holding that individual plaintiff in later- 3 filed suit was adequately represented as a class member in earlier-filed suit
How later courts described this case
- holding that individual plaintiff in later- 3 filed suit was adequately represented as a class member in earlier-filed suit
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
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3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 TYRONE PUMPHREY, Case No. 21-cv-09005-JSC
8 Plaintiff,
ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS
v.
9
Re: Dkt. Nos. 16, 22
10 BRANDON BATTLES, et al.,
Defendants.
11
12
13 This civil rights case (“Pumphrey II”) arises from Defendants’ detention of Plaintiff at
14 Martinez Jail on June 8, 2019.1 (See Dkt. No. 3.)2 Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to
15 dismiss the complaint as duplicative of Plaintiff’s earlier-filed case, Pumphrey v. Contra Costa
16 County (“Pumphrey I”), No. 3:20-cv-08474-JSC, on which this Court entered judgment on March
17 3, 2022. (Dkt. No. 16.) Having carefully considered the parties’ briefing, and having had the
18 benefit of oral argument on March 3, 2022, the Court GRANTS the motion in part and DENIES in
19 part for the reasons explained below.
20 BACKGROUND
21 I. Pumphrey II Complaint Allegations
22 On June 8, 2019, Plaintiff was sitting in his parked car outside his girlfriend’s apartment in
23 Pittsburg, California. Pittsburg police officers pulled up behind the car, arrested Plaintiff, and
24 took him to Martinez Jail. Plaintiff was booked and taken to a holding cell to use the phone to
25
26 1 All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 10, 19.)
27 2 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”) for Pumphrey II, No. 21-cv-
1 arrange bail. Inside the holding cell, Plaintiff got into a brief physical altercation with another
2 person regarding the phone. After the altercation had ended, several deputies came into the cell
3 and attacked Plaintiff, “slamming him to the ground as well as punching and kicking him in the
4 ribs after they already had his hands subdued behind his back.” (Dkt. No. 3 ¶ 15.) The deputies
5 handcuffed Plaintiff, brought him out of the cell to sit down at a medical intake table, and “then
6 slammed [his] head onto the counter, causing him to suffer a severe gash on the left side of his
7 head.” (Id. ¶ 16.) Later, the deputies took Plaintiff to a cell by himself and pinned him to the
8 ground with their body weight. After they left, Plaintiff passed out. When he regained
9 consciousness, he had severe pain around his rib cage, had difficulty breathing, and could not
10 stand or walk. He repeatedly requested medical care but the deputies ignored him. He endured
11 extreme pain for several hours before being released on bail. Family members drove Plaintiff
12 directly to the hospital, where doctors determined he had several broken ribs on both sides of his
13 body.
14 In the operative complaint, Plaintiff brings claims for excessive force and denial of medical
15 care in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights as a pretrial detainee and for disability
16 discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act. (Id. ¶¶ 20–39.) Defendants are Contra
17 Costa County, Deputy Brandon Battles, Deputy Dwight Childs, Deputy Tiffany Yarnell, Deputy
18 Ridgers, Deputy Garcia, 15 Doe deputies of Contra Costa County, and 10 Doe health care workers
19 of Contra Costa County Health Services. (Id. ¶¶ 2–8.)
20 II. Pumphrey I
21 Pumphrey I also concerned the events of June 8, 2019. (No. 3:20-cv-08474-JSC, Dkt. No.
22 1.)3 Plaintiff alleged that while he was calling his girlfriend from inside his parked car, Pittsburg
23 police officers pulled up and asked for his registration and insurance. The officers “snatched his
24 phone and threw it in the grass.” (Id. ¶ 19.) They asked Plaintiff if he was on probation or parole,
25
26
3 The Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice, (Dkt. No. 17), of documents on the
27 Pumphrey I docket. See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018)
1 and Plaintiff replied that he was on probation for a DUI. The officers ordered Plaintiff to get out
2 of his car, which he did. Plaintiff’s girlfriend’s daughter was walking nearby and asked Plaintiff if
3 he wanted her to get her mother; Plaintiff said yes. The officers told Plaintiff to sit on the curb and
4 started asking Plaintiff about his probation. They searched Plaintiff’s car without consent and then
5 informed him that they were towing his car because he didn’t have a license and was on probation.
