

23 (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Am. Ironworks &

24 Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Const. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2001). “‘[E]xtraordinary

25 circumstances’ must justify reopening.” Kemp v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1856, 1861 (2022)

26 (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863, n.11 (1988)).

27 A motion for relief is treated as a motion under Rule 59(e) if it is filed timely under that

1 F.3d at 898-99.

2 B. Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal

3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d)1 provides that “[w]hile an appeal is pending from an

4 interlocutory order or final judgment that grants, continues, modifies, refuses, dissolves, or refuses

5 to dissolve or modify an injunction, the court may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction

6 on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d). A

7 motion for an injunction pending appeal is considered under the same standard as a motion for a

8 preliminary injunction. See Tribal Vill. of Akutan v. Hodel, 859 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988). To

9 prevail, the party seeking relief must show (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits, (2) they are

10 likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of

11 equities tips in their favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural

12 Resources Defense Council. Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

13 Some courts have cautioned against “rigid” application of the likelihood of success factor

14 when an injunction is sought pending appeal. “[I]f it were, an injunction would seldom, if ever, be

15 granted ‘because the district court would have to conclude that it was probably incorrect in its

16 determination on the merits.’” Protect Our Water v. Flowers, 377 F. Supp. 2d 882, 884 (E.D. Cal.

17 2004) (quoting Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Marsh, Civ. No. 85-6433-E, 1986 WL 13440, *1

18 (D. Or. 1986)). “Such a result would not be consistent with the express language of Rule 62[d]

19 which contemplates the possibility that the district court may grant an injunction pending appeal

20 from an interlocutory order denying preliminary injunction.” Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty.

21 of San Francisco, No. 15-CV-03415-EMC, 2016 WL 9184999, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2016).

22 Where a district court has “‘ruled on an admittedly difficult legal question and when the equities

23 of the case suggest that the status quo should be maintained[,]’” Protect Our Water, 377 F. Supp.

24 2d at 884 (quoting Wash. Metro. Area v. Holiday Tours, 559 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1977)), “an

25

26

1 “The provisions of Rule 62(d) were formerly set forth in Rule 62(c).” United States v. Birdsong,

27 No. CV 17-72-M-DWM, 2019 WL 1026277, at *1 (D. Mont. Mar. 4, 2019), aff’d, 804 F. App’x

1 injunction pending appeal may be appropriate, even if the Court believed its analysis in denying

2 preliminary injunctive relief is correct.” Am. Beverage Ass’n, 2016 WL 9184999, at *2.

3 III. DISCUSSION

4 The Court will first address Mr. Sanai’s motion to alter or amend judgment2 and will then

5 turn to his motion for injunction pending appeal.

6 A. Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

7 Mr. Sanai argues that he is entitled to relief under Rule 59(e) for three reasons. He first

8 argues that the Court erred in finding that the third element for Younger abstention3 was met. ECF

9 37 at 13-17. He next argues the Court erred in failing to find that the actual bias of the state court

10 bar judge presents exceptional circumstances that preclude Younger abstention. Id. at 17-19.

11 Finally, Mr. Sanai argues that the Court erred by relying on caselaw that is “decades superseded.”

12 Id. at 19. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

13 Mr. Sanai asks the Court to revisit its finding as to the third element for Younger abstention

14 because:

15 The Court’s first error is failing to analyze the relevant time for

determining all the elements. The Court correctly determines the

16 relevant time for the first element, but not the third. It states that

[“]the California Supreme Court’s rules relating to Bar Court

17 decisions provide for an adequate opportunity for a plaintiff to

present federal constitutional claims” from an unpublished decision

18 of five years ago. A lot can happen in five years. The issue is not

whether the rules five years ago gave an adequate opportunity; the

19 question is whether Sanai has that opportunity right now.

