The Successor Agency to The Former Emeryville Redevelopment Agency and The City of Emeryville v. Swagelok Company

1

2

3

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6

7 THE SUCCESSOR AGENCY TO THE Case No. 3:17-cv-00308-WHO

FORMER EMERYVILLE

8 REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY AND THE

CITY OF EMERYVILLE, ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY

9 JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

10 Re: Dkt. No. 234

v.

11

SWAGELOK COMPANY, et al.,

12

Defendants.

13

14 Defendant Hanson Building Materials Limited (“HBML”) moves for summary judgment

15 on claims brought by the plaintiffs, the Successor Agency to the Former Emeryville

16 Redevelopment Agency and the City of Emeryville (collectively, “Emeryville”), concerning

17 liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

18 (“CERCLA”). Because there are disputed facts concerning Emeryville’s theory of alter ego

19 liability and its theory of successor liability, and for the following reasons, summary judgment is

20 GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

21 BACKGROUND

22 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

23 This case arises from a property in Emeryville, California, where the Marchant Calculating

24 Machine Company (“Marchant”) operated a calculator manufacturing business from 1917 until

25 about 1958. Declaration of Robert Doty (“Doty Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 214-2] ¶¶ 8, 14. That site,

26 known as the “former Marchant Whitney” (“FMW”) site, is now polluted with many chemicals,

27 the most prevalent of which is trichloroethylene (“TCE”). Id. ¶¶ 8, 14, 21, 23. The evidence is

1 In 1958, Marchant merged with the Smith-Corona Corporation to become “SCM.” See

2 Motion for Summary Judgment (“Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 242] 4:9-11 (citing Second Amended

3 Complaint (“SAC”) [Dkt. No. 47] ¶¶ 3, 22). In 1959, SCM sold the FMW site. Id. at 4:11 (citing

4 SAC ¶ 3). That trail of ownership leads to other defendants in this case, all of which have settled

5 with the plaintiffs. See id.; [Dkt. No. 228].

6 In 1950, Hanson Trust (also known as Hanson Plc and later known as “HBML,”

7 Declaration of Wendy Rogers (“Rogers Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 234] ¶ 2), was founded in the United

8 Kingdom in 1950. Declaration of Ali Hamidi (“Hamidi Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 237-2] Ex. 1 (Tender

9 Offer 1) at 30. In 1973, HBML formed Hanson Industries as a United States based subsidiary.

10 Hamidi Decl. Ex. 4 (Hellings Depo.) at 13:9-13. In 1975, Hanson Holdings Netherlands (“Hanson

11 Netherlands”) was formed, with 70 percent of its stock directly owned by HBML and the

12 remaining 30 percent indirectly owned by HBML. Hamidi Decl. Ex. 1 at 31, 36; Hamidi Decl.

13 Ex. 15 (Tender Offer 2) at 11-12. On August 25, 1985, HSCM Industries (“HSCM”) was formed

14 as a Delaware-based wholly owned subsidiary of HM Anglo-American Ltd., which was a

15 Delaware-based wholly owned subsidiary of HBML. Hamidi Decl. Ex. 1 at 31, 36; Hamidi Decl.

16 Ex. 15 at 11-12.

17 On August 26, 1985, the day after HSCM’s formation and following months of quietly

18 buying up stock, HBML, HSCM, and Hanson Netherlands publicly filed their first tender offer to

19 purchase SCM. Hamidi Decl. Ex. 1. The tender offer explained that HSCM had been formed to

20 purchase and hold SCM stocks, that HBML funded Hanson Netherlands directly and HSCM

21 indirectly to buy SCM stocks, and that the goal of the tender offer was for HBML to acquire and

22 influence SCM. Id. at 18-19, 30-31. The offer also explained that, among other requirements, the

23 HBML board had to sign off on the final acquisition. Id. at 18-19.

24 SCM resisted the acquisition, including by seeking help from Merrill Lynch. Hamidi Decl.

25 Ex. 16 at 18-31. HBML (not HSCM or Hanson Netherlands) sued and was granted an injunction

26 to stop SCM and Merrill Lynch from interfering with the acquisition. See id.; Hamidi Decl. Exs.

27 7, 8. HBML, HSCM, and Hanson Netherlands continued quietly buying up SCM stock and by

1 On October 11, 1985, HBML, HSCM, and Hanson Netherlands publicly filed their second

2 tender offer, with much of the same information as the first. See generally Hamidi Decl. Ex. 16.

3 In both, HBML indicated specific plans to sell SCM’s typewriter business. Hamidi Ex. 1 at 21;

4 Hamidi Ex. 16 at 10, 32.

5 On January 8, 1986, SCM agreed to a “merger” with “Hanson,” which referred to HBML.

6 Hamidi Decl. Ex. 20. The parties dispute whether HBML and SCM ultimately merged.

7 SCM’s businesses were subsequently distributed to twenty “fan companies,” though the

8 parties contest who and/or which entity designed and controlled this plan. Hamidi Decl. Ex. 12;

9 Hamidi Decl. Ex. 33; Declaration of Jason Haycock (“Haycock Decl.”) [Dkt. No. 234-1] Ex. 3

10 (Declaration of George Hempstead (“Hempstead Decl.”)). Many of the fan companies then sold

11 or liquidated the assets. Id. ¶ 7. The twentieth company, HSCM-20, received most of the rest of

12 the businesses (at the time referred to as the “rump”), including many of SCM’s former

13 environmental liabilities. Hamidi Ex. 41 (“Raos Depo.”) at 161:7-19; see also Hempstead Decl.

14 Ex. B. HSCM-20 was merged back into SCM. Hempstead Decl. ¶ 13 & Ex. B (noting HSCM-20

15 owned all of SCM’s stocks, merged with the remaining SCM corporation, and assumed all of its

16 liabilities). Its name was changed back to SCM. Id. Ex. C.

17 In 1988, SCM merged with HM Holdings, which had been formed in 1980 as an American

18 based subsidiary of HM Anglo American, which was an indirect subsidiary of HBML. See id.

19 ¶ 15 & Ex. D; Haycock Decl. Ex. 8 at MCT 1887. The new company was called HM Holdings.

20 Hempstead Decl. ¶ 15.

21 It is undisputed that HM Holdings “succeeded to” SCM’s Marchant liabilities; that HM

22 Holdings was spun-off in 1996 to become Millennium Holdings; that Millennium was acquired by

23 LyondellBasell which operated until 2009, when it entered bankruptcy; and that Emeryville cannot

24 now collect a judgment against Millennium for any violations of CERCLA.

25 It is also undisputed that HBML did not know about the FMW site or the specific

26 Marchant liabilities at the time that SCM was acquired. It is undisputed that no one knew about

27 the TCE contamination until the City of Emeryville began its testing process in the 1990s.

1 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

2 Plaintiff Emeryville initiated this lawsuit in 2017, asserting ten causes of action against

3 HBML and several other defendants. The operative complaint is Emeryville’s second amended

4 complaint. See SAC.

5 I denied HBML’s motion to dismiss, finding that I have personal jurisdiction over HBML

6 in part because Emeryville made a prima facie showing that its CERCLA claim arises out of

7 HBML’s successor liability. [Dkt. No. 143]. Subsequently, I granted settling defendants’ motion

8 for determination of good faith settlement and contribution protection. [Dkt. No. 228].

