“Where the purported existence of an inconsistency is squarely contradicted by the record, 14 it may not serve as the basis for the rejection of an examining physician’s conclusions.”
How later courts described this case
- “Where the purported existence of an inconsistency is squarely contradicted by the record, 14 it may not serve as the basis for the rejection of an examining physician’s conclusions.”
- finding legal error in 10 discounting a treating physician’s opinion where the ALJ failed to provide a “thorough summary 11 of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence,” and the assessment was instead “wholly consistent 12 with [the provider’s] treatment notes”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 KERRIE BAGLIO, Case No. 18-cv-04294-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S
9 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENYING
10 ANDREW M. SAUL1, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
11 Defendant.
Re: Dkt. No. 16
12
Defendant Andrew M. Saul is the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
13
(“SSA”). The former Acting Commissioner, Nancy A. Berryhill, acting in her official capacity,
14
denied Plaintiff Kerrie Baglio’s application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits.
15
Dkt. No 1. Plaintiff filed this appeal challenging Defendant’s final denial of disability benefits.
16
Id. The Court finds that this matter is appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the
17
matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 16-5. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
18
GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, DENIES
19
the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remands for further proceedings.
20
I. BACKGROUND
21
A. Plaintiff’s History
22
Plaintiff was born in 1971 and has been homeless or transient since 2011. AR 116, 250,
23
133, 1278. In March 2010, Plaintiff went on disability leave. AR 15, 367–72. Plaintiff worked
24
previously as a Program Coordinator at a drug and alcohol rehabilitation facility. AR 38. Plaintiff
25
reported $7,925.00 in annual earnings during 2010. AR 17–18.
26
27
1 Plaintiff alleges that she suffers from anxiety, bipolar type II disorder, depression, mania,
2 polysubstance dependence, and obsessive-compulsive disorder (“OCD”). AR 42, 502, 555.
3 Plaintiff alleges her depression and manic episodes cause severe isolation, which makes her “feel
4 like [she’s] paralyzed.” AR 42, 49, 524, 575, 1270. Plaintiff alleges her symptoms also make it
5 difficult to show up to medical appointments. AR 511, 560. Plaintiff further alleges that she
6 suffers physically from anemia, asthma, Epstein-Barr syndrome, insomnia, hypertension, post-
7 traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), psoriasis, and tearfulness. AR 47, 525, 1270. Plaintiff has a
8 history of methamphetamine use and suicide attempts. AR 47, 58, 111, 414, 662. In 2013,
9 Plaintiff was discharged from an involuntary psychiatric admission after a suicide attempt around
10 the time of her father’s death. AR 21, 413–22, 563. Plaintiff alleges that she was sexually abused
11 by a family member from ages four to thirteen. AR 501, 513.
12 B. Legal Framework of the Social Security Act
13 1. Legal Framework of the Social Security Act
14 To qualify for SSI, the claimant must be “disabled” as defined by the Social Security Act
15 (“Act”). The benefit program defines disability as an individual’s inability “to engage in any
16 substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
17 impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
18 for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),
19 1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905. The SSA deems a person disabled only
20 if:
[H]is physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such
21
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
22 considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
23 economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate
area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for
24 him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For
purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individual),
25
“work which exists in the national economy” means work which
26 exists in significant numbers either in the region where such
individual lives or in several regions of the country.
27
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
1 2. Five-Step Process for Evaluating Claimant’s Disability Claim
2 When the claimant is dissatisfied with the initial and reconsidered decisions by the SSA,
3 the claimant may request a hearing in front of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). 20 C.F.R.
4 §§ 404.929, 416.1429. The ALJ will issue a new decision based on the preponderance of the
5 evidence developed in the hearing record and in the file. Id. §§ 404.929, 416.1429. To determine
6 whether the claimant qualifies for disability benefits, the ALJ utilizes a five-step sequential
7 evaluation process. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
8 a. Step One: Substantial Gainful Work Activity.
9 At Step One, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is currently engaged in work
10 activity that is substantial and gainful. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b); id. § 416.920(a)(4)(i), (b).
11 Substantial work activity “involves doing significant physical or mental activities . . . even if it is
12 done on a part-time basis” or requires “do[ing] less, get[ting] paid less, or hav[ing] less
13 responsibility than when [the claimant] worked before.” Id. §§ 404.1572(a), 416.972(a). “Gainful
14 work activity is work activity that [the claimant] do[es] for pay or profit . . . whether or not a profit
15 is realized.” Id. §§ 404.1572(b), 416.972(b). If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
16 activity, then the claimant is not disabled, regardless of any medical condition or the claimant’s
17 age, education, or work experience. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b), 416.920(a)(4)(i), (b).
18 b. Step Two: Medical Severity of Impairment
19 If the claimant is not presently engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the ALJ
20 determines whether the claimant’s alleged impairments are medically severe. Id.
21 §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c), 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). If the claimant lacks “any impairment or
22 combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability
23 to do basic work activities,” then the impairments are not severe. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1521(a),
24 416.920(c), 416.921(a). “Basic work activities” are “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do
25 most jobs,” including physical functioning, sensory capacity, following instructions, use of
26 judgment, and responding appropriately to routine work situations (including supervision and
27 interactions with coworkers), and dealing with changes to work routines. Id. §§ 404.1521(b),
1 must have lasted or must be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months.” Id.
2 §§ 404.1509, 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.909, 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant does not meet these
3 requirements, then he is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c); id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c).
