“Unrelated claims against 25 unrelated defendants belong in different suits”
How later courts described this case
- “Unrelated claims against 25 unrelated defendants belong in different suits”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 DARYL HICKS, No. 2:22-cv-0903 KJN P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 PATRICK COVELLO, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and is proceeding in forma pauperis. This proceeding was referred to this court
19 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 302. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is now
20 before the court. As discussed below, plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed with leave to
21 amend.
22 Screening Standards
23 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
24 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
25 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
26 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
27 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
28 ////
1 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
2 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
3 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an
4 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
5 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully
6 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
7 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
8 A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
9 which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
10 support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467
11 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt
12 Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under
13 this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp.
14 Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light
15 most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor, Jenkins v.
16 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).
17 The Civil Rights Act
18 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the violation of a federal
19 constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under
20 the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d
21 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). An individual defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the
22 facts establish the defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal
23 connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation.
24 See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44
25 (9th Cir. 1978). That is, plaintiff may not sue any official on the theory that the official is liable
26 for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679
27 (2009). The requisite causal connection between a supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the
28 violation of the prisoner’s constitutional rights can be established in a number of ways, including
1 by demonstrating that a supervisor’s own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision,
2 or control of his subordinates was a cause of plaintiff’s injury. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,
3 1208 (9th Cir. 2011).
4 Discussion
5 The sole defendant identified in the caption of plaintiff’s complaint is Warden Patrick
6 Covello. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10. Plaintiff does not include a section identifying each named
7 defendant and providing his or her address for purposes of service of process.
8 Plaintiff includes no charging allegations as to defendant Covello. Moreover, plaintiff
9 cannot state a civil rights claim against defendant Covello based solely on his role as warden.
10 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
11 Plaintiff’s purported amended complaint explains why his prison sentence is too long
12 because he should receive benefit of Proposition 57 because he was convicted of a nonviolent
13 felony, that various rules violation reports also increased his sentence, and briefly recounts
14 various physical assaults by inmates and staff, including by Correctional Officer Gosai, who
15 plaintiff is suing in another case, Hicks v. Gosai, 20-2303 KJM JDP (E.D. Cal.), as well as
16 alleged mistreatment by a clinician. But plaintiff fails to specifically identify who he intends to
17 sue and for what alleged violation of his constitutional rights, and he fails to set forth any
18 requested relief.
19 Proposition 57
20 Plaintiff now informs the court that he was convicted of human trafficking, a nonviolent
21 felony, and has served his primary term. However, to the extent plaintiff again attempts to raise a
22 civil rights claim based on the refusal to provide him relief under Proposition 57, plaintiff’s
23 renewed effort fails. See Bisel v. Kernan, 2018 WL 11294697, at *7-10 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 17,
24 2018) (surveying cases challenging the failure to provide relief under Proposition 57 to inmates
25 convicted of nonviolent felonies).
26 Here, plaintiff was convicted of:
27 three counts of human trafficking of a minor [Cal. Penal Code §
236.1], four counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor more
28 than three years his junior, one count of possession of a controlled
1 substance, one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, and three
counts of furnishing a controlled substance to a minor. He was
2 sentenced to 19 years, four months in prison.
3 People v. Hicks, 17 Cal. App. 5th 496, 499, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 682, 688-89 (2017), as modified
4 (Nov. 17, 2017).1 On appeal, the state appellate court found that the trial court used a proper
5 basis to impose an aggravated sentence -- “prior convictions were numerous and of increasing
6 severity.” Id., 17 Cal. App. 5th at 512-13. The state appellate court also reiterated the trial
7 court’s reasons for imposing aggravated concurrent terms under Cal. Rules of Court 4.421(b)(2).
8 Hicks, 17 Cal. App. 5th at 513. The judgment of conviction was affirmed, but the abstract of
9 judgment was amended to reflect a consecutive sentence of one-third the midterm on count 11
10 (two years, with the “1/3 Consecutive” box checked). Id. at 516.
11 Plaintiff is correct that his conviction for human trafficking is categorized as a nonviolent
12 felony. However, such conviction requires plaintiff to register as a sex offender under California
13 Penal Code Section 290. Id. It appears that the CDCR has determined that such registration
14 requirement precludes plaintiff from receiving parole consideration under Proposition 57.
15 Contrary to plaintiff’s belief that his inability to access early release under Proposition 57
16 violates the intent of the public in passing Proposition 57, at least one state court justice disagrees.
