holding 24 3 The Attorney General has certified that Sunil Chanan "was acting within the 25 scope of his employment at all times material to [the] alleged incidents." (See Certification, filed July 31, 2020.
How later courts described this case
- holding 24 3 The Attorney General has certified that Sunil Chanan "was acting within the 25 scope of his employment at all times material to [the] alleged incidents." (See Certification, filed July 31, 2020.
- holding "[p]remature 20 suits [under Title VII] are always subject to a motion to dismiss"
- holding party seeking to 27 challenge certification "bears the burden of presenting evidence and disproving the 1 district court properly dismissed FTCA claims where plaintiff had not presented claim to 2 federal agency prior to filing suit
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
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4 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 TERESA EDWARDS, Case No. 20-cv-05276-MMC
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS; DISMISSING
9 v. COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND; VACATING HEARING
10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
11
12
13 Before the Court is defendant United States of America's ("United States") Motion
14 to Dismiss, filed August 7, 2020. Plaintiff Teresa Edwards ("Edwards") has not filed
15 opposition.1 Having read and considered the papers filed in support of the motion, the
16 Court deems the matter suitable for decision thereon, VACATES the hearing scheduled
17 for October 2, 2020, and hereby rules as follows.
18 BACKGROUND
19 On June 26, 2020, Edwards initiated the above-titled action by filing pro se in state
20 court a "Request for Civil Harassment Restraining Order[ ]," pursuant to California Code
21 of Civil Procedure section 527.6 (see Compl. (Doc. 1-1 at 14-19)),2 naming as the
22 defendant Sunil Chanan, whom Edwards alleges was her supervisor when she was
23 employed by the United States Postal Service ("USPS"). The Court construes the
24 Request as Edward's complaint. See Nakamura v. Parker, 156 Cal. App. 4th 327, 335
25
1 Under the Local Rules of this District, Edwards' opposition was due no later than
26
August 21, 2020. See Civil L.R. 7-3(a) (providing "opposition must be filed and served
not more than 14 days after the motion was filed").
27
1 (2007) (noting "harassment petition under . . . section 527.6 [is] itself essentially a cause
2 of action") (internal quotation and citation omitted). In her complaint, Edwards alleges the
3 USPS "embezzled [her] postal funds and grievance settlement checks using unknown
4 stalkers in the community" (see Complaint Ex. A (Doc. 1-1 at 14)) and that her supervisor
5 engaged in "racial discrimination" (see Compl. (Doc 1-1 at 15)).
6 On July 31, 2020, the United States removed the above-titled action to this district.
7 In its motion to dismiss, the United States argues Edwards has not alleged she submitted
8 a claim to the USPS prior to filing her complaint and, in the alternative, that Edwards fails
9 to state a cognizable claim for relief.
10 A. Tort Claims: Claim Presentation
11 To the extent Edwards alleges tort claims, such as embezzlement, the Court finds
12 the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to allege Edwards presented a claim to the
13 USPS prior to filing her complaint.
14 The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") provides the "exclusive" remedy where a
15 plaintiff alleges a tort claim against an employee of the United States who is acting within
16 the scope of his employment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1).3 A plaintiff may not file a
17 claim under the FTCA unless the plaintiff has "first presented the claim to the appropriate
18 Federal agency" and the claim has been "finally denied by the agency in writing." See 28
19 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Here, as the government points out, Edwards does not allege in her
20 complaint that she presented a claim to the USPS prior to filing the complaint.
21 Accordingly, Edwards' tort claims are subject to dismissal, with leave to amend to
22 allege, if she can do so, that she presented a claim to the USPS and the claim was
23 denied. See Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502-03 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
24
3 The Attorney General has certified that Sunil Chanan "was acting within the
25
scope of his employment at all times material to [the] alleged incidents." (See
Certification, filed July 31, 2020.) As Edwards has not offered evidence to the contrary,
26
the "Attorney General’s decision regarding scope of employment certification is
conclusive." See Green v. Hall, 8 F.3d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding party seeking to
27
challenge certification "bears the burden of presenting evidence and disproving the
1 district court properly dismissed FTCA claims where plaintiff had not presented claim to
2 federal agency prior to filing suit).
3 B. Title VII: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
4 To the extent Edwards alleges employment discrimination claims, the Court finds
5 the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to allege Edwards exhausted her
6 administrative remedies.
7 Title VII "provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in
8 federal employment," see Brown v. General Services Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976),
9 and "specifically requires a federal employee to exhaust his administrative remedies as a
10 precondition to filing suit," see Vinieratos v. United States, 939 F.2d 762, 767-68 (9th Cir.
11 1991). In particular, the employee must file a "complaint . . . with the agency that
12 allegedly discriminated against [said] complainant," see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(a), after
13 which the agency is required to conduct an "investigation of the complaint within 180
14 days of the filing of the complaint," see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(e)(2). The employee may
15 file suit "[w]ithin 90 days of receipt of final action taken" by the agency or "after one
16 hundred and eighty days from the filing of the initial charge" with the agency. See 42
17 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Where the employee files a discrimination claim before
18 completion of the administrative process, the claim is subject to dismissal. See Wrighten
19 v. Metropolitan Hospitals, Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1351 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding "[p]remature
20 suits [under Title VII] are always subject to a motion to dismiss").
21 Here, Edwards does not allege she exhausted her administrative remedies prior to
22 filing her complaint. Accordingly, her employment discrimination claims are subject to
23 dismissal, with leave to amend to allege, if she can do so, that she has exhausted her
24 administrative remedies.
25 C. All Claims: Failure to Plead Sufficient Facts
26 Edwards' claims are alternatively subject to dismissal for failure to allege sufficient
27 facts to state a cognizable claim for relief.
4 accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
2 || 556 U.S. 662, 668 (2009). Here, as the United States points out, the complaint cannot
3 || survive the instant motion to dismiss, as Edwards fails to allege sufficient facts to support
4 || the conclusory assertions made therein, including but not limited to her allegation that the
5 || USPS "embezzled" funds from her and that her supervisor engaged in "racial
6 || discrimination." (See Compl. (Doc. 1-1 at 14-15).)
7 Accordingly, the complaint is subject to dismissal, with leave to amend to allege
8 || sufficient facts to support any conclusory assertions.
9 CONCLUSION
10 For the reasons stated, the United States' motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED,
11 and the complaint is hereby DISMISSED with leave to amend.
g 12 lf Edwards wishes to file an amended complaint, she shall file such pleading no
S 13 || later than September 18, 2020.
14 IT IS SO ORDERED.
A 16 || Dated: September 2, 2020 [obits dl, Chote
MAKINE M. CHESNEY
2 17 Unitéd States District Judge
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