4 c. Step Three: Listed Impairment
5 If the claimant has a severe impairment, the ALJ proceeds to Step Three and determines
6 whether the claimant’s impairment, or combination of impairments, medically “meets or equals”
7 an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (“App. 1”). Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
8 (d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d); see also id. §§ 404.1525, 416.925 (describing Appendix 1’s purpose,
9 organization, and use). A claimant’s impairment is medically equivalent to a listed impairment if
10 it is “at least equal in severity and duration to the criteria of any listed impairment.” Id.
11 §§ 404.1526(a), 416.926(a). If the claimant’s impairment meets or exceeds the requirements of a
12 listed impairment, the claimant is disabled, regardless of age, education, and work experience. Id.
13 §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d).
14 The listings for mental disorders in Appendix 1 are arranged into eleven diagnostic
15 categories, including schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders (12.03), depressive,
16 bipolar, and related disorders (12.04), intellectual disorder (12.05), and trauma and stressor-related
17 disorders (12.15). App. 1 § 12.00(A). The listings typically have three sets of criteria: paragraphs
18 A, B, and C. Id. Paragraph A “(except 12.05) includes the medical criteria that must be present in
19 [the] medical evidence,” paragraph B “(except 12.05) provides the functional criteria [assessed], in
20 conjunction with a rating scale” to evaluate how the claimant’s mental disorder limits his or her
21 functioning, and paragraph C provides criteria used to evaluate “serious and persistent mental
22 disorders.” Id. Only some of the eleven diagnostic categories of mental disorders have paragraph
23 C criteria, and for those categories, the “mental disorder must satisfy the requirements of both
24 paragraphs A and B, or the requirements of both paragraphs A and C.” Id. If the claimant
25 satisfies the diagnostic description in the introductory paragraph and the criteria of both
26 paragraphs A and B (or A and C, when appropriate) are satisfied, the claimant has a listed
27 impairment. Id. Intellectual disorder (12.05) “has two paragraphs, designated A and B, that apply
d. Step Four: Residual Functioning Capacity and Past Relevant Work
1
If the claimant does not have a listed impairment, then at Step Four, the ALJ assesses the
2
claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and ability to perform past relevant work. 20
3
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e), 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e). The ALJ first assesses all the relevant
4
medical and other evidence in the record to determine the claimant’s RFC. Id. §§ 404.1520(e),
5
416.920(e). The claimant’s RFC gauges the most the claimant can do despite the claimant’s
6
limitations. Id. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). Before making a determination, the SSA is
7
responsible for developing the claimant’s complete medical history. Id. §§ 404.1545(a)(3),
8
416.945(a)(3).
9
In the RFC assessment, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s physical and mental abilities, as
10
well as other abilities affected by the claimant’s impairments. Id. §§ 404.1545(b)–(d),
11
416.945(b)–(d). With respect to a claimant’s physical abilities, “[a] limited ability to perform
12
certain physical demands of work activity, such as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying,
13
pushing, pulling, or other physical functions (including manipulative or postural functions, such as
14
reaching, handling, stooping or crouching), may reduce [a claimant’s] ability to do past work and
15
other work.” Id. §§ 404.1545(b), 416.945(b). With respect to a claimant’s mental abilities, “[a]
16
limited ability to carry out certain mental activities, such as limitations in understanding,
17
remembering, and carrying out instructions, and in responding appropriately to supervision,
18
coworkers, and work pressures in a work setting, may reduce [the claimant’s] ability to do past
19
work and other work.” Id. §§ 404.1545(c), 416.945(c).
20
Next, the ALJ compares the claimant’s RFC with the physical and mental demands of the
21
claimant’s past relevant work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the ALJ determines that the
22
claimant can still perform the past relevant work, then the claimant is not disabled. Id.
23
§§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). “Past relevant work” is work that the claimant has done in the past 15
24
years, that qualifies as substantial gainful activity, and that has “lasted long enough for [the
25
claimant] to learn to do it.” Id. §§ 404.1560(b)(1), 416.960(b)(1). The ALJ will determine
26
whether the claimant can do her past relevant work by evaluating the claimant’s testimony on
27
work performed in the past. Id. §§ 404.1560(b)(2), 416.960(b)(2). In addition, the ALJ may
1 evaluate the testimony of other people familiar with the claimant’s past work, the opinions of a
2 vocational expert (“VE”), or other resources, such as the Department of Labor’s Dictionary of
3 Occupational Titles. Id. §§ 404.1560(b)(2), 416.960(b)(2). If the claimant is found not capable of
4 performing past relevant work at Step Four, then the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner of
5 the SSA to prove that the claimant is not disabled at Step Five. See Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d
6 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2001).
7 e. Step Five: Adjustment to Other Work
8 If the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, then at Step Five the ALJ determines
9 whether the claimant can adjust to other work based on the claimant’s age, education, work
10 experience, and RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). At Step Five, the ALJ
11 uses the RFC assessment from Step Four to determine whether the claimant can adjust to other
12 work. Id. §§ 404.1560(c)(1), 416.920(c)(1). If the ALJ determines that “other work exists in
13 significant numbers in the national economy that [the claimant] can do,” then the ALJ will find
14 that the claimant is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1560(c)(2), 416.920(c)(2). The ALJ may meet her
15 Step Five burden in two ways: “(1) the testimony of a VE or (2) by reference to the Medical–
16 Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2.” See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d
17 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2001).
