“Absent a 13 showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its own sentencing laws 14 does not justify federal habeas relief.”
How later courts described this case
- “Absent a 13 showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its own sentencing laws 14 does not justify federal habeas relief.”
- “We have stated many times that ‘federal habeas 5 corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’ Today, we reemphasize that it is not the 6 province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law 7 questions.” (citations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 CANDELARIO VARGAS, Case No. 1:21-cv-00655-NODJ-SAB-HC
12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
RECOMMENDING DENIAL OF PETITION
13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
14 JAMES ROBERTSON,
15 Respondent.
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17 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus
18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
19 I.
20 BACKGROUND
21 On November 15, 2013, Petitioner was convicted in the Tulare County Superior Court of
22 assault with a firearm. On February 20, 2014, Petitioner was sentenced to an imprisonment term
23 of two years for assault with a firearm plus a ten-year enhancement under California Penal Code
24 section 186.22(b)(1)(C) and a three-year enhancement under California Penal Code section
25 12022.7, for a total imprisonment term of fifteen years. (LD1 1.) Petitioner did not appeal the
26 judgment. (ECF No. 12 at 1.2)
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1 “LD” refers to the documents lodged by Respondent on June 28 and September 23, 2021. (ECF Nos. 13, 19.)
1 On July 9, 2018, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and
2 Rehabilitation submitted a letter to the Tulare County Superior Court requesting that the court
3 exercise its discretion under California Penal Code section 1170(d) to recall Petitioner’s sentence
4 and resentence him in light of People v. Gonzalez, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1325 (2009).3 (LD 9.) The
5 Tulare County Superior Court conferred with the prosecutor and Petitioner’s trial counsel, who
6 agreed that “the court’s sentence was voluntarily bargained for.” (LD 10.) On November 6, 2018,
7 the Tulare County Superior Court informed the Secretary that Petitioner’s sentence would not be
8 recalled. (Id.)
9 On November 18, 2018,4 Petitioner, proceeding pro se, constructively filed a state habeas
10 petition in the Tulare County Superior Court, which denied the petition on December 21, 2018.
11 (LDs 2, 3.) On February 20, 2020, Petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, filed a state habeas
12 petition in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, which denied the petition on
13 March 19, 2020. (LDs 4, 5.) On April 8, 2020, Petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, filed a
14 petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which denied the petition on May 13, 2020.
15 (LDs 6–8.)
16 On February 2, 2021, Petitioner constructively filed the instant federal petition for writ of
17 habeas corpus challenging the superior court’s denial of recall on the grounds that his sentence is
18 unlawful and that denial of recall without notice to the offender, the assistance of counsel, the
19 opportunity to be heard and present evidence, and the opportunity to appeal violated due process
20 and equal protection. (ECF No. 1.) On June 28, 2021, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss,
21 arguing that the petition was filed outside the one-year limitation period and fails to state a
22 cognizable federal habeas claim. (ECF No. 12.) On August 23, 2021, the Court ordered
23 supplemental briefing and further development of the record. (ECF No. 17.) Respondent filed a
24 supplemental brief and lodged additional documents on September 23, 2021. (ECF Nos. 18, 19.)
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3 The letter noted that in Gonzalez, “the appellate court held the trial court should not have imposed sentence
enhancements under section 12022.7, subdivision (a) and section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C) because both
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sentence enhancements were based on the great bodily injury the defendant caused while committing the underlying
offense.” (LD 9 (citing Gonzalez, 178 Cal. App. 4th at 1332)).