9 HBML filed a motion for summary judgment, [Dkt. No. 234], and a notice of errata with

10 redline changes, (“Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 242]. Emeryville filed an opposition, [Dkt. No. 238], and a

11 correction, (“Oppo.”) [Dkt. No. 239]. HBML replied. (“Repl.”) [Dkt. No. 240]. I held a hearing

12 at which counsel for both parties appeared.

13 LEGAL STANDARD

14 Summary judgment on a claim or defense is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is

15 no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

16 law.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a). In order to prevail, a party moving for summary judgment must

17 show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to an essential element of the

18 non-moving party’s claim, or to a defense on which the non-moving party will bear the burden of

19 persuasion at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has

20 made this showing, the burden then shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to identify

21 “specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. The party opposing summary

22 judgment must then present affirmative evidence from which a jury could return a verdict in that

23 party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).

24 On summary judgment, the court draws all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the

25 non-movant. Id. at 255. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, “[c]redibility

26 determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the

27 facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Id. However, conclusory and speculative testimony

1 Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).

2 DISCUSSION

3 I. ALTER EGO THEORY OF LIABILITY

4 A “general principle of corporate law” is that “a parent corporation . . . is not liable for the

5 acts of its subsidiaries.” United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998). But “the corporate

6 veil may be pierced and the shareholder held liable for the corporation’s conduct” in certain

7 situations, including under the alter ego doctrine. Id. “[W]hen (but only when) the corporate veil

8 may be pierced, may a parent corporation be charged with derivative CERCLA liability for its

9 subsidiary’s actions.” Id. at 63-64 (footnotes omitted).

10 With respect to the alter ego theory of liability, the parties contest which jurisdiction’s

11 “choice of choice-of-law” rules apply, which jurisdiction’s substantive law applies, and whether

12 there are genuine disputes of material fact given the relevant substantive law.

13 A. Choice of Law

14 1. Choice of Choice-of-Law Analysis

15 Emeryville says California choice-of-law principles govern. HBML asserts that federal

16 substantive law should apply.

17 It is not entirely clear which choice-of-law rule applies. In 1998, the Supreme Court noted

18 that there was “significant disagreement among courts” about whether to borrow state law or apply

19 federal common law to pierce the corporate veil in cases asserting indirect CERCLA liability.

20 Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 56 n.1. The Ninth Circuit has said that “in federal question (such as this

21 one) and other cases in which our jurisdiction is not grounded in diversity, our decisions have been

22 inconsistent—sometimes we have applied the federal common law to the ‘choice of choice-of-law

23 principles,’ and in other cases we have applied forum state rules.” Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances

24 Control v. Jim Dobbas, Inc., 54 F.4th 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2022) (first quoting Cassirer v.

25 Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S. Ct. 1502, 1507 (2022); and then

26 citing Berman v. Freedom Fin. Network, LLC, 30 F.4th 849, 862 (9th Cir. 2022) (Baker, J.,

27 concurring) (collecting cases)). But relying on recent Supreme Court precedent, the Ninth Circuit

1 choice-of-law rules if “necessary to protect uniquely federal interests.” Id. (quoting Cassirer, 142

2 S. Ct. at 1509).

3 In Jim Dobbas, the Ninth Circuit applied California choice-of-law-principles where the

4 question was how to define “interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of

5 the action.” Id. at 1086. There, the parties agreed that if any legal protection existed, the source

6 was state law. Id. at 1089. The Ninth Circuit explained, “Where, as here, state law supplies the

7 ‘the substantive rule of decision,’ there is no federal interest in ‘supplant[ing] the otherwise

8 applicable choice-of-law rule.’” Id. In the present case, the legal right comes from federal law—

9 CERCLA—but the “substantive rule of decision” seems to be the law of corporations, because the

10 analysis chooses which jurisdiction’s law of corporations applies. Accordingly, it seems

11 California choice-of-law applies.

12 HBML cites many cases to explain that federal common law should apply to govern

13 corporate veil-piercing because of the federal interest in uniformity of the application of

14 CERCLA. Mot. 11:24-12:6. Each of these cases either came before or relied directly on

15 Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 63 n.9, which specifically declined to address that argument, and none

16 grapple with the standard announced in Jim Dobbas.1 At any rate, whether I apply California

17 choice-of-law or federal choice-of-law, the result is the same: the substantive law that should be

18 used here is California law.

19

20

1 In the context of successor liability, the Ninth Circuit also noted:

21 CERCLA “provides a mechanism for cleaning up hazardous-waste sites . . . and

imposes the costs of the cleanup on those responsible for the contamination.”

22 There is no evidence that the application of state corporation law will frustrate this

objective. No state provides a haven for liable companies. Nor is there reason to

23 think that states will alter their existing successor liability rules in a “race to the

bottom” to attract corporate business. States have their own interest in ensuring

24 that successor corporations do not evade liability—successor liability rules were,

after all, developed to address much more than environmental liability. It is

25 unrealistic to think that a state would alter general corporate law principles to

become a peculiarly hospitable haven for polluters.

26 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 1997)

(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Here too I find that there is no evidence that application of

27 substantive California law of corporations will frustrate CERCLA’s objective of cleaning up

1 2. California Choice-of-Law Analysis

2 Emeryville asserts that California substantive law applies because the contaminated site is

3 in California. HBML argues that federal substantive law applies because of the general federal

4 interest in uniform application of CERCLA, or that Delaware or United Kingdom substantive law

5 should apply as the law of the places of incorporation.

6 The California choice-of-law standard “analyze[s] the governmental interests of the

7 various jurisdictions involved to select the most appropriate law.” Jim Dobbas, 54 F.4th at 1089-

8 90 (quoting Wash. Mut. Bank, FA v. Super. Ct., 24 Cal. 4th 906, 15 P.3d 1071, 1077 (2001)). This

9 “governmental interest test” involves a three-step inquiry: (1) the court determines whether each

10 jurisdiction’s relevant law “is the same or different”; (2) if the laws are different, “the court

11 examines each jurisdiction’s interest in the application of its own law under the circumstances of

12 the particular case to determine whether a true conflict exists”; (3) if there is a true conflict, the

13 court evaluates “the nature of strength” of each jurisdiction’s interest in applying its own law “to

14 determine which state’s interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the

15 policy of the other state,” applying “the law of the state whose interest would be the more

16 impaired if its law were not applied.” Chen v. Los Angeles Truck Centers, LLC, 7 Cal. 5th 862,

17 867-68, 444 P.3d 727, 730-31 (2019) (quoting Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. (2006) 39

18 Cal. 4th 95, 107-108, 137 P.3d 914 (applying the court’s “seminal” decision from Reich v. Purcell,

19 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727 (1967))).