18 C. Procedural History
19 On January 24, 2014, Plaintiff applied for disability and disability insurance benefits under
20 Title II of the Act, claiming physical and mental impairment since March 15, 2010. AR 15, 248,
21 332. On February 5, 2014, Plaintiff applied for SSI under Title XVI of the Act. AR 15, 332. The
22 SSA denied both of Plaintiff’s claims on April 24, 2014, and affirmed its holding on October 13,
23 2014 on reconsideration.2 AR 151, 160. Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, but failed
24 to appear on November 15, 2016. AR 68, 170. The ALJ issued a notice to show cause for a
25 supplemental administrative hearing. AR 73. On March 14, 2017, the ALJ held a supplemental
26 administrative hearing after Plaintiff demonstrated good cause. AR 15, 31–65, 212–14. The ALJ
27
1 issued a written opinion denying both of Plaintiff’s claims on May 3, 2017. AR 24.
2 At Step One, the ALJ found Plaintiff engaged in temporary gainful activity since the onset
3 of her disability on March 15, 2010, but found that the sum of her wages did not rise to the level of
4 substantial gainful activity. AR 17–18.
5 At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
6 bipolar disorder, PTSD, and polysubstance dependence. AR 18. The ALJ also found Plaintiff’s
7 alleged hypertension, asthma, Epstein-Barr syndrome, anemia, and chronic headaches to be non-
8 severe. Id.
9 At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
10 impairments that meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment. Id.; see App. 1.
11 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had “mild limitations” in understanding, remembering, or applying
12 information. AR 18. Plaintiff also supplied “most of her background and current information
13 without any significant difficulties or limitations at the hearing.” AR 18. Plaintiff also
14 “respond[ed] well to questioning.” Id. Thus, the ALJ concluded that there was “no evidence of
15 cognitive issues or difficulties.” Id.
16 The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff had “signs of scattered and circumstantial thought
17 processes” during periods of noncompliance with medication. AR 19. However, Plaintiff was
18 “able to understand, remember, and apply information well.” AR 18. Moreover, the ALJ noted
19 that Plaintiff could “drive herself to the hearing” and “use the public transportation system.” AR
20 19. The ALJ noted that, while in a clinical interview, Plaintiff was “laughing and joking,” and
21 said that Plaintiff remarked that “she hides symptoms well.” Id. The ALJ found that Plaintiff
22 experienced “mild limitations” in adapting and managing herself and “little difficulty with
23 grooming and hygiene.” Id. Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had
24 “moderate limitations” related to concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace and interacting
25 with others. Id.
26 Prior to Step Four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a “full range
27 of work at all exertional levels.” Id. The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s underlying physical and
1 the symptoms shown. AR 20. The ALJ considered opinion evidence regarding “all symptoms
2 and the extent to which these symptoms [could] reasonably be accepted as consistent.” Id. The
3 ALJ accorded “partial weight” to Dr. Mains’ “medical source statements” because they were “not
4 entirely consistent with the record, as a whole” and he “fail[ed] to identify her history of
5 noncompliance with treatment as well as her drug and alcohol use.” AR 22. The ALJ also gave
6 little weight to the mental capacities form completed by Jordan Boehler, L.C.S.W. N.P., because
7 “[a]s a social worker, Ms. Boehler [was] an unacceptable medical source for purposes of
8 diagnosing the claimant.” Id.
9 The ALJ also evaluated the Plaintiff’s statements concerning the “intensity, persistence,
10 and limiting effects of these symptoms.” AR 20. The ALJ reviewed Plaintiff’s testimony, which
11 illustrated her mental and physical impairments, failure to obtain medication refills, and failure to
12 follow through with her treatment plan. AR 21. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s daily physical
13 activities were “not limited to the extent one would expect” because Plaintiff walked, rode the bus,
14 went grocery shopping, and sought to volunteer at an animal shelter. Id. Plaintiff’s polysubstance
15 abuse was not a contributing factor in the ALJ’s determination because Plaintiff’s mental
16 impairments were “severe and problematic” in the absence of substance abuse. Id. Thus, the ALJ
17 concluded Plaintiff’s self-reporting of alleged symptoms was “partially substantiated” by the
18 record. Id.
19 At Step Four, the ALJ found Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work as a
20 program coordinator and drug and alcohol counselor. AR 22–23. The vocational expert described
21 Plaintiff’s past occupations under the Dictionary of Occupational Titles as substance abuse
22 counselor (D.O.T. 045.107-058), a sedentary and skilled job, or program coordinator,
23 rehabilitation services (D.O.T. 076-117-010), a light and skilled job. AR 23.
24 At Step Five, when considering Plaintiff’s age (39), past work, education (high school),
25 and RFC, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
26 national economy. Id. The vocational expert testified that Plaintiff would be able to perform the
27 requirements of representative occupations such as hand packager, garment sorter, and marker,
1 AR 23–24. Accordingly, the ALJ ruled that Plaintiff was not disabled and therefore did not
2 qualify for disability and disability insurance benefits or qualify for SSI. AR 24.
3 On May 3, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s
4 decision, applying the “laws, regulations, and rulings in effect as of the date we took the action.”
5 AR 1–3. Thus, the ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision on Plaintiff’s
6 application for disability and disability insurance benefits or SSI. AR 1.
7 On July 17, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint to appeal Defendant’s final denial of disability
8 benefits and SSI. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on March 14, 2019.