6 Plaintiff pleaded with the officers not to tow his car. The officers then decided to handcuff
7 Plaintiff and put him in the back of the police car. Plaintiff told the officers several times that the
8 handcuffs were too tight, but they did not adjust them. Other officers arrived and then the group
9 “snatched the Plaintiff back out of the police car and began to issue various strikes with their
10 hands and knees to the Plaintiff’s body.” (Id. ¶ 27.) “[A]t least one Defendant officer placed his
11 knee on the back of the Plaintiff’s neck with extreme force, while his hands were cuffed behind his
12 back. The Defendant officers then placed the Plaintiff in a bodywrap device, which severely
13 inhibited his ability to breathe,” then “picked the Plaintiff up from the ground and slammed him in
14 the back of the same police car.” (Id. ¶¶ 28–29.) The officers brought Plaintiff to Martinez Jail.
15 From that point forward, the factual allegations in Pumphrey I mirror those in this case. (Id. ¶¶
16 30–42.)
17 Pumphrey I brought claims for excessive force in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth and
18 Fourteenth Amendment rights, for unlawful detention in violation of his Fourth Amendment
19 rights, and for deliberate fabrication of evidence in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
20 (Id. ¶¶ 43–72.) The complaint named Defendants Officer Colton Harvey, Officer Dillon Tindall,
21 Officer Jesus Arellano, Officer Thompson, Officer Oreja, Officer Seaborn, Officer Goldman, 25
22 Doe officers of the City of Pittsburg, Contra Costa County, and 25 Doe deputies of the County.
23 (Id. ¶¶ 2–10.) Plaintiff settled with the City of Pittsburg Officers in September 2021, (No. 3:20-
24 cv-08474-JSC, Dkt. No. 47), such that the only remaining named defendant was Contra Costa
25 County.
26 After the deadline to move to amend had passed, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an
27 amended complaint. (No. 3:20-cv-08474-JSC, Dkt. No. 50.) The Court denied the motion on
1 November 20, 2021. (Dkt. No. 1.)
2 DISCUSSION
3 I. Plaintiff’s Opposition
4 As a preliminary matter, the Court must address Plaintiff’s ex parte application to file his
5 opposition one day late. (Dkt. No. 22; see Dkt. No. 21.) Plaintiff’s counsel attests that his
6 computer crashed and prevented a timely filing. (Dkt. No. 22 at 2.) Notwithstanding the ex parte
7 styling, the Court construes Plaintiff’s application as a motion to enlarge time, which a party may
8 oppose. See N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 6-3(b). Defendants oppose on the grounds that Plaintiff’s request
9 is not made in good faith. (Dkt. No. 23.) Defendants aver that Plaintiff’s counsel has previously
10 filed strikingly similar requests citing a computer crash in several other cases, and that Plaintiff’s
11 counsel conducted other business on his computer late in the day that the opposition was due.
12 (Dkt. No. 23-1 ¶¶ 6–10.)
13 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B), the Court “may, for good cause, extend
14 the time . . . on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of
15 excusable neglect.” Factors relevant to excusable neglect include “the danger of prejudice to the
16 [opposing party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the
17 reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and
18 whether the movant acted in good faith.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd.
19 P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993).
20 The Court is troubled by Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration in light of the evidence submitted
21 by Defendants. Nonetheless, as explained at oral argument, even if the Court strikes the
22 opposition, it must still address the motion on the merits, especially since it presents a purely legal
23 question. The Court will separately address the declaration issue and addresses the merits of the
24 motion below.
25 II. Duplicative Complaint
26 “Plaintiffs generally have no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same
27 subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendant.” Adams v. Cal.