20 With respect to the first step of the inquiry, I find California law is the same as Delaware

21 law, nearly (if not) the same as federal law, and different from United Kingdom law. California

22 alter ego doctrine considers two elements: unity of interest and whether “adherence to the fiction

23 of the separate existence of the corporation would . . . sanction a fraud or promote injustice.”2 In

24 re Schwarzkopf, 626 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wood v. Elling Corp., 20 Cal.3d

25 353, 572 P.2d 755, 761 n. 9 (1977)). The elements of Delaware alter ego doctrine are

26

27

2 HBML focuses exclusively on the second element of the test in its motion; it does not move for

1 substantially the same and so application of Delaware law would yield the same analysis. See

2 Blair v. Infineon Techs. AG, 720 F. Supp. 2d 462, 470-71 (D. Del. 2010) (considering (1) whether

3 the corporations functioned as a single entity and (2) whether there was fraudulent intent, which

4 the court explained could encompass “an overall element of fraud, injustice, or unfairness”

5 (citation omitted)). Under federal law, the first element—unity of interest—is the same, though

6 for the second element it is not clear whether the Ninth Circuit requires fraud to pierce the

7 corporate veil, or if injustice is sufficient.3 The law of the United Kingdom differs from California

8 law. See Rossendale Borough Council v. Hurstwood Props. (A) Ltd. [2021] UKSC 16 ¶¶ 63-76

9 (describing the court’s doubts about piercing the corporate veil under the “evasion principle,”

10 where an entity appeared to take action to evade particular legal obligations); Prest v. Petrodel

11 Res. Ltd. [2013] UKSC 34, [2013] 2 AC 415 (explaining the limits of the “evasion principle”);

12

3 Compare Pac. Gulf Shipping Co. v. Vigorous Shipping & Trading S.A., 992 F.3d 893, 898 (9th

13

Cir. 2021) (establishing, in the context of maritime law, requisite fraudulent intent as necessary

element, and relying on other maritime cases) with Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1015,

14

1021 (9th Cir. 2017) (listing “failure to disregard their separate identifies would result in fraud or

injustice” as the second element, in the context of piercing the corporate veil for jurisdiction

15

(emphasis added)); Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015) (same); Am. Tel. &

Tel. Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.), supplemented, 95 F.3d

16

1156 (9th Cir. 1996) (same, in the context of jurisdiction for CERCLA suit). The Ninth Circuit

has not spoken as to which rule applies in this context.

17

The parties cite other cases that aren’t directly applicable. HBML first cites Operating

Engineers Pension Trust v. Reed, 726 F.2d 513, 515 (9th Cir. 1984), but that explained the

18

standard for when the “owner of a corporation will be held personally liable for trust fund

contributions” which is not directly on point here. See Repl. 13:16-17. It also cites Seymour v.

19

Hull & Moreland Engineering, 605 F.2d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 1979). While that opinion included

“fraudulent intent of the incorporators” as one of the “three general factors” relevant for

20

disregarding the corporate entity, it also said one of the “primary elements” to consider was

whether “failure to disregard the corporation would result in fraud or injustice.” Id. (emphasis

21

added) (citations omitted). Consequently, it is unclear whether the opinion holds that fraud alone

is an element or whether that element can be met through a showing of injustice. For that reason,

22

this case from 1979 does not definitively provide an applicable rule here. And it points to

Bestfoods as support, but that case merely affirmed that fraud is a notable justification for piercing

23

the corporate veil; it did not purport to hold that injustice was not a reason to do so. 524 U.S. at

52.

24

Meanwhile, Emeryville cites for support UA Local 343 United Association of Journeymen

v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994). Though that case explicitly

25

reasoned that only fraud or injustice is necessary to pierce the corporate veil (notably, citing

Seymour as support), it also held that “[t]he later ego doctrine as developed in labor law is

26

analytically differ from the traditional veil-piercing doctrine as developed in corporate law,” id.,

and so I find its reasoning inapplicable. It also cites Nordell International Res. Limited v. Triton

27

Oil, 97 F.3d 1460 (9th Cir. 1996), which is unpublished and cites to UA Local 343 for the

1 Mot. Ex. 3 (Decl. of Michael Todd KC).4

2 The second step of the inquiry addresses whether there is a “true conflict” between the

3 laws of the different jurisdictions, see Chen, 7 Cal. 5th at 867-68, asking whether each jurisdiction

4 “has a legitimate interest in the application of its rule of decision,” Abogados v. AT&T, Inc., 223

5 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Here, each jurisdiction has a legitimate interest.

6 The injurious contamination occurred in California and affected California residents, businesses,

7 and governments, and so the state has a strong interest in application of its laws as the location of

8 the injury and impending clean up efforts. HBML asserts that there is also a general federal

9 interest in ensuring uniform application of federal laws like CERCLA. Finally, HBML is

10 incorporated in Delaware and the UK, and so each has a substantial interest in determining

11 whether to pierce the corporate veil of their corporations. See Sunnyside Dev. Co., LLC v. Opsys

12 Ltd., No. C 05-0553 MHP, 2005 WL 1876106, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2005) (“Sunnyside I”)

13 (citing Schlumberger Logelco Inc. v. Morgan Equip. Co., No. C-94-1776 MHP, 1996 WL 251951,

14 at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 1996)). Because there are true conflicts, I continue to the next step of the

15 choice-of-law inquiry.

16 At the third step, I find that California’s interest in application of its own law is stronger

17 and would be more impaired than the interests of other jurisdictions if its law were not applied.

18 See Chen, 7 Cal. 5th at 867-68. California’s interest is clear and compelling: the contaminated

19 FMW site is in California and cleaning up that contamination is a guiding purpose of this

20 litigation, as is Emeryville’s goal to ensure that the costs are not borne by taxpayers, to the extent

21 permissible legally. HBML’s argument that federal law should apply because of the general

22 federal interest in uniform application of CERCLA was specifically not endorsed or rejected by

23 the Supreme Court and so is at most persuasive here. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 63 n.9. And, as

24 noted, the specific question of alter ego liability concerns state corporate law, which diminishes

25

26

4 Emeryville moves to strike the Todd Declaration for failure to apply the law to the facts of the

case. See Oppo. At 15 n.11. Because it is not clear that is an appropriate basis for moving to

27

strike this declaration in these circumstances, and because I do not rely on the substance of the

1 the strength of the federal interest. Further, while each location of incorporation holds important

2 corporate interests, I find, as other courts have found in the environmental context, that the state

3 where the injury occurred has the strongest interest in the litigation.

4 HBML cites for support Schlumberger, 1996 WL 251951, at *3, a case in which the court

5 applied Austrian law to the plaintiffs’ alter ego claims as the law of the place of incorporation.

6 There, neither party contended that the law of the forum state (California) should apply to the alter

7 ego theory of liability, but instead argued whether the law of the place of incorporation (Austria)

8 or the law provided for in the contract’s choice-of-law provision (England) applied. Id. at *1-3.

9 Because the court found “no relationship” between England and the allegedly fraudulent conduct

10 at issue, it noted Austria’s “substantial interest in determining whether the pierce the corporate veil

11 of one of its corporations” was controlling. Id. at *3. Here, of course, I am not assessing a

12 contractual choice-of-law provision, and I have already found that each jurisdiction has at least

13 some interest in and relationship to the issues. The reasoning in Schlumberger is inapplicable.