9 Dkt. No. 16 (“Pl. Mot.”). Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition
10 on April 11, 2019. Dkt. No. 17 (“Def. Mot.”). Plaintiff filed her reply on April 25, 2019. Dkt. No.
11 18 (“Pl.’s Reply Mot.”).
12 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
13 The Court has jurisdiction to review final decisions of the Commissioner. See 42 U.S.C.
14 § 405(g) (“The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the
15 record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social
16 Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.”). The Court may disturb the
17 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits only if the decision is either not supported by
18 substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir.
19 2005). “Substantial evidence ‘means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
20 adequate to support a conclusion.’” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2012)
21 (quoting Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 985, 690 (9th Cir. 2009)). This
22 evidence must be “more than a mere scintilla, but may be less than a preponderance,” id., and
23 “where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports
24 the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947,
25 954 (9th Cir. 2002).
26 Finally, the Court may not reverse an ALJ’s decision if the error is harmless. “[T]he
27 burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s
1 (alterations in original).
2 III. DISCUSSION
3 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible legal error by denying Plaintiff’s claim
4 for disability benefits. Pl. Mot. at 1. First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erroneously rejected, in
5 whole or in part, opinions of Plaintiff’s treating medical sources: Dr. Mains, Ms. Boehler, Dr.
6 Karen Yun, and Ms. Mazu Byrd, MFT. Id. at 9–15. Second, the ALJ failed to provide “specific,
7 clear and convincing reasons” for finding Plaintiff’s subjective complaints only partially
8 substantiated. Id. at 15–18. Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff’s
9 RFC without the support of substantial evidence and relied on incomplete vocational expert
10 testimony. Id. at 18–20. Finally, Plaintiff argues, based on Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018),
11 that the ALJ was improperly appointed. Id. at 20. Defendant responds that the ALJ properly
12 evaluated the opinion evidence regarding Plaintiff’s physical impairments; the ALJ gave the
13 identified opinions less weight due to their inconsistency with evidence in the record; the ALJ
14 properly evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective testimony; the ALJ’s RFC and vocational experts’
15 testimony are both supported by substantial evidence; and Plaintiff’s Appointments Clause claim
16 fails because it was not timely made. See Def. Mot. 3–15.
17 Because the Court finds that the ALJ did not provide sufficient reasons for placing partial
18 weight on Dr. Mains’ medical opinion and did not clearly assess Dr. Yun’s or Ms. Byrd’s
19 opinions, and that these errors infected the ALJ’s sequential analysis, the Court remands for
20 further administrative proceedings. The Court also finds that the ALJ provided specific, clear and
21 convincing reasons for finding Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her symptoms only partially
22 substantiated and rejects Plaintiff’s Appointments Clause claim as untimely.
23 A. Whether the ALJ Erroneously Evaluated Treating and Examining Sources
24 An ALJ distinguishes between “three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant
25 (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians);
26 and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v.
27 Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended (Apr. 9, 1996). The ALJ “may disregard
1 Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). A reviewing court must consider the “entire record as
2 a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’”
3 Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d
4 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). “[W]here the treating doctor’s opinion is not contradicted by another
5 doctor, it may be rejected only for ‘clear and convincing’ reasons.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830
6 (quoting Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991)). “[I]f the treating doctor’s
7 opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the Commissioner may not reject this opinion without
8 providing ‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record for so
9 doing.” Id. (quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)).
10 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of treating providers “in
11 whole or in part” by placing partial weight on psychiatrist Dr. Mains’ opinion and “little weight”
12 on Mr. Boehler’s mental capacities form, and by “implicitly reject[ing]” the opinions of Ms. Byrd
13 and Dr. Yun entirely. Pl. Mot. at 9–15. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ erred in his
14 determinations as to Dr. Mains, Dr. Yun, and Ms. Byrd.
15 i. Dr. Mains’ Opinions
16 The ALJ placed “partial weight” on psychiatrist Dr. Mains’ “medical source statements,”
17 finding that they were “not entirely consistent with the record as a whole,” failed to identify
18 Plaintiff’s history of non-compliance and substance use, and included statements that were
19 administrative findings “not entitled to significant weight.” AR 22. In late 2013, Dr. Mains began
20 treating Plaintiff as her primary physician at Telecare CHANGES (“Telecare”), and continued to
21 do so for roughly three years. AR 1121, 1123, 1150. Dr. Mains diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar
22 disorder, PTSD, and amphetamine dependence. AR 1007. Because the ALJ found Dr. Mains’
23 opinions inconsistent with the record, he was required to supply specific and legitimate reasons for
24 placing partial weight on the opinions, and could not “cherry-pick” from “mixed results” to
25 support a denial of benefits. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1018 (9th Cir. 2014).
26 The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the reasons proffered for placing partial weight on Dr.
27 Mains’ opinions did not meet the specific and legitimate reasons standard. In assessing Dr.
1 “Mental Health Clinician’s Confidential Report” and “Mental Impairment Questionnaire.” See
2 AR 22 (referencing Exhibits B25F (AR 1094–97) and B30F (AR 1274–78)). In these statements,
3 Dr. Mains provided opinions regarding diagnosis, treatment, and disability, encompassing the
4 statements highlighted by the ALJ. Compare AR 22 with AR 1095–96 (noting Plaintiff is
5 “markedly limited” in “sustained concentration and persistence” and that her bipolar disorder and
6 social phobia “prevent[ed] [her] from working.”).
