The Women's Student Union v. U.S. Department of Education

1

2

3

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6

7 THE WOMEN’S STUDENT UNION, Case No. 21-cv-01626-EMC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF

9 v. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION,

AND DENYING AS MOOT MOTIONS

10 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, TO INTERVENE

11 Defendant. Docket Nos. 82, 88, 89

12

13

14 Plaintiff the Women’s Student Union (“WSU”) sues Defendant the U.S. Department of

15 Education (the “Department”) to set aside regulations enacted in 2020 that reduce federal

16 protections for students enrolled in public schools from sexual harassment and sexual violence

17 under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.SC. § 1681(a). See Docket No. 78

18 (“FAC”) ⁋ 8 (citing 85 Fed. Reg. 30,026 (May 19, 2020) (codified at various places in 34 C.F.R.

19 Pt. 106) (the “2020 Regulations”)). Plaintiff alleges that the 2020 Regulations violate the

20 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (C), because they are contrary to the

21 text and purpose of Title IX. FAC § Claim ¶¶ 1-7. The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s

22 complaint because, as alleged, the complaint did not demonstrate that Plaintiff had standing under

23 Article III to pursue its claims. Docket No. 75 (“Dismissal Order”). The Court granted Plaintiff

24 leave to amend its complaint, which Plaintiff did.

25 Now pending before the Court is the Department’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First

26 Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

27 Procedure 12(b)(1). See Docket No. 89 (“MTD”). Also pending before the Court are motions to

1 Rights in Education, Independent Women’s Law Center, and Speech First, Inc. Docket Nos. 82,

2 88.

3 For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Department’s motion because Plaintiff

4 lacks standing. Accordingly, the Court DENIES as moot the motions to intervene.

5 I. BACKGROUND

6 A. Title IX Enforcement Before the 2020 Regulations

7 Title IX of the Education Amendments states that “[n]o person in the United States shall,

8 on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

9 discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20

10 U.S.C § 1681(a). The statute defines “program or activity” as “all of the operations” of a school,

11 “any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.” Id. § 1687. Federal agencies that

12 disburse funds to educational institutions—including the Department of Education—are

13 “authorized and directed” by Congress to “effectuate the provisions of” Title IX “by issuing rules,

14 regulations, or orders of general applicability.” Id. § 1682. These agencies can compel school

15 districts to comply with the provisions of Title IX—and its implementing regulations—by

16 threatening to withhold federal education funds from noncompliant school districts. Id.

17 There are two ways to enforce Title IX. First, a plaintiff (usually a student) can sue a

18 school for damages in federal court as Title IX provides a private right of action. See Franklin v.

19 Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992). In such cases, however, students can recover

20 “only for harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars

21 the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit,” and they must prove the school’s

22 “deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or activities.” Davis v.

23 Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). This standard is met only if “an official

24 who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective

25 measures on the recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s

26 programs and fails adequately to respond.” Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,

27 290 (1998). This strict definition of sexual harassment and the requirements of actual knowledge

1 Second, Title IX may be enforced administratively by the Department through the issuance

2 of rules, regulations, and guidance documents. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292 (“Agencies generally

3 have authority to promulgate and enforce requirements that effectuate the statute’s

4 nondiscrimination mandate, 20 U.S.C. § 1682, even if those requirements do not purport to

5 represent a definition of discrimination under the statute.”). The Department’s own regulations

6 require its Office for Civil Rights (OCR) to investigate any administrative complaint it receives

7 from a member of the public that indicates gender-based discrimination or sexual harassment. See

8 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(c) (“[R]esponsible Department official or his designee will make a prompt

9 investigation whenever a . . . complaint . . . indicates a possible failure to comply.” (emphasis

10 added)); id. § 106.71 (Title IX regulation incorporating the procedural provisions of the

11 Department’s Title VI regulations). If the investigation “indicates a failure to comply” with the

12 regulations, the OCR “will so inform the recipient and the matter will be resolved by informal

13 means whenever possible.” Id. § 106.7(c). Because investigations are required, Plaintiff alleges

14 school districts are almost always willing to settle to avoid the termination of their federal funding.

15 See FAC ⁋ 75.

16 Plaintiff alleges that prior to the 2020 Regulations, the Department’s guidance

17 “consistently rejected the view that the courts’ standards for determining whether a private

18 damages action could be brought against a school should be incorporated into its administrative

19 enforcement process.” FAC ⁋⁋ 27–28 (citing Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034

20 (Mar. 13, 1997) (the “1997 Guidance”); Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, 66 Fed. Reg.

21 5,512-01 (Jan. 19, 2001) (the “2001 Guidance”)). Instead, the 2001 Guidance adopted a scope of

22 liability for administrative enforcement of Title IX broader than the Gebser/Davis framework. It:

23 (1) defined sexual harassment as “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature” that is “severe,

24 persistent, or pervasive;” and (2) stated that a school may be liable “whether or not it has ‘notice’

25 of the harassment.” U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Off. for Civil Rights, Revised Sexual Harassment

26 Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties (Jan.

