“We have 3 adhered to the rule that a party generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot 4 rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” (quotation and internal 5 quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- “We have 3 adhered to the rule that a party generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot 4 rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” (quotation and internal 5 quotation marks omitted)
- unrelated claims against different defendants belong in separate suits and complaints 23 violating that principle should be rejected
- noting that “nearly all of the circuits have now disapproved any 8 heightened pleading standard in cases other than those governed by Rule 9(b)”
- a person subjects another to the deprivation 28 of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act 1 he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 TOMMY JAY EUGENE JOSEPH REID, No. 2:23-cv-1937 DB P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 RIVERA, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff is a county detainee proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42
18 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that officers at the Stanislaus County Public Safety Center opened
19 his legal mail outside his presence, denied him proper treatment for HIV, and discriminated
20 against certain inmates. Before the court is plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF
21 No. 7) and his complaint (ECF No. 1) for screening. For the reasons set forth below, the
22 undersigned will grant the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the complaint with
23 leave to amend.
24 IN FORMA PAUPERS
25 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C.
26 § 1915(a).1 (ECF No. 7.) Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.
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1 Plaintiff’s first motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) was incomplete and plaintiff
28 was directed to submit a completed motion. (See ECF No. 4.)
1 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C.
2 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in
3 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct
4 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and
5 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments
6 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account.
7 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time
8 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C.
9 § 1915(b)(2).
10 SCREENING
11 I. Legal Standards
12 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
13 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. §
14 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims
15 that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
16 granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
17 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).
18 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
19 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
20 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an
21 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
22 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully
23 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
24 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain
25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the
26 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell
27 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
28 (1957)).
1 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must
2 contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain
3 factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic,
4 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the
5 allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S.
6 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all
7 doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).
8 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:
9 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation
10 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .
. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
11 or other proper proceeding for redress.
12 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the
13 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See
14 Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
15 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the
16 meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or
17 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which
18 complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
19 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of
20 their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant
21 holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional
22 violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);
23 Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations
24 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See
25 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
26 ////
27 ////
28 ////
1 II. Allegations in the Complaint
2 At all relevant times, plaintiff was confined at Stanislaus County Public Safety Center.
3 (ECF No. 1 at 1.) The complaint names Stanislaus County and three correctional officers, Rivera,
4 Essex, and Garcia, as defendants. (Id. at 2.)
5 Plaintiff asserts three claims. First, he alleges that facility staff have been opening his
6 legal mail outside his presence. (Id. at 3.) Second, he states that he has not been receiving his
7 injections for treatment of human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”) in a timely fashion. (Id. at 4.)
8 As a result, plaintiff’s HIV is no longer undetectable and his viral load is two hundred. (Id.)
9 Third, plaintiff states that staff in the protective custody housing unit treat plaintiff and other
10 individuals confined there with disrespect and refuse to assist them. (Id. at 5.)
11 III. Does Plaintiff State a Claim under § 1983?
12 A. Legal Mail
13 1. Legal Standard
14 Inmates have a protected First Amendment interest in having properly marked civil legal
15 mail opened only in their presence. Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2017).
16 “[A] prison may adopt regulations which impinge on an inmate’s constitutional rights if those
17 regulations are ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” Witherow v. Paff, 52
18 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987));
19 Mangiaracina v. Penzone, 849 F.3d 1191, 1196–97 (9th Cir. 2017).
20 2. Analysis
21 The complaint does not state a cognizable legal mail claim under the First Amendment
22 because it fails to provide sufficient information about the alleged violation. For example, it does
23 not identify which defendants allegedly opened plaintiff’s legal mail outside his presence, when
24 they did so, which legal mail was affected, and why defendants did not have a legitimate basis for
25 doing so. Cf. Mangiaracina, 849 F.3d at 1196–97. Accordingly, plaintiff has not stated a
26 cognizable First Amendment claim. He will be granted leave to amend his complaint should he
27 wish to pursue this claim.