27 4 Pursuant to the mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s habeas petition is filed “at the time . . . [it is] delivered . . . to the
prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk.” Hernandez v. Spearman, 764 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2014)
1 On January 25, 2022, the Court issued findings and recommendation recommending that
2 Respondent’s motion to dismiss be granted and the petition be dismissed. (ECF No. 22.) On
3 February 22, 2022, Petitioner filed timely objections. (ECF No. 24.) The assigned District Judge
4 directed Petitioner to file “documentation regarding how and when he learned of the hearing held
5 in Tulare County Superior Court pursuant to the July 9, 2018, letter from CDCR” and referred
6 the matter back for amended findings and recommendations. (ECF No. 26.) On May 5, 2023, the
7 Court issued amended findings and recommendation recommending that the motion to dismiss
8 be denied. (ECF No. 28.) On September 5, 2023, the assigned District Judge adopted the
9 amended findings and recommendation and denied the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 29.)
10 On November 9, 2023, Respondent filed an answer to the petition. (ECF No. 35.) To
11 date, no reply has been filed, and the time for doing so has passed.5
12 II.
13 STANDARD OF REVIEW
14 Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody
15 pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws
16 or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,
17 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed
18 by the U.S. Constitution.
19 On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
20 of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its
21 enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th
22 Cir. 1997) (en banc). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of AEDPA and is
23 therefore governed by its provisions.
24 Under AEDPA, relitigation of any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court is barred
25 unless a petitioner can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claim:
26 ///
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5 On January 4, 2024, a court order mailed to Petitioner was returned as undeliverable with a notation that Petitioner
1 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
2 determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
3 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
4 State court proceeding.
5 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97–98 (2011); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538
6 U.S. 63, 70–71 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.
7 As a threshold matter, this Court must “first decide what constitutes ‘clearly established
8 Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71
9 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). In ascertaining what is “clearly established Federal law,” this
10 Court must look to the “holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s] decisions as
11 of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “In other words,
12 ‘clearly established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles
13 set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Id. In addition,
14 the Supreme Court decision must “‘squarely address [] the issue in th[e] case’ or establish a legal
15 principle that ‘clearly extend[s]’ to a new context to the extent required by the Supreme Court in
16 . . . recent decisions”; otherwise, there is no clearly established Federal law for purposes of
17 review under AEDPA. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wright v.
18 Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008)); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Carey v.
19 Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006). If no clearly established Federal law exists, the inquiry is at an
20 end and the Court must defer to the state court’s decision. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70; Wright, 552
21 U.S. at 126; Moses, 555 F.3d at 760.
22 If the Court determines there is governing clearly established Federal law, the Court must
23 then consider whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
24 application of, [the] clearly established Federal law.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
25 § 2254(d)(1)). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the
26 state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question
27 of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412–13; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. “The
1 word ‘contrary’ is commonly understood to mean ‘diametrically different,’ ‘opposite in character
2 or nature,’ or ‘mutually opposed.’” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405 (quoting Webster’s Third New
3 International Dictionary 495 (1976)). “A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to
4 [Supreme Court] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the
5 governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases.” Id. If the state court decision is “contrary to”
6 clearly established Supreme Court precedent, the state decision is reviewed under the pre-
7 AEDPA de novo standard. Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
8 “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if
9 the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but
10 unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.
11 “[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent
12 judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously
13 or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411; see also Lockyer,
14 538 U.S. at 75–76. The writ may issue only “where there is no possibility fair minded jurists
15 could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [the Supreme Court’s] precedents.”
16 Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. In other words, so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the
17 correctness of the state court’s decision, the decision cannot be considered unreasonable. Id. If
18 the Court determines that the state court decision is objectively unreasonable, and the error is not
19 structural, habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable unless the error had a substantial and injurious
20 effect on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).
21 The Court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court
22 judgment. Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th
23 Cir. 2011). If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the
24 reasoning from a previous state court decision, this Court may consider both decisions to
25 ascertain the reasoning of the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.
26 2007) (en banc). “When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has
27 denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the
1 99. This presumption may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other
2 explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 99–100 (citing Ylst v.
3 Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)).
4 Where the state courts reach a decision on the merits but there is no reasoned decision, a
5 federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief
6 is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853
7 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional
8 issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state court
9 decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. While the federal court cannot
10 analyze just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must
11 review the state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state
12 court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. This Court “must determine what arguments or
13 theories . . . could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is
14 possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with
15 the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 102.