1 grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008); see United States v. Haytian Republic, 154
2 U.S. 118, 124–25 (1894). Claim splitting, or filing a duplicative complaint, is not an appropriate
3 way around the denial of leave to amend an earlier-filed complaint. See Curtis v. Citibank, N.A.,
4 226 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[M]uch of the [Curtis I proposed amended complaint] alleged
5 events that had occurred prior to Curtis I’s filing. If plaintiffs had timely raised those allegations,
6 they would have been heard in Curtis I. By filing them in a second action, plaintiffs attempted to
7 avoid the consequences of their delay.”). “To determine whether a suit is duplicative, we borrow
8 from the test for claim preclusion,” examining “whether the causes of action and relief sought, as
9 well as the parties or privies to the action, are the same.” Adams, 487 F.3d at 688–89.
10 A. Causes of Action
11 The transaction test determines whether the causes of action in the earlier- and later-filed
12 complaints are the same. Id. at 689. The test has four criteria, the last of which is most important:
13 (1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would
be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2)
14 whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two
actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same
15 right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional
nucleus of facts.
16
17 Id. (cleaned up). As in Adams, Pumphrey II clearly shares a transactional nucleus of facts with
18 Pumphrey I. Pumphrey II omits the Pittsburg officers and identifies the formerly unnamed County
19 deputies, but keeps the County as a defendant. It brings a new legal theory of denial of medical
20 care and disability discrimination, but keeps the Fourteenth Amendment claim. Finally, it drops
21 the factual allegations related to Plaintiff’s arrest by Pittsburg police officers, but keeps all the
22 allegations related to Plaintiff’s detention at Martinez Jail. See id. at 689–90 (later-filed complaint
23 identified additional defendants and legal theories but shared majority of claims and same set of
24 facts). For related reasons, Pumphrey II would present substantially the same evidence as
25 Pumphrey I and involves infringement of the same right.
26 Accordingly, Pumphrey I and II involve the same causes of action.
27 B. Parties or Privies
1 privies to the action[] are the same.” Id. at 689; see Rivera v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun.
2 Emps., AFL-CIO, Loc. 444, No. 3:16-cv-04959-WHO, 2017 WL 3021038, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Cal.
3 July 17, 2017) (explaining that Adams’ discussion of the virtual representation theory of privity
4 was overruled by Taylor v. Sturgell, but the remainder of Adams is good law); see also Miller v.
5 Najera, No. 20-17348, 2021 WL 6067003 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2021) (unpublished) (applying
6 Adams); Owens v. Braithwaite, 812 F. App’x 577 (9th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (same).
7 Given that Plaintiff already sued the County with the same causes of action in Pumphrey I,
8 his Pumphrey II complaint is duplicative against the County. See Amie v. County of Los Angeles,
9 No. CV 15-03134 DMG (PLAx), 2015 WL 13916084, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2015) (dismissing
10 identical defendants from later-filed suit). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion
11 to dismiss as to the County.
12 As to the County deputies named in Pumphrey II who are not parties to Pumphrey I, (Dkt.
13 No. 3 ¶¶ 3–7), the parties are not “the same.” Adams, 487 F.3d at 689. “Even when the parties are
14 not identical, privity may exist if there is substantial identity between parties, that is, when there is
15 sufficient commonality of interest.” Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
16 Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). Defendants argue that privity exists
17 because of a “pre-existing substantive legal relationship” between the County and the deputies and
18 because the County “adequately represented” the deputies in Pumphrey I. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894
19 (identifying six exceptions to the rule against nonparty preclusion).
20 1. Pre-existing Substantive Legal Relationship
21 The Supreme Court has explained that qualifying “pre-existing substantive legal
22 relationships” include “preceding and succeeding owners of property, bailee and bailor, and
23 assignee and assignor.” Id. “These exceptions originated as much from the needs of property law
24 as from the values of preclusion by judgment.” Id. (cleaned up). Defendants argue that the
25 employment relationship between the deputies and the County is a similar substantive legal
26 relationship. This argument fails to persuade because the deputies and the County are subject to
27 different theories and scopes of liability. See Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134
1 violations resulting from official county policy or custom.”); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
2 Servs. of City of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 690–95 (1978). They do not simply inherit the rights,
3 obligations, and defenses of the other. Whether the deputies are liable for excessive force is a
4 separate inquiry from whether the County is liable for their conduct. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691
5 (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words,
6 a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”). Defendants
7 cite cases with theories closer to vicarious governmental liability for the conduct of government
8 employees, which are distinct from the Monell context here. See Rasooly v. Tarin, 691 F. App’x
9 432, 433 (9th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (finding privity under California law where County would
10 be vicariously liable for child support enforcement employee’s conduct); Davis v. County of Maui,