20 ECF 37 at 14.

21 Mr. Sanai asserts that he “could not raise any constitutional argument” in the state bar

22 proceedings because the “confessions by the State Bar” were not published March 10, 2023, until

23

24

2 The Court analyzes Mr. Sanai’s motion for relief from judgment under Rule 59(e) because Mr. Sanai

25

he filed his motion within 28 days from entry of judgment. See Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc., 248

F.3d at 898-99.

26

3 “Absent ‘extraordinary circumstances’, abstention in favor of state judicial proceedings is

required if the state proceedings (1) are ongoing, (2) implicate important state interests, and (3)

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provide the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to litigate federal claims.” Hirsh v. Justices of the

1 after he filed his petition for review. ECF 37 at 15. He then “only had 20 days to review the State

2 Bar’s redacted reports and prepare a petition for rehearing based thereof,” for which an extension

3 of time was denied. Id. His request to file an amended petition for rehearing based on a

4 law360.com published the day after his petition was also denied. Id. at 15-16. Only after the

5 petition was filed had “the State Bar revealed it had criminally referred certain of its past

6 employees and made referrals to the Fair Political Practices Commission” and released a referral

7 letter “showing that the first hearing department Judge in Sanai’s State Bar Court proceedings,

8 Donald Miles, was part of the Girardi Cabal in the State Bar who failed to report his gifts.” Id. at

9 16.

10 Mr. Sanai argues that this “procedural bar on presenting post-judgment arguments to the

11 California Supreme Court, including constitutional arguments, where the grounds for the delay in

12 presenting the arguments is the misconduct of the State Bar, eliminates the application of Younger

13 abstention under the case law.” Id. at 16. He adds that “it was not until July 23, 2023 that Sanai

14 had the explicit statements of the State Bar that it was not complying with the constitutional Brady

15 standards required by the Fourteenth Amendment and Bus. & Prof. Code §6085(b), which

16 standards it has stated in writing apply under the statute.” Id.

17 These arguments do not demonstrate a basis for relief under Rule 59(e). The Court

18 determined that the third element for Younger abstention was met in keeping with existing law.

19 ECF 35 at 3. Mr. Sanai takes issue with the timing of a decision—Robertson v. Honn, No. 17-CV-

20 01724-JD, 2018 WL 2010988, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2018), aff’d, 781 F. App’x 640 (9th Cir.

21 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 948 (2020)—cited in the Court’s order for the proposition that “the

22 California Supreme Court’s rules relating to Bar Court decisions provide for an adequate

23 opportunity for a plaintiff to present federal constitutional claims.” ECF 37 at 14; ECF 35 at 3.

24 Regardless Robertson’s timing, it correctly articulates the law in the Ninth Circuit. See Hirsh, 67

25 F.3d at 713 (“Refusing to abstain would require presuming that the California Supreme Court will

26 not adequately safeguard federal constitutional rights, a presumption the U.S. Supreme Court

27 rejected in Middlesex.”) (citing Middlesex Cty., 457 U.S. at 431); Rosenthal v. Justices. of the

1 attorneys subject to discipline with more than constitutionally sufficient procedural due process.”).

2 Granting his Rule 59(e) motion based on the arguments Mr. Sanai advances here would require

3 the Court to depart from binding authority. The Court declines to do so.

4 Mr. Sanai next argues that Younger abstention does not apply because of actual bias by

5 State Bar Court Judge Valenzuela:

6 Judge Valenzuela was placed on the State Bar Court thanks to the

machinations of Girardi and his cabal. She was selected because she

7 agreed with the Girardi philosophy of litigation, which is that

counsel’s outside relationships with judges and tribunal members

8 should be the most important criterion for litigation and legal

success. Her relationship with Girardi and his cabal are such that she

9 is hostile against any respondent who claims that improper judge

and lawyer relationships are valid defenses in state bar disciplinary

10 cases and merit discovery and exposure, because such relationships

were the key to Girardi’s success as a lawyer, while his relationships

11 with State Bar Trustees, investigators, and prosecutors gave him free

reign to steal additional moneys from his clients. Because of Judge

12 Valenzuela’s full acceptance of the Girardi principles of litigation,

she was violently and strongly prejudiced against Plaintiff, who has

13 already demonstrated the kind of judge/opposing counsel collusion

before Judge Miles that Valenzuela was placed on the State Bar

14 Court to validate and protect.

15 ECF 37 at 18 (citing ECF 1 at 12-13). He asserts that after Judge “Valenzuela recused herself

16 from Girardi’s case, Sanai sought to compel her to disclose her relationship with Girardi. He