27 19, 2001), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf (emphasis added).

1 B. The 2020 Regulations Incorporated the Gebser/Davis Framework

2 On May 19, 2020, under the leadership of then-Secretary of Education Elisabeth DeVos,

3 the Department issued the 2020 Regulations, which repudiated the Department’s prior guidance,

4 and largely aligned the standards for the OCR’s adjudication of Title IX administrative complaints

5 with the Gebser/Davis framework. See 85 Fed. Reg. at 30,033 (“The Department believes that

6 adapting the Gebser/Davis framework is appropriate for administrative enforcement, because the

7 adapted conditions (definitions of sexual harassment and actual knowledge) and liability standard

8 (deliberate indifference) reflected in these final regulations promote important policy objectives

9 with respect to a recipient’s legal obligations to respond to sexual harassment.”). Under the 2020

10 Regulations which narrowed the scope of liability, according to Plaintiff, schools must respond

11 only to harassment that (1) is severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive conduct, (2) takes place

12 on school grounds (or in an education program), regardless of where its effect is felt; (3) a school

13 employee has actual knowledge of the harassment; and that (4) a school may act with indifference

14 to the harassment, as long as it avoids being ‘deliberately indifferent. FAC ¶¶ 38, 48-49, 54, 60;

15 see also 85 Fed. Reg. at 30,032–34.

16 C. Plaintiff’s Injuries as Alleged in the FAC

17 WSU is an approved student body association of California’s Berkeley Unified School

18 District (“BUSD”). FAC ¶ 76. Plaintiff’s mission is to reduce instances of sexual harassment and

19 address barriers to success and wellbeing for young women and non-binary students at Berkeley

20 High School (“BHS”) by (1) advocating that the school district adopt policies to protect its

21 members and the student body from sex discrimination and sexual harassment; and (2) providing

22 training to the student body about their rights and responsibilities under school policy, state law,

23 and federal law. See id. ¶¶ 78-79.

24 Plaintiff alleges that members of WSU have been subject to various forms of sexual

25 harassment. FAC ¶¶ 88-89, 91-93, 97-98. Those experiences result in significant obstacles to

26 those students’ ability to learn and thrive in school—obstacles that “result not just from the initial

27 harassment alone, but also because their school fails to respond to the harassment promptly and

1 Plaintiff alleges that because BUSD has consistently failed to address sexual harassment

2 adequately, WSU would like the Department to investigate BUSD and spur policy changes. FAC

3 ¶ 83. In February 2021, WSU filed an administrative complaint with the Department’s Office of

4 Civil Rights against BUSD alleging several violations of Title IX that Plaintiff contends “are no

5 longer cognizable,” id. ¶ 86, and, but for the 2020 Regulations, it would seek to allege further

6 violations, including:

7 • Off-campus harassment: BUSD allegedly has an official and

explicit policy of not addressing any harassment that occurs

8 outside of school, even if it affects students’ ability to learn.

Id. ¶ 93. WSU specifically complained to the Department

9 about harassment that a WSU member had been subjected to

by a classmate, “John,” who repeatedly texted and made

10 unwanted sexual comments about her body. Id. ¶¶ 91, 104.

Additionally, since the February 2021 complaint, a different

11 WSU member was repeatedly harassed by John on a public

bus they both take to school, where he allegedly made

12 sexually explicit comments and touched the members

shoulder and legs. Id. ¶ 92. WSU alleges it would complain

13 of those events to the Department if the 2020 Regulations

did not make it futile to do so. Id. ¶ 105.

14

• Severe or pervasive harassment: Much of the sexual

15 harassment that WSU members and other BHS students

experience is severe but not pervasive, or pervasive but not

16 severe, but not both severe and pervasive, such as unwanted

sexual comments in class or walking through the halls my

17 multiple classmates against a single target individual. FAC ¶

87. For example, in September 20201, John harassed WSU

18 member “Jamie” in a shared class by telling her of explicit

details about his penis. Id. ¶ 89.

19

• Harassment of which BUSD should know: In Plaintiff’s

20 February 2021 complaint, it complained about hostile

environments that occurred in Zoom “breakout rooms”

21 during remote learning about which the school had

constructive but not actual knowledge. Id. ¶¶ 97-99.

22

23 According to Plaintiff, “but for the Department 2020 Regulations,” WSU’s administrative

24 complaint would be opened by investigation by the Department’s Office for Civil Rights, but

25 because the 2020 regulations no longer make their allegations unlawful, “without a doubt, [OCR}

26 cannot investigate and find BUSD in violation of Title for how it handled” the complained-of

27 sexual harassment. FAC ¶ 106. Plaintiff observes that despite its prompt replies to follow up

1 year after the complaint was filed), OCR has yet to resolve the complaint, let alone open an

2 investigation. Id. ¶ 114. Plaintiff alleges that it has not heard anything from OCR about the status

3 of its administrative complaint since July 6, 2021. Id. ¶ 113.

