The opinion
1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 HAROLD DAVIS, Case No. 19-cv-07650-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR DE
NOVO DETERMINATION OF
9 v. DISCOVERY DISPUTE; DENYING
MOTION FOR LIMITED DISCOVERY
10 PINTEREST, INC., CONTINUANCE; AND DENYING
MOTION TO SEAL
11 Defendant.
Re: Dkt. Nos. 114, 123, 124, 139
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14 Pending before the Court are several motions filed by the parties related to their ongoing
15 discovery disputes and the case schedule. The Court finds these matters appropriate for
16 disposition without oral argument and the matters are deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b).
17 I. BACKGROUND
18 A. Factual Background
19 Plaintiff Harold Davis is a digital artist and professional photographer. See Dkt. No. 56
20 (“SAC”) at ¶ 12. Defendant is an online platform that allows users to create their own virtual
21 image boards or “boards,” by “pinning” images to their boards. See id. at ¶¶ 2, 23. These images
22 may be captured by Defendant’s users, or may be copied from other sources on the internet. See
23 id. at ¶¶ 4, 23. According to Plaintiff, Defendant “does not have in place a system of screening the
24 Pins for copyright notices or other indicia of copyright ownership associated with the ‘pinned’
25 images.” See id. at ¶ 27. Rather, Defendant “monetizes those images . . . by displaying and
26 distributing those images to its users, which are incorporated with targeted advertisement.” Id. at
27 ¶ 6. Defendant also “makes downloading an image exceedingly easy” for its users, and provides
1 64. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant “deliberately removes indicia of copyright ownership
2 to render its paid advertisement more effective and to actively thwart the efforts of copyright
3 owners, like Plaintiff, to police the misuse of their works on and through Pinterest’s website and
4 app.” Id. at ¶¶ 27, 40–58. Plaintiff alleges that “[a]s a result of the copying tools Pinterest
5 provides, Pinterest is the source of rampant [copyright] infringement by third parties . . . .” Id. at
6 ¶ 65. Plaintiff alleges that he has identified “thousands upon thousands of instances where
7 Plaintiff’s federally copyrighted images are used by Pinterest to hawk goods and services.” Id. at
8 ¶¶ 7, 29–33. Based on these facts, Plaintiff filed a complaint for both direct and contributory
9 copyright infringement. See id. at ¶¶ 83–99.
10 B. Procedural History
11 Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on November 20, 2019. See Dkt. No. 1. Defendant
12 subsequently moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s contributory infringement claim. See Dkt. No. 17.
13 Rather than file an opposition or statement of non-opposition to the motion, see Civil L.R. 7-3(b),
14 Plaintiff filed the first amended complaint on March 11, 2020. See FAC. Defendant moved to
15 dismiss the contributory infringement claim, and the Court granted the motion on July 22, 2020.
16 See Dkt. No. 39. Rather than just address the deficiencies the Court identified as to his claim for
17 contributory infringement, Plaintiff sought to add a new claim to his complaint, a violation of the
18 Digital Millennial Copyright Act (the “DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b), and to bring the action on
19 behalf of a putative class. See Dkt. Nos. 41, 52. The Court denied the motion. See Dkt. No. 55.
20 Plaintiff then filed his second amended complaint on November 11, 2020. See SAC. Defendant
21 again moved to dismiss the contributory infringement claim, Dkt. No. 62, and the Court granted
22 the motion, Dkt. No. 75. Plaintiff’s case, therefore, consists of a single claim for direct copyright
23 infringement.
24 II. MOTION FOR DE NOVO DETERMINATION OF DISPOSITIVE RELIEF
GRANTED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE THOMAS S. HISXON
25
26 Plaintiff asks the Court to limit the relief that Judge Hixson provided in his July 20, 2021,
27 discovery order. See Dkt. No. 114.
