Rose v. Cemex Construction Materials Pacific, LLC

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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12 ROBERT ROSE and PAUL SIMI, on No. 2:23-cv-01979 WBS AC

behalf of themselves and those

13 similarly situated,

14 Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND

15 v. AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

16 CEMEX CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS

PACIFIC, LLC, and DOES 1 through

17 50,

18 Defendants.

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21 Plaintiffs Robert Rose and Paul Simi brought this

22 putative labor class action against Cemex Construction Materials

23 Pacific, LLC, a cement pouring company that employed plaintiffs

24 as cement truck drivers, in Sacramento Superior Court. Defendant

25 removed to federal court. Plaintiffs allege multiple violations

26 of California law, including (1) failure to pay wages for all

27 hours worked, Cal. Lab. Code § 216; (2) failure to pay wages at

28 agreed upon rates, id. §§ 221-223; (3) failure to pay overtime

1 wages, id. § 510; (4) failure to pay meal period premiums, id. §

2 512; (5) failure to timely pay wages, id. § 204; (6) failure to

3 provide accurate itemized wage statements, id. § 226; (7) failure

4 to pay wages upon termination of employment, id. §§ 201-203; and

5 (8) unfair competition, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. (Compl.

6 (Docket No. 1-1 at 16-33).)

7 Defendant moves to dismiss the action in its entirety

8 (Docket No. 6), arguing that the claims are preempted by the

9 Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) and that plaintiffs

10 failed to satisfy the requirement under the LMRA that plaintiffs

11 exhaust the remedies provided for by the collective bargaining

12 agreements (“CBAs”). Plaintiffs move to remand the action

13 (Docket No. 12), arguing that the court lacks federal question

14 jurisdiction because the LMRA does not preempt their claims.

15 I. Judicial Notice

16 Defendant requests that the court take judicial notice

17 of multiple documents. (Docket No. 60-2.) Though a court

18 generally may not consider material outside the complaint on a

19 motion to dismiss, the court may look beyond the pleadings at

20 “matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs,

21 Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

22 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take judicial

23 notice of an adjudicative fact that is “not subject to reasonable

24 dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial

25 court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and

26 readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably

27 be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

28 Defendant requests that the court take judicial notice

1 of the applicable CBAs. Plaintiffs do not dispute the accuracy

2 of the CBAs provided by defendant and do not object to the court

3 taking judicial notice of the CBAs. (See Docket No. 11-1.) “It

4 is often necessary to consider the contents of a CBA to decide a

5 motion to dismiss based on an argument of complete preemption,

6 which is considered an ‘independent corollary to the well-pleaded

7 complaint rule.’” Patrick v. Nat’l Football League, No. 23-cv-

8 1069 DMG SHK, 2023 WL 6162672, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2023)

9 (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393

10 (1987)). See also Hall v. Live Nation Worldwide, Inc., 146 F.

11 Supp. 3d 1187, 1192–93 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Parrino v. FFIP,

12 Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1998)) (taking judicial notice

13 of CBA “‘because complete preemption often applies to complaints

14 drawn to evade federal jurisdiction,’” and therefore “‘the court

15 may look beyond the face of the complaint to determine whether

16 the claims alleged as state law causes of action in fact are

17 necessarily federal claims’”) (alterations adopted). The court

18 therefore takes judicial notice of Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 to

19 defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice, which are the CBAs

20 covering July 1, 2018 through June 30, 2021, and July 1, 2021

21 through June 30, 2024, respectively.

22 The court further takes judicial notice of Exhibit 4 to

23 defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice, which is an information

24 page concerning the California minimum wage. This document was

25 retrieved from the State of California Department of Industrial

26 Relations website and is therefore a matter of public record not

27 subject to reasonable dispute. See Khoja v. Orexigen

28 Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018); Gerritsen

1 v. Warner Bros. Ent. Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1033 (C.D. Cal.

2 2015).1

3 II. LMRA Preemption

4 The court will first address the underlying question of

5 whether the claims are preempted by the LMRA, and then turn to

6 the motions to remand and dismiss.

7 Section 301 of the LMRA provides federal question

8 jurisdiction over “suits for violation of contracts between an

9 employer and a labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Here,

10 there was a CBA between defendant and a union. (See Ex. 1, 2.)

11 “[T]he Supreme Court has interpreted [section 301] to compel the

12 complete preemption of state law claims brought to enforce

13 collective bargaining agreements.” Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410

14 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge

15 No. 735, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S.

16 557, 560 (1968)).

