“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless 23 it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” 24 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- “A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless 23 it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” 24 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 RONALD WILLIAM WARD, Case No. 1:21-cv-00929-SKO (PC)
12 Plaintiff,
FIRST SCREENING ORDER
13 v.
14 S. BATRA, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff Ronald William Ward is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil
18 rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
19 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
21 governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
22 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the complaint is frivolous or malicious,
23 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
24 who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if
25 it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal
26 theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
27 //
1 II. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS
2 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)
3 “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited
4 exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain
5 “a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
6 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the
7 plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal
8 quotation marks & citation omitted).
9 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
10 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
11 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must
12 set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’”
13 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as
14 true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
15 The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of
16 any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the
17 liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal
18 theories. Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation
19 of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially
20 pled,” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal
21 quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted
22 inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
23 marks & citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not
24 sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s
25 liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted).
26 B. Linkage and Causation
27 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal
1 section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the
2 defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode,
3 423 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the
4 deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative
5 act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legal required
6 to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,
7 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).
8 C. Supervisory Liability
9 Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of
10 their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v.
11 Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d
12 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
13 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of
14 the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.
15 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567
16 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an
17 official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should
18 know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d at 570.
19 Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the official implemented
20 “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the
21 moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446
22 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations & quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v.
23 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970).
24 To prove liability for an action or policy, the plaintiff “must ... demonstrate that his
25 deprivation resulted from an official policy or custom established by a ... policymaker possessed
26 with final authority to establish that policy.” Waggy v. Spokane County Washington, 594 F.3d
27 707, 713 (9th Cir.2010). When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between
1 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.
2 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in
3 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.
4 1982).
5 III. DISCUSSION
6 A. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations
7 Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on November 12, 2021. (Doc. 11.) The Court did
8 not screen Plaintiff’s original complaint before he filed his first amended complaint.
9 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of
10 the sua sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
11 Plaintiff names Dr. Sanjeev Batra, D.O., a “Doctor under Contract,” Stephanie Clendenin,
12 Director of State Hospitals, and Executive Director Brandon Price, Robert Withrow, M.D.,
13 “Medical Director, retired,” and Dr. Jonathan Hamrick, M.D., “Chief Physician/Surgeon,” of
14 Coalinga State Hospital, in their individual capacities, as Defendants. (Doc. 11 at 1-3.)
15 In his first claim for relief, Plaintiff initially cites to several unidentified statutory or
16 regulatory provisions (Doc. 11 at 3 [e.g., Ҥ11.16 Failure to furnish adequate medical care to
17 prisoners”]) and California Government Code provisions (id. [e.g., “Govt. C §845.6”]). Plaintiff
18 then contends the “cause of [his] amputation and the worsening of [his] medical conditions was
19 caused by Dr. Sanjeev Batra, Stephanie Clendenin, Brandon Price, Dr. Robert Withrow, and Dr.
20 Johnathan Hamrick.” (Doc. 11 at 3.) Plaintiff states he saw Dr. Batra for “medical care” and as
21 his “medical conditions worsened, the more Dr. Batra’s procedure of care was denied.” (Id.)
22 Plaintiff contends “[s]igns and symptoms were ignored,” and Dr. Batra realized “his error in
23 neglecting his professional duties,” ordering an ambulance to rush Plaintiff to Community
24 Regional Medical Center. (Id. at 3-4.) He contends Dr. Batra provided inadequate medical care
25 “that the experts have varified [sic]” and that could have been prevented. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff also
26 contends a “licensing[] investigation” has been conducted and Dr. Batra and the Department of
27 State Hospitals-Coalinga have been reprimanded as a result. (Id.)
1 In his second claim, Plaintiff cites to “3333.2” for “Negligence of Health Care Providers;
2 noneconomic losses; limitations,” an apparent reference to the California Civil Code. Plaintiff
3 thereafter quotes subdivisions “(a),” “(b),” and “(2).” Plaintiff does not provide any facts
4 regarding this second claim. (Doc. 11 at 4.) Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of “$250,000.00 per
5 defendant x 5 defendants” for his pain and suffering, “plus punitive damages, all Court costs,
6 legal fees, including all copies, the costs for attorney fees for the hours [he] spent in the
7 preparation of this case as would be alloted [sic] to an attorney, disability and all medical need
8 pretaining [sic] to my amputation and heart condition for life.” (Doc. 11 at 5.)
9 B. Plaintiff Asserts Only State Law Claims
10 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint asserts only state law claims. He makes no reference to
11 any federal constitutional provision or federal statute in asserting those claims.
12 Section 1983 provides:
13 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
14 Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
15 deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
16 at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ….
17 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
18 “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a
19 method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
20 393–94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman v.
21 Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Tatum v. Moody, 768 F.3d 806, 814 (9th
22 Cir. 2014); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v.
23 Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).
24 “Traditionally, the requirements for relief under [§] 1983 have been articulated as: (1) a
25 violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) proximately
26 caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting under color of state law.” Crumpton v. Gates, 947
27 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Or, more simply, courts have required plaintiffs to “plead that
1 Constitution or federal statutes.” Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986);
2 see also Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F. 3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2015); Long v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 442
3 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1999)
4 (en banc); Ortez v. Wash. Cty., Or., 88 F.3d 804, 810 (9th Cir. 1996).
5 Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law. See Galen v.
6 Cty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir.
7 2001); Sweaney v. Ada Cty., Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997); Lovell v. Poway Unified
8 Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1996); Ybarra v. Bastian, 647 F.2d 891, 892 (9th Cir. 1981).
