Opinion

(PS) Rogers v. Gordon

Court
District Court, E.D. California
Filed
May 15, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 18.3%

“Dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to 8 amend is proper only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be 9 cured by amendment.”

How later courts described this case

  • “Dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to 8 amend is proper only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be 9 cured by amendment.”
  • “the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying McGee’s request to proceed 10 IFP because it appears from the face of the amended complaint that McGee’s action is frivolous 11 or without merit”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 KIM EDWARD ROGERS, No. 2:23-cv-0532 DJC DB PS

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER

14 PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE, et al.,

15 Defendants.

16

17 Plaintiff Kim Edward Rogers is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was referred

18 to the undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Pending

19 before the court are plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915,

20 motion for leave to amend, and amended complaint.1 (ECF Nos. 2, 5 & 6.) The amended

21 complaint alleges that the defendants discriminated against plaintiff based on plaintiff’s race.

22 The court is required to screen complaints brought by parties proceeding in forma

23 pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.

24 2000) (en banc). Here, plaintiff’s amended complaint is deficient. Accordingly, for the reasons

25 stated below, plaintiff’s amended complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend.

26 ////

27

1 Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend will be granted and the undersigned will screen plaintiff’s

28 amended complaint.

1 I. Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

2 Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application makes the financial showing required by 28

3 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). However, a determination that a plaintiff qualifies financially for in forma

4 pauperis status does not complete the inquiry required by the statute. “‘A district court may deny

5 leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed

6 complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.’” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d

7 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First Nat. Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th

8 Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Department of Child Support Services, 584 Fed. Appx. 638 (9th

9 Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying McGee’s request to proceed

10 IFP because it appears from the face of the amended complaint that McGee’s action is frivolous

11 or without merit”); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the

12 District Court to examine any application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine

13 whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit,

14 the court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”).

15 Moreover, the court must dismiss an in forma pauperis case at any time if the allegation of

16 poverty is found to be untrue or if it is determined that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to

17 state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune

18 defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A complaint is legally frivolous when it lacks an

19 arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v.

20 Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984). Under this standard, a court must dismiss a

21 complaint as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the

22 factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

23 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to

24 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

25 570 (2007). In considering whether a complaint states a cognizable claim, the court accepts as

26 true the material allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most

27 favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v.

28 Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245

1 (9th Cir. 1989). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by

2 lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true

3 conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western

4 Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

5 The minimum requirements for a civil complaint in federal court are as follows:

6 A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain (1) a

short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s

7 jurisdiction depends . . . , (2) a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for

8 judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.

9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

10 II. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

11 According to the amended complaint, plaintiff was involved in a vehicle “collision while

12 traveling on February 7, 2023.” (Am. Compl. (ECF No. 6) at 3.) The amended complaint alleges

13 that defendants Progressive Insurance Claims and United Financial Casualty Company “have

14 employed hardball tactics of stonewalling, low-balling, and fraudulently manipulating the claims

15 evaluation process” as it relates to plaintiff’s insurance claim. (Id. at 2.) The amended complaint

16 alleges these actions constituted “racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42

17 U.S.C. § 1985(3). (Id. at 2-3.)

18 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same

19 right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” Patterson v. McLean

20 Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176 (1989). To state a claim pursuant to § 1981 a complaint must

21 allege: (1) a plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant had an intent to

22 discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the

23 activities enumerated in the statute, i.e., the making and enforcing of a contract. Morris v. Office

24 Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 1996).

25 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) creates a cause of action against defendants in a conspiracy to

26 interfere with an individual’s civil rights. To state a claim under § 1985(3), a complaint must

27 allege: (1) a conspiracy, (2) to deprive any person or class of persons of the equal protection of

28 the laws, (3) an act done by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) a

1 personal injury, property damage, or deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the

2 United States. Gillispie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980); Giffin v. Breckenridge,

3 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971). § 1985 applies only where there is a racial or other class-based

4 discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ actions. Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d

5 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit has held that a claim under § 1985 must allege

6 specific facts to support the allegation that defendants conspired together. Karim-Panahi v. Los

7 Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). A mere allegation of conspiracy

8 without factual specificity is insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id.; Sanchez v.

9 City of Santa Anna, 936 F.2d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 1991).

10 Here, the amended complaint contains no factual allegations in support of any claim.

11 Instead, the amended complaint simply alleges that the defendants “conspired . . . to deprive and

12 obstruct Plaintiff from obtaining a complete and non-encumbering settlement process.” (Am.

13 Compl. (ECF No. 6) at 3.) Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a flexible

14 pleading policy, a complaint must give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claims and must

15 allege facts that state the elements of each claim plainly and succinctly. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2);

16 Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). “A pleading that offers

17 ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of cause of action will not do.’

18 Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual

19 enhancements.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,

20 557). A plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which the

21 defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claims. Jones, 733 F.2d at 649.

22 II. Leave to Amend

23 For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s amended complaint must be dismissed. The

24 undersigned has carefully considered whether plaintiff may further amend the complaint to state a

25 claim upon which relief can be granted. “Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include

26 undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, and futility.” California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan

27 Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath

28 ////

1 Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to amend shall

2 be freely given, the court does not have to allow futile amendments).

3 However, when evaluating the failure to state a claim, the complaint of a pro se plaintiff

4 may be dismissed “only where ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

5 in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221,

6 1228 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972)); see also Weilburg v.

7 Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to

8 amend is proper only if it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be

9 cured by amendment.”) (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203-04 (9th Cir.

10 1988)).

11 Here, the undersigned cannot yet say that it appears beyond doubt that further leave to

12 amend would be futile. Plaintiff’s amended complaint will therefore be dismissed, and plaintiff

13 will be granted leave to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that if

14 plaintiff elects to file a second amended complaint “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of

15 the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals

16 of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

17 Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. “While legal conclusions can provide the complaint’s framework, they

18 must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. Those facts must be sufficient to push the

19 claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible[.]” Id. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

20 at 557).

21 Plaintiff is also reminded that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make an

22 amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that any amended complaint be complete

23 in itself without reference to prior pleadings. The second amended complaint will supersede the

24 amended complaint just as the amended complaint superseded the original complaint. See Loux

25 v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Thus, in a second amended complaint, just as if it were

26 the initial complaint filed in the case, each defendant must be listed in the caption and identified

27 in the body of the complaint, and each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be

28 sufficiently alleged. Any amended complaint which plaintiff may elect to file must also include

1 concise but complete factual allegations describing the conduct and events which underlie

2 plaintiff’s claims.

3 CONCLUSION

4 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

5 1. The April 28, 2023 motion for leave to amend (ECF No. 5) is granted;

6 2. The amended complaint filed April 28, 2023 (ECF No. 6) is dismissed with leave to

7 amend.

8 3. Within twenty-eight days from the date of this order, a second amended complaint

9 shall be filed that cures the defects noted in this order and complies with the Federal Rules of

10 Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice.2 The second amended complaint must bear the

11 case number assigned to this action and must be titled “Second Amended Complaint.”

12 4. Failure to comply with this order in a timely manner may result in a recommendation

13 that this action be dismissed.3

14 DATED: May 12, 2023 /s/ DEBORAH BARNES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

2 Alternatively, if plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action plaintiff may file a notice of

26

voluntary dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

27

3 Plaintiff need not file another application to proceed in forma pauperis at this time unless

28 plaintiff’s financial condition has improved since the last such application was submitted.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.