noting that once the moving party meets 8 its initial burden, the nonmoving party must “designate specific facts showing that there is a 9 genuine issue for trial” (internal quotation and citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- noting that once the moving party meets 8 its initial burden, the nonmoving party must “designate specific facts showing that there is a 9 genuine issue for trial” (internal quotation and citation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
Case No. 20-cv-04389-EMC
7 SONYA MARTIN, et al.,
8 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND THE
9 v. COURT’S JUDGMENT
10 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE Docket Nos. 117, 118
BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL
11 DISTRICT, et al.,
12 Defendants.
13
14
15 I. INTRODUCTION
16 Plaintiffs Sheila Quintana and Sonya Martin sued the Board of Education of the Berkeley
17 Unified School District (the “Board”) and its employees Donald Evans, Pasquale Scuderi, Delia
18 Ruiz, and Maggie Riddle (collectively, “Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for race
19 discrimination. On March 30, 2023, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary
20 judgment, holding that Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred. Plaintiffs now bring a motion to alter
21 or amend the Court’s judgment (erroneously stylized by Plaintiffs as a “motion for new trial”)
22 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Having considered the parties’ briefs and
23 accompanying submissions, as well as the oral argument of counsel, the Court hereby DENIES
24 the motion to alter or amend the Court’s judgment.
25 ///
26 ///
27 ///
1 II. LEGAL STANDARD
2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 59(e) allows a party to file “[a] motion to alter or
3 amend a judgment[, which] must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.”1
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Rule 59(e) is “an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests
5 of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th
6 Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that
7 there are four basic grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted. They are:
8 (1) if such motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or
fact upon which the judgment rests; (2) if such motion is necessary
9 to present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3)
if such motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) if the
10 amendment is justified by an intervening change in controlling law.
11 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011).
12 III. DISCUSSION
13 Plaintiffs present four arguments to support their Rule 59(e) motion: (1) the Court’s order
14 was inequitable and violative of Due Process because Plaintiffs were not able to complete fact
15 discovery, (2) the Court committed prejudicial error by not properly considering the decision of
16 the Commission for Teacher Credentialing (the “Commission”) not to prosecute Plaintiff Martin
17 for job abandonment, (3) the Court should have considered additional evidence of a racially
18 hostile work environment, and (4) the Court erred in finding that any discrimination against
19 Plaintiff Quintana ended, at latest, on April 22, 2016. (See Docket Nos. 118 (“Mot.”), 121-2
20 (“Am. Mot.”) at 9-12.) None of these arguments has merit.
21 Plaintiffs first argue that the Court allowed them only limited discovery and that this
22 “procedural flaw violated Due Process,” was “inequitable,” and was “prejudicial.” (Am. Mot. at
23 9-10.) It is true that the Court initially allowed the parties to conduct only limited discovery for
24 use in facilitating settlement. (See Docket Nos. 33 (minute order on “focused discovery”), 37
25 (clerk’s notice reiterating the minute order).) However, contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, the Court
26
1 After filing their Rule 59(e) motion, Plaintiffs filed a corrected motion, which was untimely
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since it occurred thirty-two days after the Court entered judgment for Defendants. See Docket
1 opened up fact discovery in a March 29, 2022, scheduling order, well before Defendants filed their
2 November 23, 2022, motion for summary judgment. (See Docket Nos. 59 at 2 (scheduling order
3 noting that “Parties may proceed with depositions and written discovery in conformance with the
4 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”), 84 (motion for summary judgment).) Additionally, if
5 Plaintiffs believed that a lack of discovery prevented them from effectively presenting their
6 opposition, they should have provided the Court, in response to Defendants’ summary judgment
7 motion, with an affidavit or declaration specifying what facts they had been unable to discover.
8 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (“If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified
9 reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer
10 considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take
11 discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.”). Plaintiffs provided no such declarations or
12 affidavits. Thus, this case’s discovery procedure was not inequitable and is not a ground to alter
13 or amend the Court’s entry of judgment for Defendants.
14 Plaintiffs next argue that the Court erred when discussing the Board’s report to the
15 Commission regarding Plaintiff Martin’s alleged job abandonment. (Am. Mot. at 9-10.) Plaintiffs
16 aver that (1) the Court mistakenly represented that Martin lost her action before the Commission
17 when in fact “the Attorney General’s office denied [sic] to prosecute this action on behalf of the
18 [Commission],” and (2) that the Board reported Martin to the Commission within the limitations
19 period. (Id.) However, the Court never discussed the Commission’s ultimate decision because it
20 was (and is) irrelevant to whether Martin’s claims are time-barred. The Board did report Martin to
21 the Commission in September 2016, within the limitations period; however, by Plaintiffs’ own
22 admission, this was well after Martin’s employment with Defendants had ended. (See Docket No.