4 Plaintiff alleges that it has suffered “procedural injury” because “the 2020 Regulations

5 deny WSU and its members the right they had prior to the 2020 Regulations to have their

6 administrative complaints investigated.” Id. ¶ 115. The denial of that “procedural right,” Plaintiff

7 contends, “impinges on the concrete interest of WSU and its members to participate in and benefit

8 from BUSD’s education program because the denial allows the hostile environment at BUSD to

9 continue unremediated.” Id. ¶ 116. Plaintiff further alleges that “the cumulative effect of each of

10 the challenged 2020 Regulations” is to “lead to students experiencing more sexual harassment and

11 receiving fewer remedies.” Id. ¶ 120. The Regulations are also alleged to injure Plaintiff because

12 they create an incentive for schools like BHS to “avoid learning about the harassment its students

13 experience, in order to avoid triggering any obligations under the Regulations” and “discourage

14 students from filing complaints with their schools in the first place.” Id. ¶¶ 121-22. Finally,

15 Plaintiff alleges that the 2020 Regulations “discourage BUSH From taking action that were

16 previously required under the Department’s prior interpretations of Title IX” and, thus, “deprive

17 WSU of a critical bargaining tool as it seeks to achieve. . . changes at BHS as part of WSU’s

18 organizational purpose.” Id. ¶ 127.

19 D. Procedural Background and Recent Events

20 On March 8, 2021, WSU filed this action challenging the 2020 Regulations as unlawful

21 under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). WSU alleges that the 2020

22 Regulations are arbitrary and capricious, not supported by a reasoned explanation, and conflict

23 with Title IX. FAC at 30-31.

24 On September 2, 2021, the Court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss the

25 complaint for lack of jurisdiction because Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege organizational or

26 associational standing. See Dismissal Order. With respect to organizational standing, the Court

27 explained that “Plaintiff may not establish injury by engaging in activities that it would normally

1 investigating allegations of sexual harassment, meeting with school administrators) were typical

2 pursuits. Id. at 9–11. Similarly, on associational standing, the Court explained, “Plaintiff fails to

3 plausibly allege that its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right,” so it

4 could not establish standing on their behalf. Id. at 13–14. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to

5 amend its complaint.

6 On October 4, 2021, Plaintiff timely filed an amended complaint which includes additional

7 allegations related to WSU members’ experiences of sexual harassment, that WSU and its member

8 would file additional administrative complaints with the Department but for the 2020 Regulations,

9 and that the Department had still not responded to WSU’s administrative complaint. See generally

10 FAC ¶¶ 86-114.

11 On January 19, 2022, the Department’s Office for Civil Rights issued a letter to Plaintiff’s

12 counsel stating that it “understands [Plaintiff’s] allegations to be that [BUSD] has allowed a

13 hostile environment on the basis of sex to exist at Berkeley High School by failing to respond

14 promptly and effectively to incidents of sexual harassment at the School from the 2018-19 school

15 year to the present.” Docket No. 111-1 at 2. The letter further stated that “OCR is opening the

16 complaint allegation for investigation.” Id. OCR noted that “with regard to alleged incidents that

17 occurred prior to [August 14, 2020], OCR is evaluating [Plaintiff’s] complaint based on the prior

18 Title IX regulation that was in effect at the time when the alleged acts occurred,” id. at 2 n.1,

19 implying that incidents which occurred after August 14, 2020 would be evaluated under the 2020

20 Regulations. That same day, the Department’s OCR issued a letter informing BUSD’s

21 Superintendent that it had opened an investigation of the District. Docket No. 112-2.

22 Now pending is the Department’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

23 for lack of jurisdiction because Plaintiff lacks standing. See MTD. Also pending before the Court

24 are motions to intervene as Defendants by the State of Texas and three groups – the Foundation

25 for Individual Rights in Education, Independent Women’s Law Center, and Speech First, Inc.

26 Docket Nos. 82, 88.

27 ///

1 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

2 A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction/Standing (Rule 12(b)(1))

3 Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

4 “[L]ack of Article III standing requires dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under

5 [Rule] 12(b)(1).” Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). The “irreducible

6 constitutional minimum” of standing requires that a “plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in

7 fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to

8 be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (“Spokeo II”), 136 S. Ct.

9 1540, 1547 (2016). These three elements are referred to as, respectively, injury-in-fact, causation,

10 and redressability. Planned Parenthood of Greater Was. & N. Idaho v. U.S. Dep't of Health &

11 Human Servs., 946 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir. 2020). “The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal

12 jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing these elements,” which at the pleadings stage means

13 “clearly . . . alleg[ing] facts demonstrating each element.” Spokeo II, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (quoting

14 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975)).

