involuntary 6 administration of psychotropic drugs
How later courts described this case
- involuntary 6 administration of psychotropic drugs
- no § 1983 claim was stated for allegedly false charges because the 1 under Sandin
- affirming district court’s order for prison officials to expunge the disciplinary charge 7 from plaintiff’s prison record
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 DOUGLAS V. JACKSON, Case No. 20-cv-08695-EMC
8 Plaintiff,
ORDER OF SERVICE
9 v.
Docket No. 13
10 VILLASENOR, et al.,
11 Defendants.
12
13
14 I. INTRODUCTION
15 Douglas V. Jackson filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to complain
16 about events and omissions at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad. His second amended
17 complaint is now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This order directs service
18 on the Defendants.
19 II. BACKGROUND
20 Mr. Jackson’s second amended complaint alleges the following about events and
21 omissions that occurred at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad:
22 On May 5, 2018, correctional officer (C/O) Villasenor asked Mr. Jackson where he was
23 from and did not like Mr. Jackson’s answer that identified Jackson’s housing unit. Docket No. 13
24 at 6. Mr. Jackson apparently had misunderstood the question to be an inquiry about his housing
25 unit whereas C/O Villasenor wanted to learn where Mr. Jackson had lived “on the streets” rather
26 than where he lived within the prison and thus was dissatisfied with Mr. Jackson’s response
27 identifying his housing unit. See id. at 6. C/O Villasenor then wrote Mr. Jackson’s name and
1 Three days later, on May 8, 2018, C/O Villasenor stopped Mr. Jackson as he was walking
2 to a medical appointment and said, “I told you that I would be seeing you again” and “now we’ll
3 see if you still don’t like the police.” Id. at 7. C/O Villasenor then told C/O Clark “to ‘fuck’
4 plaintiff’s cell up since he wanted to be a ‘smart ass.’ C/O Clark searched plaintiff’s cell but there
5 was no cell search slip written because . . . C/O Clark did not find anything in plaintiff’s cell.” Id.
6 C/Os Villasenor and Luna then “fabricated/falsified” a CDCR-115 rule violation report
7 against Mr. Jackson. Id. They were acting “in co-hoots in retaliation against plaintiff because
8 C/O Villasenor was dissatisfied with an answer that plaintiff gave him” several days earlier. Id. at
9 8 (error in source). C/Os Villasenor and Luna falsely stated in one CDCR-115 that they both
10 entered Mr. Jackson’s cell and stated that they confiscated marijuana, a controlled substance. See
11 id. at 3.
12 C/O Villasenor and C/O Luna stated in a second CDCR-115 that they confiscated a cell
13 phone. Id. at 6. According to Mr. Jackson, the CDCR has yet to dismiss this CDCR-115. Id. at 3-
14 4. (He does not allege that he ever was adjudicated guilty of the charge.)
15 The hearing on the CDCR-115 for distribution of controlled substance was postponed
16 pending resolution of criminal charges related to the matter. Id. at 3. In January 2020, the
17 criminal charges were dismissed in furtherance of justice. See Docket No. 13-3 at 13. Also in
18 January 2020, the senior hearing officer on the CDCR-115 “determined” that the reports of C/O
19 Villasenor and C/O Luna were “falsified” and found Mr. Jackson not guilty. Id. at 4, 27.
20 Numerous adverse consequences flowed from Mr. Jackson receiving the CDCR-115. He
21 was put on C-status for 60 days, which meant he had lost privileges regarding canteen, phone,
22 yard, dayroom, and packages. Id. at 4. During C-status, he also was deprived of electronic
23 devices, including a TV, radio, and fan for his hot cell. Id. Also, because criminal charges were
24 pending with him, he had to go to court each month, a process that involved searches and being
25 transported in shackles. Id. Although no credit-loss was assessed for the CDCR-115 regarding
26 the marijuana, he did not receive certain credits due to being put on close custody status while the
27 criminal charges were pending. See id. at 5. According to Mr. Jackson, he was disciplined before
1 III. DISCUSSION
2 A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner
3 seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28
4 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any
5 claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
6 seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b).