14 The other two cases that HBML cites rely directly on Schlumberger. See Mot. 12:17-28.

15 In Sunnyside I, 2005 WL 1876106, at *3, the court found that Austrian law should apply to the

16 issue of alter-ego theory where Austria was the state of incorporation. But that order specifically

17 noted that the parties did not brief the issue and so there was “no reason to depart” from its prior

18 analysis in Schlumberger. Id. at *3. And in Leitner v. Sadhana Temple of New York, Inc., No. CV

19 13-07902 MMM (EX), 2014 WL 12588643, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2014), the court relied on

20 Sunnyside I and Schlumberger to find that the law of the state of incorporation should apply, and

21 also noted that the parties did not brief the choice-of-law question and so did not provide the court

22 with competing jurisdictional interests. These cases are unpersuasive for the same reasons as

23 Schlumberger.

24 For those reasons, California choice-of-law dictates the application of California

25 substantive law of alter-ego in this case.

26 3. Federal Choice-of-Law Analysis

27 Even if federal choice-of-law applied, it would lead to the same result. “Federal common

1 Bornemisza Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2017), reversed and remanded on

2 other grounds by Cassirer, 142 S. Ct. 1502 (quoting Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de

3 C.V., 930 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1991)). Where there is no relevant state statutory directive on

4 choice-of-law, the Restatement looks to seven factors to determine the applicable rule of law; “a

5 court is supposed to apply [these] factors to decide which [jurisdiction] has the most significant

6 relationship to the case.” Cassirer, 862 F.3d at 962.5 The factors are:

7 (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of

the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative

8

interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the

9 protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular

field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the

10

determination and application of the law to be applied.

11

Rest. (2d) of Conflicts of Laws § 6(2)(1)-(g). The Restatement also provides:

12

(1) Issues involving the rights and liabilities of a corporation . . . are determined by

13 the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most

significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated

14

in § 6.

15 (2) The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine such

issues, except in the unusual case where, with respect to the particular issue, some

16

other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, in

17 which event the local law of the other state will be applied.

18 Id. § 302 (emphasis added). As applied to corporate law, the most important § 6

19 factors are:

20 the needs of the interstate and international systems, certainty, predictability and

uniformity of result, protection of the justified expectations of the parties,

21 implementation of the relevant policies of the state with the dominant interest in the

22 decision of the particular issue, and ease in the application of the law to be applied.

Id. § 302 cmt. (c).

23

Here, the needs of the interstate and international systems and the implementation of the

24

policies of the jurisdiction with the dominant interest favor application of California law. As

25

26

27

5 HBML agrees federal common law follows the Restatement (Second) and then asserts that

1 explained, each jurisdiction has a compelling interest in application of its own rules: the federal

2 interest in uniformity of applying federal law, California’s interest in protecting its environment

3 and remedying an injury that occurred its jurisdiction, and Delaware’s and the UK’s interests in

4 applying their laws to their corporations. But in this case, California has the dominant interest as

5 this state is where the injury occurred, the ongoing harm is felt, and any remedies will be

6 implemented. These factors favor California law.

7 To be sure, there is a compelling federal interest in certainty, predictability, and uniformity

8 in CERCLA cases, which favors application of federal law. But the Supreme Court has

9 specifically not held that this interest outweighs the application of state law in this area. See

10 Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 63 n.9. Accordingly, whether this outweighs state or international interests

11 is unclear, and so this factor is neutral.

12 In addition, Emeryville is justified in expecting the application of California law to an

13 injury that occurred in California, that was caused by (at the time) a corporation subject to

14 California laws, and that will be ameliorated in California by the actions of the local governments.

15 HBML is justified in expecting application of Delaware or UK law given its places of

16 incorporation. But neither party seems to have a justified expectation in the application of federal

17 common law for the question of piercing the corporate veil in this context.

18 Finally, the ease of application of the law to be applied is neutral when comparing state

19 and federal law because California and federal laws for alter ego doctrine are very similar, save

20 the possibility that federal law requires fraud.6 This factor favors application of California or

21 federal law over UK law.

22 In sum, though a closer question than the California conflict of laws analysis, these factors

23 show California has the most “significant relationship” to the injuries and facts of this case. Rest.

24 (2d) of Conflict of Laws § 302. California substantive law applies.

25 B. Substantive Law

26 To repeat, California alter ego doctrine considers two elements: unity of interest and

27

1 whether “adherence to the fiction of the separate existence of the corporation would . . . sanction a

2 fraud or promote injustice.” In re Schwarzkopf, 626 F.3d at 1038. “[B]oth of these requirements

3 must be found to exist before the corporate existence will be disregarded.” Associated Vendors,

4 Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 837 (1962). Determining whether these elements

5 are met is “not a question of law,” id., and so a genuine dispute concerning either element

6 precludes granting summary judgment.7

7 “California courts emphasize that the alter ego determination is very fact specific.”

8 Daewoo Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Opta Corp., 875 F.3d 1241, 1250 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

9 “Finding an ‘inequitable result’ under the second element of alter ego liability ‘generally

10 require[s] some evidence of bad faith conduct on the part of defendants.’” Id. (citation omitted).

11 But California law does not require bad faith or intentional fraud to meet the second element of

12 the alter ego doctrine and pierce the corporate veil. City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Purdue

13 Pharma L.P., 491 F. Supp. 3d 610, 635 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (first citing RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con,

14 Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1985); and then citing Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. 88 Connection Corp.,

15 15-cv-04554-LB, 2016 WL 3257656, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2016)); see also Associated

16 Vendors, 210 Cal. App. 2d at 838 (noting the alter ego theory “does not depend on the presence of

17 actual fraud” but that “bad faith in one form or another is an underlying consideration” (citations

18 omitted)). Rather, “[s]o long as there is a unity of interest and ownership, courts will ignore the

19 corporate form and attribute wrongful or inequitable conduct to the organization controlling the

20 corporation.” Purdue Pharma, 491 F. Supp. 3d at 635 (citing Pac. Bell, 2016 WL 3257656, at

21 *3). Wrongful or inequitable conduct includes “when the corporate form is used to perpetuate a

22 fraud, circumvent a statute, or accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable purpose.” Pac.

23 Bell, 2016 WL 3257656, at *3 (quoting Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Ct., 83 Cal. App. 4th

24

25

7 HBML says that the first element concerning unity of interest “is not at issue” in this motion,

Repl. at 2 n.2, and Emeryville contends that HBML’s failure to contest this element precludes

26

summary judgment, see Oppo. 16:3-14. But because both elements are necessary to pierce the

corporate veil, Associated Vendors, 210 Cal. App. 2d at 837, even assuming this first element

27

favors Emeryville, summary judgment would be proper if Emeryville cannot show a genuine

1 523, 538 (2000)). At least one court in this circuit denied summary judgment and found an

2 inequitable result where failing to pierce the corporate veil would allow the defendant company

3 “to escape liability for potential violations of CERCLA.” L.A. Terminals, Inc. v. City of Los

4 Angeles, No. CV-186754-MWF-RAOX, 2020 WL 8028241, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2020).

5 The question on this motion is whether there is a genuine dispute of fact regarding

6 HBML’s use of the corporate form to, as relevant here, circumvent a statute or accomplish another

7 wrongful or inequitable purpose. See id. Emeryville asserts that there are disputed facts

8 concerning this question. Oppo. 16:22-20:4. In particular, Emeryville’s theory seems to be that

9 HBML knew of and intentionally avoided its SCM and FMW responsibilities—thus

10 circumventing CERCLA and/or accomplishing another inequitable purpose—by acquiring SCM

11 and profiting from acquisition of its assets, while simultaneously using its corporate structures to

12 continue “kicking the can down the road” (as Emeryville’s counsel said at the hearing) on its

13 known or suspected environmental responsibilities. Emeryville argues that HBML knew it

14 acquired or was willfully blind to acquiring environmental liabilities, including Marchant

15 CERCLA liabilities, but instead of resolving the known issues or providing funds to address them,

16 passed those liabilities through various corporate structures to avoid addressing or funding them,

17 concluding by spinning them off in a non-arms-length transaction with a company that did not

18 benefit from the acquisition. As explained, Emeryville submitted sufficient (if disputed) evidence

19 for each of these to survive summary judgment.