28 ////
1 B. Inadequate Medical Treatment
2 1. Legal Standard
3 Pretrial detainees2 alleging that an individual defendant provided inadequate medical care
4 must establish that:
5 (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the
conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those
6 conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious
harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures
7 to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the
circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk
8 involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct
obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused
9 the plaintiff's injuries.
10 Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Gordon test”). Courts use
11 the same test for determining whether a convicted prisoner has suffered a serious medical need to
12 determine whether a detainee faced a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. Under that test, a
13 medical need is serious “if the failure to treat the prisoner’s condition could result in further
14 significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin, 974 F.2d at
15 1059 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). Indications of a serious medical need include the
16 “existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of
17 comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an
18 individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Lopez v. Smith,
19 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059–60).
20 When detainees seek to sue a county under § 1983, they “must prove that action pursuant
21 to official municipal policy caused their injury.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)
22 (quotation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442
23 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is only when execution of a government’s policy or custom
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2 Plaintiff does not specify whether he was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner at the time
25 of the alleged violation. For purposes of screening, the undersigned therefore assumes that he
was a pretrial detainee. See Vazquez v. County of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2020)
26 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment is more protective than the Eighth Amendment ‘because the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits all punishment of pretrial detainees, while the Eighth
27 Amendment only prevents the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment of convicted
prisoners.’” (quoting Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis
28 removed)).
1 inflicts the injury that the municipality as an entity is responsible.”). “A policy can be one of
2 action or inaction.” Long, 442 F.3d at 1185. At the pleading stage, “plaintiffs in civil rights
3 actions against local governments [are required] to set forth no more than a bare allegation that
4 government officials’ conduct conformed to some unidentified government policy or custom,”
5 while providing “sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the
6 opposing party to defend itself effectively.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d
7 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012).
8 2. Analysis
9 Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable inadequate medical treatment claim. He does not
10 identify which defendants failed to timely administer his medication or when the alleged violation
11 occurred. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) To the extent plaintiff intended to bring this claim against an
12 individual defendant, the pleadings do not meet the first prong of the Gordon test because it is not
13 clear from his factual allegations that jail officials acted intentionally, rather than negligently.
14 Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1413 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[N]egligent conduct by
15 the state official is not enough to state a claim under section 1983 based on an alleged violation of
16 the fourteenth amendment due process clause.”). To the extent plaintiff seeks to hold the County
17 liable for staff’s failure to timely administer his medication, he has not alleged that staff acted
18 pursuant to an official policy, custom, or practice. Thompson, 563 U.S. at 60.
19 For these reasons, plaintiff has not stated a cognizable inadequate medical care claim. He
20 will be granted the opportunity to amend his complaint.
21 C. Discrimination
22 Plaintiff’s third claim alleges that facility staff discriminate against inmates in the
23 protective custody housing unit based on their housing assignment. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff
24 does not state the legal basis for this claim, nor does he describe how staff have discriminated
25 against him or how their alleged conduct has affected him “‘in a personal and individual way.’”
26 Spokeo v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
27 555, 560 n.1 (1992)).
28 ////
1 To the extent he is doing so, plaintiff is advised that he cannot assert a discrimination
2 claim on behalf of other prisoners. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (“We have
3 adhered to the rule that a party generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot
4 rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” (quotation and internal
5 quotation marks omitted)).
6 To state a cognizable discrimination claim, plaintiff must adequately describe how staff
7 treats him in protective custody differently from detainees in other housing units. See Price v.
8 Neotti, No. C 09–2818 MMC (PR), 2009 WL 3732008, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2009). He must
9 also plead facts that indicate the difference in treatment is due to his housing status and that it
10 does not serve a legitimate penological purpose. See Wilkins v. MaComber, No. 2:16-CV-0475
11 TLN DMC P, 2019 WL 4640554, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2019).
12 Accordingly, plaintiff has not stated a cognizable discrimination claim and will be granted
13 leave to amend the complaint. Should he choose to pursue this claim, he must identify the legal
14 basis and the alleged facts supporting a discrimination claim.
15 IV. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 18(a) and 20(a)(2)
16 It is not clear which of the claims discussed above are brought against the County and
17 which ones are brought against the defendant correctional officers. There does not appear to be
18 any overlap between these claims, and they appear to rely on different facts and unrelated issues
19 of law.