15 A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be factual or facial. See Safe Air for Everyone v.

16 Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “In a facial attack,” “the challenger asserts that the

17 allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.”

18 Id. The court “resolves a facial attack as it would a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6):

19 Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s

20 favor, the court determines whether the allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the

21 court’s jurisdiction.” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014).

22 “[I]n a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by

23 themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at

24 1038. In resolving such an attack, unlike with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court

25 “may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a

26 motion for summary judgment.” Id. Moreover, the court “need not presume the truthfulness of

27 the plaintiff's allegations.” Id.

1 Either way, “it is within the trial court’s power to allow or to require the plaintiff to supply,

2 by amendment to the complaint or by affidavits, further particularized allegations of fact deemed

3 supportive of plaintiff’s standing.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; see also Table Bluff Reservation

4 (Wiyot Tribe) v. Philip Morris, Inc., 256 F.3d 879, 882 (9th Cir. 2001) (in assessing standing, the

5 court may consider “the complaint and any other particularized allegations of fact in affidavits or

6 in amendments to the complaint”).

7 III. DISCUSSION

8 In response to the Department’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for lack

9 of subject matter because Plaintiff does not have standing, Plaintiff does not argue it has

10 organizational standing, as it did in defending its standing to pursue the initial complaint. Cf.

11 Dismissal Order at 8-13. Instead, Plaintiff contends that WSU “has standing in its own right and

12 on behalf of its members” under the “special standing doctrine [which] applies when litigants

13 attempt to vindicate procedural rights.” Docket No. 103 (“Opp.”) at 16-17 (citing Ctr. for Auto

14 Safety, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 342 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11-12 (D.D.C. 2004))

15 (emphasis added); see also id. at 22-23 (“WSU does not allege an organizational standing theory;

16 WSU argues instead that it has been deprived of a procedural right designed to protect the concrete

17 interests of WSU and its members.”). Plaintiff argues that the 2020 Regulations “strip them

18 [WSU and its members] of their procedural right to trigger an investigation of BUSD through [the

19 Department’s] administrative complaint system for certain types of sexual harassment that WSU

20 members have experienced and that is no longer considered a violation of Title IX.” Opp. at 17

21 (emphasis added).

22 While Plaintiff artfully frames the complaint as a dispute over procedure, at its core, the

23 FAC takes issue with the substance of the 2020 Regulations. Plaintiff alleges that the substance of

24 the 2020 Regulations violate the APA and Title IX. FAC § Claim ¶¶ 1-7. Plaintiff’s allegations

25 of deprivations of process are derivative of Plaintiff’s challenges to the legality of the substance of

26 the Regulations. Therefore, as explained below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not plausibly

27 alleged procedural injury to establish Article III standing to pursue this action.

1 A. Standing Analysis for Procedural Injury

2 As noted above, WSU does not advance a conventional theory of standing based on

3 organizational or associational standing. Instead, it relies on standing based on procedural injury.

4 “A special standing doctrine applies when litigants attempt to vindicate procedural rights, such as

5 the right to have notice of proposed regulatory action and to offer comments relating to such

6 action.” Ctr. For Auto Safety, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 2d at 11-12 (citing Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of

7 Florida v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). To show a cognizable procedural

8 injury for standing purposes, “[a plaintiff] must allege. . . that (1) the [agency] violated certain

9 procedural rules; (2) these rules protect [a plaintiff's] concrete interests; and (3) it is reasonably

10 probable that the challenged action will threaten their concrete interests.” Citizens for Better

11 Forestry v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 969–70 (9th Cir. 2003).

12 As to the first prong, “Procedural injury results from the violation of a statute or regulation

13 that guarantees a particular procedure.” Californians for Renewable Energy v. United States

14 Env’t Prot. Agency, No. C 15-3292 SBA, 2018 WL 1586211, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2018)

15 (citing West v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Transp., 206 F.3d 920, 930 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000)) (emphasis

16 added); see also Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 970–71 (“[W]holesale neglect of the

17 regulations' mandatory inclusion of the public in the process results in a procedural injury.”)

18 (footnote and citation omitted, emphasis added); City of Sausalito v. O'Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197

19 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] cognizable procedural injury exists for Article III purposes when, because of

20 a failure to honor a statutorily required procedure, it is ‘reasonably probable that the challenged

21 action will threaten [a plaintiff's] concrete interests.’”) (emphasis added); Fla. Audubon Soc. v.

22 Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“a plaintiff may have standing to challenge the failure

23 of an agency to abide by a procedural requirement”) (emphasis added). Procedural injury flows

24 from the violation of a procedural right; a deprivation of a required process to which plaintiff is

25 entitled as a matter of law.