20 First, there is evidence that HBML knew of the potential for acquiring environmental

21 superfund liabilities in its takeover of SCM but failed to investigate further. In August 1985,

22 HBML discussed or planned to discuss with its attorneys the topic of “Environmental

23 investigation—superfund claims and pending lawsuits”8 as relating to the impending hostile

24 takeover of SCM. Hamidi Decl. Ex. 52 ¶ 12. HBML also knew that hostile takeovers risked

25 resulting in unknown environmental liabilities due to their secretive and accelerated processes.

26 Hamidi Decl. Ex. 41 (“Raos Depo.”) 126:15-2. The purchasing companies—at least one of which

27

1 was funded by and 70 percent owned directly by HBML, Hamidi Decl. Ex. 1 at 31, 36; Hamidi

2 Decl. Ex. 15 at 11-12; Hamidi Decl. Ex. 13 at HBML 25531—knew that the transaction involved

3 acquiring SCM’s liabilities. Hamidi Decl. Ex. 11 (Clarke Depo.) at 40:10-41:3. HBML also

4 knew of SCM’s connection to Marchant, and publicly available records existed at the time

5 showing that Marchant was a predecessor to SCM, that it manufactured calculators at the FMW

6 site, and that there was a substantial risk of that site being subject to a CERCLA suit, Bookspan

7 Decl. at 20-23. Emeryville’s expert points out that SCM filed a Form 10-K with the SEC in 1984

8 that specifically noted the possibility of superfund-related clean-up liabilities, id. at 20, and

9 notably, HBML’s tender offer states that the information included about SCM was based on

10 “publicly available documents” including the same Form 10-K from 1984. Hamidi Decl. Ex. 1 at

11 23, 25. Despite the plans, available information, and understanding of its importance and risk,

12 HBML did not investigate the FMW site further. Taken together, this suggests that HBML9 was

13 aware of, or at least willfully blind to, its potential SCM-related environmental liabilities.

14 Second, although HBML may not have known about the specific Marchant liability, there

15 is evidence that it was aware post-takeover that it acquired potentially costly environmental

16 liabilities from SCM. See Hamidi Decl. Ex. 11 (Clarke Depo.) 169:17-170:3 (showing that

17 Hanson Netherlands understood that all of SCM’s liabilities were included in the acquisition);

18 Hempstead Decl. ¶ 8 (Hanson Industries acknowledges that SCM’s assets came with its

19 liabilities). In 1993, HBML Finance Director Brian Hellings circulated a memo regarding his

20 concerns about the insurance market, specifically pointing out that with the acquisition of SCM

21 and other organizations, HBML10 “took over substantial liabilities to clean up toxic sites due to

22

9 As noted, HBML does not contest the unity of interest element in this motion. To clarify,

23

though, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that HBML was responsible for these actions, not

merely a subsidiary: for example, HBML’s board of directors approved and ratified the takeover

24

announcement, which was made on HBML’s behalf, Hamidi Decl. Ex. 3 at 1, and while the

minutes say the offer “would be made by wholly owned subsidiaries of” HBML, id., there is

25

evidence that the purchasing subsidiaries were funded and controlled entirely by HBML, Hamidi

Decl. Ex. 6 (noting HBML controlled the purchasing subsidiaries and that HBML directly or

26

indirectly provided the funding to at least one purchasing subsidiary); Hamidi Decl. Ex. 54. There

is also other evidence suggesting that HBML did not have a role in the tender offer. See Hamidi

27

Decl. Ex. 5 (“[Hanson Industries] really had no role in this tender offer.”).

1 contamination of ground at chemical sites.” Hamidi Decl. Ex. 56; see also Hamidi Decl. Ex. 24 at

2 135:3-22 (confirming Hellings drafted the internal memo). Separately, there is also an indemnity

3 agreement from July 1989 between SCM (which at the time was a “direct, wholly-owned

4 subsidiary of” HM Holdings) and HM Holdings (which at the time was “an indirect, wholly-

5 owned subsidiary of” HBML), created in anticipation of the initial public offering of SCM’s

6 typewriter business. Hamidi Decl. Ex. 54 at 1-2; see also Hamidi Decl. Ex. 53 (describing

7 HBML’s control over the IPO). Emeryville submitted apparently undisputed evidence that the

8 definition of “Hanson Environmental Liabilities” in that agreement included all liabilities related

9 to Marchant,11 see Hamidi Decl. Ex. 24 at 199:22-200:25; see also Hamidi Decl. Ex. 54 at 5-8;

10 and that at least HM Holdings knew of its liabilities related to Marchant, see also Hamidi Decl.

11 Ex. 11 (Clarke Depo.) at 40:10-41:3 (acknowledging that as of January 1986, HSCM Holdings

12 and Hanson Netherlands knew they would acquire all of SCM’s liabilities).

13 Third, there is evidence that suggests HBML understood that environmental liabilities

14 could not be transferred easily. See Hamidi Decl. Ex. 47 at 3 (showing HBML knew that the

15 environmental liabilities acquired via Kalamazoo could not be transferred or disposed of). Though

16 the evidence Emeryville provides shows that HBML knew that environmental liabilities related to

17 a separate site could not be transferred, a factfinder could infer that HBML understood the legal

18 restrictions surrounding transfer of environmental liabilities.

19 Fourth, evidence shows HBML chose the corporate structure for distributing the SCM

20 assets in order to avoid tax and capital gains liabilities. See Hamidi Decl. Ex. 12 (showing the fan

21 company structure distributing SCM’s businesses was chosen to avoid certain tax liabilities);

22

23

Director, meant that HBML took over the liabilities when he said “we” took them over, or if he

meant that the relevant subsidiary took over the liability. See Hamidi Decl. Ex. 24 at 136:3-

24

137:21.

25

11 This evidence is apparently undisputed because HBML does not contest it in reply, nor does it

seem to submit evidence that disputes this definition. But the indemnity agreement itself says that

26

“Hanson Environmental Liabilities” does not include liabilities related to past, present, or future

SCM business. Hamidi Decl. Ex 54 at 5-8. It is not entirely clear if that is limited solely to SCM

27

typewriter business, or if it is limited just to “SCM” as it existed post-acquisition, or something

1 Hamidi Decl. Ex. 33 (showing HBML’s finance director suggested certain structures and transfers

2 for beneficial tax reasons); Hempstead Decl. ¶ 8 (“The SCM restructuring transactions were

3 largely driven by U.S. tax concerns.”). While these structures are of course not inherently

4 unlawful, and this does not specifically show that HBML used these structures to avoid CERCLA

5 liabilities, the evidence could provide context for a factfinder to ascertain HBML’s intentions

6 regarding its corporate structure, particularly given its understanding of its possibly significant

7 environmental liabilities.