9 Where a violation of state law is also a violation of a constitutional right, however, § 1983 does
10 provide a cause of action. See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 370; Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 921 (9th
11 Cir. 1986); see also Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2007).
12 In sum, Plaintiff has not asserted a violation of any federal right protected by the
13 Constitution or a federal statute. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleges only violations of
14 state law. As noted above, § 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state law.
15 Galen, 477 F.3d at 662.
16 C. Leave to Amend
17 In the Ninth Circuit, “[p]ro se plaintiffs proceeding [in forma pauperis] must … be given
18 an opportunity to amend their complaint [prior to dismissal] unless it is absolutely clear that the
19 deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d
20 1221, 1228 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation & internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rodriguez
21 v. Steck, 795 F.3d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 2015) (order); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th
22 Cir. 2012) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless
23 it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”
24 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted)); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th
25 Cir. 1995); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 529–30 (9th Cir. 1985); cf. Denton v. Hernandez, 504
26 U.S. 25, 34 (1992) 102 (suggesting that if the complaint’s deficiencies could be remedied by
27 amendment, then it may be abuse of discretion to dismiss complaint without granting leave to
1 dismissal. See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1106; cf. Denton, 504 U.S. at 34 (declining to address the Ninth
2 Circuit’s notice and leave-to-amend rule for frivolous complaints).
3 “Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect …, a pro se litigant is
4 entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of
5 the action.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); see also Lopez
6 v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125,
7 1139 (9th Cir. 2015).
8 Here, it is possible Plaintiff could amend his complaint to assert a claim or claims
9 pertaining to a violation of his federal rights thus curing the deficiencies identified herein.
10 Therefore, Plaintiff will be granted leave to file a second amended complaint.
11 1. Legal Standards Concerning Federal Claims
12 The following legal standards are provided for Plaintiff’s consideration. Should Plaintiff
13 elect to file a second amended complaint, these standards provide relevant information for
14 purposes of pleading a cognizable claim.
15 The government has an “obligation to provide medical care for those
whom it is punishing by incarceration,” and failure to meet that
16 obligation can constitute an Eighth Amendment violation cognizable
under § 1983. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–05 [] (1976). In
17 order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate
medical care, a plaintiff must show “deliberate indifference” to his
18 “serious medical needs.” Id. at 104 []. This includes “both an
objective standard—that the deprivation was serious enough to
19 constitute cruel and unusual punishment—and a subjective
standard—deliberate indifference.” Snow [v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d
20 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds by
Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc)].
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22 Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014). See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
23 97, 105 (1976) (“[D]eliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of
24 action under § 1983”); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Toguchi v. Chung,
25 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004). This rule applies to “physical, dental, and mental health.”
26 Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v.
27 Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Prisoners must also be protected from serious risks to their health.
1 (1993); Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 1995).
2 “[T]o show deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that the course of treatment the
3 doctors chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that the defendants chose
4 this course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the plaintiff's health.” Hamby v.
5 Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks & citation omitted).
6 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard. A showing of medical malpractice or negligence
7 is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment” Id. (internal
8 quotation marks & citation omitted).
9 “A ‘serious’ medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in
10 further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” McGuckin v. Smith,
11 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104); see also Jett, 439 F.3d at
12 1096; Doty v. Cty. of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).
13 “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical
14 condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.
15 Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a
16 prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.
17 2. Additional Information Relevant to Amendment
18 Should Plaintiff choose to file a second amended complaint, he should make clear the
19 nature and grounds for each claim, and clearly and concisely explain the basis for each
20 defendant's liability—in compliance with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
21 requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
22 is entitled to relief.”1 To state a claim against a defendant in his or her individual capacity,
23 Plaintiff must allege specific facts from which the Court can reasonably infer that the defendant
24 personally participated in the violation alleged. Plaintiff may not rely on conclusory allegations
25 and formulaic recitations of applicable law. Plaintiff is strongly encouraged to use the standard
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27 1 The Court must be able to determine, from the amended pleading, when the alleged injury occurred, how
it was inflicted, by whom, and the nature of the constitutional claims against each defendant. If a
defendant would have difficulty understanding and responding to a pleading, it violates Rule 8. United
1 civil rights complaint form when filing any amended complaint.
2 Plaintiff should also carefully review the linkage and causation requirements, and
3 information concerning supervisor liability, as provided above in Section II, subsections B and C.
4 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
5 Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to state
6 any cognizable claim against any named Defendant. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend his
7 complaint to cure the identified deficiencies to the extent he is able to do so in good faith. Lopez,
8 203 F.3d at 1130.
9 If Plaintiff wishes to file a second amended complaint, any such amended complaint
10 should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what each named defendant did that led to
11 the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Although accepted
12 as true, the “[f]actual allegation must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative
13 level ….” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Plaintiff may not change the nature of
14 this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his second amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507
15 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints).
16 Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. Lacey v.
17 Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, an amended complaint must be
18 “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” See Local Rule 220.
19 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint should be complete in and of itself, without reference to his
20 first amended complaint.
21 Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that:
22 1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; and,
23 2. Within 21 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either:
24 (a) file a second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by
25 the Court in this order; or
26 (b) in the alternative, file a notice of voluntary dismissal (Fed. R. Civ. P.
27 41(a)(1)(i)); and
1 action be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and
2 for failure to prosecute.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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5 Dated: November 22, 2022 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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