17 appealed that issue all the way to the California Supreme Court, which is how that Court was

18 notified that Sanai was digging into the Girardi corruption years before the State Bar finally

19 admitted it.” Id. at 18-19 (citing ECF 1 at 14). According to Mr. Sanai, “the Court must accept as

20 true under a sua pontet [sic] pleading motion or as a matter of fact due to Defendants’ default

21 completely forecloses the application of Younger abstention.” ECF 37 at 19.

22 As set forth in the Court’s order, ECF 35 at 4, these allegations are insufficient. “[O]ne

23 who alleges bias ‘must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as

24 adjudicators’” with “evidence.” Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 713-14. Even if the allegations are taken as

25 true, Mr. Sanai has not overcome this presumption.4 His failure to establish the bias exception to

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4 Because Mr. Sanai has not overcome this presumption, the Court need not address Mr. Sanai’s

27

further argument that “[w]here the tribunal is disqualified because of actual bias or under the

1 Younger stands, notwithstanding Mr. Sanai’s related final argument, to which the Court now turns.

2 Mr. Sanai’s last argument is that Hirsh was superseded by Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal

3 Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). In that case, the Supreme Court “addresse[d] an extraordinary situation

4 where the Constitution require[d] recusal.” Id. at 886. There, the chairman and chief executive

5 officer of a company facing a $50 million adverse jury verdict contributed $3 million to replace an

6 incumbent with the judicial candidate that would foreseeably preside over the appeal of that

7 verdict. Id. at 884, 886. The contributions “eclipsed the total amount spent by all other . . .

8 supporters and exceeded by 300% the amount spent by [the candidate’s] campaign committee.”

9 Id. at 884. The newly-elected justice denied a motion for recusal and voted with the majority to

10 reverse the verdict. Id. at 872. “On these extreme facts,” the Supreme Court determined that “the

11 probability of actual bias r[ose] to an unconstitutional level.” Id. at 886.

12 Since Caperton, the Ninth Circuit has continued to apply the presumption of honesty and

13 integrity in those serving as adjudicators. See, e.g., United States v. Zitlalpopoca-Hernandez, 805

14 F. App’x 494, 497 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that the defendant did not establish that the “district

15 judge displayed bias or that the circumstances and facts of th[e] case overcame the presumption of

16 honesty and integrity”) (citations and quotations omitted). In light of such authority, this Court

17 does not read Caperton as eroding that presumption. The Court’s application of that presumption

18 is thus consistent with Ninth Circuit law and does not provide basis to grant Mr. Sanai relief under

19 Rule 59(e).

20 Mr. Sanai’s complaints that the discovery procedures in state bar disciplinary proceedings

21 are inadequate to collect evidence to prove bias, ECF 37 at 19-20, and that he need not include

22 evidence in his complaint, id. at 21, do not persuade the Court. In his motion for relief, he

23 highlights:

24 [O]n June 6, 2003, law360.com published an article concerning the

referral of State Bar employees, including the State Bar Court judge

25 who first handled Sanai’s case, which sets out the factual predicates

for a related due process problem for Justices Kruger, Groban and

26 Jenkins to rule on State Bar proceedings where a person, like Sanai,

is demanding comprehensive disclosure by anyone in the State Bar

27 about the connections with Girardi, and discovery against Girardi’s

June 6, 2023. As the article explains: The State Bar of California

1 has reported seven former employees to a political watchdog agency

for failing to disclose cash or gifts from the scandal-marked Girardi

2 Keese law firm, according to records obtained by Law360. Over the

past decade, the bar said, celebrity trial lawyer Tom Girardi treated

3 many of the then-bar officials to opulent parties and luncheons,

tickets to shows and sporting events, while a steady stream of clients

4 accused him of misconduct. None of this was reflected in the ex-

employees’ annual conflict-of-interest filings, according to the bar’s

5 letter to the California Fair Political Practices Commission….