8 Fifth, HBML transferred SCM’s environmental liabilities into Millennium, and there is

9 evidence suggesting that the transfer was not done at arms-length and was not beneficial to

10 Millennium’s businesses. See Hamidi Decl. Ex. 54 at 71 (showing the eventual demerger of SCM

11 and HM Holdings as well as the transfer of assets and liabilities to the newly organized

12 Millennium Chemicals corporation was “not . . . the result of arm’s length negotiations.”); Hamidi

13 Decl. Ex. 58 (Deposition of Robert Lee) 385:17-387:11 (noting Millennium did not receive any

14 business advantage from taking on SCM’s legacy environmental liabilities, nor were the liabilities

15 related to other businesses Millennium acquired); Hamidi Decl. Ex. 59 (Deposition of William

16 Landuyt) 101:24-102:3 (same). From this a factfinder could determine that HBML created

17 Millennium and carried out the transfer strictly to avoid funding its environmental liabilities.

18 Finally, Emeryville’s evidence demonstrates that HBML benefitted financially throughout

19 all of these processes. It profited from the acquisition and IPO of SCM’s typewriter business. See

20 generally Hamidi Decl. Ex. 53 (repeatedly referencing how “Hanson [Plc] [HBML] acquired

21 SCM,” describing HBML’s role in the IPO, and explaining the resulting profits). It avoided

22 certain taxes through the use of the fan companies. Hamidi Decl. Ex. 12; see also Hempstead

23 Decl. ¶ 8. It knowingly transferred away its environmental liabilities to Millennium without

24 having to pay for them. See Hamidi Decl. Ex. 24 at 199:22-200:25; Hamidi Decl. Ex. 54 at 5-8;

25 Hamidi Decl. Ex. 54 at 71.

26 All of these taken together suggest that HBML was in charge of and profited from these

27 transactions; that it knew generally of its environmental liabilities, at least strongly suspected it

1 and that it undertook its corporate form—including the initial acquisition form, the fan companies,

2 and the eventual transfer and sell off of Millennium—in order to reap the profitable rewards while

3 “kicking the can down the road” on the environmental liabilities to avoid having to fund them.

4 This is more than sufficient to create a question of fact whether there was “bad faith,” Daewoo

5 Elecs., 875 F.3d at 1250, or whether HBML’s corporate form was “used to . . . circumvent a

6 statute[] or accomplish some other wrongful or inequitable purpose,” Pac. Bell, 2016 WL

7 3257656, at *3. And, contrary to HBML’s assertions, see Mot. 16:8-17, 19:3-21, 19:27-20:3;

8 Repl. 6:16-18, this is enough to suggest a causal connection between Emeryville’s alleged

9 injury—the contamination and recovery of CERCLA fees—and the alleged misuse of HBML’s

10 corporate structure—chosen to avoid paying for “superfund” responsibilities.

11 Additionally, I am not persuaded by HBML’s argument that the inequitable result is

12 difficulty enforcing a judgment against Millennium and that Emeryville sat on its rights for too

13 long. See Mot. 15:12-16:7; Repl. 6:13-16. Rather, the inequitable result is that a potentially

14 responsible party—HBML—would be able to profit from its acquisition and corporate structuring

15 without being held responsible for its CERCLA liabilities. Emeryville’s evidence points not to

16 mere difficulty collecting on CERCLA liabilities but rather to corporate decisions made in an

17 effort to avoid statutory and legal requirements.

18 HBML’s arguments about circumventing unknown liabilities are also unpersuasive.

19 HBML asserts that it could not have circumvented an unknown liability and that it is undisputed

20 that no one knew of the contamination at the FMW site until 1999, so the “issue is whether HBML

21 ever incurred CERCLA liability to begin with.” See Repl. 8:3-16. It also says that it could not

22 have discovered the TCE pollution, that there is no evidence that TCE came from Marchant, and

23 that it cannot show inequitable result because it was never aware of the contamination. Id. 11:15-

24 27; Mot. 14:19-15:10. But as noted, Emeryville’s evidence shows that HBML incurred CERCLA

25 liability because it planned, directed, funded, and profited from the acquisition of SCM,12 which

26

12 See Hamidi Decl. Ex. 13 at HBML 25531 (Hanson Netherlands “obtained all funds for the

27

purchase of the 2,446,000 Shares [of SCM] it acquired through loans made to it by Hanson

1 caused the corporation to take on all of SCM’s liabilities, including the environmental ones related

2 to Marchant—regardless of the fact that the specific TCE contamination was unknown until 1999.

3 To the extent that HBML takes issue with that evidence, including whether TCE came from

4 Marchant, it merely creates a dispute of material fact to be resolved at trial. And HBML did not

5 circumvent an “unknown” liability; rather, Emeryville presents evidence that HBML took on

6 SCM’s environmental liabilities, knew there was significant risk that those could include

7 superfund related liabilities like the ones at issue in this litigation, failed to investigate and learn of

8 those specific liabilities despite its plan to do so and the available public information, and then

9 implemented a corporate structure specifically to avoid dealing with the liabilities it was willfully

10 blind to while simultaneously profiting from the acquisition. From that evidence, a factfinder

11 could find that HBML knowingly circumvented CERCLA liabilities.13

12 For those reasons, there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the corporate veil

13 should be pierced under the alter ego doctrine. HBML’s motion is DENIED.14

14

and other sources of funds available for tender offer to acquire SCM shares, noting that the

15

depositing subsidiaries were “wholly owned by Hanson Trust”); Hamidi Decl. Ex 1 at 18-19, 20-

21, 24 (August tender offer showing Hanson Trust (HBML) offered to purchase all outstanding

16

shares, intended to influence SCM’s management, provided suggestions for ultimate corporate

structure, expected to file statutorily-required documents and be point of contact for government

17

agencies); id. at 35-36 (noting the role HBML played in funding the purchases).

18

13 The parties present disputed facts concerning undercapitalization. I agree there are facts

supporting both sides but because undercapitalization alone does not appear to be sufficient to

19

show alter ego, and because I find sufficient evidence to move this question to trial without

assessing undercapitalization, I do not address it further here. See RRX Indus., 772 F.2d at 546

20

(noting that an “inequitable may follow” undercapitalization (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).

Relatedly, HBML moves in reply to strike Emeryville’s expert declaration related to

21

undercapitalization. See Repl. 10:8-10. Because I do not rely on that declaration, and because

Emeryville has not had the opportunity to respond, the motion is DENIED without prejudice.