1 A. Background
2 As relevant to this motion, the parties submitted their joint case management statement on
3 November 17, 2020. See Dkt. No. 59. In it, the parties raised a dispute about whether and when
4 Plaintiff should be required to identify all instances of alleged copyright infringement. See id. at
5 2–3. Defendant argued that requiring Plaintiff to identify the alleged infringements would allow it
6 to investigate and take discovery as necessary. Id. Plaintiff, however, urged that it need only
7 provide examples of the alleged infringement “because the instances of Defendant’s infringement
8 are numerous and on-going . . . .” See id. at 3. During the November 24 case management
9 conference, the Court agreed that a deadline was necessary to ensure the efficient litigation of this
10 case. The Court therefore directed the parties to meet and confer and submit a proposed case
11 schedule incorporating this date. The parties did so, see Dkt. No. 61, and on December 15, 2020,
12 the Court largely adopted the parties’ proposal in its scheduling order, Dkt. No. 63. The
13 scheduling order accordingly set June 1, 2021, as the “[d]eadline for Plaintiff to serve final
14 identification of alleged infringements at issue.” Id. The scheduling order also set a July 2, 2021,
15 discovery cut-off. Id. However, the order explicitly stated that “Defendant may pursue discovery
16 regarding the identified alleged infringements through September 3, 2021.” See id.
17 On December 16, Defendant served Interrogatory No. 2:
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For each Work In Suit, identify the URL on Pinterest or other unique
19 identifying information sufficient for Pinterest to locate each instance
of alleged infringement.
20
21 See Dkt. No. 114-2 (“Moore Decl.”), Ex. 2 at 3. Plaintiff provided the following in response:
22
Plaintiff responds that he will produce documents in response to this
23 Interrogatory pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 33(d) and refers Defendant
to Plaintiff’s forthcoming production in response to Defendant’s First
24 Set of Document Requests. Discovery and Plaintiff’s investigation
are ongoing and Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement and update
25 this response if or when additional responsive information or
documents come to its attention.
26
27 See Dkt. No. 138-2, Ex. 1 at 4. On June 1, Plaintiff produced various documents, including a PDF
1 spreadsheet was “incomprehensible.” See Dkt. No. 138 at 4. On June 4, 2021, Plaintiff’s counsel
2 therefore emailed the Excel spreadsheet in native format (“June 4 Spreadsheet”). See Dkt. No.
3 138-4, Ex. 3. On June 8, Defendant asked Plaintiff to confirm that this spreadsheet constituted
4 Plaintiff’s final identification of the alleged infringements and the response to Defendant’s
5 Interrogatory No. 2. See Dkt. No. 138-5., Ex. 4 at 1–2. If the June 4 Spreadsheet was Plaintiff’s
6 complete response to Interrogatory No. 2, Defendant asked Plaintiff to provide a cover page and
7 verification identifying it as such. Id. at 2. Plaintiff did not address the spreadsheet directly.
8 Rather, he responded that he “identified the federally registered images by artist and name,” and
9 “has explained in detail the nature of Pinterest’s infringement and ha[s] provided examples of the
10 infringement.” See Dkt. No. 138-6, Ex. 5. During subsequent communications, Plaintiff
11 stipulated that “the 51 works identified in the SAC were the Works in Suit.” Dkt. No. 114 at 3.
12 However, Plaintiff explained that the June 4 Spreadsheet was merely “a sample of the URLs and
13 Pin IDs” because “the same image may have hundreds or thousands of different URLs and Pin
14 IDs.” See Id.
15 Defendant subsequently filed a motion to compel, asking that Judge Hixson require
16 Plaintiff to (1) “produce through formal discovery a bates-numbered version of the June 4
17 spreadsheet limited to the alleged infringements of the 51 works actually at issue in this case”; and
18 (2) “produce a verified supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 2 identifying by bates number
19 that document as Plaintiff’s final identification of alleged infringements.” See Dkt. No. 93 at 3.
20 In the July 20, 2021 order, Judge Hixson first excused Plaintiff’s failure to provide the
21 identification of infringements “in a usable format” by the June 1 deadline as a “minor foot fault,”
22 accepting the June 4 Spreadsheet as “substantially timely.” See Dkt. No. 108 at 3. Regarding
23 Interrogatory No. 2, Judge Hixson explained that Defendant was not asking “the factual question
24 of identifying each instance in which one of his registered works was reproduced or displayed on
25 the Pinterest service.” See id. at 4. Rather, Judge Hixson recognized that Defendant was asking
26 Plaintiff about “his legal contentions: Identify each instance in which you claim we committed
27 infringement.” Id. Judge Hixson explained:
[Plaintiff’s] legal contentions can be whatever he wants them to be.
