stating that “the most 11 important [factor] is whether the individual posed an immediate threat to officer or public 12 safety.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “the most 11 important [factor] is whether the individual posed an immediate threat to officer or public 12 safety.”
- stating that the police department’s use of force 9 policy “classifies the use of both pepper spray and a police service dog as ‘intermediate’ 10 force.”
- stating that the Fourth Amendment governs the 19 treatment of an arrestee up until arraignment
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 ALEXSEY PREDYBAYLO, an No. 2:19-cv-01243-MCE-CKD
individual,
12
Plaintiff,
13 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
v.
14
SACRAMENTO COUNTY,
15 CALIFORNIA, a county government
and the operator of the Sacramento
16 County Sheriff’s Department and its
Correctional Health Services Division;
17 DEPUTY JARROD HOPECK;
DEPUTY BENJAMIN GONZALES;
18 DEPUTY ROBERT RANUM; DEPUTY
JEFFREY WILSON; and Does 1
19 through 20,
20 Defendants.
21
22 Through this action, Plaintiff Alexsey Predybaylo (“Plaintiff”) seeks redress from
23 Defendants Sacramento County (the “County”) and Deputies Jarrod Hopeck (“Hopeck”),
24 Benjamin Gonzales (“Gonzales”), Robert Ranum (“Ranum”), and Jeffrey Wilson
25 (“Wilson”) (collectively with the County, “Defendants”). Plaintiff’s Second Amended
26 Complaint (“SAC”), filed November 14, 2020, alleges two causes of action: (1) Individual
27 Liability for Violation of Plaintiff’s Constitutional Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Unlawful
28 Use of Force) against Hopeck, Gonzales, Ranum, and Wilson; and (2) Municipal Liability
1 for Violation of Plaintiff’s Constitutional Rights (Deliberate and Callous Disregard for
2 Repeated Acts of Excessive Force) against the County. Presently before the Court are
3 the parties’ cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, both of which have been fully briefed.
4 ECF Nos. 53 (“Defs.’ Mot.”), 55, 57 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), 58 (“Defs.’ Reply”), 59, 60. For the
5 reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Motion is
6 DENIED as moot.1
7
8 BACKGROUND2
9
10 A. Plaintiff’s Arrest and Booking at the Sacramento County Main Jail
11 On July 5, 2017, Plaintiff was arrested by Sacramento Police Sergeant Andy Hall
12 (“Hall”) for possession of firearms and controlled substances as well as resisting arrest
13 and was taken to the Sacramento County Main Jail (“Main Jail”).3 The booking process
14 began with a cursory pat down and Plaintiff removing his shoelaces and belt. During this
15 time, Hall informed Plaintiff that he needed to confiscate Plaintiff’s clothes for evidence.
16 While Hall completed the arresting paperwork, Plaintiff was examined by medical
17 personnel. Plaintiff was taken to the medical intake screening, where he reported to
18 have taken Xanax and Norco and that he had scrapes along his knee from running away
19 from Hall. See Ex. P, ECF No. 53-5, at 176–81 (medical intake form dated July 5, 2017).
20 The medical intake form indicated that Plaintiff was detoxing from Xanax and Norco and
21 that medical personnel should follow-up with Plaintiff once he was booked
22 ///
23
24 1 Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court ordered these
matters submitted on the briefs. E.D. Local Rule 230(g).
25
2 Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are taken from Defendants’ Statement of
Undisputed Facts and Plaintiff’s Response thereto. ECF Nos. 53-2, 57-1. Furthermore, all page citations
26
are to the CM/ECF assigned page numbers.
27 3 Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ inclusion of facts surrounding his arrest are irrelevant and
prejudicial in violation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Pl.’s Response Defs.’ Statement of
28 Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 57-1 ¶¶ 1–7. The Court only recounts what is necessary for context.
1 into a housing unit. Id. Plaintiff was medically cleared and was transferred into the
2 County’s custody.4
3 The parties dispute whether Plaintiff was cooperative during this time and rely on
4 a surveillance video in the booking photo area. See Ex. M, ECF No. 53-5 (“Booking
5 Photo Video”) (no audio). In the beginning of said video, Plaintiff is handcuffed and
6 escorted by Hopeck and Ranum for his booking photo while Gonzales and Wilson
7 operated the fingerprint machine and camera.5 Id. at 0:01–0:10. Hopeck and Ranum
8 remain on each side of Plaintiff as photographs were taken of Plaintiff’s front and side
9 profiles. See id. at 0:10–1:27. At one point, when Plaintiff, Hopeck and Ranum’s backs
10 are facing the surveillance camera, the Booking Photo Video shows Plaintiff moving his
11 right arm. Id. at 1:28–1:36. According to Defendants, Plaintiff attempted multiple times
12 to move his right arm and pull away from Hopeck at his side, and that Ranum grabbed
13 Plaintiff’s left elbow because Plaintiff was continuing to move around during the photo
14 including jerking his body and shoulder downwards.6 See Ex. C, Ranum Dep., ECF No.
15 53-5, at 100–01; Ex. D, Gonzales Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 126. On the other hand,
16 Plaintiff counters that he did not move his elbow or shift his weight in any manner that
17 was uncooperative or assaultive, only that he shifted his weight for a moment because
18 his leg hurt. See Ex. A, Predybaylo Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 21–22, 47–48. The
19
4 Hopeck testified at his deposition that, during this same timeframe, he remembered hearing
20 noises and yelling at the nurse’s station, but he could not recall any specific threats or what was said. See
Ex. B, Hopeck Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 57. Plaintiff, however, testified that he did not remember being
21 verbally abusive. Ex. A, Predybaylo Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 37.