22

14 Even if federal substantive law applied, and even if federal substantive law required a showing

23

of fraud, the outcome would be the same. Genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary

judgment on a finding of fraud for similar reasons as explained. HBML argues that it did not

24

know about the FMW site or its acquired liabilities in Emeryville and so could not have had the

requisite fraudulent intent. But while Emeryville does not contest that HBML did not know about

25

the FMW site, it presents evidence that HBML knew it acquired environmental liabilities and

could have investigated further to confirm their extent, see Hamidi Decl. Ex. 24 at 199:22-200:25;

26

see also Hamidi Decl. Ex. 54 at 5-8; Bookspan Decl. at 20-23; Hamidi Decl. Ex. 1 at 23, 25; and

that it chose its corporate form to avoid liabilities, see Hamidi Decl. Ex. 12. Together, that implies

27

that HBML was, at minimum, willfully blind to its liabilities, which creates a dispute of material

1 II. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY

2 Federal law and California law for successor liability are not practically different.

3 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 362-64 (9th Cir.

4 1997); see also Mot. 20 n.10; Oppo. 22 n.14. Under CERCLA and as relevant to this case, an

5 asset purchaser may be liable as a successor corporation if it “expressly or impliedly agree[d] to

6 assume the liability” or if the relevant transaction constitutes a “‘de-facto’ consolidation or

7 merger.”15 Atchison, 159 F.3d at 361 (citation omitted).

8 Here, the parties contest whether successor liability must be established through a direct

9 asset purchase transaction or if it can also be shown via a stock takeover and corporate

10 reorganization. If the latter establishes successor liability, the parties contest whether Emeryville

11 presents evidence showing assumption of liability or de-facto consolidation or merger.

12 A. Successor Liability Standard

13 First, I address whether the transactions here can be treated as asset purchases for the

14 purpose of addressing successor liability. HBML argues that successor liability can only be

15 established through asset purchases, Mot. 20:19-23:9, though it agrees in reply that cases have

16 found successor liability without formal asset purchases where the company alleged to be the

17 successor succeeded to the assets of the predecessor, Repl. 13:2-13.

18 A stock purchase is different from an asset purchase and so by itself, it does not establish

19 successor liability. See Sunnyside Dev. Co., LLC v. Opsys Ltd., No. C 05 0553 MHP, 2007 WL

20 2462142, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2007) (“Sunnyside II”) (citing Potlatch Corp. v. Superior Ct.,

21 154 Cal. App. 3d 1144, 1150-51 (1984)). However, successor liability can be established without

22 a “straightforward asset purchase.” United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 987 F. Supp.

23 1233, 1239 (E.D. Cal. 1997). In Iron Mountain, the question was whether the alleged successor

24 corporation, Stauffer, was a corporate successor to Mountain Copper, the undisputed polluter

25

26

15 There are two other considerations—whether the purchasing corporation is merely a

27

continuation of the selling corporation, and where the transaction was fraudulently entered into to

1 responsible under CERCLA that had been dissolved decades earlier. Id. at 1234-35. Stauffer had

2 initially tried to buy from Mountain Copper its stake in a separate company, but when Mountain

3 Copper refused to sell its stake, Stauffer successfully took control of Mountain Copper via two

4 tender offers. Id. at 1236. Stauffer “became the sole shareholder of Mountain Copper and its

5 wholly owned subsidiaries.” Id. After acquisition, Stauffer sought to dissolve Mountain Copper,

6 in part for a tax deduction. Id. Through various other transactions, all of Mountain Copper’s

7 assets were transferred to Stauffer in exchange for Stauffer assuming all of Mountain Copper’s

8 liabilities. Id. at 1236-37. The court reasoned that while these actions were not a “straightforward

9 asset purchase,” they were sufficient to constitute an asset purchase for the purposes of successor

10 liability under CERCLA because “the purpose of the stock buy out was to gain control of a

11 particular asset,” Stauffer gained control and ownership of Mountain Copper, and Stauffer

12 subsequently liquidated Mountain Copper and distributed its assets to Stauffer. Id. at 1239

13 (collecting cases reaching similar results).

14 Here, HBML says that there is no evidence that any assets were transferred to HBML as

15 opposed to a fan company or other subsidiary. But as explained above, Emeryville presents

16 evidence that HBML controlled and funded the acquisition of SCM despite the purchases being

17 made by nominally separate subsidiaries. Supra n.12; see also Hamidi Ex. 1 at 30-31 (noting

18 HSCM Holdings was an indirect subsidiary of HBML created one day before the tender offer as a

19 holding company, and that HBML owned 70 percent of Hanson Netherlands directly and owned

20 the remaining 30 percent indirectly); Hamidi Decl. Ex. 15 at 11-12 (same). There is also evidence

21 that HBML controlled the distribution of SCM’s businesses, including its assets to fan companies,

22 and did so for tax purposes and so that it could profit from the typewriter IPO while channeling

23 liabilities into other fan companies. See, e.g., Hamidi Decl. Ex. 12 (showing that HBML chose the

24 fan company structure to distribute SCM’s businesses to avoid certain tax liabilities); Hamidi

25 Decl. Ex. 1 at 21 (confirming that the planned business structure was HBML’s idea); Hamidi

26 Decl. Ex. 33 (showing HBML’s finance director suggested certain structures and transfers for

27 beneficial tax reasons); Hamidi Decl. Ex. 53 (describing HBML’s role in and control of the IPO);

1 but see Hempstead Decl. ¶¶ 9-10 (stating that HBML had no role in the restructuring of SCM).16

2 Taken together, a factfinder could infer that SCM’s assets transferred to HBML as opposed to its

3 subsidiaries.

4 That finding would be legally sufficient to establish a purchase of assets for successor

5 liability. As in Iron Mountain, there is evidence suggesting that HBML (via its control and

6 funding of subsidiaries) took over SCM by purchasing stock via tender offers, see generally

7 Hamidi Decl. Exs. 1, 16 (tender offers); that the acquisition of SCM was at least in part

8 specifically carried out to control the typewriter business, which yielded a successful initial public

9 offering, Hamidi Decl. Ex. 1 at 38 (specifically referring to typewriter business); Hamidi Decl. Ex.

10 16 at 10, 32 (same); Hamidi Decl. Ex. 53 (IPO); that HBML controlled the structure of SCM and

11 other business decisions, Hamidi Decl. Ex. 33 (HBML’s finance director in charge of structure);

12 Hamidi Decl. Ex. 53 (benefits to HBML of structure); and that HBML (via its control and funding

13 of subsidiaries) agreed to acquire all of SCM’s liabilities, including the Marchant liability, see,

14 e.g., Hamidi Decl. Ex. 24 at 199:22-200:25; see also Hamidi Decl. Ex. 54 at 5-8.