1 If he wants to use an expensive supercomputer to scan billions of
images to find every last one that contains his registered works, he is
2 free to do that. If he instead just wants to use reasonable diligence to
find instances of infringement, he can do that too. It is up to him to
3 build his own case.
4
5 Id. Judge Hixson also rejected the idea that “the June spreadsheet lists only examples of alleged
6 infringement,” explaining:
7
Judge Gilliam’s scheduling order stated that June 1 was the deadline
8 for Davis “to Serve Final Identification of Alleged Infringements.”
ECF No. 63. The June spreadsheet was therefore the final
9 identification of the alleged infringements. To put it another way, any
instances of infringement not listed in that spreadsheet are not part of
10 Davis’s case. The undersigned will not issue an order requiring Davis
to list every instance of alleged infringement because Judge Gilliam
11 already issued that order and set a deadline that has passed.
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13 Id. at 4–5 (emphasis in original). Judge Hixson ordered Plaintiff to serve an amended, verified
14 response to Interrogatory No. 2 “that identifies the June 4 spreadsheet by Bates” number . . . .” Id.
15 at 5. Plaintiff served an amended, verified response, which contained the following objection:
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With respect to specification of “the URL on Pinterest,” Plaintiff
17 objects that this Interrogatory is unduly burdensome because Pinterest
has the ability to locate all instances in which Defendant has
18 distributed or displayed Plaintiff’s Work In Suit on its website and
application with the “other unique identifying information” that
19 Plaintiff already provided in Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint, ECF No. 56-1, namely the owner’s name (Harold Davis),
20 the name of each Work in Suit, and a color image of each Work in
Suit . . . .
21
22 See Moore Decl., Ex. 3. Plaintiff also identified documents by bates number, including the June 4
23 Spreadsheet, that he contended identified “instances of alleged infringement of the Works in
24 Suit . . . .” Id. Defendant believes this response is impermissible because it identifies “over 100
25 additional infringements not included in the June 4 Spreadsheet.” See Dkt. No. 138 at 7.
26 Plaintiff now seeks de novo review of the parties’ discovery dispute and moves to limit the
27 relief granted in Judge Hixson’s July 20 order. Dkt. No. 114.
1 B. Legal Standard
2 A magistrate judge may hear and decide a pretrial matter that is not dispositive of a party’s
3 claim or defense, and such decision may be set aside by the district court only if it is “clearly
4 erroneous” or “contrary to law.” See 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). This
5 standard is highly deferential, and “[t]he reviewing court may not simply substitute its judgment
6 for that of the deciding court.” Grimes v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th
7 Cir. 1991). For a dispositive matter, the district court “must determine de novo” whether to adopt
8 the magistrate judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
9 C. Analysis
10 Plaintiff asks the Court to issue an order that would (1) recharacterize as dicta Judge
11 Hixson’s finding that the June 4 Spreadsheet was the final identification of the alleged
12 infringements; and (2) overrule the July 20 order to the extent it limits Plaintiff’s identification of
13 alleged infringements to just the spreadsheet. Dkt. No. 114. In short, Plaintiff asks this Court to
14 confirm that his case is not limited to the alleged instances of infringement identified in the June 4
15 Spreadsheet. Plaintiff further argues that the Court should review Judge Hixson’s order de novo
16 because “[b]y limiting the instances of infringement that are actionable within the case, the [July
17 20] Order limits Plaintiff’s claims” and “has the effect of dismissing any claim of infringement not
18 in the June 1 spreadsheet.” Dkt. No. 114 at 6.
