denial of 27 leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where further amendment would be futile
How later courts described this case
- denial of 27 leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where further amendment would be futile
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 DARRYL W. HUDSON, No. 1:22-cv-01313-JLT-EPG (PC)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
13 v.
(Docs. 1, 13)
14 C. PFEIFFER, et al.,
ORDER DISMISSING ACTION
15 Defendants.
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17 The assigned magistrate judge entered findings and recommendations that “[t]his action
18 be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim,” and that “[t]he Clerk of Court be
19 directed to close this case.” (Doc. 13 at 9.) Plaintiff filed objections on March 6, 2023. (Doc.
20 14.)
21 According to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court has conducted a de novo review of the
22 case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the Court concludes that the magistrate judge’s
23 findings and recommendations are supported by the record and by proper analysis.
24 In his objections, Plaintiff asks for leave to amend. (Doc. 14.) Though leave to is
25 generally given liberally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), a court may decline to do so if amendment
26 would be futile. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of
27 leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where further amendment would be futile). Here, the
28 Court concludes any attempt to amend in the ways suggested by Plaintiff would be futile. First,
een enn nn ee een ee SI IE I I ROI EERE IE IE
1 | nothing in the record suggests that a sufficient liberty interest is at stake to support his due
2 | process claim. Plaintiff states that he is appealing his sentence and asserts that, if he is successful
3 | on appeal, the RVR could affect him in the future at his parole board hearing. This is insufficient.
4 | (See Doc. 13 at 6 (explaining that in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995), “the
5 | Supreme Court held that neither thirty days in solitary confinement nor issuance of a Rules
6 | Violation Report that could be used in parole proceedings were substantial enough deprivations of
7 | liberty interests to trigger procedural due process protections”).) Thus, even if the RVR could
8 | affect him at a parole board hearing, this possibility is not sufficient to create a cognizable liberty
9 | interest. Second, even if a sufficient liberty interest existed, as discussed in the findings and
10 | recommendations, some evidence supported the guilty finding, which satisfies the applicable
11 | legal standard. Finally, to the extent Plaintiff suggests he plans to amend to include allegations
12 | that he was not permitted to call inmate Bonner as a witness at his RVR hearing, his objections
13 || acknowledge that he was allowed to ask inmate Bonner questions prior to the hearing. Moreover,
14 | asupplement to the RVR acknowledges the questions and answers by inmate Bonner (Doc. | at
15 | 18), and it appears that the hearing officer reviewed the questions and answers prior to issuing his
16 || decision. (Ud. at 18 & 20.)' Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
17 1. The findings and recommendations issued on February 9, 2023, (Doc. 13), are
18 ADOPTED IN FULL.
19 2. This action is DISMISSED, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.
20 3. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
53 Dated: _ March 9, 2023 Charis [Tourn
TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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' Plaintiff asserts for the first time in his objections that unnamed officers gave him the RVR in retaliation for his
27 | participation in a different lawsuit. (Doc. 14.) Any such claim would be separate from the due process claim
Plaintiff brought here. Nothing in this order should be interpreted to prevent Plaintiff from pursuing a separate case
28 | in relation to any retaliation claim, to the extent such a claim is otherwise viable.