23 98 (“Summ. J. Opp.”) at 6 (“Martin took a vice principal position at a different school district after
24 June 30, 2016, the end date of her position as Principal of Jefferson.”); FAC ¶ 30 (noting that
25 “Martin’s employment contract for the Principal position at Jefferson Elementary School . . .
26 ended on June 30, 2016”); Docket No. 84-6 Ex. BB (letter to the Commission).) The Court
27 previously noted that acts occurring after an employment relationship terminates cannot contribute
1 in contract, those claims cannot be based on conduct that occurred after a contractual relationship
2 has terminated. See Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006) (“Section 1981
3 offers relief when racial discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual relationship, as well as
4 when racial discrimination impairs an existing contractual relationship, so long as the plaintiff has
5 or would have rights under the existing or proposed contractual relationship.” (emphasis added)).
6 Plaintiffs thus do not show that the Court made an error in fact or law regarding the report to the
7 Commission, nor do they show that altering the judgment is necessary to prevent manifest
8 injustice. This issue, too, is not a ground to alter or amend the Court’s entry of judgment.
9 Plaintiffs further maintain that they “can readily establish, on available evidence, that theirs
10 was a racially hostile work environment.” (Am. Mot. at 11.) Plaintiffs proceed to list “evidence
11 that can be presented at a jury trial that has been discussed in their Motion in Opposition to
12 summary judgment.” (Id. at 11-12.) However, Plaintiffs’ evidence is irrelevant to the statute of
13 limitations question. The Court never decided whether a hostile work environment existed; rather,
14 the Court found Plaintiffs’ claims time-barred because they did not allege any acts of
15 discrimination within the limitations period. (See Docket No. 113 at 10.) Plaintiffs’ argument that
16 the Court improperly rejected evidence of hostile work environment because “Federal Civil Jury
17 Instruction 10.5 allows the evidence of racial hostility against others of Plaintiffs’ same race as
18 probative of the hostile environment” is similarly irrelevant. (Am. Mot. at 5.) So are the cases
19 upon which Plaintiffs rely. (Id.) The sole issue here is the timeliness, not the merits, of Plaintiffs’
20 hostile work environment claim. Plaintiffs have shown no error, newly uncovered evidence, or
21 manifest injustice regarding the hostile work environment claim.
22 Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the Court made a “manifest error of law” by holding that
23 Plaintiff Quintana did not allege discrimination after April 22, 2022, when she submitted her letter
24 of resignation. (Docket Nos. 125 (“Reply”) at 2-3, 121-1 (Quintana declaration stating that
25 individuals who submit letters of resignation to the Berkley Unified School District “rescind their
26 resignation from said district” in a “practice [that] is quite commonplace”).) This argument fails
27 for three reasons. First, in their opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
1 instead of staying in such a hostile environment infested with racism against her and all persons of
2 her race.” (Summ. J. Opp. at 9.) Hence, Plaintiffs stated that the discrimination against Quintana
3 ended when she was forced to resign, not when her resignation became effective. Second, even if
4 Plaintiffs had alleged that Quintana faced discrimination until her resignation became effective,
5 they alleged no specific discrimination Quintana faced on that day. Thus, any assertion that
6 Quintana faced discrimination on June 30, 3016, would be conclusory and insufficient. See
7 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986) (noting that once the moving party meets
8 its initial burden, the nonmoving party must “designate specific facts showing that there is a
9 genuine issue for trial” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). Third, Plaintiffs had ample
10 opportunity to provide a fulsome account of Quintana’s last day of employment during summary
11 judgment, and they furnish no reason why they did not do so. In any event, for the reasons stated
12 above, even if Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged she suffered discrimination on the day she was
13 terminated, her § 1981 claim would still be untimely. This issue provides no grounds for altering
14 or amending the Court’s entry of judgment for Defendants.
15 None of Plaintiffs’ arguments raise any manifest error of fact or law upon which the
16 Court’s previous order rested, point to any new evidence, any change in controlling law, or show
17 that granting this motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Therefore, the Court denies
18 Plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend the Court’s judgment.2
19 IV. CONCLUSION
20 The Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend the judgment.
21 This order disposes of Docket Nos. 117 and 118.
22 IT IS SO ORDERED.
23 Dated: June 27, 2023
24 ______________________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
25 United States District Judge
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2 Defendants have also submitted a bill of costs, which Plaintiffs oppose on the grounds that their
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motion for new trial renders the bill of costs premature. (Docket Nos. 117, 119.) Because