The opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 95-20161
_____________________
FREDDIE JOHN DANIEL,
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
versus
THERON KEITH HARRISON,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(CA-H-91-0225)
_________________________________________________________________
August 14, 1996
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, JOLLY and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM:*
Contending that he is entitled to qualified immunity in this
42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force action, prison guard Theron Keith
Harrison appeals the judgment awarded Freddie John Daniel, a state
prisoner. Because Daniel did not sustain a “significant” injury,
as required by the clearly established law at the time of the
incident, we REVERSE the judgment in favor of Daniel and RENDER
judgment for Harrison.
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule
47.5.4.
I.
Daniel claimed that in September 1990, Harrison used excessive
force; Harrison claimed qualified immunity. Following a bench
trial, the district court held that Harrison used such force, and
entered judgment for Daniel, awarding nominal compensatory damages
of $10 and punitive damages of $800. Harrison was ordered to pay
Daniel’s attorney’s fees of $10,000, plus costs of $700.
II.
Harrison grounds qualified immunity on the fact that Daniel
did not sustain objective physical injuries as a result of the use
of force. We conduct a bifurcated analysis to assess the
application of such immunity. E.g., Rankin v. Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d
103, 105 (5th Cir. 1993).
The first step is to determine whether a violation of a
clearly established constitutional right is alleged. Id.
“[C]urrently applicable constitutional standards [are used] to make
this assessment”. Id. at 106. This step is satisfied by the
allegation that Harrison used excessive force against Daniel, in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); see also Dunn v. Denk, 79 F.3d 401,
402 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Because the first step is satisfied, we next determine whether
Harrison’s “conduct was objectively reasonable”. Rankin, 5 F.3d at
105. This assessment is made in light of the legal rules
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established at the time of the incident. Id. at 108. At the time
of the September 1990 incident, the controlling law was Huguet v.
Barnett, 900 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1990), decided in May 1990.
(Huguet controlled until late February 1992, when its significant
injury prong was overruled by Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1
(1992). See Rankin, 5 F.3d at 105 n.2.)
Under Huguet, an excessive force claimant is required to prove
1. a significant injury, which
2. resulted directly and only from the use
of force that was clearly excessive to
the need, the excessiveness of which was
3. objectively unreasonable, and
4. the action constituted an unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.
900 F.2d at 841 (emphasis added).
The district court held, erroneously, that Shillingford v.
Holmes, 634 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1981), provided the controlling
legal standard at the time of the incident. Under Shillingford,
[i]f the state officer’s action caused severe
injuries, was grossly disproportionate to the
need for action under the circumstances and
was inspired by malice rather than merely
careless or unwise excess of zeal so that it
amounted to an abuse of official power that
shocks the conscience, it should be redressed
under Section 1983.
Id. at 265. The court found that no objective injuries were found
by the prison nurse who examined Daniel immediately after the
incident, and that Daniel failed to prove that the use of force
proximately caused a cerebral aneurysm rupture which occurred two
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and one-half years after the incident. (Although Daniel filed a
cross-appeal, he does not contend that any holding, including that
on the aneurysm, was erroneous. His cross-appeal is, therefore,
DISMISSED.)
Nevertheless, the court held that Harrison’s actions were
objectively unreasonable. It stated that “[t]he physical abuse in
this case was sufficiently severe, disproportionate to the need
presented, and so deliberate and unjustified to overcome the
defense of qualified immunity.” The court reasoned that “[t]he
fact that Daniel was not more seriously injured at the time of this
[September 1990] incident was merely `fortuitous’ and does not bar
Daniel’s cause of action for excessive force.”
It is not necessary to address whether the district court
applied Shillingford correctly, because, as discussed, Huguet, not
Shillingford, provides the standard for determining the objective
reasonableness of Harrison’s conduct. Because the court applied
the incorrect legal standard, it did not make a finding on whether
Daniel sustained the “significant injury” required by Huguet.
This notwithstanding, a remand is unnecessary, because the
record contains no evidence to support a finding that Daniel
sustained such an injury. Although he testified that he had
several knots on his head and experienced pain in his arm, neck,
head, and back for several days after the incident, the district
court found that Daniel was examined by a nurse immediately
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following the incident, and that no objective injuries were found.
This finding is supported not only by Daniel’s trial testimony, but
also by his medical records, photographs taken while he was at the
infirmary after the incident, and a videotape of the examination
(covering Daniel proceeding to it, being examined and photographed,
and departing), all of which were admitted into evidence at trial.
III.
Because Daniel failed to prove that he sustained a significant
injury, as required by the clearly established law at the time of
the incident, Harrison is qualifiedly immune from liability under
§ 1983. Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment in favor of Daniel,
and RENDER judgment in favor of Harrison.
REVERSED and RENDERED
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