7 Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d
8 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
9 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a
10 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the
11 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487
12 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
13 A. Retaliation
14 A prisoner’s First Amendment retaliation claim has five elements: “(1) An assertion that a
15 state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected
16 conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and
17 (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408
18 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2008) (footnotes omitted).
19 Giving the pro se second amended complaint the liberal construction to which it is entitled,
20 it appears to state a cognizable claim against C/O Villasenor and C/O Luna for retaliation. C/O
21 Villasenor allegedly ordered a cell search for retaliatory purposes and C/Os Villasenor and Luna
22 allegedly wrote false CDCR-115s for retaliatory purposes after Mr. Jackson made a statement that
23 was perceived as flippant by C/O Villasenor.
24 B. Due Process/False Charges
25 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects
26 individuals against governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property without due process of
27 law. Interests that are procedurally protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two
1 215, 223-27 (1976). In the prison context, these interests are generally ones pertaining to liberty.
2 Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner
3 implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by state law. See
4 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980)
5 (transfer to mental hospital), and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (involuntary
6 administration of psychotropic drugs)). Deprivations that are less severe or more closely related to
7 the expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a procedurally protected
8 liberty interest, provided that the liberty in question is one of “real substance.” See Sandin, 515
9 U.S. at 477-87. An interest of “real substance” will generally be limited to freedom from restraint
10 that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
11 incidents of prison life” or “will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence.” Id. at 484, 487.
12 When there is a deprivation of a liberty interest of real substance due to a disciplinary
13 decision, the procedural protections required are: written notice, time to prepare for the hearing, a
14 written statement of decision, allowance of witnesses and documentary evidence when not unduly
15 hazardous, and aid to the accused where the inmate is illiterate or the issues are complex. Wolff v.
16 McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-67 (1974). There also must be some evidence to support the
17 disciplinary decision, see Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454, and the information that forms
18 the basis for prison disciplinary actions must have some indicia of reliability. See Cato v. Rushen,
19 824 F.2d 703, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1987).
20 False accusations alone generally are not actionable under § 1983 because falsely accusing
21 a person of misconduct does not violate a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
22 States. For a false accusation to be potentially actionable under § 1983, the false charge must
23 implicate some constitutional right, such as the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to due process,
24 when the false charge results in discipline that is severe enough to amount to a deprivation of a
25 protected liberty interest under Sandin – that is, by imposing an atypical and significant hardship
26 or by inevitably affecting the duration of confinement. See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641,
27 653-54 (3d Cir. 2002) (no § 1983 claim was stated for allegedly false charges because the
1 under Sandin). Moreover, a § 1983 claim generally is not stated if the inmate is afforded the
2 procedural protections required by federal law at the disciplinary hearing. See id. at 654. The
3 Ninth Circuit has, however, held that a prisoner’s right to due process might be violated by the
4 inclusion of a false disciplinary charge “based on no evidence whatsoever” in the prisoner’s file
5 even absent a cognizable liberty interest. See Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771, 772 (9th
6 Cir. 1999) (affirming district court’s order for prison officials to expunge the disciplinary charge
7 from plaintiff’s prison record).
8 An allegation that a false accusation resulted in criminal prosecution also may be
9 actionable under § 1983. There is a “clearly established due process right not to be subjected to
10 criminal charges on the basis of false evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the
11 government.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2001). To prevail on a §
12 1983 claim of deliberate fabrication leading to criminal prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that (1)
13 the defendant official deliberately fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate fabrication caused the
14 plaintiff's deprivation of liberty. Id. at 1115. It is not necessary that the plaintiff be “convicted on
15 the basis of the fabricated evidence to have suffered a deprivation of liberty – being criminally
16 charged is enough.” Caldwell v. City and County of San Francisco, 889 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir.
17 2018) (citations omitted).
