“Federal courts have no power to consider claims for which they lack subject-matter 15 jurisdiction.”
How later courts described this case
- “Federal courts have no power to consider claims for which they lack subject-matter 15 jurisdiction.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
5 SAN JOSE DIVISION
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7 SCOTT JOHNSON, Case No. 20-cv-06048-BLF
8 Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
9 v. DISMISS AND DECLINING TO
EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL
10 TECHBUSINESS RESOURCES, LLC, JURISDICTION OVER STATE LAW
CLAIM
11 Defendant.
[Re: ECF 12]
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Before the Court is Defendant Techbusiness Resources, LLC's (“Techbusiness”) motion to
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dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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12(b)(1). Mot., ECF 12. Techbusiness argues that Plaintiff Scott Johnson's only federal claim—
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brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.—
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18 is moot because Techbusiness has since removed the barriers alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff
19 Johnson has failed to respond to the motion.
20 The Court finds it appropriate to take the motion under submission for decision without
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oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). The Court agrees with Techbusiness that the
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ADA claim is moot, and for the following reasons GRANTS Techbusiness's motion to dismiss the
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ADA claim. The Court DECLINES TO EXERCISE supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
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state law claim.
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26 I. BACKGROUND
27 Johnson is a level C-5 quadriplegic who relies on a wheelchair for mobility. Compl. ¶ 1,
March, and July 2020, he visited the public business Old Floors. Id. ¶ 8. During these visits,
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2 Johnson observed that Old Floors lacked a compliant, accessible parking space. Id. ¶¶ 10-18.
3 Johnson alleges that Techbusiness owns the real property located at 440 Queens Lane, San Jose,
4 California. Id. ¶¶ 2–3.1 Johnson filed this action against Techbusiness on August 27, 2020,
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alleging violations of the ADA and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51–
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53. See generally id. For his ADA claim, he seeks only injunctive relief to remove the alleged
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barriers to access. See id., Prayer ¶ 1.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
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10 Federal courts can adjudicate only those cases which the Constitution and Congress
11 authorize them to adjudicate: those involving diversity of citizenship or a federal question, or
12 those to which the United States is a party. Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 376–77
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(2012); see also Chen-Cheng Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th
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Cir. 1992) (“Federal courts have no power to consider claims for which they lack subject-matter
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jurisdiction.”). The Court has a continuing obligation to ensure that it has subject matter
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jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A defendant may raise the defense of lack of subject
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18 matter jurisdiction by motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
19 The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian
20 Life Ins., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
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A jurisdictional challenge may be facial or factual. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373
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F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the attack is facial, the Court determines whether the
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allegations contained in the complaint are sufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction,
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25 accepting all material allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in favor of the party
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1 Johnson does not plead facts that allege Old Floors is located at 440 Queens Lane in San Jose.
asserting jurisdiction. Id.; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). Where the attack is
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2 factual, however, “the court need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations.” Safe
3 Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. In resolving a factual dispute as to the existence of subject
4 matter jurisdiction, the Court may review extrinsic evidence beyond the complaint without
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converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Id. Once the moving party has
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made a factual challenge by offering affidavits or other evidence to dispute the allegations in the
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complaint, the party opposing the motion must “present affidavits or any other evidence necessary
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to satisfy its burden of establishing that the court, in fact, possesses subject matter jurisdiction.” St.
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10 Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Savage v. Glendale Union High
11 Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).
12 When jurisdictional issues are intertwined with the merits, a court “must apply the
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summary judgment standard in deciding the motion to dismiss.” Johnson v. California Welding
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Supply, Inc., 2011 WL 5118599 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011). Because Johnson’s claim and
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jurisdiction are both premised on the ADA, jurisdiction and substance are intertwined.
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Accordingly, the Court applies the summary judgment standard to Techbusiness’s motion to
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18 dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A motion for summary judgment should be granted
19 if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
20 matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th
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Cir.2000). A genuine issue for trial exists if the non-moving party presents evidence from which a
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reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that party, could resolve the
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material issue in his or her favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49
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25 (1986).
26 “Jurisdictional dismissals in cases premised on federal-question jurisdiction are
27 exceptional, and must satisfy the requirements specified in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).”
determined that jurisdictional dismissals are warranted “where the alleged claim under the
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2 Constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of
3 obtaining federal jurisdiction or where such claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Bell, 327
4 U.S. at 682–83.
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III. DISCUSSION
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The ADA's anti-discrimination provision applies to “any person who owns, leases (or
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leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The parties do not
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dispute that Old Floors qualifies as a place of public accommodation under section 12182(a).