17 Whether a claim is preempted by the LMRA is a two-step

18 inquiry. First, a court must determine whether the asserted

19 claim involves a right which “exists solely as a result of the

20 CBA” or “by virtue of state law.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l

21 Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal

22 quotation marks omitted). If the right exists solely because of

23 the CBA, then the state law claim is preempted. Id. If the

24 right exists independently of the CBA, then the court must move

25 to the second step, “asking whether the right is nevertheless

26 substantially dependent on analysis of a [CBA].” Id. (internal

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1 The court does not take judicial notice of Exhibit 3,

28 which is not necessary to resolution of the motions.

1 quotation marks omitted). If it is, then the state law claim is

2 preempted.

3 A. First Claim

4 The court first examines whether plaintiffs’ first

5 claim for failure to pay wages for all hours worked under Cal.

6 Lab. Code § 216 involves a right which “exists solely as a result

7 of the CBA” or “by virtue of state law.” See Kobold, 832 F.3d at

8 1032. For the first step of the preemption inquiry, “a court

9 must focus its inquiry on the legal character of a claim . . .

10 and not whether a grievance [under the CBA] arising from

11 precisely the same set of facts could be pursued.” Id. at 1033

12 (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394) (emphasis in original).

13 “Only if the claim is ‘founded directly on rights created by a

14 collective-bargaining agreement’ does § 301 preempt it.” Id.

15 (quoting Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123 (1994)). Claims

16 are not preempted under the first step “if they just refer to a

17 CBA-defined right, rely in part on a CBA’s terms of employment,

18 run parallel to a CBA violation, or invite use of the CBA as a

19 defense.” Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 921

20 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (internal citations omitted).

21 Plaintiffs’ claim under § 216 clearly does not arise

22 directly from the CBAs, but rather from the California Labor

23 Code. And “‘the mere existence of a CBA does not compel

24 preemption of plaintiff’s state law . . . claims.’” See McGinty

25 v. Holt of Cal., No. 2:22-cv-00865 WBS AC, 2022 WL 3226130, at *2

26 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2022) (quoting Miller v. Bimbo Bakeries USA,

27 Inc., No. 11-cv-00378 WHA, 2011 WL 1362171, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr.

28 11, 2011)) (alterations adopted). The court therefore turns to

1 the second step of the inquiry.

2 “[T]o determine whether a state [statutory claim] is

3 ‘substantially dependent’ on the terms of a CBA” under the second

4 step of the test, a court must “decide whether the claim can be

5 resolved by looking to versus interpreting the CBA.” Burnside v.

6 Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007). A state

7 statutory claim that requires “interpreting” a CBA is said to be

8 “substantially dependent” on the CBA, and thus preempted by LMRA

9 section 301. Id. A state statutory claim that merely requires

10 “looking to” a CBA, on the other hand, is said not to be

11 “substantially dependent” on the CBA, and thus is not preempted

12 by the LMRA. Id. “At this second step of the analysis, claims

13 are only preempted to the extent there is an active dispute over

14 the meaning of contract terms.” Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc.,

15 913 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks

16 omitted).

17 Defendant does not detail what interpretation of --

18 rather than mere reference to -– the CBAs would be required to

19 resolve the first claim. The motion provides excerpts of the

20 CBAs that lay out the relevant wage and hour terms but does not

21 explain which terms would potentially be contested. There is no

22 indication that there are any “questions about the scope,

23 meaning, or application of” the terms establishing the hour

24 calculations and rates of pay. See Livadas, 512 U.S. at 125.

25 As far as the court can see, resolving plaintiffs’

26 first claim would only require “looking to” the CBAs to aid in

27 calculating the hours and pay rates to be used in determining

28 whether defendant violated the Labor Code. See Burnside, 491

1 F.3d at 1060. The court therefore concludes that plaintiffs’

2 first claim is not preempted by the LMRA. See Livadas, 512 U.S.

3 at 125 (claims under California Labor Code were not preempted by

4 LMRA where, “[b]eyond the simple need to refer to bargained-for

5 wage rates in computing the penalty, the collective-bargaining

6 agreement [was] irrelevant to the dispute”); Beck v. Saint-Gobain

7 Containers, No. 2:16-cv-03638 CAS SK, 2016 WL 4769716, at *5

8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2016) (LMRA does not preempt a claim where

9 “the terms of the CBA will only be considered by way of reference

10 and will not be reasonably disputed by the parties”).

11 B. Second Claim

12 Plaintiffs’ second claim alleges that defendant failed

13 to pay agreed-upon wages in violation of California Labor Code §§

14 221-23.

