holding that 2 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal
How later courts described this case
- holding that 2 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal
- discussing 2 “under color of state law”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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JASON SCOTT HOUNIHAN, Case No. 1:23-cv-00163-EPG (PC)
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Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER
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v. ORDER ALLOWING PLAINTIFF’S
14 COMPLAINT TO PROCEED ON HIS
JOSE C. VILLASENOR, EIGHTH AMENDMENT SEXUAL
15 ASSAULT CLAIM AGAINST
Defendant. DEFENDANT VILLASENOR
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ORDER FINDING SERVICE OF
17 COMPLAINT APPROPRIATE, AND
FORWARDING SERVICE DOCUMENTS
18 TO PLAINTIFF TO COMPLETE AND
RETURN WITHIN THIRTY DAYS
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20 Jason Hounihan (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner1 proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in
21 this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the complaint
22 commencing this action on February 2, 2023. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges that defendant
23 Villasenor ordered a nurse to insert his hands into Plaintiff’s rectum even though Plaintiff had
24 already been x-rayed and a doctor clearly stated that there were no foreign objects in Plaintiff’s
25 body. The complaint is now before this Court for screening.
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1 Plaintiff does not allege whether he is awaiting trial or if he has already been convicted. As the Court
28 finds that Plaintiff’s claim should proceed under the higher Eighth Amendment standards for prisoners who have
been convicted, the Court need not address this issue at this time.
1 The Court has reviewed the complaint and finds that the following claim should
2 proceed past screening: Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment sexual assault claim against defendant
3 Villasenor.
4 As the Court has found that Plaintiff’s only claim should proceed past screening, the
5 Court will authorize service of process on defendant Villasenor.
6 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
7 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
8 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
9 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are
10 legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
11 that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
12 § 1915A(b)(1), (2). As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (ECF No. 4), the Court may
13 also screen the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any
14 portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
15 determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
16 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
17 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
18 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are
19 not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
20 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
21 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient
22 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.
23 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting
24 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts
25 “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d
26 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a
27 plaintiff’s legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
28 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal
1 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
2 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal).
3 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
4 Plaintiff alleges as follows in his complaint:
5 Plaintiff was taken to a hospital to be x-rayed for contraband, even though he did not
6 have any. The doctor clearly stated that there were no foreign objects in Plaintiff’s body.
7 Nevertheless, defendant Villasenor, a deputy at the Tulare County Sheriff’s Office, instructed a
8 male nurse to stick his hands up Plaintiff’s rectum.
9 Plaintiff has had internal pain since this incident. Additionally, Plaintiff suffers from
10 PTSD, he is distraught, and he was humiliated.
11 Plaintiff has been asking for the Prison Rape Elimination Act hotline number for three
12 months, but it has not been provided to Plaintiff and it is not posted.
13 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
14 A. Section 1983
15 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
16 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
17 to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
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secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
19 action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
20 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely
21 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor,
22 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see
23 also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los
24 Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir.
25 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).
26 To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted
27 under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the
28 Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.
1 2006); see also Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing
2 “under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the
3 meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or
4 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which
5 complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183
6 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite
7 causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others
8 which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional
9 harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of
10 causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.”
11 Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City
12 of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).
13 A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the
14 deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual
15 connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have
16 been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S.
17 658, 691, 695 (1978).
18 Supervisory personnel are not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their
19 employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant
20 holds a supervisory position, the causal link between the supervisory defendant and the claimed
21 constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Fayle v.
22 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.
23 1978). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability,
24 a plaintiff must allege some facts that would support a claim that the supervisory defendants
25 either: were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, Hansen v.
26 Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); “knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent
27 them,” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); or promulgated or “implement[ed]
28 a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the
1 moving force of the constitutional violation,” Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646 (citations and internal
2 quotation marks omitted).
3 For instance, a supervisor may be liable for his or her “own culpable action or inaction
4 in the training, supervision, or control of his [or her] subordinates,” “his [or her] acquiescence
5 in the constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is made,” or “conduct that showed a
6 reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d
7 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
8 B. Sexual Assault in Violation of the Eighth Amendment2
9 Sexual harassment or abuse of an inmate by a prison official is a violation of the Eighth
10 Amendment. Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Schwenk
11 v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000)). In evaluating such a claim, “courts consider
12 whether ‘the official act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind’”—the subjective
13 component—“and if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively ‘harmful enough’ to establish a
14 constitutional violation”—the objective component. Wood, 692 F.3d at 1046 (alteration in
15 original) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)). As “sexual assault serves no
16 valid penological purpose … where an inmate can prove that a prison guard committed a sexual
17 assault, we presume the guard acted maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
18 causing harm, and the subjective component of the Eighth Amendment claim is satisfied.”
19 Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1144 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Wood, 692 F.3d at 1050;
20 Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1196 n.6). “Any sexual assault is objectively ‘repugnant to the
21 conscience of mankind’ and therefore not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes.”
22 Bearchild, 947 F.3d at 1144 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10).
23 In sum,
24 a prisoner presents a viable Eighth Amendment claim where he
or she proves that a prison staff member, acting under color of
25 law and without legitimate penological justification, touched the
prisoner in a sexual manner or otherwise engaged in sexual
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28 2 While the Court is applying the Eighth Amendment, as discussed above, the Court is not making a
determination as to whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner at the time of the incident.
conduct for the staff member’s own sexual gratification, or for
1 the purpose of humiliating, degrading, or demeaning the prisoner.
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Bearchild, 947 F.3d at 1144.
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Plaintiff alleges that defendant Villasenor directed a nurse to stick his hands up
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Plaintiff’s rectum, even though a doctor had clearly stated that there were no foreign objects in
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Plaintiff’s body. Plaintiff has had internal pain since this incident. Additionally, Plaintiff
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suffers from PTSD, he is distraught, and he was humiliated.
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Liberally construing Plaintiff’s complaint, and as this case is at the screening stage, the
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Court finds that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment sexual assault claim against defendant
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Villasenor should proceed past screening.
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IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
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The Court has screened Plaintiff’s complaint and finds that Plaintiff’s Eighth
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Amendment sexual assault claim against defendant Villasenor should proceed past screening.
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As the Court has found that Plaintiff’s only claim should proceed past screening, the
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Court will authorize service of the complaint on defendant Villasenor.
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Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
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1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment sexual assault claim against
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defendant Villasenor;
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2. Service of Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1), which was filed on February 2, 2023,
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is appropriate for the following defendant:
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a. Jose C. Villasenor, who was employed as a Tulare County Sheriff’s Office
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Deputy at Bob Wiley Detention Facility;
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3. The Clerk of Court shall SEND Plaintiff one (1) USM-285 form, one (1) summons,
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a Notice of Submission of Documents form, an instruction sheet, and a copy of the
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complaint filed on February 2, 2023 (ECF No. 1);
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4. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall
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complete the attached Notice of Submission of Documents and submit the
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completed Notice to the Court with the following documents:
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1 a. A completed summons for each defendant;
2 b. A completed USM-285 form for each defendant; and
3 c. Two (2) copies of the endorsed complaint filed on February 2, 2023 (ECF
4 No. 1);
5 5. Plaintiff need not attempt service on Defendant and need not request waiver of
6 service. Upon receipt of the above-described documents, the Court will direct the
7 United States Marshals Service to serve the above-named defendant pursuant to
8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 without payment of costs; and
9 6. Failure to comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this action.
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ul IT IS SO ORDERED.
12 | Dated: _ February 7, 2023 [sf ey —
13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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