26 “[A] substantive injury results from the violation of a statute or regulation that guarantees a

27 particular result.” Californians for Renewable Energy, 2018 WL 1586211, at *7 (emphasis

1 substantive action that may be taken. See, e.g., City of Sausalito, 386 F.3d at 1197 (“For purposes

2 of Article III standing, we do not require a plaintiff to demonstrate that a procedurally proper

3 [Environmental Impact Statement] will necessarily protect his or her concrete interest in the

4 park.”).

5 On the second prong, “[i]n the context of procedural violations, the injury-in-fact

6 requirement is met if ‘the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened concrete

7 interest of [the plaintiff] that is the ultimate basis of [its] standing.’” Nat’l Fam. Farm Coal. V.

8 EPA, 966 F.3d 893, 909 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Salmon Spawning & Recovery All. V. Gutierrez,

9 545 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also Ctr. for L. & Educ. v. Dep't of Educ., 396 F.3d

10 1152, 1159–60 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Appellants must show both (1) that their procedural right has

11 been violated, and (2) that the violation of that right has resulted in an invasion of their concrete

12 and particularized interest. ‘[A] prospective plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant caused

13 the particularized injury, and not just the alleged procedural violation.’”) (citation omitted).

14 And, on the third prong, a plaintiff “need only show that the exercise of a procedural right

15 ‘could protect [its] concrete interests.” Id. (quoting Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States,

16 306 F.3d 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2002), and Cottonwood Env’t Law Ctr. V. U.S. Forest Serv., 789 F.3d

17 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2015). The focus is on process, not outcome.

18 Accordingly, a plaintiff’s “successful showing of a procedural injury lightens its burden on

19 the remaining Article III standing requirements.” Tinian Women Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy,

20 976 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2020). Specifically, a plaintiff “can establish standing without

21 meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.” Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969,

22 975-77 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). “When alleging the deprivation of a procedural right,

23 ‘instead of needing to establish that compelling the agency to follow the correct procedure would

24 lead to a substantive result that favors the petitioner’s concrete interests, the petitioner need only

25 show that its concrete interests could be better protected.’” Young v. Trump, 506 F. Supp. 3d 921,

26 935 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Pres. Office v. FERC, 949

27 F.3d 8, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2020)).

1 B. Plaintiff’s Alleged Procedural Injury

2 Plaintiff argues that it has suffered procedural injury-in-fact because “[t]he 2020

3 Regulations narrow and weaken an administrative enforcement scheme that was previously

4 available to WSU and its members” – the Department’s mandatory obligation to “make a prompt

5 investigation whenever. . . a complaint . . . indicates a possible failure to comply” with the

6 protections of Title IX. Opp. at 17 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 100.7). Plaintiff argues that it has

7 adequately alleged procedural injury because the FAC “alleges BUSD policies and practices, and

8 numerous instances of unchecked harassment suffered by students, that can no longer trigger an

9 investigation by [the Department].” Id. at 18. Plaintiff contends that the procedural mechanism of

10 the Department conducting an Investigation protected Plaintiff’s concrete interest in “protect[ing]

11 students, like WSU’s members, from sexual harassment and to ensure that they can learn in an

12 environment safe from unlawful discrimination.” Opp. at 20.

13 Plaintiff’s theory of injury, however, fails to satisfy the first prong of the procedural injury

14 standard: it does not allege a “violation of a statute or regulation that guarantees a particular

15 procedure.” Californians for Renewable Energy, 2018 WL 1586211, at *7 (emphasis added);

16 Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 969-70.

17 The source of the procedural right which Plaintiff alleges the Department violated is 34

18 C.F.R § 100.7(c). That provision provides, in relevant part:

19 Investigations. The responsible Department official or his designee

will make a prompt investigation whenever a compliance review,

20 report, complaint, or any other information indicates a possible

failure to comply with this part.

21

22 Id. (emphases added). There is no guarantee of an investigation. The Department’s obligation to

23 “make a prompt investigation” is contingent on the Department’s receipt of information, including

24 through a complaint, which the Department determines “indicates a possible failure to comply”

25 with the relevant substantive law. Id. Under § 100.7(c), the Department is not required to

26 conduct an investigation upon the receipt of any complaint, and Plaintiff is not entitled to an

27 investigation by simply submitting a complaint. Instead, an investigation only becomes

1 comply” with the substance of the Title IX regulations.