18 Liberally construed, the second amended complaint states a cognizable claim against C/O
19 Villasenor and C/O Luna for a due process violation under the Burnsworth case, as Mr. Jackson
20 indicates that they wrote the report that was put in his file was based on false evidence. Liberally
21 construed, the second amended complaint also states a claim against C/O Villasenor and C/O Luna
22 for a due process violation under the Caldwell case, as Mr. Jackson indicates that they wrote the
23 fabricated report that led to Mr. Jackson being criminally charged with a marijuana-related
24 offense. Although Mr. Jackson ultimately was found not-guilty of the CDCR-115 for marijuana
25 distribution and although the criminal charges ultimately dismissed, claims are stated because
26 neither Burnsworth nor Caldwell require a final disciplinary decision adverse to the inmate or a
27 criminal conviction.
1 IV. CONCLUSION
2 1. The second amended complaint, liberally construed, states cognizable § 1983
3 claims against C/O Villasenor and C/O Luna for retaliation and due process violations.
4 2. The following defendants, both of whom apparently work at CTF-Soledad, shall be
5 served:
6 - C/O Villasenor
- C/O Luna
7
8 Service on the listed Defendant shall proceed under the California Department of Corrections and
9 Rehabilitation’s (CDCR) e-service program for civil rights cases from prisoners in CDCR custody.
10 In accordance with the program, the clerk is directed to serve on CDCR via email the following
11 documents: the operative second amended complaint (Docket No. 13), the order of dismissal with
12 leave to amend (Docket No. 11), this order, a CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver form, and a
13 summons. The clerk also shall serve a copy of this order on the plaintiff.
14 3. No later than 40 days after service of this order via email on CDCR, CDCR shall
15 provide the court a completed CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver advising the court which
16 defendant(s) listed in this order will be waiving service of process without the need for service by
17 the United States Marshal Service (USMS) and which defendant(s) decline to waive service or
18 could not be reached. CDCR also shall provide a copy of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver
19 to the California Attorney General’s Office which, within 21 days, shall file with the court a
20 waiver of service of process for the defendant(s) who are waiving service.
21 4. Upon receipt of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver, the clerk shall prepare for
22 each defendant who has not waived service according to the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver a
23 USM-205 Form. The clerk shall provide to the USMS the completed USM-205 forms and copies
24 of this order, the summons and the operative complaint for service upon each defendant who has
25 not waived service. The clerk also shall provide to the USMS a copy of the CDCR Report of E-
26 Service Waiver.
27 5. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the following briefing schedule for
1 a. No later than August 10, 2021, Defendants must file and serve a motion for
2 summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If Defendants are of the opinion that this case
3 cannot be resolved by summary judgment, Defendants must so inform the Court prior to the date
4 the motion is due. If Defendants file a motion for summary judgment, Defendants must provide to
5 Plaintiff a new Rand notice regarding summary judgment procedures at the time they file such a
6 motion. See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2012).
7 b. Plaintiff's opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion
8 must be filed with the Court and served upon Defendants no later than September 17, 2021.
9 Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment provided later in
10 this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment.
11 c. If Defendants wish to file a reply brief, the reply brief must be filed and
12 served no later than October 1, 2021.
13 6. Plaintiff is provided the following notices and warnings about the procedures for
14 motions for summary judgment:
15 The defendants may make a motion for summary judgment by
which they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for
16 summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure will, if granted, end your case. . . . Rule 56 tells you what
17 you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment.
Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no
18 genuine issue of material fact -- that is, if there is no real dispute
about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party
19 who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing
20 makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by
declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on
21 what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in
declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
22 authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict
the facts shown in the defendants' declarations and documents and
23 show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do
not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if
24 appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is
granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand
25 v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998).
26 If Defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
27 it is seeking to have the case dismissed. As with other defense summary judgment motions, if a
1 case will be dismissed and there will be no trial.
2 7. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendant’s
3 counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendant’s counsel. The Court may disregard
4 any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until a defendant’s
5 counsel has been designated, Plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to the
6 defendant, but once a defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to
7 counsel rather than directly to the party.
8 8. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
9 No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required
10 before the parties may conduct discovery.
11 9. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the
12 Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court's orders in a timely
13 fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant
14 to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
15 10. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this
16 case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case.
17
18 IT IS SO ORDERED.
19
20 Dated: June 28, 2021
21
22 ______________________________________
EDWARD M. CHEN
23 United States District Judge
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