Karlen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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7 GERARD KARLEN, et al., Case No. 22-cv-02127-JSC

8 Plaintiffs,

ORDER RE: MOTION TO TRANSFER

v.

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Re: Dkt. No. 7

10 WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al.,

Defendants.

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13 Plaintiffs, proceeding without representation by a lawyer, sue Wells Fargo for

14 discriminatory housing practices. (Dkt. No. 1.)1 Before the Court are Wells Fargo’s motions to

15 transfer and dismiss. (Dkt. Nos. 7, 11.) After carefully considering the parties’ briefing, and

16 having had the benefit of oral argument on July 14, 2022, the Court GRANTS the motion to

17 transfer and accordingly declines to rule on the motion to dismiss, as explained below.

18 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

19 Ms. Karlen, who is Black, owns a home at 10 Pheasant Lane in Westport, Connecticut and

20 lives there with her husband, Mr. Karlen. Plaintiffs filed suit in this District against Wells Fargo

21 Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) and Wells Fargo Mortgage Backed Securities 2007-2 Trust (“the

22 Trust”). (Dkt. No. 1.) They allege that Wells Fargo is “a corporation organized under the laws of

23 California” that “maintains its principal offices” in San Francisco. (Id. ¶ 4.) “[I]n association with

24 numerous subsidiaries and affiliates,” Wells Fargo “operates a national bank and related

25 businesses.” (Id. ¶ 5.) The Trust is a securitized New York trust. Wells Fargo and its subsidiaries

26 “are long time servicers of the purported note . . . secured by a mortgage on” Plaintiffs’ home. (Id.

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1 ¶ 6.) Wells Fargo acquired the purported note in 2006 and transferred it to the Trust in 2007,

2 without notifying Plaintiffs. In 2019, the Trust transferred the purported note back to Wells Fargo,

3 without notifying Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs tried to learn the owner of the purported note over the years

4 and Wells Fargo refused to provide that information.

5 Wells Fargo discriminated against Plaintiffs on the basis of Ms. Karlen’s race by

6 interfering with their attempts to sell the home except at a below-market price; surveilling,

7 intimidating, and harassing Plaintiffs; preventing Plaintiffs from maintaining and upgrading the

8 home; refusing to provide Plaintiffs’ mortgage statements; refusing to speak to Ms. Karlen in

9 favor of Mr. Karlen; and engaging attorneys who harassed Ms. Karlen in a deposition and released

10 an unsigned transcript of the deposition to the defendant in an unrelated medical malpractice

11 action brought by Ms. Karlen. Plaintiffs bring claims under the Fair Housing Act.

12 DISCUSSION

13 I. Motion to Transfer

14 Wells Fargo moves to transfer this case to the District of Connecticut.2 (Dkt. No 7.) “For

15 the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer

16 any civil action to any other district or division where the action might have been brought.” 28

17 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The purpose of Section 1404(a) is to “prevent the waste of time, energy and

18 money and to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and

19 expense.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (cleaned up). “[T]he district court has

20 discretion to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case

21 consideration of convenience and fairness.” Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498

22 (9th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). Because “great weight is generally accorded plaintiff’s choice of

23 forum,” Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987), the burden is on the moving party to

24 demonstrate that jurisdiction and proper venue would exist in the district to which a transfer is

25 requested and that the balance of conveniences favors transfer. See Commodity Futures Trading

26 Comm’n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 1979).

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A. Jurisdiction and Venue in the District of Connecticut

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2 The court to which a case is transferred must “(1) be able to exercise personal jurisdiction

3 over the defendants, (2) have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, and (3) be a proper

4 forum.” Albertson v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., No. C–08–05441 RMW, 2009 WL 3870301, at

5 *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2009) (citing Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1960)).

6 Wells Fargo concedes, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that a District of Connecticut court

7 would have personal jurisdiction over it in this case. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Bank of Am.

8 N.A., 916 F.3d 143, 149–52 (2d Cir. 2019) (finding specific personal jurisdiction over bank that

9 held mortgage loans on property in the forum state and allegedly breached contractual

10 obligations); see also Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 625, 631 (2d Cir. 2016)

11 (noting that under Connecticut law, a defendant may waive or forfeit objections to personal

12 jurisdiction). Plaintiffs assert subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity, but their

13 complaint also supports the exercise of federal question jurisdiction. (See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 10–12.)