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10 Techbusiness brings a factual challenge to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that
11 Johnson’s ADA claim is moot because, as of October 2020, none of the alleged access barriers in
12 the Old Floors parking lot are present. Mot. at 5; ECF 12-4. To support this argument,
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Techbusiness offers the declaration2 of Michael Miyaki, a Certified Access Specialist who has
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worked in the field of disability access compliance for the past ten years. See Miyaki Decl. ¶ 2,
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ECF 12-2; ECF 12-3 (Miyaki Qualifications); ECF 12-4 (Miyaki Report on Old Floors ADA
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Compliance). Miyaki states in his declaration that he performed an inspection of Old Floors and
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18 found that “there was a van accessible parking space on the Premises; that the van accessible space
19 had an adjacent access aisle; that both the accessible space and access aisle had appropriate slopes
20 of 2% or less; that the accessible parking space has the required ‘Van Accessible’ and ‘Minimum
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Fine’ signage; and that an appropriate path of travel from the parking exists at the Property.” ECF
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12-3 ¶ 7; see also ECF 12-4. Miyaki further concluded that the parking space met the relevant size
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and marking guidelines. ECF 12-3 ¶¶ 8-9. As such, Techbusiness contends that this Court cannot
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26 2 The Ninth Circuit has recognized that affidavits are perfectly appropriate evidence for
determining whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. See Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d
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at 1039 (quoting Savage, 343 F.3d at 1039 n.2).
provide Johnson with the injunctive relief he seeks. Mot. at 5. Johnson does not offer any contrary
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2 evidence to meet his burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction in the face of this evidence
3 from Techbusiness. See St. Clair, 880 F.2d at 201; Savage, 343 F.3d at 1040 n.2. Indeed, Johnson
4 did not respond to the instant motion. See ECF 13 (notice of non-response).
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The uncontroverted evidence shows that the ADA violations alleged by Johnson are no
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longer present at the property owned by Techbusiness. A claim may become moot if (1)
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subsequent events have made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior cannot
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reasonably be expected to recur, and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably
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10 eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135
11 F.3d 1260, 1274 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n,
12 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968); Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. Of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 854 (9th
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Cir. 1985)). In the context of a complaint brought under the ADA, “because a private plaintiff can
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sue only for injunctive relief (i.e. for removal of the barrier) under the ADA, a defendant’s
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voluntary removal of alleged barriers prior to trial can have the effect of mooting a plaintiff’s
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ADA claim.” Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011); see, e.g., Johnson
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18 v. 1082 El Camino Real, LP, 2018 WL 1091267, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2018) (finding an ADA
19 claim moot where “the undisputed evidence show[ed] that Defendants ha[d] corrected the sole
20 alleged access barrier alleged in the complaint”). This is precisely the scenario here. In view of the
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record before the Court, Johnson cannot plausibly expect to encounter the alleged barrier in the
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future.
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The Court finds Johnson's ADA claim moot and on that basis grants Techbusiness's motion
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25 to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
26 2. California Unruh Act claim
27 The Court has dismissed Johnson's only federal law claim against Techbusiness, such that
1 declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Unruh Act claims after dismissing the parallel
2 ADA claim. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mantena LLC, 2020 WL 1531355, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31,
3 2020; Johnson vy. Torres Enterprises LP, 2019 WL 285198, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2019):
4 Johnson v. 1082 El Camino Real, LP, 2018 WL 1091267, at *2; see also Johnson v. Otter, 2019
5 WL 452040, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2019) (exercising supplemental jurisdiction “at least until” an
identical ADA claim against a non-moving defendant was resolved”). Because the Court finds that
it would not further “the interest of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity,” it, too,
9 declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Johnson’s remaining Unruh Act claim. See
10 || Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 2001).
11 || IV. ORDER
12 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Techbusiness's motion to dismiss Johnson's
= 13 ADA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The Court DECLINES TO
EXERCISE supplemental jurisdiction over Johnson's Unruh Act claim and DISMISSES the claim
Z WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Johnson refiling it in state court.
17 || Dated: November 27, 2020
18 hom fly homer)
19 BETH LABSON FREEMAN
United States District Judge
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