To prove liability for 11 an action or policy, the plaintiff “must . . . demonstrate that his deprivation resulted from an 12 official policy or custom established by a . . . policymaker possessed with final authority to 13 establish that policy.”
How later courts described this case
- To prove liability for 11 an action or policy, the plaintiff “must . . . demonstrate that his deprivation resulted from an 12 official policy or custom established by a . . . policymaker possessed with final authority to 13 establish that policy.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 JEFFEREY S. NEDD, Case No. 1:23-cv-01630-HBK (PC)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO
RANDOMLY ASSIGN CASE TO DISTRICT
13 v. JUDGE
14 LANDON BIRD, et al. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
DISMISS CASE1
15 Defendants.
(Doc. No. 16)
16
FOURTEEN-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD
17
18 Pending before the Court for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A is Plaintiff’s Third
19 Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 16). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned
20 recommends the district court dismiss the Third Amended Complaint because it fails to state any
21 cognizable federal claim and any further amendments would be futile.
22 SCREENING REQUIREMENT
23 A plaintiff who commences an action while in prison is subject to the Prison Litigation
24 Reform Act (“PLRA”), which requires, inter alia, the court to screen a complaint that seeks relief
25 against a governmental entity, its officers, or its employees before directing service upon any
26 defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This requires the court to identify any cognizable claims and
27
1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302
28 (E.D. Cal. 2023).
1 dismiss the complaint, or any portion, if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon
2 which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
3 such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2).
4 At the screening stage, the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true,
5 construes the complaint liberally, and resolves all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v.
6 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Bernhardt v. L.A. County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir.
7 2003). The Court’s review is limited to the complaint, exhibits attached, materials incorporated
8 into the complaint by reference, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice. Petrie v.
9 Elec. Game Card, Inc., 761 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). A court
10 does not have to accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted
11 deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Critical
12 to evaluating a constitutional claim is whether it has an arguable legal and factual basis. See
13 Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989).
14 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that a complaint include “a short and
15 plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
16 Nonetheless, a claim must be facially plausible to survive screening. This requires sufficient
17 factual detail to allow the court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the
18 misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service,
19 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not
20 sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard.
21 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Although detailed factual allegations are not
22 required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
23 statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted), and courts “are not required
24 to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir.
25 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
26 If an otherwise deficient pleading can be remedied by alleging other facts, a pro se litigant
27 is entitled to an opportunity to amend their complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v.
28 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lucas v. Department of Corr., 66 F.3d
1 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). However, it is not the role of the court to advise a pro se litigant on how
2 to cure the defects. Such advice “would undermine district judges’ role as impartial
3 decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131
4 n.13. Furthermore, the court in its discretion may deny leave to amend due to “undue delay, bad
5 faith or dilatory motive of the part of the movant, [or] repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
6 amendments previously allowed . . . .” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Srvs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892
7 (9th Cir. 2010).
8 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF OPERATIVE PLEADING
9 Plaintiff Jefferey S. Nedd (“Plaintiff” or “Nedd’) is a state prisoner who is proceeding pro
10 se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. Nos. 1, 5).
11 On November 22, 2023, the undersigned screened Plaintiff’s Complaint and found that it failed to
12 state any cognizable constitutional claim. (See Doc. No. 6). The Court advised Plaintiff of the
13 pleading deficiencies and applicable law and afforded Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended
14 complaint. (Id.). Plaintiff timely filed a First Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 7, “FAC”). On
15 November 28, 2023, the Court screened Plaintiff’s FAC and found it also failed to state any
16 cognizable claim. (See Doc. No. 8). On November 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed a proposed second
17 amended complaint, presumably before he received the Court’s November 28, 2023 Screening
18 Order. (Doc. No. 9). On December 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed two nearly identical proposed
19 amended complaints, with one copy being unsigned and the other signed. (See Doc. Nos. 12, 13).