17 In re Gadlin, 31 Cal. App. 5th 784, 796 (2019), aff'd, 10 Cal. 5th 915 (2020) (concurrence). In
18 Gadlin, Justice Baker evaluated Proposition 57 in the context of those inmates, like plaintiff, who
19 were convicted of nonviolent felonies but were convicted of sex offenses that require registration
20 as a sex offender under California Penal Code Section 290. Gadlin, 33 Cal. App. 5th at 796. The
21 Justice concluded that
22 Proposition 57’s proponents assured voters that those required to
register as sex offenders would not benefit from the initiative, and
23 that assurance leaves me convinced voters did not intend to preclude
24 1 Plaintiff’s sentence was comprised of the following: “the upper term of 12 years on count 1;
consecutive terms of two years eight months (one-third the midterm) on counts 2 and 6;
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concurrent three year terms (the upper term) on counts 3, 4, 5, 8, and 10; 365 days on count 9
(time served); a concurrent sentence of three years (the upper term) on count 10; a consecutive
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two year sentence (one-third the midterm) on count 11; and concurrent nine year sentences (the
27 upper term) on counts 12 and 13. Defendant was assessed various fines and fees, awarded
presentence custody credits, and ordered to register pursuant to section 290.” Hicks, 17 Cal. App.
28 5th at 503.
1 CDCR from promulgating regulations that preclude relief for state
prison inmates incarcerated for a current crime that requires
2 registration as a sex offender.
3 Gadlin, 31 Cal. App. 5th at 796. In his amended complaint, plaintiff identifies no facts that
4 support a cognizable civil rights claim in connection with Proposition 57. In addition, plaintiff
5 fails to identify a particular individual responsible for such alleged violation.
6 Remaining Allegations
7 The remaining allegations in plaintiff's amended complaint are too vague and conclusory
8 to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. The court
9 has determined that the amended complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as
10 required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy,
11 a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones
12 v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least
13 some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff's claim.
14 Id. Plaintiff must specifically identify what cause of action he is pursuing against each named
15 defendant, and what relief he seeks through this action.
16 Misjoinder
17 Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
18 Misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an action. On
motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add
19 or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.
20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Rule 20(a) provides that all persons may be joined in one action as defendants
21 if “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect
22 to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” and
23 “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
24 20(a)(2). See also George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Unrelated claims against
25 unrelated defendants belong in different suits”). If unrelated claims are improperly joined, the
26 court may dismiss them without prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; 7 Alan Wright, Arthur Miller &
27 Mary Kay Kane, Richard Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1684 (3d ed. 2012); Michaels
28 Building Co. v. Ameritrust Co., 848 F.2d 674, 682 (6th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissing under
1 Rule 21 of certain defendants where claims against those defendants did not arise out of the same
2 transaction or occurrences, as required by Rule 20(a)).
3 Leave to Amend
4 Because plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of Rules 8(a)(2) and 10 of the
5 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the amended complaint must be dismissed. The court will,
6 however, grant leave to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiff is required to use the court’s
7 form to file his amended pleading.
8 If plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how
9 the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s federal constitutional or
10 statutory rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the second amended
11 complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no
12 liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a
13 defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v.
14 Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.
15 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights
16 violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
17 A district court must construe a pro se pleading “liberally” to determine if it states a claim
18 and, prior to dismissal, tell a plaintiff of deficiencies in his complaint and give plaintiff an
19 opportunity to cure them. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31. While detailed factual allegations are
20 not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
21 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
22 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted
23 as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
24 Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 570).
25 A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
26 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility
standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for
27 more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
28 defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
] plausibility of entitlement to relief.
2 || Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Although legal conclusions can
3 || provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations, and are not
4 | entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. at 1950.
5 An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading.
6 || Local Rule 220; See Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015)
7 || (‘an ‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-
g || existent.’” (internal citation omitted)). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original or
9 || prior pleading is superseded.
10 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
11 1. Plaintiff's amended complaint is dismissed.
12 2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a second
13 || amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules
14 || of Civil Procedure, this court’s orders, and the Local Rules of Practice; the second amended
15 || complaint must be filed on the court’s complaint form, bear the docket number assigned this case
16 || and be labeled “Second Amended Complaint”;
17 || failure to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a
18 || recommendation that this action be dismissed.
19 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the form for filing a civil rights
20 || complaint by a prisoner.
21 | Dated: January 24, 2023
22 A Abar
Mick0903.14amd UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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