15 Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ second claim is

16 preempted at step one because, insofar as it is brought under

17 sections 222 and 223, it expressly relies upon the CBAs. Section

18 222 makes it “unlawful, in case of any wage agreement arrived at

19 through collective bargaining . . . to withhold from said

20 employee any part of the wage agreed upon.” Id. § 222 (emphasis

21 added). Section 223 provides that “[w]here any statute or

22 contract requires an employer to maintain the designated wage

23 scale, it shall be unlawful to secretly pay a lower wage while

24 purporting to pay the wage designated by statute or by contract.”

25 Id. § 223 (emphasis added).

26 The court is unconvinced. In Schurke, the en banc

27 Ninth Circuit considered a preemption challenge to a “state law

28 right to reschedule vacation leave for family medical purposes”

1 where the plaintiff’s “underlying right to vacation leave” was

2 established by a CBA. 898 F.3d at 913. Like California Labor

3 Code §§ 222-23, the state statute at issue in Schurke expressly

4 relied upon the terms established by CBAs. See id. at 914. The

5 Ninth Circuit nonetheless concluded that the claim at issue arose

6 directly from state law at step one because the plaintiff alleged

7 a violation of a “state law right,” not the CBA itself. See id.

8 at 927. See also Sarmiento v. Sealy, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 3d 1131,

9 1143-44 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (collecting cases and concluding that

10 claims arising under California Labor Code sections 222 and 223

11 are not preempted). Here, plaintiffs similarly allege violation

12 of a state law right, namely the right to agreed-upon wages. The

13 second claim therefore arises from state law rather than directly

14 from the CBAs.

15 The court thus turns to the second step. As with the

16 first claim, defendants have not pointed to any potentially

17 contested term that might require that the court interpret,

18 rather than merely refer to, the CBAs at issue in determining

19 whether it violated the California Labor Code. The second claim

20 is therefore not preempted by the LMRA.

21 C. Third Claim

22 Plaintiffs’ third claim alleges that defendant failed

23 to pay overtime wages in violation of California Labor Code §

24 510. Section 510 provides that the “requirements of this section

25 do not apply to the payment of overtime compensation to an

26 employee working pursuant to . . . [a]n alternative workweek

27 schedule adopted pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement

28 pursuant to Section 514.” Cal. Lab. Code § 510(a)(2). Section

1 514 states that “Sections 510 and 511 do not apply to an employee

2 covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement if the

3 agreement expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and

4 working conditions of the employees, and if the agreement

5 provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked and a

6 regular hourly rate of pay for those employees of not less than

7 30 percent more than the state minimum wage.” Id. § 514. “By

8 its terms, therefore . . . section 510 does not apply to an

9 employee who is subject to a qualifying CBA.” Curtis, 913 F.3d

10 at 1153–54.

11 As explained by the Ninth Circuit in Curtis, if the

12 applicable CBA “meet[s] the requirements of section 514, [the

13 employee’s] right to overtime exists solely as a result of the

14 CBA, and therefore is preempted under § 301.” Id. at 1154

15 (internal quotation marks omitted). The CBAs here plainly meet

16 these requirements, which plaintiffs do not appear to dispute.

17 (See Ex. 1 at 2-17, Ex. 2 at 4-19 (providing wage and hour

18 policies, descriptions of job duties and various working

19 conditions, overtime premiums for all employees, and a starting

20 minimum wage rate of $28.36 for concrete truck drivers); Ex. 4 at

21 2 (stating that California’s minimum wage for employers with 26

22 employees or more was $11 in 2018 and increased to $15.50 by

23 2023).) Plaintiffs’ third claim is therefore completely

24 preempted by the LMRA. See Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1154.

25 Plaintiffs try to distinguish the instant case from

26 Curtis on the basis that the claim does not require

27 interpretation of the underlying CBAs; however, this argument

28 confuses the analysis. Whether the claim requires interpretation

1 of a CBA is part of the second step of the analysis, not the

2 first. As the court has concluded, the third claim is preempted

3 at step one.