11 No. 10–00070 KSC, 2010 WL 11531281, at *10 (D. Haw. May 4, 2010) (finding privity under
12 Hawaii law where government employees enforced a published rule on water meters).
13 Defendants’ insistence that there is a substantive legal relationship because the County
14 pays for the defense and any liability of the deputies is unsupported by any precedent. Instead, the
15 relationship of the County to the individual defendants is similar to that in Adams, where the
16 county agency employed the individual defendants. Adams held there was privity under the
17 virtual representation theory, 487 F.3d at 691, the theory which Taylor rejected, 553 U.S. at 904.
18 Thus, there is no legal basis for finding a substantive legal relationship under the facts alleged
19 here. Defendants’ reliance on Madrid v. Martin, No. C10-05015-JSW, 2011 WL 13257832 (N.D.
20 Cal. Mar. 7, 2011), is unpersuasive given that the opinion did not include any analysis of the
21 privity question.
22 Accordingly, Defendants have not established that they meet the pre-existing substantive
23 legal relationship exception to the rule against nonparty preclusion. See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894.
24 2. Adequate Representation
25 The Supreme Court has also “confirmed that, in certain limited circumstances, a nonparty
26 may be bound by a judgment because she was adequately represented by someone with the same
27 interests who was a party to the suit.” Id. (cleaned up). “Representative suits with preclusive
1 guardians, and other fiduciaries.” Id. (cleaned up); see, e.g., Bojorquez v. Abercrombie & Fitch,
2 Co., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1117, 1123–24 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that individual plaintiff in later-
3 filed suit was adequately represented as a class member in earlier-filed suit). Defendants argue
4 that the County adequately represented the deputies in Pumphrey I by opposing Plaintiff’s motion
5 for leave to amend to name the deputies. For similar reasons as the pre-existing substantive legal
6 relationship exception, Defendants have not established that this exception applies. The deputies
7 do not have the same interests as the County because they are subject to different theories of
8 liability. Additionally, the deputies are sued in their individual capacity, (Dkt. No. 3 ¶¶ 3–7), and
9 thus were not adequately represented by the County for which they worked in their official
10 capacity. See Amie, 2015 WL 13916084, at *5–6 (holding that officer sued in individual capacity
11 was not in privity with County).
12 Accordingly, Defendants have not established that they meet the adequate representation
13 exception to the rule against nonparty preclusion. See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894.
14 * * *
15 Although Pumphrey I and II involve the same causes of action, they involve privies only
16 with respect to the County, not the deputies. See Adams, 487 F.3d at 688–89. Accordingly, the
17 Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the County but DENIES as to the other
18 Defendants.
19 Where all or part of a complaint is duplicative, a court has discretion to “to dismiss [the]
20 later-filed complaint without prejudice, to consolidate the two actions, [] to stay or enjoin
21 proceedings, . . . or to dismiss the second action with prejudice.” Id. at 692; see, e.g., Amie, 2015
22 WL 13916084, at *6–7 (staying later-filed suit pending resolution of earlier-filed suit). The Court
23 exercises its discretion to dismiss the County from Pumphrey II with prejudice. “[W]here one
24 district court had duplicative suits contemporaneously pending on its docket, . . . [dismissal] with
25 prejudice . . . protect[s] the parties from vexatious and expensive litigation and [] serve[s] the
26 societal interest in bringing an end to disputes.” Adams, 487 F.3d at 692–93.
27 CONCLUSION
1 II complaint against Contra Costa County is dismissed with prejudice, but the remainder is not
2 || dismissed.
3 IT IS SO ORDERED.
4 Dated: March 3, 2022
5
6 ne
JACQUELINE SCOTT CORL
7 United States Magistrate Judge
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