14 In any event, complete diversity of citizenship would exist because Plaintiffs are citizens of

15 Connecticut and Wells Fargo is a citizen of South Dakota. Rouse v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 747

16 F.3d 707, 708, 715 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that as a national banking association not organized

17 under the laws of any state, “Wells Fargo is a citizen only of South Dakota” for purposes of

18 subject matter jurisdiction); see Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996) (noting that

19 diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity of citizenship). Finally, venue would be proper

20 in Connecticut because Wells Fargo is subject to personal jurisdiction there. See Urista v. Wells

21 Fargo & Co., No. 20-cv-01689-H-AHG, 2022 WL 104278, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 202) (citing

22 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2)).

23 B. Convenience

24 Turning to the convenience factors, the Court may consider:

25 (1) plaintiffs’ choice of forum, (2) convenience of the parties, (3)

convenience of the witnesses, (4) ease of access to the evidence, (5)

26 familiarity of each forum with the applicable law, (6) feasibility of

consolidation with other claims, (7) any local interest in the

27 controversy, and (8) the relative court congestion and time to trial in

1 Easton v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 20-cv-02193-HSG, 2020 WL 3639934, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 6,

2 2020).

3 Plaintiffs’ choice of forum is entitled to less weight here because they do not reside in

4 California. See id. at *3 (“Plaintiff[] . . . chose to sue in a forum where she does not reside.

5 Indeed, because Plaintiff resides in the Central District, a transfer there would logically be more

6 convenient.” (cleaned up)); see also Forsburg v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 5:20-cv-00046, 2022

7 WL 989246, at *9 (W.D. Va. Mar. 21, 2022) (“[G]iven that [one plaintiff] lives in the Northern

8 District of California, no named plaintiffs live in the Western District of Virginia, and there are

9 four other putative class actions addressing the same issues . . . pending in the Northern District of

10 California, which are being handled by the same district judge as consolidated or related cases,

11 retaining the case in the Western District of Virginia is less convenient for the parties and

12 witnesses.”).

13 The other relevant factors favor transfer. See Jones, 211 F.3d at 498 (noting that court has

14 discretion to consider factors in an individualized, case-by-case manner). The case “finds its

15 center of gravity” in Connecticut, where the property is located and where Plaintiffs allege they

16 were harassed, they tried make improvements to the property, they tried to sell the property, and

17 Ms. Karlen was deposed. Johns v. Panera Bread Co., No. 08-1071 SC, 2008 WL 2811827, at *5

18 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2008) (cleaned up). While the case is not necessarily related to the judicial

19 foreclosure on Plaintiffs’ home pending in Connecticut Superior Court, (see Dkt. No. 7-1 at 35–

20 46),3 some overlap among witnesses and discovery is possible.

21 Plaintiffs do not contend that this District would be more convenient for them; nor have

22 they identified specific witnesses here or identified any allegations that suggest there are likely to

23 be any witnesses in this District. Instead, they fear continued harassment if the case proceeds

24 closer to home. They also argue that this case has more to do with Wells Fargo’s corporate

25 practices, emanating from California, than with Plaintiffs’ home in Connecticut. See Urista, 2022

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27 3 The Court takes judicial notice of the adjudicative fact of the pending judicial foreclosure

1 WL 104278, at *5—-6 (citing cases within the Ninth Circuit finding Wells Fargo’s principal place

2 of business is in San Francisco, California). The Court gives weight to this consideration;

3 however, the Court finds that on balance the convenience factors weigh in favor of transfer. See

4 Easton, 2020 WL 3639934, at *3.

5 Oe Ok

6 This action could have been brought in the District of Connecticut, and the Section 1404(a)

7 convenience factors weigh in favor of transfer. Because the Court grants Wells Fargo’s motion to

8 transfer, it declines to rule on the motion to dismiss.

9 CONCLUSION

10 Defendant’s motion to transfer is GRANTED. The Clerk shall transfer the case to the

11 District of Connecticut and close the file.

12 This Order disposes of Docket No. 7.

13 IT IS SO ORDERED.

14 |] Dated: July 14, 2022

5 FACQ ELINE SCOTT CORL

nited States District Judge

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