7 First, while the ALJ reasoned that Dr. Mains’ findings were not entirely consistent with the
8 record, he did not explain how or why. It is unclear, for example, whether the ALJ found Dr.
9 Mains’ opinions that Plaintiff had “marked limitations in attention and that her bipolar disorder
10 prevented her from working,” AR 22, were inconsistent with something in the record, and if so,
11 what it was. This brief reference to some inconsistency did not “set[] out a detailed and thorough
12 summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence,” as required to satisfy the specific or
13 legitimate reasons standard. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751 (quoting Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d
14 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986)).
15 The ALJ also afforded only partial weight to Dr. Mains’ opinions because some of his
16 statements were administrative findings reserved to the Commissioner. AR 22. In the statements,
17 Dr. Mains found that Plaintiff had work restrictions related to her mental health conditions, such
18 that she was “fully disabled.” Id. The ALJ’s conclusion did not provide specific and legitimate
19 reasons for placing partial weight on Dr. Mains’ opinions. SSA regulations provide for medical
20 opinions that address a claimant’s impairment or ability to work:
21 Medical Opinion. A medical opinion is a statement from a medical
source about what [the claimant] can still do despite [his/her]
22 impairment(s) and whether [the claimant] have one or more
impairment-related limitations or restrictions in the following abilities
23 . . . [the claimant’s] ability to perform mental demands of work
activities, such as understanding; remembering; maintaining
24 concentration, persistence, or pace; carrying out instructions; or
responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, or work
25 pressures in a work setting. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2)(iii).
26 While the Court agrees that a treating physician’s conclusion that a claimant is disabled is not
27 dispositive, that such an opinion “will not [be] give[n] any special significance,” and that the
1 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)–(3), simply stating that the opinions made administrative findings does
2 not provide a legitimate reason for placing less weight on the three years of treatment history
3 underlying Dr. Mains’ opinions. In context, Dr. Mains’ opinions addressed his summary view of
4 the impact of Plaintiff’s observed mental health conditions on her ability to work, as opposed to
5 being simply an unsupported legal conclusion. See AR 1096 (on page three of form, after
6 previous pages detailed Dr. Mains’ observations and diagnosis of bipolar disorder, answering
7 “yes” to question “Does this individual’s mental health condition prevent them from working?”).
8 The ALJ’s blanket rejection on this basis did not provide the reasoning necessary to justify
9 discounting Dr. Mains’ opinions.
10 Finally, the ALJ found that Dr. Mains “fail[ed] to identify [Plaintiff’s] history of
11 noncompliance with treatment as well as her drug and alcohol use.” AR 22. This does not appear
12 to be consistent with the record. See AR 1096 (“Mental Health Clinician’s Report” with boxes
13 checked for “drug abuse” and “recovering drug abuser”); AR 1277 (“Mental Impairment
14 Questionnaire” with “yes” checked in response to the question “Is your patient currently abusing
15 alcohol or drugs?”). The Questionnaire also reflects that Dr. Mains was aware of Plaintiff’s non-
16 compliance with treatment based on her symptoms and limitations. See AR 1278 (noting that
17 patient has difficulty with “attending appointments,” “regularly taking medications,” and
18 “consistently engaging with treatment, in part because “[e]xtreme social avoidance keeps her at
19 [her] house,” making follow-up difficult”). These observations are consistent with Dr. Mains’
20 treatment notes in the record, which reflect that over the course of her treatment, Plaintiff
21 “followed through with a few appointments,” and had “not followed through with picking up her
22 medications.” AR 1157; see also AR 996 (“Symtpoms (sic) complicated by med non-
23 compliance”); AR 1054 (noting that Plaintiff’s “engagement is sketchy and everytime she comes
24 in and she insists she is committed and it will be better, and everytime engagement remains
25 sketchy.”); 1057 (“Getting medications to her has always been a challenge for us, it seems she has
26 barely gotten any prescriptions while she has been with us, yet she sates she takes meds
27 regularly.”). Dr. Mains also noted that it was difficult to assess whether Plaintiff was “hypomanic
1 Notwithstanding these observations, Dr. Mains said that his opinions would not “materially
2 change if [Plaintiff] were not abusing drugs or alcohol.” AR 1277. 3 So the record does not
3 support the conclusion that Dr. Mains “failed to identify” the drug use and compliance issues, and
4 thus does not provide a basis for discounting his opinions for this reason. A treating physician’s
5 “statements must be read in context of the overall diagnostic picture he draws.” Holohan v.
6 Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001). Absent some explanation as to why Dr. Mains
7 needed to say more about Plaintiff’s substance abuse and noncompliance with treatment than he
8 did in his opinions, the ALJ did not articulate a sufficient basis for partially discounting those
9 opinions. See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 676–77 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding legal error in
10 discounting a treating physician’s opinion where the ALJ failed to provide a “thorough summary
11 of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence,” and the assessment was instead “wholly consistent
12 with [the provider’s] treatment notes”); see also Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir.
13 1996) (“Where the purported existence of an inconsistency is squarely contradicted by the record,
14 it may not serve as the basis for the rejection of an examining physician’s conclusions.”).
15 In summary, the ALJ did not provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by
16 substantial evidence for placing partial weight on Dr. Mains’ opinions.
17 ii. Dr. Yun’s and Ms. Byrd’s Opinions
18 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ “improperly and implicitly rejected” the opinions of Dr.
