Opinion

Washington v. Pacific Credit Exchange

Court
District Court, N.D. California
Filed
Sep 20, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 18.8%

The opinion

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6

7 RICHARD WASHINGTON, Case No. 21-cv-02374-JCS

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION

9 v. TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY

10 PACIFIC CREDIT EXCHANGE, COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT BE

DISMISSED

Defendant.

11

Re: Dkt. Nos. 1, 3

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13 I. INTRODUCTION

14 Plaintiff Richard Washington, pro se, applies to proceed in forma pauperis. See dkt. 3.

15 Sufficient cause having been shown, that application is GRANTED.

16 The Court now reviews the sufficient of Washington’s complaint under 28 U.S.C.

17 § 1915(e)(2)(B). Washington is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why his complaint should not be

18 dismissed for the reasons discussed below. No later than October 18, 2021, Washington must file

19 either an amended complaint curing the deficiencies addressed in this order or a response arguing

20 why his current complaint is sufficient. If Washington does not file such a response or his

21 response fails to cure the deficiencies addressed herein, the case will be reassigned to a United

22 States district judge with a recommendation for dismissal.

23 The case management conference previously set for September 24, 2021 is CONTINUED

24 to November 19, 2021 at 2:00 PM, to occur via Zoom webinar.

25 II. THE COMPLAINT

26 Because a plaintiff’s allegations are generally taken as true in resolving the sufficiency of a

27 complaint, this section summarizes the allegations of Washington’s complaint as if true. Nothing

1 On February 23, 2021, Washington submitted a complaint to the Consumer Financial

2 Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) regarding Defendant Pacific Credit Exchange (“PCE”). Compl. (dkt.

3 1) ¶ 6. His complaint to the CFPB reads as follows:

4 15 U.S.C. 1601 Violations 1. Fraudulently used my credit card in an

application(s) for credit reports. [12 CFR § 1026.61 (a), (3); [12 CFR

5 § 1026.61 (a), (15) 2. Fraudulently used my credit card to open a

credit card account(s) [12 CFR § 1026.61 (a), (15)] 3. They are not

6 the original creditor. [12 CFR § 1026.61] 4. No consumer credit

contract was established. [12 CFR § 1026.61 (a), (12)] 5. Submitted

7 information about alleged transactions or experiences to credit

reporting companies. [15 U.S.C. 1681 (2,A,)].

8

9 Id. Ex. A (brackets in original).

10 According to Washington, PCE “responded to the CFPB complaint using profane and

11 obscene language; they furnished documents, admitted to several federal law violations and

12 incriminated themselves.” Id. ¶ 7. Washington asserts that documents furnished by PCE in

13 response “contained violations to several federally protected consumer rights.” Id. PCE’s

14 response, as stated in a CFPB report attached to Washington’s complaint, reads as follows:

15 Upon receiving Mr Washington’s CFPB complaint, I, on behalf of

Pacific Credit Exchange (PCE) opened an investigation into Mr.

16 Washington’s allegations. I found that PCE is an assignee for

collection purposes for a car loan that Mr Washington defaulted on.

17 The original credit and assignor is California Auto Finance (CAF) PO

Box 14225 Orange CA 92863. I have attached a copies of the contract

18 & ledger that CAF supplied us at time of assignment. In direct

response to Mr Washington numbered allegations #1 & #2 PCE never

19 accessed any credit or debit card that belongs to Mr. Washington. #3

Mr. Washington is correct PCE is not the original creditor, California

20 Auto Finance is, as I previously stated. #4 A consumer contract was

opened by Mr. Washington by purchasing a car that was financed by

21 California Auto Finance. #5 Mr. Washington is correct, PCE has

reported the collection account information to the credit bureaus. It is

22 PCE’s position that this is a valid debt and the information PCE

supplied to the credit bureaus is allowed by law. James Schaffer

23 President Pacific Credit Exchange

24 Id. Ex. A. An account detail statement is attached, apparently submitted to the CFPB by PCE,

25 which Washington has marked with references to a number of statutory sections—specifically, 15

26 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1602, 1605, 1611, 1635, 1640, and 1692(f)(i). Compl. Ex. A. The CFPB closed

27 the complaint after receiving PCE’s response. Id.