20 On March 5, 2024, the Court disregarded Plaintiff’s presumably prematurely filed proposed
21 second amended complaint, struck the unsigned amended complaint, and directed the Clerk to
22 accept and file the other signed proposed amended complaint as the operative Third Amended
23 Complaint in this case. (See Doc. Nos. 15, 16, “TAC”). The Court also liberally construed
24 Plaintiff’s declaration and exhibits (Doc. No. 14) filed on December 26, 2023, as part of his Third
25 Amended Complaint. (Id. at 3).
26 The events in the TAC took place at Valley State Prison in Chowchilla, CA (“VSP”).
27 (See generally id.). The TAC identifies the following VSP staff as Defendants: (1) Warden
28 Landon Bird; (2) Correctional Sergeant John Doe #1; (3) Correctional Officer John Doe #2, (4)
1 Office Technician John Doe #3, and (4) Litigation Coordinator John Doe #4. (Id. at 3). Liberally
2 construed, the TAC and supporting declaration alleges a First Amendment access to court claim.
3 (Id.). The following facts are presumed to be true at this stage of the screening process and due to
4 their brevity, the Court recites them in full below:
5 On or about 3-10-23 I timely mailed my appeal of denial of petition
for Habeas corpus to the 9th Circuit. Pursuant to CDCR and Valley
6 State Prison policies Def[endant] John Doe #2 mailroom employees
failed to process my mail to the 9th Circuit so that defendant John
7 Doe #3 under the supervision of John Doe #1 Mailroom sergeant
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants [sic] Bird was aware of the
8 delaying of Plaintiff mails [sic] pursuant to an underground policy
establisted [sic] by Bird as show [sic] by the grievance Plaintiff
9 further alleges that Defendant Bird is liable as he had knowledge of
the violations and policy, had the power to stop this policy and
10 deliberately failed to do so in violation of 42 USC, 1986 Defendant
John Doe #4 as litigation coordinator was aware of Plaintiff[’s]
11 petition and filing deadlines as he is in contact with California Atty
General’s Office and is apprised of all legal filings by prisoners at
12 valley state Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Bird is liable as
he had knowledge of violations and policy had the power to stop this
13 policy and deliberately failed to do so.
14 (Id. at 3, 5) (lack of punctuation in original). The TAC does not specify any relief being sought.
15 Nedd’s declaration filed in support of his TAC attaches the following exhibits: (1) Docket
16 summary for Nedd’s federal habeas petition, Case No. 1:22-cv-704; (2) Docket summary for
17 Nedd’s Ninth Circuit appeal, Case No. 23-15730; (3) a copy of an Office of Appeal Decision
18 dated October 21, 2023 regarding Nedd’s interference with mail claim; (4) a copy of an Office of
19 Grievances Decision dated November 21, 2023 regarding Nedd’s interference with mail claim;
20 (5) a letter dated September 5, 2023 from attorney Richard Fitzer; and (6) a copy of a July 25,
21 2023 Order from the Ninth Circuit denying Nedd’s request for a certificate of appealability.
22 (Doc. No. 14 at 4-18). In considering Plaintiff’s TAC, the Court also takes judicial notice of its
23 own files and the files of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 2
24
2 Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits a court to take judicial notice of facts that are “not subject to
25 reasonable dispute” because they are either “generally known within the trial court's territorial
jurisdiction,” or they “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
26 reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The Court may take judicial notice on its own or at the
request of any party. Id. 201(c). Courts may take judicial notice of court proceedings “if those
27 proceedings have a direct relation to the matters at issue.” United States ex. Rel. Robinson Rancheria
Citizens Counsel v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations and internal quotation marks
28 omitted).
1 Nedd filed a federal habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 10, 2022
2 in this Court that was docketed at Case No. 1:22-cv-00704-JLT-HBK. On March 29, 2023, the
3 district court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations to grant respondent’s
4 motion to dismiss the petition as time barred, and to deny Nedd a certificate of appealability.
5 Nedd v. Bird, No. 1:22-CV-0704 JLT HBK, 2023 WL 2696633, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2023),
6 certificate of appealability denied, No. 23-15730, 2023 WL 5163337 (9th Cir. July 25, 2023).