20 Plaintiff is informed that he may not bring unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a
21 single action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2); Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir.
22 2011) (unrelated claims against different defendants belong in separate suits and complaints
23 violating that principle should be rejected). While multiple claims against a single party may be
24 alleged in a single complaint, unrelated claims against different defendants must be alleged in
25 separate complaints. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding, under
26 Rule 18(a), prisoner improperly brought complaint raising fifty distinct claims against twenty-
27 four defendants).
28 ///
1 Plaintiff may only bring a claim against multiple defendants so long as (1) the claim(s)
2 arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences, and (2)
3 there are common questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a); Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co.
4 of N. Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980). As a practical matter, this means that claims
5 involving different parties cannot be joined together in one complaint if the facts giving rise to the
6 claims were not factually related in some way—that is, if there was not “similarity in the factual
7 background.” Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997). General allegations are
8 not sufficient to constitute similarity when the specifics are different. Id.
9 If plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint he should assert only claims arising from
10 common events and containing common questions of law or fact. See George, 507 F.3d at 607
11 (holding that “[u]nrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits.”).
12 Alternatively, plaintiff may select a single defendant and bring as many claims as he has against
13 that party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
14 AMENDING THE COMPLAINT
15 The court has determined that the complaint (ECF No. 1) fails to state a cognizable claim.
16 Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff is advised that in an
17 amended complaint he must clearly identify each defendant and the action that defendant took
18 that violated his constitutional rights. The court is not required to review exhibits to determine
19 what plaintiff’s charging allegations are as to each named defendant. The charging allegations
20 must be set forth in the amended complaint, so defendants have fair notice of the claims plaintiff
21 is presenting. That said, plaintiff need not provide every detailed fact in support of his claims.
22 Rather, plaintiff should provide a short, plain statement of each claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
23 Any amended complaint must show the federal court has jurisdiction, the action is brought
24 in the right place, and plaintiff is entitled to relief if plaintiff’s allegations are true. It must
25 contain a request for particular relief. Plaintiff must identify as a defendant only persons who
26 personally participated in a substantial way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional right.
27 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation
28 of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another’s act or omits to perform an act
1 he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation).
2 In an amended complaint, the allegations must be set forth in numbered paragraphs. Fed.
3 R. Civ. P. 10(b). Plaintiff may join multiple claims if they are all against a single defendant. Fed.
4 R. Civ. P. 18(a). If plaintiff has more than one claim based upon separate transactions or
5 occurrences, the claims must be set forth in separate paragraphs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
6 The federal rules contemplate brevity. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d
7 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “nearly all of the circuits have now disapproved any
8 heightened pleading standard in cases other than those governed by Rule 9(b)”); Fed. R. Civ. P.
9 84; cf. Rule 9(b) (setting forth rare exceptions to simplified pleading). Plaintiff’s claims must be
10 set forth in short and plain terms, simply, concisely and directly. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
11 N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system,
12 which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
13 An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading.
14 E.D. Cal. R. 220. Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, all prior pleadings are superseded.
15 Any amended complaint should contain all of the allegations related to his claim in this action. If
16 plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims against the defendant, they must be set forth in the amended
17 complaint.
18 By signing an amended complaint, plaintiff certifies he has made reasonable inquiry and
19 has evidentiary support for his allegations, and for violation of this rule the court may impose
20 sanctions sufficient to deter repetition by plaintiff or others. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
21 CONCLUSION
22 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
23 1. Plaintiff’s second motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 7) is granted.
24 2. Plaintiff’s first motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is denied as moot.
25 3. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff
26 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
27 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order
28 to the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
1 4. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) does not state any cognizable claims.
2 5. The complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed with leave to amend.
3 6. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended
4 complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal
5 Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint
6 must bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “First
7 Amended Complaint.”
8 7. Failure to comply with this order may result in a recommendation that this action be
9 dismissed.
10 || Dated: November 3, 2023
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B ORAH BARNES
mB: 1S UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
14 | Prisoner Inbox/Civil Rights/S/reid1937.sern
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