2 This regulatory provision contrasts with the unqualified, mandatory, procedural

3 requirements extant in cases finding procedural injury. See, e.g., California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558,

4 571 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding procedural injury where agency issued “[interim final rules] without

5 notice and comment as required under the [Administrative Procedure Act]”) (emphasis added);

6 Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 970 (“Citizens were deprived of the opportunity to

7 comment on the USDA's EA and FONSI at all points in the rulemaking process. This deprivation

8 violated their rights under the regulations implementing NEPA. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (‘The

9 agency shall involve the public, to the extent practicable, in preparing [EAs] ....’); id. § 1506.6

10 (‘Agencies shall ... [m]ake diligent efforts to involve the public in preparing and implementing

11 their NEPA procedures[,] ... [p]rovide public notice of ... the availability of environmental

12 documents so as to inform those persons ... who may be interested or affected[,][and] ... [s]olicit

13 appropriate information from the public.’)”); Beeman v. TDI Managed Care Servs., Inc., 449 F.3d

14 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Plaintiffs make out a procedural injury: the failure on the part of the

15 [Pharmacy Benefit Managers] to follow the statutory procedures requiring they conduct studies

16 and provide them to third parties” where the relevant statutory provision stated “study report. . .

17 shall be transmitted by certified mail by each prescription drug claims processor to the chief

18 executive officer or designee, of each client for whom it performs claims processing services. . .

19 no less often than every 24 months”). Plaintiff fails to cite any cases finding procedural injury

20 involving similar procedural rules that are contingent on an agency’s determination of substantive

21 violations of law.

22 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the harm that Plaintiff alleges – its inability to “trigger an

23 investigation” by the Department pursuant to the pre-2020 rules – does not stem from deficiencies

24 or failures in the Department’s compliance with the process set out in 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(c).

25 Plaintiff does not challenge the Department’s procedures for reviewing or adjudicating

26 administrative complaints, which are set forth in the Department’s Case Processing Manual. FAC

27 ¶ 66. Plaintiff does not allege that any of the Case Processing Manual procedures are unlawful,

1 Plaintiff challenges, in essence, the substance of the 2020 Regulations – the Department’s changes

2 to the substantive definitions of what constitutes sexual harassment, where harassment must take

3 place to trigger affirmative obligations by a school, and the standard by which liability of a school

4 is assessed. See FAC ¶¶ 86-103.

5 Plaintiff’s briefing acknowledges that its theory of procedural injury is dependent on its

6 argument that the substance of the challenged 2020 Regulations is unlawful:

7 In other words, [the Department’s] interpretation of the substantive

scope of Title IX determines the availability of its administrative

8 enforcement mechanism. If a complaint does not allege conduct

that, if true, would violate Title IX, then [the Department] cannot

9 investigate. But if it does, [the Department] must open an

investigation—and if that investigation further reveals conduct that

10 violates Title IX, [the Department] must provide appropriate

remedies.

11

12 Opp. at 18 (emphasis added).

13 That Plaintiff’s concern is with the substance of the laws it challenges, not the procedure,

14 is further evinced by the relief that Plaintiff seeks in this case -- a “permanent injunction holding

15 unlawful and setting aside the [2020] Regulations challenged in this Complaint.” FAC at 32.

16 Such relief would not limited to requiring a procedure; it would change the substantive meaning

17 of the Title IX regulations.

18 The Department argues with some merit that Plaintiff’s assertion of a procedural injury, if

19 accepted here, would “render every law procedural”:

20 After all, every change to substantive law affects the type of

complaints that may be filed: for example, a tort reform law that

21 eliminates certain torts narrows the type of complaints that may be

filed; prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation

22 broadens the type of charges that may be filed with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission; and establishing what forms

23 of sexual harassment violate Title IX affects the type of

administrative complaints that may be filed with the Department.

24

25 Reply at 7.

26 Indeed, the logic of Plaintiff’s standing theory is not limited to changes in Title IX’s

27 investigation criteria. If it is claimed that the 2001 regulations were insufficiently protective of

1 those regulations under the procedural injury theory; the OCR investigation would not be available

2 on as a broad a basis as that claimant believes is proper. In short, Plaintiff’s procedural injury

3 theory is expansive and would not be limited to changes in the Department’s regulations.

4 Plaintiff’s reliance on Young v. Trump, 506 F. Supp. 3d. 921, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2020), appeal

5 dismissed sub nom. Young v. Biden, 2021 WL 3507648 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2021), is misplaced. In

6 Young, this Court found procedural injury where Plaintiffs alleged a “complete freeze of their

7 beneficiaries’ immigrant visa petitions.” Id. The Court reasoned that Plaintiffs’ “important

8 procedural right” was violated by the alleged fact that “consular officials [were] categorically

9 precluded from processing Plaintiffs’ immigrant visa applications.” Id. at 936. The alleged

10 violation was not concerned with the substantive standard for issuance of a visa, but the procedural

11 right conferred by statute of obtaining the timely processing and adjudication of the visa

12 applications. That procedural right obtained irrespective of the ultimate outcome of the

13 adjudication.