19 The Court has carefully reviewed Judge Hixson’s order, and regardless of the standard of
20 review, the Court finds that the order is well-reasoned and correct in all respects.1 The Court
21 agrees that Interrogatory No. 2 is properly viewed as seeking Plaintiff’s legal contentions about
22 the specific instances of alleged infringement at issue in this case. See Dkt. No. 108 at 4. Plaintiff
23 argues that the July 20 order improperly dictates how Plaintiff must identify the alleged instances
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1 In his reply brief, Plaintiff suggests that if the July 20 order were dispositive, then it “is void as a
matter of law.” See Dkt. No. 141 at 4. This borders on frivolous. Even Plaintiff’s own authorities
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note that magistrate judges may issue “a recommended disposition, including, if appropriate,
proposed findings of fact” for dispositive matters. See Khrapunov v. Prosyankin, 931 F.3d 922,
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931 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b)). If challenged, “the district court must determine
1 of infringement. See Dkt. No. 114 at 8–9. As an initial matter, Plaintiff suggests that it was
2 enough that he “identified 51 Works that are at issue” in this case with enough detail so that
3 Defendant could “locate each instance of alleged infringement” for itself. See id. at 9. This is
4 simply wrong. Identifying the works at issue in this case may be necessary, but is insufficient to
5 identify the alleged instances of infringement. As Judge Hixson explained, “some [] reproductions
6 or displays [of the works] might not be infringement at all if Pinterest has an affirmative defense
7 that applies, such as license or fair use.” See Dkt. No. 108 at 4. It is not Defendant’s job to
8 speculate about the nature and scope of Plaintiff’s case. The Court understands Plaintiff’s concern
9 that the number of possible infringements may be vast, but as Judge Hixson aptly stated, “[i]t is up
10 to [Plaintiff] to build his own case.” Id. Plaintiff may not shift that obligation onto Defendant.
11 Plaintiff further argues that the June 4 Spreadsheet “was never identified as or intended to
12 be the one and only document identifying alleged infringements.” See Dkt. No. 141 at 4. Rather,
13 Plaintiff asserts that he served Defendant “with pleadings and discovery that identified alleged
14 infringements,” “on a rolling basis” prior to the June 1 deadline and consistent with Federal Rule
15 of Civil Procedure 33(d). See id. at 2, 5. However, Plaintiff makes no effort to explain how
16 Defendant could recognize the final identification of alleged infringements from prior productions
17 or pleading documents.2 See also Dkt. No. 108 at 5 (rejecting Plaintiff’s Rule 33(d) reference as
18 insufficient). Plaintiff further argues that “the Scheduling Order makes no mention of a ‘list,’” so
19 a summary document containing the alleged infringements was not required. See Dkt. No. 114 at
20 9. The Court declines to credit such patent gamesmanship. The June 1 deadline was “for Plaintiff
21 to serve final identification of alleged infringements at issue.” Dkt. No. 63 (emphasis added).
22 Plaintiff’s argument would render the deadline entirely meaningless. The June 4 Spreadsheet
23 appears to be the only identification of the alleged infringements. Judge Hixson’s order, which
24 refers to the spreadsheet as the “final identification of the alleged infringements,” Dkt. No. 108 at
25 5, appears to be entirely accurate. The Court rejects Plaintiff’s belated request to expand the scope
26
2 In his reply brief, Plaintiff argues that Defendant used identification of infringement “to spoliate
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evidence in an attempt to thwart Plaintiff’s ability to prove his case.” See Dkt. No. 141 at 4. Such
1 of the alleged infringements four months after the deadline and after the close of discovery.
2 Lastly, to the extent Plaintiff disagrees that he should have had to provide a “final
3 identification of alleged infringements at issue” in this case at all, this Court—not Judge Hixson—
4 ordered Plaintiff to do so by June 1. See Dkt. No. 63. Judge Hixson simply held Plaintiff to that
5 deadline and to his discovery obligations. Plaintiff is not free to disregard court orders. If there
6 was any ambiguity about Plaintiff’s obligation, he should have sought clarification well before the
7 June 1 deadline. And Plaintiff can eventually appeal this order if he disagrees with it. The motion
8 is therefore DENIED.