19 Yun and Ms. Byrd by essentially ignoring them in declining to adopt what he referred to as “crisis
20 evaluations.” Pl. Mot. at 14–15. In 2011, Plaintiff was treated at Alameda County Behavioral
21 Health Care Services (also called “North County Crisis Services”) by Dr. Yun and Ms. Byrd. AR
22 499, 521. Dr. Yun and Ms. Byrd treated Plaintiff over the course of multiple visits between July
23 and November 2011, and again in November and December 2013. AR 499-576. During
24 Plaintiff’s treatment in 2011, Dr. Yun noted Plaintiff’s history of substance abuse, depression,
25 bipolar disorder, and suicide attempts. AR 524. In August 2011, Dr. Yun rated Plaintiff’s global
26
27
1 assessment function (“GAF”) at 46, later updating it in November 2011 to 50.4 AR 521, 526.
2 Over the course of her treatment, Dr. Yun observed that Plaintiff presented with “[p]sychomotor
3 retardation,” “[d]epressed” mood, “[i]mpaired” concentration, and “[i]mpaired-[m]oderate” to
4 “[i]mpaired-[s]evere” judgment,” while also noting that Plaintiff’s memory, abstract thinking,
5 orientation, thought process, and speech presented in normal range. AR 525–26. Dr. Yun
6 prescribed several medications to Plaintiff and noted that Plaintiff self-reported “[t]aking meds as
7 [prescribed] [has] benefits.” AR 531. Dr. Yun’s records show several missed appointments,
8 leading to intermittent prescription use. AR 532, 546, 549, 556. Plaintiff was discharged from
9 North County Crisis Services in November 2011 due to her failure to attend appointments and was
10 presumed to be out of medications. AR 521–22.
11 Dr. Yun again treated Plaintiff in 2013 during a follow-up appointment after Plaintiff
12 attempted suicide, and updated Plaintiff’s GAF score to 43. AR 560–63. Dr. Yun noted that
13 Plaintiff had not taken her medication in the two years since her initial intake in 2011 and noted
14 her history with substance abuse. Id. Ms. Byrd also treated Plaintiff during the same periods. Ms.
15 Byrd’s notes reflect several in person appointments, where she documented Plaintiff’s then-
16 present symptoms and evaluations. AR 499–520. These evaluations noted the following
17 observations of Plaintiff: “[i]nsight/judgment limited,” “[m]ood anxious,” “wide range of affect,”
18 and “[t]angential thought process,” among others. AR 505, 508, 509. Ms. Byrd also noted several
19 missed appointments, as well as inconsistent prescription use. See AR 510, 520, 540. Ms. Byrd’s
20 GAF scores of Plaintiff ranged from 50 to 52. AR 513.
21 The ALJ did not mention Dr. Yun’s or Ms. Byrd’s evaluations by name. Generally,
22 “[w]here an ALJ does not explicitly reject a medical opinion or set forth specific, legitimate
23 reasons for crediting one medical opinion over another, he errs.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. The
24 ALJ did, however, evaluate what he referred to as “crisis evaluations,” and rejected them on the
25
26
4 GAF scores are a tool used by mental health professionals to quantify in a single measure a
patient’s overall level of functioning at a given moment. See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic &
27
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, at 30-32 (4th ed. Text Revision (200)). A GAF of 50
1 ground that they were initial assessments based on “subjective complaints.” AR 22. In this
2 discussion, the ALJ cited to “Exhibit 5F/4,” id., which does not exist in the record. See AR 25–30.
3 The Court assumes this was a typo, and that the ALJ was referring to Exhibit B5F at page 4, which
4 contains a form titled, “CRISIS PROGRAM Alameda County Mental Health CRISIS Evaluation”
5 that was prepared when Plaintiff began treatment at North County Crisis Services. See Exhibit
6 B5F (AR 501–03). The ALJ correctly noted that this form reflects an initial evaluation of Plaintiff
7 when she began treatment in August 2011. Id. While this evaluation was prepared by Ms. Byrd,
8 it does not contain any opinion by Dr. Yun or reflect any of the further evaluations in Plaintiff’s
9 file for the subsequent four months of treatment at North County Crisis Services. The ALJ
10 “declined to adopt the limitations set forth in the crisis evaluations” because “the assessment of
11 ‘substantial’ impairments is vague and contradicted by the overall record, including the claimant’s
12 testimony.” AR 22.
13 The problem for the Court in reviewing the ALJ’s analysis is that it is not clear whether the
14 ALJ categorized the entirety of Dr. Yun’s and Ms. Byrd’s treatment of Plaintiff as “crisis
15 evaluations.” While Plaintiff’s treatment in 2013 might be characterized as a “crisis evaluation”
16 because it included only one visit, her 2011 treatment would not obviously fall into that category
17 given that the records note continued appointments over four months. See Patton v. Colvin, No.
18 13-cv-00518-LHK, 2014 WL 12558849, at *8 n.7 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2014) (finding that where a
19 doctor only saw plaintiff one time, she was not a treating physician, and thus noting that “the ALJ
20 did not need to give specific reasons to discredit her opinions”). It appears that the ALJ’s brief
21 observation that “the assessment of ‘substantial’ impairments is vague and contradicted by the
22 overall record, including the claimant’s testimony,” AR 22, may refer to the single August 2011
23 intake form. See AR 501–503 (marking that Plaintiff “exhibits a substantial impairment in the
24 following area(s): Community living arrangement[,] Daily activities, including employment,
25 household responsibilities, and attending scheduled programs[,] and Social relationships,
26 including the ability to establish and maintain relationship and social support systems.”). But even
27 if that one form could be disregarded or discounted, there was no explanation of how this would
1 Byrd’s later evaluations (as detailed throughout her treatment notes) over the course of Plaintiff’s
2 four-month treatment at North County Crisis Center.