14 Similarly, Plaintiff’s citations to three other cases purportedly finding procedural injury,

15 Opp. at 21, are inapposite. Unlike here, two of those cases involved claims challenging specific,

16 mandatory, procedural rules established by law, rights were not qualified by the agency’s

17 determination of whether substantive standards were met. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. United

18 States Dep't of Educ., 407 F. Supp. 3d 524, 533-34 (D. Md. 2019) (“the Amended Complaint

19 alleges that OCR complaints filed by COPAA member Katie Kelly, an attorney for students with

20 disabilities, were subject to dismissal under the March 2018 Manual” pursuant to a “provision

21 requiring dismissal of complaints by individuals who have filed previously”); Californians for

22 Renewable Energy, 2018 WL 1586211, at *8 (“The gravamen of Plaintiffs' claims is that the EPA

23 failed to issue mandatory preliminary findings within 180 days of accepting their respective

24 complaints for investigation, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 7.115.”). And the third case Plaintiff cites,

25 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 797 F.3d 1087, 1094 (D.C.

26 Cir. 2015), applies an organizational standing analysis – it does not examine whether the plaintiff

27 had shown procedural injury.

1 Plaintiff’s reliance on Committee for Full Employment v. Blumenthal is similarly

2 misplaced. In Committee for Full Employment, the D.C. Circuit held that Plaintiffs had

3 demonstrated procedural injury where they filed numerous charges of discrimination with the

4 Office of Revenue Sharing pursuant to the “agency’s procedural regulations” which “entitled

5 complainants to a review of their complaint,” but where Plaintiffs had not received any word of

6 action by the agency on their complaints. 606 F.2d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court

7 reasoned that, “Complainants are injured if this procedural right is denied to them, regardless of

8 whether their complaint is ultimately found meritorious” and that “the complaints that they have

9 filed with [the agency] have not received the attention due under the Act and regulations.” Id.

10 (emphasis added). Importantly, the D.C. Circuit found the Plaintiffs had established standing on

11 their theory of procedural injury because “[a] court can redress [their] injury by, e.g., ordering [the

12 agency] to process promptly [Plaintiffs’] complaints.” Id.

13 Tellingly, the remedy Plaintiffs seek here is not an order directing the Department to

14 “process promptly” Plaintiff’s complaint. Id. Instead, Plaintiff seeks to set aside and enjoin

15 operation of the 2020 Regulations: a decidedly substantive remedy because Plaintiff’s complaint

16 challenges substantive law. Cf. California v. Health & Hum. Servs., 281 F. Supp. 3d 806, 821–22

17 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd in relevant part in California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2018)

18 (“Plaintiffs have stated a procedural injury that is sufficient for the purposes of Article III

19 standing. They assert that Defendants failed to comply with the APA's notice and comment

20 requirement, resulting in Plaintiffs' being denied the opportunity to comment and be heard”).

21 Vacatur of the 2020 Regulations is not a procedural remedy; it is not a request “that the agency

22 follow the correct procedures.” Salmon Spawning & Recovery All. v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220,

23 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2008). In the final analysis, Plaintiff seeks a “guarantee[d] . . . particular

24 result.” Californians for Renewable Energy, 2018 WL 1586211, at *7.

25 Indeed, the procedural injury of not being able to trigger an investigation by the

26 Department, cannot be sustained here. After Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint, the

27 Department’s Office for Civil Rights adjudicated the administrative complaint and opened an

1 arguendo that Plaintiff had demonstrated a procedural right to an investigation under 34 C.F.R. §

2 100.7(c), the Department has now acted on Plaintiff’s administrative complaint and has opened an

3 investigation into BUSD based on Plaintiff’s allegations. See Docket No. 111-1, 112-2. Contrary

4 to Plaintiff’s assertions, see Docket No. 111, nothing in the Department’s letter opening an

5 investigation indicates that the Department declined to investigate any portion of Plaintiff’s

6 administrative complaint. Cf. Docket No. 111-1 at 2 (OCR “understands [Plaintiff’s] allegations

7 to be that [BUSD] has allowed a hostile environment on the basis of sex to exist at Berkeley High

8 School by failing to respond promptly and effectively to incidents of sexual harassment at the

9 School from the 2018-19 school year to the present . . . OCR is opening the complaint allegation

10 for investigation.”).1

11 Plaintiff contends that because the investigation decision confirms that the Department will

12 evaluate its investigation of incidents that took place after August 14, 2020 under the 2020

13 Regulations, “the crux of WSU’s standing theory—that WSU can no longer raise certain

14 allegations before OCR, depriving it of an important procedural protection—remains the same.”

15 Docket No. 111 at 2. However, the Department did open an investigation on the allegations that

16 Plaintiffs fear are not cognizable under the 2020 Regulations. The Department did not decline to

17 conduct an investigation on any grounds.

18 To the extent Plaintiff contends that future complaints of incidents not cognizable under

19 the 2020 Regulations will not be investigated by the Department, this assertion is speculative. Not

20 only has the Department in fact opened an investigation of Plaintiff’s allegedly non-cognizable

21 allegations, but nothing in 34 C.F.R. 100.7(c) or elsewhere in the regulatory framework prohibits

22 the Department from deciding to open an investigation of a future complaint. At most, the

23 regulations do not mandate an investigation be opened; it does not bar such investigations.