Donald Miles, who was a State Bar Court Judge from 2006 to 2018,

6 attended a Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles

convention party and Super Bowl party hosted by Girardi Keese,

7 and may have attended a Christmas Eve luncheon in 2013, the bar

said. He was also hosted by the firm at a 2013 award dinner and a

8 non-profit luncheon. The referral letter said he did not report Girardi

or Girardi Keese as a source of those gifts…. Greenberg declined to

9 comment. Dunn, Nowicki and Miles did not respond to requests for

comment this week. Layton and Oehler could not immediately be

10 reached for comment this week. Their former attorney, Bob Baker

of Baker Keener & Nahra, suggested that few at the bar complied

11 with annual conflict-of interest filings, known as Form 700s. “How

many employees of the State Bar filed a Form 700,” Baker wrote in

12 an email to Law360. “I would assume way less than 50%.” Id.; see

also Exh. EEEEE Vol. VII Docket No. 22-3.

13

Girardi’s lavishing of free hospitality on judges and public officials

14 was notorious and invitations were coveted. The fight for tickets to

such events was fierce; one former California appellate justice tried

15 to use a ticket as a lure to seduce a young lawyer; when that failed,

the justice and his friends took her to Girardi’s party and tried to bed

16 her. See In Re Jeff Johnson, Cal. Jud. Performance Comm’n,

Decision Removing Jeff Johnson (June 2, 2020) at 56-7; C. Sanai

17 Decl. ¶29.

18 According to the State Bar, a failure to report attendance at a Girardi

Super-Bowl party or his legendary Las Vegas dinner and party is an

19 offense under California law that can trigger financial penalties of

up to $5,000.00. Vol. VII Docket No. 22-3. That determination

20 imperils dozens if not hundreds of California judges and public

officials who attended Girardi’s parties and dinners but who failed

21 to file Form 700s. Sanai reviewed the Form 700 disclosures for

Justices Groban, Jenkins, and Kruger from September 2016

22 onwards. C. Sanai Decl. ¶30 Docket No. 32-1. Not a single free

dinner (other than ones accompanying speeches, which public

23 officials are allowed to accept) from anyone is disclosed. Either the

Justices never accepted invites to legal functions where someone

24 else gave a speech for free or got taken out to dinner by a lawyer, or

they did not make any disclosures. The answer of course is that they

25 are invited and attend all the time. The State Bar’s position that

dinners and paid for travel over $50 is correct as a matter of law, and

26 it is clear that California jurists are not complying with it.

27 Justices Groban, Jenkins and Kruger bear significant legal and

meritorious. That’s because the evidence includes judges on the

1 invitation lists that the State Bar has examined in the Halpern May

report. Justices Groban, Jenkins and Kruger, and indeed the other

2 justices, have a financial interest in keeping these lists secret,

whether or not they ever attended one of the affairs, because of the

3 costs of addressing the question through legal counsel and proving

non-attendance at one of Girardi’s affairs could equal the fines.

4 There is a constitutionally intolerable risk that jurists such as

Groban, Jenkins and Kruger will be biased against any litigant such

5 as Sanai whose legal claims before them include demands for

disclosure of detailed information concerning Girardi’s corruption of

6 the State Bar and the judiciary, as it put them at risk of investigation

and personal payment of legal fees to defend against investigations

7 into judicial carousing at Girardi’s expense, plus fines when found

to have violated the statute.