7 Judgment was entered that same day. Id. Specifically, the district court determined that
8 Petitioner had until July 13, 2021, to file a timely federal habeas petition and his petition filed in
9 this Court was filed nearly a year after any petition should have been filed and he otherwise failed
10 to show he was entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. (Id., see also Doc. No. 14 at 9). Nedd
11 filed a notice of appeal on May 10, 2023. (Doc. No. 14 at 9). After the Ninth Circuit directed
12 Nedd to show cause why the notice of appeal should not be dismissed as untimely, on July 25,
13 2023, the Ninth Circuit denied Nedd a certificate of appealability finding “the notice of appeal
14 was not timely filed and Nedd did not file a motion to extend time for appeal in the district court.”
15 Nedd v. Bird, No. 23-15730, 2023 WL 5163337, at *1 (9th Cir. July 25, 2023); (see also Doc. No.
16 14 at 18). The Ninth Circuit denied Nedd’s motions for reconsideration. (Doc. No. 14 at 12).
17 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant John Doe #2 failed to mail Plaintiff’s timely March 10,
18 2023 notice of appeal of the denial of habeas corpus petition to the Ninth Circuit, denying him
19 access to the courts. Plaintiff attributes liability to the other Defendants based on respondeat
20 superior or an unspecified and wholly conclusory allegation that a “policy” resulted in the delay
21 in the mailing of his timely notice of appeal.
22 APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
23 A. Respondeat Superior and Rule 8
24 Liberally construed, Plaintiff assigns fault to various John Does and the Warden stemming
25 from John Doe #2’s alleged failure to timely mail his notice of appeal. Liability under section
26 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant. “There is no
27 respondeat superior liability under section 1983.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th
28 Cir.1989) (citations omitted). A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his
1 subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations or knew of the violations
2 and failed to act to prevent them. Id., see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1206–07 (9th Cir.
3 2011). Here the TAC contains no allegations that any of the John Does or the Warden were
4 involved in John Doe No. 2’s alleged failure to mail the notice of appeal.
5 Plaintiff avers that a “policy” caused the alleged mailing delay. The allegation that a
6 “policy” caused any alleged mail delay is wholly conclusory as the TAC contains no allegations
7 whatsoever identifying any “policy.” See Harrison v. Campbell, 2023 WL 7525950, at *2 (E.D.
8 Cal. Nov. 13, 2023) (finding complaint failed to state a claim where, inter alia, plaintiff
9 challenged a state-wide policy, “but fail[ed] to allege the substance of the policy.”); see also
10 Waggy v. Spokane County Washington, 594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th Cir. 2010) (To prove liability for
11 an action or policy, the plaintiff “must . . . demonstrate that his deprivation resulted from an
12 official policy or custom established by a . . . policymaker possessed with final authority to
13 establish that policy.”). Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations,
14 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
15 statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).
16 The undersigned now turns to the sole claim against John Does #2.
17 B. First Amendment – Access to Courts
18 Inmates have a First Amendment constitutional right of access to the courts, and prison
19 officials may not actively interfere with an inmate’s right to litigate. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
20 343, 346 (1996); Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009). Courts have traditionally
21 differentiated between two types of access claims, those involving the right to affirmative
22 assistance to litigate a potential claim, and those involving an inmate’s right to litigate without
23 active interference once a claim is initiated. Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir.
24 2011), overruled on other grounds as stated by Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n.6 (9th
25 Cir. 2015); see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002). Where, as here, an
26 inmate is alleging a backward looking access to court violation, he must show: (1) his access is
27 being “frustrated” or “impeded” and he was, or is, suffering an “actual injury”; (2) the claim he is
28 bringing is a non-frivolous claim; and (3) the claim must involve his criminal conviction or
1 sentence or the conditions of his confinement., i.e. claims involving direct criminal appeals,
2 petitions for writs of habeas corpus, and civil rights actions brought under section 1983 to
3 vindicate basic constitutional rights. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351-53; Christopher, 563 U.S. at 413-14.