15 At this stage, it is clear this case differs significantly from Potlatch, on which HBML

16 relies. There the acquiring-corporation purchased stock but did not acquire any of the target’s

17 physical assets, and the target continued its business separate from the acquiring-corporation for

18 eleven years after the stock purchase. Potlatch, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 1150-51. In contrast, here all

19 of SCM’s assets were acquired and then distributed to the fan companies, and many of SCM’s

20 businesses were liquidated, sold, or fundamentally altered. See Hempstead Decl. ¶¶ 11-12

21 (acknowledging that once SCM’s operating businesses were distributed to fan companies, the

22 remaining assets and liabilities were distributed to HSCM-20). Accordingly, the reasoning in

23 Potlatch is not applicable here.

24 HBML also points to Sunnyside II, which found that transferring assets “to an ‘intervening

25 corporation’ is not sufficient for successor liability to attach under California law.” 2007 WL

26

27

16 Emeryville also says that in exchange for receiving the assets, the fan companies returned SCM

1 2462142, at *7. But as support, the court cited Katzir’s Floor & Home Design, Inc. v. M-

2 MLS.com, 394 F.3d 1143, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2004), which held that the transfer of assets to an

3 intervening corporation was insufficient to establish the “mere continuation” exception to

4 successor liability, which is not at issue in this case. Additionally, the Sunnyside II court pointed

5 out that there was only “a single relevant transfer of business assets” and that the plaintiff “ma[de]

6 no attempt to pierce the corporate veil between” the parent and subsidiary. 2007 WL 2462142, at

7 *7. Here, there are many relevant transfers of business assets: the transfers of assets from SCM to

8 the purchasing companies, which were at least partly funded and controlled by HBML, which also

9 came up with the plan and the ultimate corporate structure; the transfer of the assets from the

10 purchasing companies to the fan companies; and the transfer of some of those assets—including

11 the Marchant liability—to Millennium. Additionally, as explained in the alter ego analysis and

12 unlike in Sunnyside II, Emeryville not only attempts to pierce the corporate veil between HBML

13 and its subsidiaries but presents sufficient evidence for a factfinder to determine that the corporate

14 veil should be pierced. The reasoning in Sunnyside II does not control here.

15 Accordingly, I find that the transactions related to the acquisition of SCM should be treated

16 as an asset purchase for the purposes of successor liability.

17 B. Exceptions to Non-Liability for Asset Transfers

18 Asset purchasers are only liable as successor corporations under CERCLA if one of four

19 exceptions apply. Atchison, 159 F.3d at 361. The relevant exceptions at issue in this case are

20 whether “[t]he purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the liability” and

21 whether “[t]he transaction amounts to a ‘de-facto’ consolidation or merger.” Id. (citation omitted).

22 1. Express or Implied Assumption of Liability

23 In CERCLA cases, “[c]ourts have universally held that ‘language transferring “all

24 liabilities” is sufficiently broad to include environmental liabilities.’” United States v. Sterling

25 Centrecorp Inc., 960 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1035 (E.D. Cal. 2013), aff’d, 977 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 2020)

26 (collecting cases). Courts also look beyond written agreements “to consider all relevant

27 circumstances” when assessing whether a contracting party has expressly assumed a seller’s

1 996 (1970)). Indeed, even where certain liabilities are unknown, a company can assume those

2 liabilities unless the written agreement contains “clear and specific language . . . used to effect the

3 exclusion” of the unknown liabilities. Id. at 1036 (citation omitted).

4 Here, it is undisputed that “all” of SCM’s liabilities were transferred to the fan companies

5 which, given the reasoning from and legal basis cited in Sterling, included SCM’s environmental

6 liabilities, which in turn included the “unknown” Marchant liability. See also Hempstead Decl.

7 ¶¶ 11-12 (acknowledging the Marchant liabilities were part of SCM’s liabilities that were

8 eventually distributed to HSCM-20). HBML seems to agree that HM Holdings assumed the

9 Marchant liability. See Repl. 14:14:12-22; see also Hempstead Decl. ¶¶ 11-15 (acknowledging

10 that the Marchant liability was part of the group of assets and liabilities that eventually merged

11 into HM Holdings). Accordingly, HBML only contests whether there is evidence that HBML

12 assumed (expressly or impliedly) the Marchant liability.

13 But again, Emeryville presents evidence showing that HBML was responsible for planning,

14 executing, and funding the acquisition of SCM, see supra n. 12; that HBML characterized the

15 acquisition as a merger between SCM and HBML, Hamidi Decl. Ex. 25 at 1; that HBML

16 understood that it was assuming SCM’s liabilities, Hamidi Decl. Ex. 11 (Clarke Depo.) at 40:10-

17 41:3; that HBML controlled and benefitted from the significant and fundamental changes to

18 SCM’s business structure, see, e.g., Hamidi Decl. Ex. 33 (showing HBML’s finance director

19 suggested certain structures and transfers for beneficial tax reasons); and that HBML knew of the

20 potential environmental risk it took on, see Hamidi Decl. Ex. 41 (“Raos Depo.”) 126:15-2; Hamidi

21 Decl. Ex. 24 at 199:22-200:25; see also Hamidi Decl. Ex. 54 at 5-8. Together, given “all relevant

22 circumstances,” Sterling, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 1035, a factfinder could find that HBML—as opposed

23 to HM Holdings or another subsidiary—assumed SCM’s Marchant liability when it acquired

24 SCM, distributed and liquidated its assets and liabilities, and profited from subsequent actions.

25 Accordingly, there are genuine disputes whether successor liability can be established via

26 the implied assumption of liability doctrine. For that reason, HBML’s motion is DENIED.

27 2. De Facto Merger

1 its amended complaint. See Dkt. No.

2 “[A] plaintiff’s failure to plead a particular theory may preclude her from asserting that

3 theory for the first time at summary judgment,” and “[a] plaintiff may also be precluded from

4 grounding her pleaded theory of liability in facts asserted for the first time at summary judgment.”

5 Lynn v. Invitae Corp., 466 F. Supp. 3d 1038, 1041-42 (D. Ariz. 2020) (first citing Coleman v.

6 Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1292 (9th Cir. 2000); and then citing Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports

7 (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 969 (9th Cir. 2006)). Those cases address “the prejudice to a defendant

8 who has no notice of the claimed theories or underlying facts until after discovery closes and

9 therefore cannot defend itself.” Id. (citing Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1292). But courts may consider a

10 new theory of liability raised for the first time at summary judgment so long as it does not

11 introduce new facts or claims, is based on the facts alleged in the complaint, and defendants were

12 aware of or given notice of the issues. Television Events & Mktg., Inc. v. AMCON Distrib., Co.,

13 484 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1139-1140 (D. Haw. 2006) (first citing Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160,

14 1164 (9th Cir. 1991); then citing Am. Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat’l Bank, 690 F.2d 781,

15 786 (9th Cir. 1982); and then citing 5B C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 1357, at 676

16 (2004)).

17 Here, HBML was not given notice of the de facto merger issue in the complaint, despite

18 sufficient opportunity for Emeryville to do so in its multiple amendments to the complaint and

19 vigorous litigation at the motion to dismiss. Though the de facto merger analysis rests on some of

20 the same facts and does not raise a new claim, see Television Events, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1140, it

21 requires a separate analysis of certain distinct facts given its different underlying elements, see

22 Oppo. 24:4-10. It would be unfair to allow Emeryville to proceed on this new theory of liability

23 that it presented for the first time in opposition to this motion for summary judgment. Regardless,

24 as discussed, the claim survives under the implied assumption of liability theory. For that reason,

25 HBML’s motion is GRANTED concerning the de facto merger theory.

26

27

1 CONCLUSION

2 For those reasons, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

3 IT IS SO ORDERED.

4 Dated: June 1, 2023

6

liam H. Orrick

7 United States District Judge

8

9

10

11

12

15

16

= 17

Z 18

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22

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25

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27

28