9 III. MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF DISCOVERY DEADLINE
10 Next, Defendant seeks a continuance of the September 3, 2021 discovery deadline to take
11 the deposition of third-party Pixsy. Dkt. No. 124. The Court notes at the outset that Defendant
12 did not file this motion until the day of the discovery deadline.
13 A. Background
14 On February 1, 2021, Plaintiff served his response to Defendant’s Interrogatory No. 6,
15 which asked Plaintiff to “[d]escribe in detail the circumstances under which [he] first because
16 aware of each alleged infringement identified in [his] response to Interrogatory No. 2 . . . .” Dkt.
17 No. 126-1, Ex. 2. Plaintiff explained that “he generally became aware of infringement by
18 Pinterest in 2015 via the Pixsy reverse search engine.” Id. According to Plaintiff, “Pixsy is a
19 digital investigative company that provides services to image owners to combat digital copyright
20 infringement.” See Dkt. No. 126 at 1. On May 25, 2021, Defendant served Pixsy with a
21 document subpoena. See Dkt. No. 124-1 (“Kramer Decl.”) at ¶ 2. Pixsy responded on July 22,
22 2021, with six documents (the “Pixsy documents”). Id. Defendant contends that the Pixsy
23 documents show that in 2015, Pixsy identified extensive use of Plaintiff’s images on Pinterest.
24 See id. at ¶¶ 3–4. Defendant further explains that during Plaintiff’s and his wife’s August 2021
25 depositions,3 Defendant introduced the Pixsy documents, and Plaintiff and his wife testified about
26 the documents extensively without objections from Plaintiff’s counsel. See id.
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1 On August 19, 2021, Defendant served Pixsy with a deposition subpoena seeking, inter
2 alia, testimony authenticating and explaining the Pixsy documents. See id. at ¶ 6. Defendant
3 noticed the deposition for September 1, 2021, two days before the close of discovery regarding the
4 alleged infringements.4 See id. On August 30, Plaintiff’s counsel sent an email to Defendant
5 claiming that the Pixsy documents are attorney work product and demanding their sequestration.
6 Id. at ¶ 7, & Ex. A. Defendant suggests that these documents and the anticipated deposition
7 testimony will establish that at least some of Plaintiff’s infringement claims are barred by the
8 statute of limitations. Defendant filed a discovery motion with Judge Hixson on September 13
9 challenging Plaintiff’s work product assertion. See Dkt. No. 131. Judge Hixson requested
10 supplemental briefing from the parties, Dkt. No. 132, and this motion remains pending.
11 Defendant requests that the Court continue the September 3, 2021 discovery deadline until
12 fourteen days after Judge Hixson’s order resolving the work-product claim solely to allow
13 Defendant to take Pixsy’s deposition. Dkt. No. 124.
14 B. Analysis
15 The parties’ arguments about whether a continuance of the discovery deadline is
16 appropriate largely turn on the merits of Plaintiff’s work product claim. Compare Dkt. No. 124,
17 with Dkt. No. 126. But it is for Judge Hixson to decide this issue in the first instance. If Judge
18 Hixson finds that the Pixsy documents do not constitute work product and allows deposition
19 testimony about them, then a brief extension may be appropriate. The need for a continuance,
20 however, may be moot if Judge Hixson finds that these documents are protected work product.
21 Rather than speculate about the need for and duration of any extension of the current deadline, the
22 Court DENIES Defendant’s motion without prejudice to renewal following Judge Hixson’s order.
23 The Court notes, however, that the parties’ delay in completing discovery and raising discovery
24 disputes has put the case schedule at risk. The parties’ dispositive motions must be filed by
25 November 4 to meet the December 9 dispositive motion hearing deadline. See Dkt. No. 63. Even
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4 As explained above, the scheduling order set a July 2, 2021, discovery cut-off. Dkt. No. 63.
1 a short continuance could, therefore, jeopardize the case schedule, a result the Court wishes to
2 avoid if at all possible. The parties may not create a scheduling problem through their own
3 litigation tactics, then try to force the Court to delay the case by presenting the need for a
4 continuance as a fait accompli.
5 C. Motion to Seal
6 Defendant also filed an administrative motion to file documents under seal in connection
7 with its brief concerning the motion for a continuance of the discovery deadline. Dkt. No. 123.