4 “Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly
5 constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Lewis at 355 (emphasis omitted).
6 A habeas petition that challenges a state court conviction is a qualifying case for purposes
7 of satisfying the third requirement of Lewis, supra. However, Plaintiff cannot satisfy either steps
8 one or two of Lewis. Regarding the first requirement, Nedd claims he delivered his timely appeal
9 on March 10, 2023 and “John Doe #2 mailroom employees failed to process my mail to the 9th
10 Circuit.” While failing to process a notice of appeal that was timely delivered to a correctional
11 official for mailing would normally satisfy the first step, here the procedural posture of Nedd’s
12 habeas corpus action, the exhibits attached to Nedd’s declaration, and his own dated and signed
13 filings in his underlying habeas case belie Plaintiff’s averments of fact in this action. As an initial
14 matter, the district court did not deny the petition until March 29, 2023. Thus, a notice of appeal
15 delivered by Nedd to John Doe #2 for mailing on March 10, 2023 would have been premature.
16 Second, Nedd’s notice of appeal, which is attached to the March 29, 2023 dismissal order, was
17 signed and dated by Nedd on May 5, 2023.3 (See Case No. 1:22-cv-00704-JLT-HBK, Doc. No.
18 22 at 1). Further, in response to Nedd’s grievance, correctional officials reviewed the mailroom
19 logbooks and determined:
20 The Legal Log confirms [Nedd] sent out legal mail to US Court of
Appeal for the 9th Circuit on 5/8/2023 and did not request for his
21 legal mail to be certified for tracking. The mailing received was
received by Mailroom staff on 5/8/2023 and was sent out via United
22 States Postal Service (USPS) on 5/8/2023.
23 (Doc. No. 14 at 15). Nedd’s appeal was docketed by the district court on May 10, 2023 (See Case
24 No. 1:22-cv-00704-JLT-HBK, Doc. No. 22) and processed by the Ninth Circuit on May 12, 2023
25 (Case No. 23-15730). (Doc. No. 14 at 9, 12). On May 15, 2023, the Ninth Circuit issued an
26
27 3 To be timely, Nedd needed to file his Notice of Appeal no later than April 28, 2023, thirty (3) days after
entry of judgment of the order sought to be appealed. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Thus, even affording
28 Nedd the benefit of the mailbox rule, his Notice signed and dated May 5, 2023 would be untimely.
1 order directing Nedd to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed as untimely. (Doc.
2 No. 14 at 12). Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions in his TAC that he timely delivered the notice of
3 appeal and John Doe #2 failed to mail it, in his response to the Ninth Circuit’s show cause order
4 Nedd made no mention that he had earlier delivered his notice to appeal to John Doe #2 but
5 instead offered the following explanations:
6 I tried filing my Notice of Appeal in the District Court and it was sent
back unfiled. So I had to file it with the Ninth Circuit. Because of
7 this, the filing was late.
8 . . .
9 I sent my paperwork to Richard Fitzer the Attorney I had and he said
he made copys [sic] of the paperwork. I never new [sic] I had to file
10 them. Mr. Fitzer gave me the wrong paperwork to send to you guys.
11 (See Case No. 1:22-cv-00704-JLT-HBK, Doc. No. 26 at 1-2).
12 As a rule, the Court accepts the facts as pled in a complaint as true. However, where the
13 facts are contradicted by the exhibits or by matters of which the court may take judicial notice,
14 the Court need not accept the facts in a complaint as true. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266
15 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001)
16 (citing Mullis v. United States Bankr.Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Simmons
17 v. Koh, 2021 WL 4267484, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2021) (finding plaintiff’s complaint failed
18 to state a claim based in part on judicially noticed facts in attached exhibits, which contradicted
19 the complaint); Dilbert v. CDCR, 2023 WL 8358502, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2023) (same).