4 C. Fourth Claim

5 Plaintiffs’ fourth claim alleges that defendant failed

6 to pay meal period premiums in violation of California Labor Code

7 § 512. Section 512’s protections do not extend to certain

8 employees, including those in construction occupations, who are

9 covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement that

10 “expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and working

11 conditions of employees, and expressly provides for meal periods

12 for those employees, final and binding arbitration of disputes

13 concerning application of its meal period provisions, premium

14 wage rates for all overtime hours worked, and a regular hourly

15 rate of pay of not less than 30 percent more than the state

16 minimum wage rate.” See Cal. Lab. Code § 512(e)-(f). Plaintiffs

17 are engaged in a construction occupation and the CBAs here

18 plainly meet section 512(e)’s requirements, which plaintiffs do

19 not appear to dispute. (See Ex. 1 at 2-23, Ex. 2 at 4-24

20 (providing wage and hour policies, descriptions of job duties and

21 various working conditions, meal periods for all employees, final

22 and binding arbitration of meal period grievances, overtime

23 premiums for all employees, and a starting minimum wage rate of

24 $28.36 for concrete truck drivers); Ex. 4 at 2 (stating that

25 California’s minimum wage for employers with 26 employees or more

26 was $11 in 2018 and increased to $15.50 by 2023).)

27 As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit in Curtis held

28 that because section 514 excludes employees who are subject to a

1 qualifying CBA from the protections of section 510, claims under

2 section 510 are completely preempted when there is a qualifying

3 CBA. See 913 F.3d 1154. Curtis did not address whether claims

4 subject to section 512’s CBA exception are completely preempted.

5 However, “both sections 512 and 514 have nearly identical

6 exemptions that make the rights they confer negotiable.”

7 Radcliff v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 519 F. Supp. 3d 743, 751–

8 52 (S.D. Cal. 2021). The court therefore “sees no reason why

9 Curtis should not be extended to preempt meal period claims made

10 by an employee who falls within the exemption set forth in

11 section 512(e).” See id.

12 In line with this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit has

13 extended Curtis’s logic to section 512’s CBA exemption in an

14 unpublished memorandum decision. See Marquez v. Toll Glob.

15 Forwarding, 804 F. App’x 679, 680 (9th Cir. 2020). Multiple

16 district courts have similarly applied Curtis to section 512.

17 See, e.g., Radcliff, 519 F. Supp. 3d at 751-52; Schwanke v. Minim

18 Prods., Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00111 SVW JPR, 2021 WL 4924772, at *2

19 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2021); Rodriguez v. USF Reddaway Inc., No.

20 2:22-cv-00210 TLN DB, 2022 WL 18012518, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 30,

21 2022); Jimenez v. Young’s Mkt. Co., LLC, No. 21-cv-02410 EMC,

22 2021 WL 5999082, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2021); Blackwell v.

23 Com. Refrigeration Specialists, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-01968 KJM CKD,

24 2021 WL 2634501, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 25, 2021). The court

25 agrees with this line of cases and therefore concludes that

26 plaintiffs’ fourth claim under section 512 is completely

27 preempted by the LMRA.

28 Plaintiffs argue that the exemption does not apply here

1 because the CBAs provide that defendant “will comply with all

2 applicable law and regulations governing meal periods” (see Ex. 1

3 at 7, Ex. 2 at 9), indicating a contractual intent for section

4 512’s protections to apply. The court is unpersuaded. The

5 unambiguous text of section 512 mandates that all employees be

6 excluded from the section’s protections when an applicable CBA

7 has the required terms, without regard to the intent of the

8 parties. See Cal. Lab. Code § 512(e).

9 Even if the court accepted plaintiffs’ argument, the

10 claim would be preempted at step two of the analysis. By arguing

11 that language from the CBA indicates that the parties intended to

12 circumvent section 512’s CBA exemption, plaintiffs have put the

13 meaning of a contract term at issue. As a result, the court

14 would be required to interpret, rather than merely refer to, the

15 terms of the CBA in deciding the claim. See Burnside, 491 F.3d

16 at 1060-61. The claim would therefore be preempted. See id.;

17 Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1153.

18 D. Fifth Claim

19 Plaintiffs’ fifth claim alleges that defendant failed

20 to timely pay wages in violation of California Labor Code § 204.

21 Section 204 provides that “when employees are covered by a

22 collective bargaining agreement that provides different pay

23 arrangements [than those provided for in section 204], those

24 arrangements shall apply to the covered employees.” Cal. Lab.

25 Code § 204(c). The CBAs here plainly meet these requirements.

26 (Compare Ex. 1 at 9, Ex. 2 at 10 (“All employees will be paid

27 their wages at regular weekly paydays.”) with Cal. Lab. Code §

28 204(a) (“All wages . . . are due and payable twice during each

1 calendar month . . . .”).)