3 Based on the limited explanation provided, the Court cannot tell whether the ALJ
4 considered and rejected Dr. Yun’s opinion or Ms. Byrd’s subsequent evaluations (and why), or if
5 he simply overlooked them. This leads to the conclusion that the decision did not provide the
6 required specific and legitimate reasons for disregarding these opinions (if they were in fact
7 considered and disregarded). Even if there might be legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Yun’s and
8 Ms. Byrd’s opinions, the Court may only “review the ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning and
9 factual findings offered by the ALJ—not post hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the
10 adjudicator may have been thinking.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225
11 (9th Cir. 2009). Without any clear discussion of Dr. Yun’s and Ms. Byrd’s opinions, the Court
12 cannot assess whether the ALJ considered them, as “crisis evaluations” or otherwise, and if so,
13 what the basis was for rejecting them entirely based on a citation to one form. This lack of clarity
14 also requires remand.5
15 The Court finds that the cumulative errors—failure to provide specific and legitimate
16 reasons to place partial weight on Dr. Mains’ opinion and failure to clearly address Dr. Yun’s and
17 Ms. Byrd’s opinions—were not harmless, as they infected the ALJ’s determinations throughout
18 the sequential analysis. Specifically, the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Mains’ opinion deserved
19 only partial weight is significant in the context of the entire record. An ALJ can evaluate medical
20 sources by using factors including the “length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of
21 examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability, consistency with
22 the record, and specialization of the doctor.” See Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 655 (9th Cir.
23 2017); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)–(6). As Plaintiff’s longest treating psychiatrist reflected in the
24 record, Dr. Mains provides extensive notes regarding Plaintiff’s psychiatric treatment over the
25
5 The Court notes that the ALJ also evaluated reported GAF scores (including those in Exhibit
26
B5F from North County Crisis Services) and found that they do not “support a longitudinal pattern
of significant or serious limitations that would support any residual function capacity limitations.”
27
AR 22. While the ALJ provides sufficient reasoning to place partial weight on the scores
1 course of three years. Thus, if Dr. Mains’ opinion had been fully credited, the Court cannot say
2 with certainty that the ALJ would still have reached the same result. The same is true of Dr.
3 Yun’s and Ms. Byrd’s opinions. Cf. Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th
4 Cir. 2006) (“[W]here the ALJ’s error lies in a failure to properly discuss competent lay testimony
5 favorable to the claimant, a reviewing court cannot consider the error harmless unless it can
6 confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the testimony, could have
7 reached a different disability determination.”).6
8 B. The ALJ’s Credibility Analysis
9 “An ALJ [must] support his credibility finding about [a claimant’s] testimony with
10 specific, clear and convincing reasons.” Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228,
11 1234 (9th Cir. 2011). To evaluate the claimant’s testimony, the ALJ may rely on “ordinary
12 techniques of credibility evaluation,” including “inconsistencies either in the testimony or between
13 the testimony and claimant’s conduct.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112 (citing Turner, 613 F.3d at 1224
14 n.3). “The ALJ may discredit a claimant’s testimony when the claimant reports participation in
15 everyday activities indicating capacities that are transferable to a work setting.” Id. at 1113. The
16 Court “may not engage in second-guessing” when substantial evidence in the record supports the
17 ALJ’s credibility finding. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002).
18 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective testimony about her
19 symptoms, providing only boilerplate language to discount the testimony. Pl. Mot. at 15–16. The
20 ALJ referenced Plaintiff’s testimony in concluding she was “able to walk her dog, and she would
21 have little difficulty volunteering at an animal shelter if offered.” AR 21. The ALJ noted that
22
23
6 These errors in the ALJ’s assessment of the severity of Plaintiff’s impairment at Step Three
affected the remaining analysis. The ALJ based his judgment regarding Plaintiff’s functional
24
residual capacity on the partial, little, or no weight given to the Plaintiff’s treating providers, and
reevaluation of those opinions could affect the ALJ’s conclusions regarding the RFC. Similarly,
25
reevaluation of those opinions could affect the ALJ’s conclusions at Step Five. Because the ALJ
did not adequately explain his assessment of the medical opinion evidence at Step Three, the
26
findings at Step Four and Five are erroneous, and the Court need not reach Plaintiff’s additional
arguments regarding those steps. Further, because these issues warrant remand, the Court does not
27
address Plaintiff’s arguments as to the opinions of Mr. Boehler (referred to as “Ms. Boehler” in
1 Plaintiff rides the bus, shops for groceries at night, walks her therapy dog, lives with a friend, and
2 checks social media. AR 20. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s participation in physical activities “is
3 not entirely consistent with her allegations of disability.” AR 21. The ALJ also acknowledged
4 Plaintiff’s statements that she had “difficulty getting up and getting out a few times per month.”
5 AR 20. Based on the record, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was capable of daily living activities.