20 Here, the exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s declarations and both this Court’s and the Ninth Circuit’s
21 dockets evidence that Plaintiff submitted his May 5, 2023 notice of appeal to correctional officials
22 for mailing and that correctional officials promptly mailed the May 5, 2023 notice of appeal. (See
23 Doc. No. 14 at 4-18). Plaintiff’s contention that he delivered his notice of appeal to John Doe #2
24 for mailing on March 10, 2023, even if true, would have no effect since the Court had not yet
25 issued its order denying the petition.
26 Further, the district court’s docket does not reflect that any pleading, including a notice of
27 appeal was “sent back,” but indeed reflects that the May 5, 2023 Notice of Appeal was received
28 and docketed on May 10, 2023, consistent with correctional officials’ Legal Mail logbook noting
1 a mailing of May 8, 2023. Thus, Plaintiff cannot point to an act by any correctional official that
2 frustrated Plaintiff’s prosecution of his habeas case, other than his own belated filing of the notice
3 of the appeal. See Hennings v. Cates, No. 22-55484, 2023 WL 8469341, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 7,
4 2023) (“Hennings’ untimely filing, then, was caused not by his restricted access to the library, but
5 by his own lack of diligence or his lack of awareness of the applicable AEDPA statute of
6 limitations.”).
7 Likewise, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the second element—a meritorious case. Here, the
8 district court dismissed Nedd’s habeas corpus petition because it was filed more than a year after
9 AEDPA’s one-year limitation period had expired, and the district court further had denied
10 Plaintiff a certificate of appealability. Further, the Ninth Circuit, after affording Plaintiff an
11 opportunity to show cause why it should not deny the notice of appeal as untimely also denied
12 Plaintiff a certificate of appealability. Thus, Plaintiff cannot show that he was obstructed from
13 prosecuting a meritorious case and suffered an actual injury. See Franks v. Johnson, 2022 WL
14 3137438, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2022) (“A missed filing deadline, by itself, is not enough to
15 state an access to the courts claim. The plaintiff must identify his underlying claim and show that
16 it arguably had some merit”), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 4842987 (C.D. Cal.
17 Sept. 30, 2022); see also Mejia v. Cate, 2013 WL 684456, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2013)
18 (finding no access to courts claim stated where plaintiff filed untimely habeas petition and did not
19 allege facts showing that the substance of his appeal was non-frivolous.).
20 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
21 Based on the above, the undersigned finds Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint fails to
22 state any cognizable claim. The TAC suffers from many of the same pleading deficiencies that
23 the undersigned identified and explained to Plaintiff in screening his original Complaint and First
24 Amended Complaint. (See Doc. Nos. 6, 8). Plaintiff reasserted many of the same claims that
25 were asserted in his prior complaints. Despite being provided with guidance and the appropriate
26 legal standards and multiple opportunities to amend his complaint, Plaintiff was unable to cure
27 the deficiencies identified above. A plaintiff’s repeated failure to cure a complaint’s deficiencies
28 constitutes “a strong indication that the [plaintiff has] no additional facts to plead.” Zucco
1 | Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal
2 | quotation marks omitted). Thus, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss the
3 | FAC without further leave to amend. McKinney v. Baca, 250 F. App’x 781 (9th Cir. 2007)
4 | (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir.1992)) (noting discretion to deny leave to
5 || amend is particularly broad where court has afforded plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend
6 | his complaint).
7 ACCORDINGLY, it is ORDERED:
8 The Clerk of Court randomly assign this case to a district judge for consideration of these
9 | Findings and Recommendations.
10 It is further RECOMMENDED:
11 The Third Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 16) be dismissed under § 1915A for failure to
12 || state a claim and this case be dismissed.
13 NOTICE TO PARTIES
14 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District
15 | Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(). Within 14 days
16 | after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written
17 | objections with the Court. /d.; Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned,
18 | “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The assigned District Judge
19 | will review these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A party’s
20 | failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of certain rights on
21 | appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).
22
*3 | Dated: _ March 20, 2024 Mile. Wh fareh fackte
24 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA
35 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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