1 and Invoice” to PCE. Id. ¶ 8. Those documents asserted a right to verify the debt under 15 U.S.C.

2 § 1692g and, like his CFPB complaint, included a number of citations to various subparts of 12

3 C.F.R. § 1026.61. Compl. Ex. B.

4 On February 26, 2021, Washington filed complaints with the Attorney General of

5 California and the California Department of Financial Protection including similar allegations to

6 his CFPB complaint. Id. ¶¶ 9–10 & Exs. C–D. PCE provided similar responses, which

7 Washington characterizes as defamatory and in violation of “federal law.” Id.

8 Washington has attempted to contact the purported original creditor, California Auto

9 Finance, and has filed a CFPB complaint against it, but has not received a response. Id. ¶¶ 11–12

10 & Ex. E.

11 Washington mailed additional documents to PCE on March 12, 2021 but his mail was

12 returned as undeliverable, despite using the same address where he had previously used for PCE.

13 Id. ¶¶ 13–14 & Exs F–G. He also filed another CFPB complaint against PCE on March 12, 2021,

14 reading as follows:

15 Multiple TRUTH IN LENDING 15 USC 1601 laws are being violated

and causing me great injury. I sent an Affidavit of Truth, Debt

16 Validation Letter, and invoice to PACIFIC CREDIT EXCHANGE. I

also filed a CFPB complaint. PACIFIC CREDIT EXCHANGE

17 admits to opening accounts, furnishes documents, produces my

personal information and uses profane and obscene language. They

18 do so within the response to the CFPB complaint and letters to my

personal address. My credit card, as defined by 15 USC 1602 of

19 TRUTH IN LENDING is being unauthorizedly used fraudulently by

PACIFIC CREDIT EXCHANGE. They have refused to remedy the

20 situation and adhere to the federal laws in governance. I am the

original creditor and consumer and my rights are being violated and

21 infringed upon.

22 Id. ¶ 15 & Ex. H. PCE responded on March 20, 2021, stating that it stood by its response to

23 Washington’s previous CFPB complaint. Id. Ex. H. The CFPB closed the second complaint after

24 receiving PCE’s response. Id.

25 Washington asserts that PCE “further infringed upon [his] federally protected consumer

26 rights, by mailing [him] threats, furnishing documents, profane language and obscene language on

27 March 15, 2021.” Id. ¶ 16. He attaches a letter from PCE bearing that date that includes an

1 Mr. Washington,

2 In response to your recent request for validation of a debt on the above

matter, please find attached copies of the contract and the ledger that

3 are the basis of this debt.

4 The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the

age of your debt, we will not sue you for it. If you do not pay the debt,

5 Pacific Credit Exchange may continue to report it to the credit

reporting agencies as unpaid for as long as the law permits this

6 reporting.

7 Id. Ex. I. PCE’s letter attaches what appears to be a contract between Washington and “Phantom

8 Motors” (although the version filed in the record of this case is low-resolution and not entirely

9 legible), as well as an account ledger. Id.

10 Washington asserts two claims against PCE, for violation of the Truth in Lending Act

11 (“TILA”), citing 15 U.S.C. § 1601, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), citing

12 15 U.S.C. § 1692. His TILA claim is as follows:

13 17. PACIFIC CREDIT EXCHANGE unauthorizedly used my credit

card in applications for credit reports and stole my identity

14 fraudulently.

15 18. PACIFIC CREDIT EXCHANGE unauthorizedly used my credit

card to access my personal information which constitutes as identity

16 theft and fraud. This information was used to harass, annoy, threaten

and cause me injury.