16 III.
17 DISCUSSION
18 A. Ground One
19 In his first claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in declining to recall
20 Petitioner’s allegedly unlawful sentence. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Respondent argues that this claim
21 presents no federal question and was neither arbitrary and capricious nor fundamentally unfair.
22 (ECF No. 35 at 5.)
23 By statute, federal courts “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in
24 behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he
25 is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
26 § 2254(a). “[T]he second use of ‘in custody’ in the statute requires literally that the person
27 applying for the writ is contending that he is ‘in custody’ in violation of the Constitution or other
1 Errors of state law generally do not warrant federal habeas corpus relief. See Wilson v.
2 Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (per curiam) (“[I]t is only noncompliance with federal law that
3 renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts.”);
4 Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (“We have stated many times that ‘federal habeas
5 corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’ Today, we reemphasize that it is not the
6 province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law
7 questions.” (citations omitted)). Petitioner may not “transform a state-law issue into a federal one
8 merely by asserting a violation of due process.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir.
9 1996). Nevertheless, a state court’s misapplication of state law may give rise to federal habeas
10 corpus relief if a petitioner can demonstrate that the error was “so arbitrary or capricious as to
11 constitute an independent due process or Eighth Amendment violation.” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497
12 U.S. 764, 780 (1990). See also Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Absent a
13 showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its own sentencing laws
14 does not justify federal habeas relief.”).
15 Here, the Tulare County Superior Court conferred with the prosecutor and Petitioner’s
16 trial counsel, who agreed that “the court’s sentence was voluntarily bargained for,” and informed
17 the Secretary that Petitioner’s sentence would not be recalled, citing to People v. Hester, 22 Cal.
18 4th 290 (2000). (LD 10.) The court quoted the following language from Hester:
19 The rule that defendants may challenge an unauthorized sentence on appeal even
if they failed to object below is itself subject to an exception: Where the
20 defendants have pleaded guilty in return for a specified sentence, appellate courts
will not find error even though the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction in
21 reaching that figure, so long as the trial court did not lack fundamental
jurisdiction. . . . When a defendant maintains that the trial court’s sentence
22 violates rules which would have required the imposition of a more lenient
sentence, yet the defendant avoided a potentially harsher sentence by entering into
23 the plea bargain, it may be implied that the defendant waived any rights under
such rules by choosing to accept the plea bargain.
24
25 (LD 10 (quoting Hester, 22 Cal. 4th at 295 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).) In
26 denying Petitioner’s habeas petition, the Tulare County Superior Court stated:
27 Petitioner requests resentencing under the theory that the Tulare Court Superior
Court imposed an unauthorized sentence under PC 1170.l(g). Petitioner was
1 assault with a firearm under PC 245(a)(2), with a ten year enhancement under PC
186.22(b)(l)(c), and a three year enhancement under PC 12022.7.
2
Petitioner claims that the Court was prevented from stacking the enhancement
3 terms, and was limited to the higher of the two enhancements.
4 Petitioner’s claim is not well taken, as the Count 1 Petitioner pled to was not the
original count in the Complaint. Rather, it was a reduced charge that Petitioner
5 entered into as the result of a plea agreement. This plea agreement is clearly set
out in the November 13, 2013 Court minutes, as well as the November 15, 2013
6 Court minutes. It is also clearly stated on the record at the sentencing hearing that
Petitioner was taking a plea deal, and waiving any right to appeal.
7
Where defendants have pleaded guilty in return for a specified sentence, appellate
8 courts will not find error even though the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction
in reaching that figure, so long as the trial court did not lack fundamental
9 jurisdiction ... When a defendant avoided a potentially harsher sentence by
entering into the plea bargain, it may be implied that the defendant waived any
10 rights under other rules by choosing to accept the plea bargain. The rationale
behind this policy is that defendants who have received the benefit of their
11 bargain should not be allowed to trifle with the courts by attempting to better the
bargain through the appellate process (which Defendant waived in in [sic] any
12 event this case).