8 i. Legal Standard
9 Courts generally apply a “compelling reasons” standard when considering motions to seal
10 documents. Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 678 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kamakana
11 v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)). “This standard derives from the
12 common law right ‘to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records
13 and documents.’” Id. (quoting Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178). “[A] strong presumption in favor of
14 access is the starting point.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quotations omitted). To overcome this
15 strong presumption, the party seeking to seal a judicial record attached to a dispositive motion
16 must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the
17 general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in
18 understanding the judicial process” and “significant public events.” Id. at 1178–79 (quotations
19 omitted). “In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in
20 disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have become a
21 vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public
22 scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon v.
23 Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978)). “The mere fact that the production of records
24 may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not,
25 without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id.
26 Records attached to nondispositive motions must meet the lower “good cause” standard of
27 Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as such records “are often unrelated, or only
1 requires a “particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information
2 is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th
3 Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific
4 examples of articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966
5 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted).
6 ii. Analysis
7 Because Defendant moves to file documents related to a nondispositive motion, the Court
8 will apply the lower good cause standard. Defendant seeks to file under seal portions of Plaintiff’s
9 deposition attached as an exhibit to and discussed in Defendant’s motion for a continuance of the
10 discovery deadline. The only proffered justification for sealing is that the information was
11 designated as “Highly Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only” by Plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 123-1 at
12 ¶ 3. But a designation of confidentiality is not sufficient to establish that a document is sealable.
13 See Civ. L. R. 79-5(d)(1)(A). “Confidential” is merely the parties’ initial designation of
14 confidentiality to establish coverage under the stipulated protective order. See Verinata Health,
15 Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., No. 12-cv-05501-SI, 2015 WL 5117083, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
16 31, 2015) (“But good cause ‘cannot be established simply by showing that the document is subject
17 to a protective order or by stating in general terms that the material is considered to be
18 confidential’”) (quoting Bain v. AstraZeneca LP, No. 09-cv-4147, 2011 WL 482767, at *1 (N.D.
19 Cal. Feb. 7, 2011)). Thus, Defendant’s motion does not comply with Civil Local Rule 79-
20 5(d)(1)(A). In addition, as the designating party for the materials, Plaintiff did not comply with
21 Civil Local Rule 79-5(e)(1), because he did not file a declaration within four days of Defendant’s
22 motion. See Civ. L.R. 79-5(e)(1).
23 Further, the Court has reviewed and does not believe the deposition excerpts contain
24 confidential information, and therefore do not warrant sealing. The Court accordingly DENIES
25 Defendant’s administrative motion to file under seal. Dkt. No. 123. The Court DIRECTS
26 Defendant to file public versions of all documents for which the proposed sealing has been denied
27 within seven days of this order. The parties may also file a new motion to seal within seven days
1 IV. CONCLUSION
2 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to limit Judge Hixson’s July 20
3 discovery order, Dkt. No. 114; DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the request for an extension
4 of fact discovery, Dkt. No. 124; and DENIES Defendant’s motion to seal, Dkt. No. 123.
5 The parties have also filed a stipulation seeking to extend the case schedule based on the
6 || parties’ extensive discovery disputes. See Dkt. No. 139. This is a problem of the parties’ own
7 || making. The parties were aware of the case deadlines and should have raised any discovery
8 disputes early enough for resolution before the dispositive motion deadline. The Court further
9 notes its view that the parties have been unable to work cooperatively throughout this case, and
10 || have instead consumed disproportionate court resources. The Court accordingly DENIES the
11 stipulation. Dkt. No. 139. The parties are directed to proceed with the current case schedule and
12 || move this case forward expeditiously. If resolution of any of the pending discovery disputes
5 13 provides an additional basis to move for summary judgment, the Court will consider whether there
14 || is good cause to permit a second motion for summary judgment or to extend the case schedule at
3 15 that time.
a 16 IT IS SO ORDERED.
2 17 |) Dated: 10/22/2021
1g Alaywed 5 Sbl|).
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
19 United States District Judge
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