17

19. PACIFIC CREDIT EXCHANGE unauthorizedly used my credit

18 card to open credit consumer accounts. These fraudulently opened

accounts, hurt my reputation, causing economical disadvantages, post

19 traumatic stress, mental anguish and injury.

20 20. PACIFIC CREDIT EXCHANGE fabricated bills and contracts

that misrepresent finance charges.

21

21. PACIFIC CREDIT EXCHANGE willfully and knowingly gives

22 false information about me which hurts my reputation, causes

economical disadvantages, post traumatic stress, mental anguish and

23 injury.

24 Compl. ¶¶ 17–21. His FDCPA claim reads as follows:

25 22. PACIFIC CREDIT EXCHANGE fabricated bills and contracts

that show a positive number as the finance charge and that the credit,

26 in fact, originates from me.

27 23. PACIFIC CREDIT EXCHANGE mailed me letters that use

1 24. PACIFIC CREDIT EXCHANGE threatened me and caused post

traumatic stress and mental anguish.

2

25. PACIFIC CREDIT EXCHANGE gives false implications that

3 accounts were turned over to them innocently by the alleged original

creditor.

4

26. PACIFIC CREDIT EXCHANGE mailed letters to my personal

5 address without permission and indicates that they are debt collectors.

This is embarrassing and defames my character.

6

27. PACIFIC CREDIT EXCHANGE furnishes documents, for an

7 alleged debt, that clearly shows no contract, agreement or

authorization was given to them for such collection attempt. They

8 stole my identity and committed fraud.

9 Id. ¶ 27.

10 III. ANALYSIS

11 A. Legal Standard

12 Where a plaintiff is found to be indigent under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and is granted leave

13 to proceed in forma pauperis, courts must engage in screening and dismiss any claims which:

14 (1) are frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek

15 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

16 Marks v. Solcum, 98 F.3d 494, 495 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

17 Procedure provides that a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing

18 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint that lacks such statement fails to state a claim

19 and must be dismissed.

20 In determining whether a plaintiff fails to state a claim, the court assumes that all factual

21 allegations in the complaint are true. Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th

22 Cir. 1995). However, “the tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s allegations as true is

23 inapplicable to legal conclusions” and to “mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

24 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading

25 that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

26 will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The pertinent question is whether the

27 factual allegations, assumed to be true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

1 Where the complaint has been filed by a pro se plaintiff, as is the case here, courts must

2 “construe the pleadings liberally . . . to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v.

3 Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “A district court should not dismiss a

4 pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the

5 complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir.

6 2012) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203−04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)).

7 B. Washington’s Complaint Is Not Sufficient

8 Washington’s complaint does not provide a short and plain statement of his claim that

9 would put PCE on notice of either the conduct through which it allegedly violated TILA and the

10 FDCPA or the provisions of those statutes it purportedly violated.

11 Much of Washington’s complaint consists of the sort of conclusory statements held

12 insufficient in Iqbal and Twombly: for example, that PCE “unauthorizedly used [Washington’s]

13 credit card to access [his] personal information” and to “open credit consumer accounts,” that it

14 “fabricated bills and contracts,” and that it “knowingly gives false information” about Washington.

15 Compl. ¶¶ 18–21. The complaint fails to explain what personal information PCE allegedly

16 accessed, what accounts it allegedly opened, what documents it allegedly fabricated, or what

17 information it provided that was false. In some instances, such as Washington’s assertions that

18 PCE used “profane and obscene language” in its written responses, id. ¶¶ 7, 16, 23, his conclusory

19 allegations appear to be contradicted by the documents attached to his complaint, which include

20 no language that could in any way be characterized as obscene or profane, see id. Exs. A, I. It is

21 also not entirely clear whether Washington disputes that he incurred the debt or that PCE was

22 authorized to collect it, or if his claims are based solely on the manner in which PCE has

23 attempted to do so.

