United States v. Brown

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL BROWN, a/k/a Michael  No. 01-4611

Haseem Brown, a/k/a Rasheem

Jamal Russell, a/k/a Hakeem

Brown, a/k/a Rasheem Russell,

Defendant-Appellant.



Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Claude M. Hilton, Chief District Judge;

Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge.

(CR-01-23-A)

Submitted: January 18, 2002

Decided: February 8, 2002

Before TRAXLER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL

Peter L. Goldman, O’REILLY & MARK, L.L.C., Alexandria, Vir-

ginia, for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Kath-

leen M. Kahoe, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria,

Virginia, for Appellee.

2 UNITED STATES v. BROWN

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Michael Brown appeals his conviction following his conditional

guilty plea to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. See 18

U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 2000). On appeal, Brown asserts the dis-

trict court improperly denied his motion to suppress a firearm found

in his shoe following his arrest. We affirm.

Brown was arrested for public intoxication, and the firearm in

question was discovered during a subsequent custodial search of

Brown’s person. Accordingly, unless the arrest was illegal, that search

does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. See Chimel v. California,

395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (holding police officers may conduct

warrantless search of suspect’s person after arrest to remove weapons

that could be used to resist arrest or escape). Reviewing evidence

presented at the suppression hearing in the light most favorable to the

government, see United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th

Cir. 1998) (providing standard of review), we find there was an ade-

quate basis for Brown’s arrest for public intoxication, and that that

basis existed prior to the frisk conducted by the arresting officer. See

Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963) (noting the legality of arrest

for state offense that does not otherwise implicate the Constitution is

to be judged by state law); Fierst v. Virginia, 173 S.E.2d 807, 810 n.2

(Va. 1970) (providing statutory definition of intoxicated). Accord-

ingly, we find no error in the district court’s denial of Brown’s motion

to suppress.

In light of the foregoing, we affirm Brown’s conviction and sen-

tence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED