The opinion
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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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7 HAROLD DAVIS, Case No. 19-cv-07650-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS
9 v.
Re: Dkt. No. 27
10 PINTEREST, INC.,
11 Defendant.
12
13 Pending before the Court is Defendant Pinterest, Inc.’s motion to dismiss Count II of
14 Plaintiff Harold Davis’s first amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 27. The Court finds this matter
15 appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil
16 L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss with
17 leave to amend.
18 I. BACKGROUND
19 A. Factual Background
20 Plaintiff is a digital artist and professional photographer. See Dkt. No. 23 (“FAC”) at ¶ 1.
21 Defendant is an online platform that allows users to create their own virtual “pinboards” or
22 “boards,” by “pinning” images to their boards. See id. at ¶ 14. These images may be captured by
23 Defendant’s users, or may be copied from other sources on the internet. See id. Once copied and
24 displayed on Pinterest, Defendant allows users to copy, post, download, crop, alter, and share
25 these images. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 309–315. 329. According to Plaintiff, Defendant “employs no
26 system of screening for copyrighted images, copyright notices, or other indicia of copyright for
27 images upload by Pinterest users, or saved by Pinterest users to Pinterest Boards.” See id. at ¶ 25.
1 violate the intellectual property rights of others,” including photographers like Plaintiff. See id. at
2 ¶ 17.
3 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “copied, posted, and distributed” several of Plaintiff’s
4 copyrighted photographs. See id. at ¶¶ 27–306. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s display of these
5 photographs included his name, and in many cases a copyright notice. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 153–306.
6 Based on these facts, Plaintiff filed a complaint for both direct and contributory copyright
7 infringement. See id. at ¶¶ 323–332.
8 B. Procedural History
9 Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on November 20, 2019. See Dkt. No. 1. Defendant
10 subsequently moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s contributory infringement claim . See Dkt. No. 17.
11 Rather than file an opposition or statement of non-opposition to the motion, see Civil L.R. 7-3(b),
12 Plaintiff filed the operative amended complaint on March 11, 2020. See FAC. Plaintiff’s
13 substantive allegations remain largely the same as those in his initial complaint, though the FAC
14 includes 31 additional copyrighted photographs that Defendant allegedly infringed. Compare Dkt.
15 No. 1 at ¶¶ 9–115 with FAC at ¶¶ 9–332. Defendant again moves to dismiss the contributory
16 infringement claim.
17 II. LEGAL STANDARD
18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain
19 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A
20 defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be
21 granted under Rule 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the
22 complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”
23 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule
24 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
25 on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible
26 when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
27 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
1 complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
2 Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless,
3 courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of
4 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir.
5 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)).
6 III. DISCUSSION
7 A. Motion to Dismiss
8 Defendant filed the pending motion to dismiss on April 10, 2020. See Dkt. No 27.
9 Plaintiff subsequently filed his response, styled as a “Response to Defendant’s Partial Motion to
10 Dismiss and Request for Leave to Amend.” See Dkt. No. 36. The response itself is only a page
11 and a half long and does not address the substance of Defendant’s motion to dismiss. See id.
12 Indeed, Plaintiff describes the “statement of issue to be decided” in the response as whether he
13 should be granted leave to amend due to newly discovered facts. See id. at 2. The Court interprets
14 Plaintiff’s failure to oppose the motion, and request for leave to amend, as an acknowledgement
15 that his contributory infringement claim should be dismissed.
16 The Court also finds that dismissal is warranted based on the substance of Plaintiff’s
17 complaint. To establish a claim for contributory copyright infringement, Plaintiff “must establish
18 that there has been direct infringement by third parties.” See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
19 508 F.3d 1146, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007). Once this threshold issue has been established, Plaintiff
20 must further allege that Defendant “(1) has knowledge of another’s infringement and (2) either
21 (a) materially contributes to or (b) induces that infringement.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc.,
22 847 F.3d 657, 670 (9th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). Material contribution “[i]n the online
23 context” requires the defendant to have “actual knowledge that specific infringing material is
24 available using its system, and . . . simple measures [would] prevent further damage to
25 copyrighted works, yet [the defendant] continues to provide access to infringing works.” Id. at
26 671 (quotation omitted). And inducement requires the defendant to “distribute[] a device with the
27 object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative
1 Here, Plaintiff alleges that copyright infringement is rampant on the internet and that
2 Defendant’s platform “provides a mechanism for people to easily and swiftly violate the
3 intellectual property rights of others . . . .” See FAC at ¶¶ 14–17, 329. This “mechanism” includes
4 allowing users to “copy, post, download, crop, alter, and share” copyrighted material. See id. at
5 ¶ 329. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant does not screen for copyright images and “openly
6 encourages users to violate the copyrights of others.” See id. at ¶¶ 25–26. Yet critically, Plaintiff
7 does not allege facts detailing direct infringement by a third party. Plaintiff only alleges that
8 Defendant has infringed Plaintiff’s copyrights. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 329–331. Plaintiff likewise has
9 not alleged that Defendant had actual knowledge of specific third-party infringement; what
10 “simple measures” Defendant should have taken to prevent such infringement; or what “clear
11 expression or other affirmative steps” Defendant has taken to induce or foster infringement. See
12 Giganews, 847 F.3d at 671–72. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss
13 Count II of Plaintiff’s amended complaint.
14 B. Leave to Amend
15 In response to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff seeks leave to amend based on “recently
16 learned new facts.” See Dkt. No. 36 at 2. Plaintiff urges that granting leave to amend would allow
17 him to buttress his claim for contributory infringement and address Defendant’s legal arguments.
18 See id. at 3. Defendant, in response, contends that Plaintiff’s request is procedurally deficient
19 because Plaintiff neither explains the new facts nor attaches the proposed amendment to his
20 response. See Dkt. No. 38 at 2 (citing Civil L.R. 10-1). The Court understands Defendant’s
21 concern that Plaintiff has had an opportunity to amend before and his complaint remains deficient.
22 Nevertheless, there is a presumption under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 that “[t]he court
23 should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. The Ninth
24 Circuit has emphasized that “[t]his policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” See Eminence
25 Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). The Court
26 cannot say at this stage that amendment would be futile. And because a case schedule has not yet
27 been set, the Court cannot say that Defendant would be prejudiced by granting leave to amend.
1 IV. CONCLUSION
2 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count II of □□□□□□□□□□□
3 amended complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint by no later
4 than August 14, 2020, if he can do so consistent with his Rule 11 obligations. Plaintiff may not
5 add any additional defendants or new claims. The Court further SETS a telephonic case
6 || management conference for August 25, 2020, at 2:00 p.m. The parties shall file a joint case
7 management statements by August 18, 2020.
8 All counsel as well as members of the public and press may use the following dial-in
9 information below to access the conference line:
10 Dial In: 888-808-6929
11 Access Code: 6064255
12 IT IS SO ORDERED.
13 || Dated: 7/22/2020
4 :
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
15 United States District Judge
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