13 (LD 3.)
14 The state court declined to recall Petitioner’s sentence because Petitioner pleaded guilty
15 in exchange for a reduced charge and specified sentence, relying on California Supreme Court
16 precedent. Petitioner has not demonstrated that the state court’s determination was arbitrary and
17 capricious or was otherwise fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to
18 federal habeas corpus relief on his first claim, and it should be denied.
19 B. Ground Two
20 In his second claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that the denial of recall without notice to
21 the offender, the assistance of counsel, the opportunity to be heard and present evidence, and the
22 opportunity to appeal violated due process and equal protection. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Respondent
23 argues that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because “[e]rrors in the collateral review process are
24 generally not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings” and “Petitioner has not shown that any
25 of his claimed rights for these collateral sentencing proceedings were clearing established by the
26 U.S. Supreme Court.” (ECF No. 35 at 7.)
27 This claim was raised in a state habeas petition filed in the California Court of Appeal,
which summarily denied the petition. (LDs 4, 5.) The claim was also raised in the California
1 Supreme Court, which summarily denied Petitioner’s petition for review. (LDs 6–8.) There is no
2 reasoned state court decision on this claim, and the Court presumes that the state court
3 adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Johnson, 568 U.S. at 301. Accordingly, AEDPA’s
4 deferential standard of review applies, and the Court “must determine what arguments or theories
5 . . . could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible
6 fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the
7 holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.
8 The Ninth Circuit has noted that “[f]ederal due process challenges to state adjudications
9 of state substantive rights are generally cognizable. This may be particularly true where, as here,
10 a pro se petitioner raises a question not yet clearly decided.” Clayton v. Biter, 868 F.3d 840, 846
11 n.2 (9th Cir. 2017). Although “[f]ederal due process challenges to state adjudications of state
12 substantive rights are generally cognizable,” id., the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to
13 habeas relief here. “[W]hen a Supreme Court case “does not ‘squarely address[ ] the issue in
14 th[e] case’ or establish a legal principle that ‘clearly extend[s]’ to a new context to the extent
15 required by the Supreme Court . . . it cannot be said, under AEDPA, there is ‘clearly established’
16 Supreme Court precedent addressing the issue before us, and so we must defer to the state
17 court’s decision.” Moses, 555 F.3d at 754 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original)
18 (quoting Wright, 552 U.S. at 125). Here, as noted by Respondent, “no prior Supreme Court case
19 has clearly held that Sixth Amendment rights to notice, counsel, appeal, and personal appearance
20 attach to post-conviction sentence recall proceedings.” (ECF No. 35 at 8.) Therefore, the state
21 court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly
22 established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of fact. The state
23 court’s decision was not “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
24 comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562
25 U.S. at 103.
26 Further, Petitioner “cannot establish an equal protection claim warranting habeas relief,
27 simply because, or if, the [state court] misapplied [California] law or departed from its past
1 | 369 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1962) (“We have said time and again that the Fourteenth Amendment
2 | does not assure uniformity of judicial decisions ... [or] immunity from judicial error... . Were
3 | it otherwise, every alleged misapplication of state law would constitute a federal constitutional
4 | question.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original)).
5 Based on the foregoing, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief on his
6 | second claim, and it should be denied.
7 Il.
8 RECOMMENDATION
9 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of
10 | habeas corpus be DENIED.
11 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court
12 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304
13 | of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California.
14 | Within THIRTY (30) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may
15 | file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be
16 | captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the
17 | objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The
18 | assigned United States District Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling
19 | pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within
20 | the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Wilkerson_v.
21 | Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th
22 | Cir. 1991)).
23
24 IT IS SO ORDERED. F- 2 ee
45 | Dated: _ February 23, 2024 "
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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