referring to 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
How later courts described this case
- referring to 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
- holding that there is no 4 respondeat superior liability under § 1983
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 LUCIOUS WILSON, No. 2:23-CV-1901-DMC-P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 K. FRANCESCHI, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1.
19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
21 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was
22 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel.
23 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or
24 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can
25 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
26 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that
27 complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
28 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply,
1 concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice
3 of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121,
4 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity
5 overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail
6 to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening
7 required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory.
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9 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
10 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) K. Franceschi, Chief of Mental
11 Health; (2) Anderchuk, Doctor Supervisor; (3) Esenwein, Rt.; and (4) Falco, sergeant. See ECF
12 No. 1, pg. 2. Plaintiff currently resides at the California Health Care Facility (CHCF), but the
13 alleged violations occurred at California State Prison, Sacramento (CSP-SAC). See id. at 1.
14 Plaintiff is diagnosed with bipolar disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder
15 (PTSD) and requires mental health services to prevent his psychosis from worsening. Id. at 3.
16 Plaintiff has submitted numerous requests and grievances about receiving inadequate therapy and
17 treatment of his illnesses but alleges that staff at CSP-SAC have refused. Id. Plaintiff alleges that
18 group sessions consisted only of watching movies or playing board games. Id. These structured
19 therapy sessions would last ten hours, allowing COs to be paid exorbitant overtime. Id.
20 Plaintiff claims that he suffered a psychotic break from extended exposure to
21 stressors, deliberate indifference, and inadequate care. Id. Plaintiff became extremely manic and
22 lost control of his actions. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff constantly heard demonic voices telling him to
23 harm or kill others or himself. Id. at 4. Plaintiff cut his arm, which required him to receive seven
24 stitches. Id. He was placed in a crisis bed and moved to the hospital at the California Medical
25 Facility (CMF) to receive acute care. Id. Plaintiff has been placed in crisis beds twice, acute care
26 twice, and is currently receiving intermediate care at CHCF. Id. Plaintiff has not been
27 downgraded to enhanced outpatient program (EOP) level of care after approximately five or six
28 months of treatment. Id.
1 Plaintiff claims that he qualifies as a protected class member of Coleman v.
2 Newsom because of his bipolar disorder and PTSD. Id. at 3. Plaintiff is in constant contact with
3 the “Coleman” lawyers. Id. Plaintiff has also contacted other individuals, including a federal
4 judge and the Governor regarding the CDCR’s embezzlement, fraud, and misappropriation of
5 public funds that were meant to rehabilitate violent felons before their release to the public. Id.
6 Plaintiff claims his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments have been violated. Id.
7 at 3. He is seeking relief in the form of $15,000 and the immediate implementation of ten hours
8 of structured rehabilitative programing. Id. at 7.
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10 II. DISCUSSION
11 Plaintiff’s complaint has a number of defects, discussed in more detail below.
12 First, Plaintiff has not stated any facts linking the Defendants to the purported constitutional
13 violation. Second, Plaintiff does not allege any of the Defendants acted with the purpose of
14 inflicting harm. Third, to the extent Plaintiff is bringing a claim against supervisors (i.e.,
15 Defendants Franceschi and/or Andershuk), Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that the Defendants
16 who are supervisors participated in or directed the alleged constitutional violation.
17 A. Causal Link
18 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual
19 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See
20 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A
21 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of
22 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform
23 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”
24 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations
25 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See
26 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth
27 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional
28 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
1 Plaintiff has not alleged facts to establish a causal connection between any of the
2 Defendants and a constitutional violation. None of the named Defendants are identified or
3 referenced in the complaint. Plaintiff alleges he received “inadequate care by those entrusted to
4 provide said care,” but does not state facts linking any of the named Defendants to this allegation.
5 Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend.
6 B. Deliberate Indifference
7 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the
8 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel
9 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,
10 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts
11 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102
12 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.
13 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with
14 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,
15 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when
16 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such
17 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)
18 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of
19 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison
20 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.
21 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious
22 injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105;
23 see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health
24 needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is
25 sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant
26 injury or the “. . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d
27 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).
28 Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition
1 is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily
2 activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See
3 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
4 The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases
5 than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with
6 medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,
7 974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to
8 decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.
9 1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See
10 Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical
11 treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See
12 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate
13 that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
14 Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give
15 rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a
16 difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate
17 course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,
18 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).
19 Here, there appears to be a difference of opinion between Plaintiff and medical
20 providers concerning treatment for Plaintiff’s conditions. This does not give rise to an Eighth
21 Amendment claim. Plaintiff has not alleged facts indicating that Defendants acted deliberately
22 and wantonly for the purpose of inflicting pain. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to
23 amend to allege facts, if he can, to show more than a claim based on a difference of medical
24 opinion.
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1 C. Supervisor Liability
2 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their
3 employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no
4 respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional
5 violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The
6 Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on
7 knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government
8 officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct
9 and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory
10 personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of
11 constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be
12 liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v.
13 Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
14 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such
15 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.
16 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.
17 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in
18 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th
19 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
20 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676.
21 Plaintiff fails to state how Defendants K. Franceschi, the Chief of Mental Health,
22 or Anderchuk, the Doctor Supervisor, were personally involved in the alleged violation. Again,
23 to the extent he can, Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend the complaint to allege
24 facts showing these Defendants’ personal involvement.
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1 III. CONCLUSION
2 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by
3 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire
4 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is
5 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See
6 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to
7 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended
8 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if
9 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make
10 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be
11 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
12 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the
13 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See
14 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
15 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection
16 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
17 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
18 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the
19 time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at
20 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply
21 with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).
22 See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).
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] Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
2 1. Plaintiffs original complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and
3 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of
4 | service of this order.
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6 || Dated: January 23, 2024 Svc
7 DENNIS M. COTA
8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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