8

There is a second dimension. As pointed out in the State Bar’s letter,

9 concealment of information by a public official tolls the limitations

period for crimes or civil penalties committed during office. See

10 Exh. EEEEE Vol. VII Docket No. 22-3 at 1541. The refusal to

reverse Judge Valenzuela’s ruling barring Sanai from obtaining

11 information relevant to his accusations of corruption had the effect

of concealing any misconduct that they may have committed that

12 otherwise passed the limitations period. See Exh 5, Vol. VI Docket

No. 21-7 at 1484-5. There is a constitutionally intolerable risk that

13 jurists such as Groban, Jenkins and Kruger will be biased against

any litigant such as Sanai whose legal claims before them include

14 demands for disclosure of such information that extends the

limitations period for any claims of failure to disclosure reportable

15 information, even the jurists are in fact innocent, if Girardi’s

invitation lists could include them.

16

ECF 37 at 22-24. These assertions are far from the “extreme facts” that led the Supreme Court to

17

find a constitutionally intolerable probability of actual bias in Caperton. They remain insufficient

18

for a showing of bias that would preclude Younger abstention, and as such, they do not present a

19

basis for relief under Rule 59(e).

20

Mr. Sanai also argues throughout his briefs that the Court denied him due process by

21

dismissing his complaint sua sponte without notice and an opportunity to be heard, rendering the

22

Court’s judgment void, see ECF 37 at 11, and that the Court should have dismissed his claims

23

without prejudice instead of without leave to amend, see ECF 37 at 12, 22. The Court agrees with

24

the latter but not the former. The Court will amend its order and corresponding judgment to

25

specify that dismissal is without prejudice pursuant to Younger. See Wasson v. Riverside Cty., 234

26

F. App’x 529, 530 (9th Cir. 2007) (remanding with instructions to dismiss remaining claims

27

without prejudice pursuant to Younger). Mr. Sanai’s motion to alter or amend judgment is

1 otherwise denied.

2 B. Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal

3 Turning to the motion for injunction pending appeal, Mr. Sanai argues that “[h]e has

4 demonstrated probable and indeed strong success on the merits with ongoing irreparable injury,

5 along with a balance of hardships favoring him and consistency with the public interest[.]” ECF

6 40 at 8.

7 As to the first factor, Mr. Sanai reiterates the arguments advanced in his motion to alter or

8 amend judgment. ECF 40 at 9-14 (quoting ECF 37 at 14-21). The Court rejects those arguments

9 for the same reasons set forth above. As relevant in the context of a motion for injunction pending

10 appeal, they do not convince the Court that Mr. Sanai’s challenge to the state bar disciplinary

11 proceedings are likely to succeed on the merits. The Ninth Circuit has rejected similar challenges

12 and expressly held that state bar proceedings afford an attorney adequate opportunity to raise

13 federal constitutional claims. See Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 713; Rosenthal, 910 F.2d at 565. The Court

14 therefore concludes that the first factor does not weigh in favor of granting a injunction pending

15 appeal. The Court also concludes that there is no novel or unsettled issue that would warrant

16 granting such relief in the face of clear precedent. Compare Am. Beverage Ass’n, 2016 WL

17 9184999, at *2 (granting injunction pending appeal where Ninth Circuit had not squarely decided

18 issue in dispute).

19 As to the second factor, Mr. Sanai argues that he “is suffering irreparable injury each day

20 as he was not granted relief effective by June 30, 2023 which was the finality date for his

21 suspension order.” ECF 40 at 15. He asserts that “[t]he State Bar compounded the irreparable

22 harm accelerating the order’s practical effect by falsely stating in Sanai’s Bar profile that he was

23 already ineligible to practice law, months before the June 30, 2023 ordered date, and notifying the

24 Ninth Circuit within hours of the entry of the Supreme Court’s orders even before they took

25 effect.” Id. Mr. Sanai also asserts:

26

Constitutional injuries constitute irreparable harm. Monterey Mech.