2 As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit in Curtis held

3 that claims subject to a statutory exception are completely

4 preempted. See 913 F.3d 1154. Several district courts have

5 extended Curtis’s reasoning to section 204. See, e.g., Renteria-

6 Hinjosa v. Sunsweet Growers, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01413 DJC DB, 2023

7 WL 6519308, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2023); Ariola v. Raytheon CA

8 Techs. Corp., No. 23-cv-4664 MWF AGR, 2023 WL 5764296, at *7

9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2023); Johnson v. San Francisco Health Care &

10 Rehab Inc., No. 22-cv-01982 JSC, 2022 WL 2789809, at *9 (N.D.

11 Cal. July 15, 2022); Tolentino v. Gillig, LLC, No. 20-cv-7427

12 MMC, 2021 WL 121193, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2021). The CBA exception

13 under section 204 operates similarly to the exception discussed

14 in Curtis, and as such the court “sees no principled reason why

15 the holding of Curtis would not extend to section 204 claims.”

16 See Ariola, 2023 WL 5764296, at *8. The court therefore

17 concludes that plaintiffs’ fifth claim under section 204 is

18 completely preempted by the LMRA.

19 E. Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Claims

20 Plaintiffs’ sixth claim alleges failure to provide

21 accurate itemized wage statements, Cal. Lab. Code § 226; the

22 seventh claim alleges failure to pay wages owed upon termination

23 of employment, id. §§ 201-203; and the eighth claim alleges

24 unfair competition, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Defendant

25 argues only that because plaintiffs’ first through fifth claims

26 are preempted, the remaining claims –- which, as pled, are

27 derivative of the first through fifth claims –- must also fail.

28 However, as discussed above, the first and second claims are not

1 preempted. The court therefore concludes that the sixth,

2 seventh, and eighth claims are not preempted by the LMRA.

3 III. Motion to Remand

4 “Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a defendant may remove an

5 action filed in state court to federal court if the federal court

6 would have original subject matter jurisdiction over the action.”

7 Moore-Thomas v. Ala. Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th

8 Cir. 2009). If “it appears that the district court lacks subject

9 matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. §

10 1447(c).

11 Federal courts have original jurisdiction over actions

12 arising under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Pursuant to the

13 doctrine of complete preemption, a state law claim preempted by

14 section 301 of the LMRA “is considered, from its inception, a

15 federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.” Balcorta

16 v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th

17 Cir. 2000). Such claims may be removed to and heard in federal

18 court. Jackson v. S. California Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 646 (9th

19 Cir. 1989).

20 As explained above, several of plaintiffs’ state law

21 claims are completely preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.

22 Accordingly, the court has federal question jurisdiction and will

23 deny plaintiffs’ motion to remand.

24 IV. Motion to Dismiss

25 “Prior to bringing suit, an employee seeking to

26 vindicate personal rights under a collective bargaining agreement

27 must first attempt to exhaust any mandatory or exclusive

28 grievance procedures provided in the agreement.” Soremekun v.

1 Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 985–86 (9th Cir. 2007).

2 Therefore, a claim preempted by section 301 of the LMRA should be

3 dismissed if brought by an employee who failed to exhaust the

4 applicable CBA’s mandatory grievance procedure. See Kobold, 832

5 F.3d at 1036.

6 At oral argument, plaintiff conceded that all claims

7 arising under the CBAs must be grieved pursuant to the procedures

8 outlined therein. Defendant argues that because plaintiffs do

9 not plead that they utilized the mandatory grievance procedures

10 outlined in the CBAs, the preempted claims must be dismissed. As

11 explained above, the court concludes that the third, fourth, and

12 fifth claims are completely preempted by the LMRA. Because

13 plaintiffs do not plead that they exhausted the remedies provided

14 for in the CBAs, those claims must be dismissed.

15 Also as explained above, the court concludes that the

16 first, second, sixth, seventh, and eighth claims are not

17 preempted by the LMRA. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss those

18 claims will be denied.

19 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion to

20 remand (Docket No. 12) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion to

22 dismiss (Docket No. 6) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED as to

23 the third claim for overtime wages, fourth claim for failure to

24 pay meal period premiums, and fifth claim for failure to timely

25 pay wages, which are hereby DISMISSED. The motion to dismiss is

26 DENIED in all other respects.

27 Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date of this Order

28 to file an amended complaint, if they can do so consistent with

enn enone nn nn nn nn nn nn en OI IEE OD NE

1 this Order. .

2 Dated: January 25, 2024 ehh A, ha bee

WILLIAM B. SHUBB

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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