The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 GEORGE SCOTT, Case No. 1:22-cv-00774-BAM
12 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED
13 v. COMPLAINT
14 DA OFFICE OF STANISLAUS (Doc. 1)
COUNTY,
15 THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE
Defendant.
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18 Plaintiff George Scott (“Plaintiff”), a county jail inmate proceeding pro se and in forma
19 pauperis, initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 24, 2022.
20 Plaintiff’s complaint is currently before the Court for screening. (Doc. 1.)
21 I. Screening Requirement and Standard
22 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
23 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
24 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous
25 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary
26 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b);
27 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
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1 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
2 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
3 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
4 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
5 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as
6 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
7 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
8 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires
9 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable
10 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret
11 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully
12 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility
13 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
14 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations
15 Plaintiff is currently housed at the Stanislaus County Jail. He appears to bring suit against
16 the District Attorney’s Office of Stanislaus County and District Attorney Monteneno and claims
17 double jeopardy on a criminal case. (See generally Doc. 1.) Plaintiff alleges: “In 2018 I did time
18 for the D.V [illegible] violation. They are trying to send me to prison for the D.V [illegible]
19 violation in 2022.” (Doc. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff identifies injuries to include mental agony, emotional
20 distress, pain and suffering, and lost wages. He seeks $250,000 “for the 120 days for pain &
21 suffering, mental agony, lost wages, counseling.” (Id. at 4.)
22 III. Discussion
23 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to
24 state a cognizable claim for relief under section 1983. As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he will be
25 granted an opportunity to amend his complaint to cure the identified deficiencies to the extent he
26 can do so in good faith. To assist Plaintiff, the Court provides the pleading and legal standards
27 that appear relevant to his claims.
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1 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and
3 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
4 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
5 of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
6 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
7 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
8 at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are
9 not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–557.
10 Although Plaintiff’s complaint is short, it is not a plain statement of his claims. At a basic
11 level, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state what happened, when it happened, and who was involved.
12 Plaintiff’s conclusory statements are not sufficient. Plaintiff’s complaint also is partially illegible.
13 If Plaintiff elects to amend his complaint, he must clearly state what happened, when it happened
14 and who was involved.
15 B. Section 1983 – Linkage Requirement
16 The Civil Rights Act under which this action presumptively was filed provides:
17 Every person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
18 immunities secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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20 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
21 The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions
22 of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v.
23 Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, (1976). The Ninth
24 Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right,
25 within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s
26 affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the
27 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
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1 Here, Plaintiff fails to link any defendant to alleged wrongful conduct. In order to state a
2 claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each defendant with some affirmative act
3 or omission demonstrating a violation of Plaintiff’s federal rights.
4 C. Prosecutorial Immunity
5 To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring suit against District Attorney Monteneno, this
6 defendant may be immune from suit. “A state prosecuting attorney enjoys absolute immunity
7 from liability under § 1983 for his conduct in ‘pursuing a criminal prosecution’ insofar as he acts
8 within his role as an ‘advocate for the State’ and his actions are ‘intimately associated with the
9 judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir.
10 2009); see also Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 912 (9th Cir.2012) (“Prosecutors
11 performing their official prosecutorial functions are entitled to absolute immunity against
12 constitutional torts.”). Therefore, Defendant Monteneno would be entitled to prosecutorial
13 immunity for actions associated with Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution.
14 Further, Plaintiff brings suit against the District Attorney’s Office itself, but he does not
15 make any allegations specifically against the Office. To the extent Plaintiff intends to hold the
16 Office responsible for the district attorney’s conduct as a prosecutor, he cannot do so. “There is
17 no respondeat superior liability under section 1983.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.
18 1989).
19 D. Younger Abstention
20 Although not entirely clear, Plaintiff may be attempting to challenge ongoing criminal
21 proceedings in Stanislaus County. However, any such claim is barred under the doctrine of
22 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Younger doctrine “prevents a federal court in most
23 circumstances from directly interfering with ongoing criminal proceedings in state court.” Jones
24 v. Buckman, No. 2:18-cv-0054-EFB P, 2019 WL 1227921, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2019).
25 “Further, the Younger abstention doctrine bars requests for declaratory and monetary relief for
26 constitutional injuries arising out of a plaintiff's ongoing state criminal prosecution.” Id., citing
27 Mann v. Jett, 781 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986).
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1 E. Heck Bar
2 It has long been established that state prisoners cannot challenge the fact or duration of
3 their confinement in a section 1983 action and their sole remedy lies in habeas corpus relief.
4 Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005). Often referred to as the favorable termination rule or
5 the Heck bar, this exception to § 1983’s otherwise broad scope applies whenever state prisoners
6 “seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement-either directly through an injunction
7 compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies
8 the unlawfulness of the State’s custody.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81; Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
9 477, 482, 486–87 (1994); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644 (1997). Thus, “a state prisoner’s
10 § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or
11 equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or
12 internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the
13 invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Id. at 81–82.
14 Plaintiff’s damages allegations expressly implicate the validity of his confinement.
15 However, Plaintiff may not pursue § 1983 damages for his claims until Plaintiff can prove “that
16 the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
17 declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question
18 by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
19 F. Habeas Corpus
20 To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to challenge the validity of his conviction, the
21 duration of conviction, or his incarceration, the exclusive method for asserting that challenge is by
22 filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. As stated above, state prisoners cannot challenge the
23 fact or duration of their confinement in a § 1983 action, and their sole remedy lies in habeas
24 corpus relief. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 78 (“[A] prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action
25 to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement. He must seek federal habeas corpus relief (or
26 appropriate state relief) instead.”).
27 Plaintiff also claims a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Double Jeopardy
28 Clause precludes “a second prosecution for the same offense,” and prevents “the State from
1 ‘punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense.’”
2 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369, (1997), quoting Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389,
3 396 (1995). To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to plead a double jeopardy claim, his federal
4 legal remedy lies in a writ of habeas corpus. Sekona v. Trujillo, No. 1:19-cv-0399-AWI-BAM
5 (PC), 2019 WL 7290493, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2019), report and recommendation adopted,
6 No. 1:19-cv-00399-AWI-BAM (PC), 2020 WL 7186099 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2020).
7 IV. Conclusion and Order
8 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to
9 state a cognizable claim for relief under section 1983. As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court
10 will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to cure the identified deficiencies to the
11 extent he is able to do so in good faith. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
12 Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what
13 each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556
14 U.S. at 678-79. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise
15 a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
16 Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated
17 claims in his first amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no
18 “buckshot” complaints).
19 Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint.
20 Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended
21 complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.”
22 Local Rule 220.
23 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
24 1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;
25 2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an
26 amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order (or file a notice of
27 voluntary dismissal); and
28 3. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the
1 Court will recommend dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order
2 and for failure to state a claim.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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5 Dated: August 8, 2022 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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