6 AR 21.
7 With respect to Plaintiff’s alleged mental disability, the ALJ found that the “longitudinal
8 record does not show the presence of disabling limitation or restrictions.” AR 20. The ALJ found
9 that Plaintiff’s “treatment history shows that, when compliant with her treatment plan, she
10 improves considerably,” but noted that the record “consistently documents a failure to obtain
11 refills and to follow through with her treatment plan.” AR 20–21. The ALJ alluded to Plaintiff’s
12 testimony that prescribed medications helped “[a] little bit,” and that “[i]t’s better with what [Dr.
13 Mains is] giving me than without.” AR 45. Plaintiff further testified that she has trouble focusing
14 due to her bipolar disorder, which causes her to get “manic, and depressive, and suicidal.” AR 49.
15 Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s statements were only partially
16 substantiated because the overall record illustrated that she was going on and off her medications.
17 AR 21–22. The ALJ found that the Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could
18 reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” AR 20. However, the ALJ also found
19 that the Plaintiff’s statements “concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these
20 symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the
21 record for the reasons explained in this decision.” Id. Thus, the ALJ concluded that the Plaintiff’s
22 statements about her alleged symptoms were only “partially substantiated” by the record. AR 21.
23 The Court finds that the ALJ adequately provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for only
24 partially crediting Plaintiff’s testimony.
25 Although the Court acknowledges that many courts have found compelling reasons to view
26 occasional non-compliance with treatment as rooted in an underlying mental affliction, non-
27 compliance was not the only reason for given by the ALJ for partially crediting Plaintiff’s
1 occasionally going off their medication when the record affords compelling reason to view such
2 departures from prescribed treatment as part of claimants’ underlying mental afflictions.”);
3 Nguyen, 100 F.3d at 1465 (finding invalid an ALJ’s reasons for rejecting claimant’s assertions
4 about his depression because claimant “may have failed to seek psychiatric treatment for his
5 mental condition, but it is a questionable practice to chastise one with a mental impairment for the
6 exercise of poor judgment in seeking rehabilitation.”) (quoting Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d
7 1116, 1124 (6th Cir. 1989)). Instead, the ALJ pointed to Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her daily
8 actions, her living situation, and her ability to testify coherently, as well as her interactions with
9 friends and providers, in finding that the evidence pointed to a mild limitation in understanding,
10 remembering, or applying information, a moderate limitation in interacting with others, a
11 moderate limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and mild limitations in
12 adapting and managing herself. AR 19. “To satisfy the paragraph B criteria, [a claimant’s] mental
13 disorder must result in ‘extreme’ limitation of one, or ‘marked’ limitation of two, of the four areas
14 of mental functioning.” 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Finding that Plaintiff did not meet
15 this requirement based on her testimony and the overall record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s
16 impairments did not severely impair her functioning capacity. By pointing to Plaintiff’s additional
17 testimony, as well as evidence from the record, the ALJ sufficiently provided clear and convincing
18 reasons for only partially crediting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms.
19 C. Appointments Clause Challenge
20 Plaintiff contends that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v. SEC, the ALJ was
21 not constitutionally appointed, and therefore Plaintiff’s case should be remanded for a new
22 hearing. Pl. Mot. at 21. In Lucia, the Supreme Court held that ALJs within the Securities and
23 Exchange Commission (“SEC”) are “Officers of the United States,” subject to the Appointments
24 Clause of Article II of the United States Constitution. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2051, 2055,
25 (2018). Accordingly, “only the President, a court of law, or a head of department” may appoint
26 inferior officers under the Appointments clause. Id. The Supreme Court noted that:
27 [O]ne who makes a timely challenge to the constitutional validity of
the validity of [the ALJ’s] appointment before the Commission, and
1 continued pressing that claim in the Court of Appeals and this Court.
2 Id. (citation and internal quotes omitted) .
3 Here, Plaintiff failed to raise a timely challenge to the constitutional validity of the ALJ’s
4 appointment. Plaintiff never presented an Appointments Clause challenge at the administrative
5 level or at any other time before filing the present motion. See Kabani & Co., Inc. v. U.S. Sec. &
6 Exch. Comm’n, 733 F. App’x 918, 919 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that “petitioners’ forfeited their
7 Appointments Clause claim by failing to raise it in their briefs or before the agency”); see also
8 Allen v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-03414-HSG, 2019 WL 1438845, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2019)
9 (rejecting Appointments Clause arguments when the challenge was not timely made at the
10 administrative level); Hugues v. Berryhill, No. CV 17-3892-JPR, 2018 WL 3239835, at *2 n.2
11 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2018) (“To the extent Lucia applies to Social Security ALJs, Plaintiff has
12 forfeited the issue by failing to raise it during his administrative proceedings.”). Plaintiff failed to
13 respond to this argument in her reply, and the Court rejects Plaintiff’s Appointments Clause
14 challenge as untimely.
15 //
16 //
17 //
18 //
19 //
20 //
21 //
22 //
23 //
24 //
25 //
26 //
27 //
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
2
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and DENIES the Commissioner’s cross-motion for
3
summary judgment.
4
The action is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings consistent with this
5
opinion. “[I]f additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative
6
proceeding, a social security case should be remanded.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1019 (quoting
7
Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981)). Although the Court has found that the
8
reasons articulated by the ALJ in assigning partial to no weight to medical opinions were
9
insufficient, it is possible that the ALJ could address this issue on remand. Thus, remand for
10
award of benefits is not warranted in this case.
11
The clerk is directed to close this case.
12
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 5/26/2020
Maspurrel 5 Sb □
4 HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge
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