27 Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 715 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that “‘an

alleged constitutional infringement will often alone constitute

2008), rev’d on other grounds, Nat’l Aero. & Space Admin. v.

1 Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 131 S.Ct. 746, 178 L.Ed.2d 667 (2011)

(stating that, “[u]nlike monetary injuries, constitutional violations

2 cannot be adequately remedied through damages and therefore

generally constitute irreparable harm”). The Defendants argue that

3 ““a party is not entitled to a preliminary injunction unless he or she

can demonstrate more than simply damages of a pecuniary nature.”

4 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 747 F.2d 511, 519

(9th Cir. 1984).” The “more” consists of monetary injuries that are

5 not “fully compensable in monetary terms.” Here the Defendants’

immunity from damages constitutes the “more”. Id. at 520; Hirsh v.

6 Justices of Supreme Court of California, 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir.

1995). While Sanai was unable to articulate the amount of losses

7 when he filed the motion, he now can articulate two lost matters

worth at least $55,000 in fees if relief is not granted. Sanai Decl.

8 hereto at ¶31.

9

ECF 40 at 15-16.

10 This Court cannot find irreparable harm to Mr. Sanai where binding authority clearly holds

11 that “[t]he State of California provides attorneys subject to discipline with more than

12 constitutionally sufficient procedural due process[.]” See Rosenthal, 910 F.2d at 565. Reliance on

13 $55,000 in alleged lost fees or some other unspecified “monetary injuries that are not ‘fully

14 compensable in monetary terms,” is also insufficient to demonstrate irreparable harm. See Idaho

15 v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 794 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[P]urely economic harms are

16 generally not irreparable, as money lost may be recovered later, in the ordinary course of

17 litigation.”). In any event, Mr. Sanai’s complaint contains no prayer for damages. See generally

18 ECF 1; see also ECF 32 at 23 (“The Complaint does not request damages.”). The Court therefore

19 concludes that the second factor does not weigh in favor of issuing an injunction pending appeal.

20 As to the third factor, Mr. Sanai claims that “Defendants suffer[] no hardship from attorney

21 discipline not being imposed on Sanai.” ECF 40 at 16. Even if the Court credited this statement,

22 it would be insufficient to shift the balance of equities in Mr. Sanai’s favor for the reasons

23 discussed in connection with the remaining factors. The third factor, then, does not weigh in favor

24 of granting an injunction pending appeal.

25 As to the fourth factor, Mr. Sanai asserts that “it is always in the public interest to prevent

26 the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” ECF 40 at 16 (citation and quotations omitted).

27 As set forth above, however, the state bar disciplinary process affords Mr. Sanai an opportunity to

] assert the challenges he raises here. Interfering with that process impedes, rather than furthers, the

2 || public interest. Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 712 (“California’s attorney disciplinary proceedings implicate

3 || important state interests.”); see also Middlesex Cty., 457 U.S. at 434 (“States traditionally have

4 || exercised extensive control over the professional conduct of attorney. ... The ultimate objective of

5 such control is the protection of the public, the purification of the bar and the prevention of a re-

6 || occurrence.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court concludes that

7 || Mr. Sanai has not shown that the public interest weighs in favor of granting an injunction pending

8 appeal.

9 Because Mr. Sanai has not made the requisite showing in connection with the applicable

10 || factors, he is not entitled to an injunction pending appeal. See Sanai v. Cardona, No. 22-CV-

11 01818-JST, 2023 WL 3899008, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2023) (““Sanai has failed to make a

12 || sufficient showing to justify the entry of a temporary restraining order or to demonstrate a basis

13 for an order to show cause regarding the issuance of an injunction pending appeal. Sanai’s motion

14 || is therefore denied.”’).

15 |} IV. CONCLUSION

a 16 For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants in part the motion to alter or amend

2 17 || judgment and denies the motion for injunction pending appeal.

18 IT IS SO ORDERED.

19 || Dated: August 24, 2023

20

21 Wed / 7

22 coh

ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN

23 United States District Judge

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