24 For the most part, Washington’s complaint does not tie any of PCE’s alleged misconduct

25 to any particular provision of law. While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “do not

26 countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the

27 claim asserted,” they require at least “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

1 R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (emphasis added). Both of the statutes at issue govern a wide range of lending

2 and debt collection conduct, with detailed regulations setting forth specific obligations of lenders

3 and debt collectors. Many of the more specific statutes and regulations that Washington cites in

4 the various administrative complaints attached to his judicial complaint appear to provide no basis

5 for a claim: as a few examples, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 is a declaration of purpose with no specific

6 requirements, 15 U.S.C. § 1602 is a list of definitions, and 12 C.F.R. § 1026.61 concerns “hybrid

7 prepaid-credit cards”—not the purported automotive loan at issue in this case. Given

8 Washington’s scattershot approach to largely inapplicable legal authority in the exhibits to his

9 complaint, his failure to cite any particular provision in the complaint itself would leave a

10 reasonable defendant guessing as to the asserted basis for liability.

11 To the extent Washington bases his claims on the use of positive rather than negative

12 numbers to indicate a debt in the ledger that PCE provided to the CFPB and others, see, e.g.,

13 Compl. ¶ 22 & Ex. A, the Court discerns no way in which that would be misleading in context.

14 The ledger lists customer payments as negative numbers, interest and late fees as positive

15 numbers, and shows payments decreasing the principal while interest and late fees increase it. See

16 id. Exs. A, I. Any reader of this ledger would understand that the positive balance indicated a debt

17 owed.

18 To the extent Washington’s claims rest on PCE’s alleged use of a “credit card,” the

19 attachments to his complaint suggest he is referring to his social security number or state

20 identification card. See Compl. Ex. F (“Fact, my social security card, social security number, and

21 CA Identification card is in fact a credit card as defined by federal law.”). The Court is aware of

22 no legal authority to support the proposition that such forms of identification are “credit cards”

23 within the meaning of the laws at issue. The statute Washington cites states that the “term ‘credit

24 card’ means any card, plate, coupon book or other credit device existing for the purpose of

25 obtaining money, property, labor, or services on credit.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(l). While social

26 security numbers and government identification cards are sometimes used as identification in the

27 context of obtaining credit, they do not exist for the purpose of obtaining credit. Washington

1 identification card is a “credit card.”

2 It is not entirely clear that nothing in Washington’s complaint could support a claim. That

3 said, his conclusory assertions, attachments citing apparently inapplicable legal authority, reliance

4 on untenable theories regarding the definition of a “credit card” and the significance of positive

5 numbers, and failure to identify the legal theories he intends to pursue in this case, taken together,

6 obscure any potential merit to his claims. As a whole, the complaint does not satisfy the

7 requirements of Rule 8(a) and Iqbal to present a short and plain statement of Washington’s claim,

8 plausibly supported by factual allegations. Washington is therefore ORDERED TO SHOW

9 CAUSE why his complaint should not be dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim

10 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

11 IV. CONCLUSION

12 For the reasons discussed above, Washington is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why his

13 complaint should not be dismissed, by filing either an amended complaint or a response arguing

14 why his current complaint is sufficient, no later than October 18, 2021.

15 Any amended complaint must include the caption and civil case number used in this order

16 (21-cv-02374) and the words FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an

17 amended complaint completely replaces the previous complaint, any amendment may not

18 incorporate claims or allegations of Washington’s original complaint by reference, but instead

19 must include all of the facts and claims Washington wishes to present and all of the defendants he

20 wishes to sue. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992).

21 Washington is encouraged to contact the Federal Pro Bono Project’s Pro Se Help Desk for

22 assistance as he continues to pursue this case. Lawyers at the Help Desk can provide basic

23 assistance to parties representing themselves but cannot provide legal representation. Although in-

24 person appointments are not currently available due to the COVID-19 public health emergency,

25 Washington may contact the Help Desk at (415) 782-8982 or FedPro@sfbar.org to schedule a

26 / / /

27 / / /

1 telephonic appointment.

2 IT IS SO ORDERED.

3 Dated: September 20, 2021

4

J PH C. SPERO

5 ief Magistrate Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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