24

25

1 Plaintiff asks the Court to read OCR”s summary of Plaintiff’s allegations as related to “sexual

harassment at the School” to imply that OCR will not investigate any allegations in the complaint

26

of incidents of sexual harassment that occurred outside of the school, per the 2020 Regulations.

Docket No. 111. But the letter contains no language indicating that OCR has rejected any part of

27

Plaintiff’s administrative complaint, that OCR is declining to address any allegations in the

1 Plaintiff’s response to the Department’s decision to investigate the allegations in its

2 administrative complaint underscores the flaws in Plaintiff’s theory of procedural injury. Plaintiff

3 is not alleging any violations by the Department of procedural requirements. The Department has

4 now acted on Plaintiff’s complaint, and has initiated the process of conducting an investigation.

5 In summary, Plaintiff has not shown a cognizable injury because it has not satisfied the

6 first prong of the procedural injury analysis: it has not alleged the Department violated its

7 procedural rights in a manner that triggers a more lenient standard for standing. Thus, Plaintiff

8 has not established that it has suffered procedural injury for purposes of Article III standing.

9 C. Leave to Amend

10 The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s initial complaint because it determined that

11 Plaintiff had not alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate organizational or associational standing.

12 See generally Dismissal Order. The Court, however, identified the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s

13 allegations in support of organizational and associational standing, see id. at 8-14, and granted

14 Plaintiff leave to amend its complaint, id. at 14. For example, the Court previously held that

15 Plaintiff failed “to plausibly allege that its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their

16 own under the first prong of the associational standing test” because the initial complaint includes

17 only

18 boilerplate allegations [that] merely speculate that the 2020

Regulations will lead BUSD to disregard certain sexual harassment

19 complaints; there are no specific allegations in the complaint that

BUSD has in fact disregarded a single sexual harassment complaint

20 or that a single student has chosen not to report or file a complaint

after suffering sexual harassment; let alone that there has been a

21 noticeable decline in sexual harassment reports at BHS or BUSD.

22 Dismissal Order at 13-14. Plaintiff bolstered the factual allegations of injury in its amended

23 complaint, see FAC ¶¶ 89, 91-92, 98, but did not expressly connect those allegations to the 2020

24 Regulations. Additionally, Plaintiff pursued, for the first time, a different theory of standing in its

25 opposition brief – associational standing based on procedural injury. See Opp. 22-23 (“WSU does

26 not allege an organizational standing theory; WSU argues instead that is has been deprived of a

27 procedural right”); 23 (“WSU’s standing does not depend on the 2020 Regulations causing

1 2020 Regulations deprive WSU of a procedural mechanism for obtaining redress for BUSD’s

2 unwillingness to act.”), 26-27 (“Before the 2020 Regulations, WSU could seek administrative

3 redress for certain instances of sexual harassment. Now, it cannot. That procedural deprivation

4 threatens WSU and its members’ concrete interest in an educational environment free from sexual

5 harassment and discrimination. WSU and its members therefore possess standing to challenge the

6 2020 Regulations.”). As explained above, however, Plaintiff failed to establish standing under its

7 theory of procedural injury because Plaintiff’s allegations are not cognizable under the doctrine of

8 procedural injury.

9 Although Plaintiff’s theory of procedural injury is insufficient to establish standing, the

10 Court cannot exclude as futile the possibility that Plaintiff might still successfully amend its

11 complaint to establish organizational or traditional associational standing by addressing the

12 deficiencies the Court identified in its initial Dismissal Order. Thus, the Court grants Plaintiff

13 leave to amend its complaint. See Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th

14 Cir. 2003) (“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not appropriate unless it is

15 clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.” (citation omitted)).

16 D. Motions to Intervene

17 Also pending before the Court are motions to intervene as Defendants by the State of

18 Texas and three groups – the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, Independent

19 Women’s Law Center, and Speech First, Inc. Docket Nos. 82, 88. Because the Court grants the

20 Department’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Firs Amended Complaint, the Court denies as moot the

21 Proposed Intervenors’ motions. The Court’s denial without prejudice as to the Proposed

22 Intervenors re-filing their respective motions if and when Plaintiff files a second amended

23 complaint.

24 ///

25 ///

26 ///

27 ///

1 IV. CONCLUSION

2 The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the FAC for lack of subject matter

3 jurisdiction because Plaintiff has failed to establish standing. Docket No. 89. Plaintiff’s FAC is

4 dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint within thirty (30)

5 days of entry of this order. The Court DENIES as moot and without prejudice the motions to

6 intervene. Docket Nos. 82, 88.

7 This order disposes of Docket Nos. 82, 88, 89.

8

9 IT IS SO ORDERED.

10

11 Dated: February 16, 2022

12

13 ______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

14 United States District Judge

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