22 5 According to Defendants, “[a]nytime an arrestee is handcuffed and escorted by two or more
deputies for their booking photo, it indicates that the arrestee has been uncooperative.” Defs.’ Statement
23 of Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 53-2 ¶ 18 (citing Ex. C, Ranum Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 99–100; Ex. D,
Gonzales Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 124–25). In response, Plaintiff cites Hall’s deposition testimony in which
he testified that he did not recall Plaintiff being uncooperative; however, Hall does not appear in the
24
Booking Photo Video. See Ex. 6, Hall Dep., ECF No. 55-4, at 344 (stating he did not see Plaintiff being
uncooperative during the booking process); see generally Booking Photo Video.
25
6 When Plaintiff attempted to move his right arm and pull away from Hopeck, Defendants claim
26
that “Gonzales, Ranum, and Hopeck were aware and believed that Plaintiff was passively resisting, while
in handcuffs, throughout the booking process, and these are early indicators for deputies that an arrestee
27
can become violent.” Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 53-2 ¶ 23 (citing Ex. B, Hopeck
Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 71–72, 76; Ex. C, Ranum Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 104; Ex. D, Gonzales Dep., ECF
28 No. 53-5, at 129, 130).
1 surveillance video ends with Hopeck and Ranum escorting Plaintiff out of the booking
2 photo area. Booking Photo Video at 1:37–1:41.
3 B. Plaintiff’s Strip Search Inside the Main Jail Safety Cell
4 Main Jail policy requires deputies to strip search arrestees when they are brought
5 in for drug possession, gun charges, or violence charges.7 After taking his booking
6 photos, Plaintiff, who remained in handcuffs, was taken to Safety Cell #2 for a strip
7 search by Hopeck, Ranum, Gonzales, and Wilson.8 See Ex. F, Hall Dep., ECF No. 53-5,
8 at 151 (stating Hall was also present during the strip search). There is a surveillance
9 video from inside Safety Cell #2. Ex. O, ECF No. 53-5 (“Safety Cell Video”) (no audio).
10 According to Defendants, the cameras inside the safety cells are covered with post-it
11 notes because the video is shared with non-law enforcement County employees.
12 Deputies remove the post-it note to ask the arrestee if they have drugs or weapons and
13 afterwards, the post-it note is placed back on the camera for privacy during the strip
14 search. With that said, the Safety Cell Video begins with Gonzales removing the post-it
15 note from the camera. Id. at 0:00–0:01. Plaintiff then enters Safety Cell #2 with Ranum
16 holding his left arm and Hopeck holding his right arm. Id. at 0:01–0:05. Gonzales
17 pointed to the camera and asked Plaintiff if he had any additional drugs hidden on his
18 body. Id. at 0:05–0:08 (no audio); see Ex. D, Gonzales Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 121–22.
19 Plaintiff apparently did not answer Gonzales’ question but the Safety Cell Video shows
20 Plaintiff talking and turning around to face the deputies. Safety Cell Video at 0:05–0:09;
21 see also Ex. B, Hopeck Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 81 (“Well, he’s – he’s talking and he’s
22 turning to the left as he’s like attempting to turn around towards Deputy Ranum.”); Ex. C,
23 Ranum Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 97–98. Gonzales then replaced the post-it note over the
24 camera. Safety Cell Video at 0:09–0:11.
25
7 Plaintiff does not dispute the reason for the strip search or challenge the need for the strip
26
search. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 16.
27 8 Once again, Defendants assert that “[s]trip searches that involve more than two deputies usually
indicate the arrestee is not cooperative.” Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 53-2 ¶ 29 (citing
28 Ex. E, Wilson Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 143; Ex. F, Hall Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 152–53).
1 As to what transpired after the camera was covered, Defendants refer to Plaintiff’s
2 deposition testimony. It is undisputed that the deputies removed Plaintiff’s handcuffs,
3 and Plaintiff then took off his shirt, socks, and shoes without incident. See Ex. A,
4 Predybaylo Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 26–27.
5 Plaintiff next needed to remove his pants and underwear and at this time, he was
6 approximately one foot away from the wall. Id. at 30. Hopeck testified that he first used
7 verbal commands to get Plaintiff to comply with the strip search, face the wall, and
8 remove his pants. See Ex. B, Hopeck Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 81 (“Well, we had told him
9 multiple times just to walk in and, you know, stop turning around, just walk forward, and it
10 appears there in the [Safety Cell Video] that he’s continuously turning to the left . . .”).
11 Plaintiff provides the following account as to what happened next:
12 And that’s when Deputy Hopeck told me to put my hands
behind my back, and I was confused about it. And then he told
13 me – and then he – he wrapped his hands around my thumbs
– wrapped his hand – I had my hands behind my back, and he
14 told me to relax your thumbs.9
15 And then once I told him, “my thumbs are relaxed,” and then
he yelled, “I said, relax your f’ing [sic] thumbs.” And then that’s
16 when the other two officers – I believe it was Ranum and
Gonzales – they pulled my pant legs out from under me.
17
And I went head first, and I hit my head on the ground. And
18 then Hopeck dropped his knee – dropped his knee on my
temple and then had me pinned down to the ground.10
19
20 Ex. A, Predybaylo Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 26–27; but see Ex. B, Hopeck Dep., ECF
21 No. 53-5, at 56 (“[H]e was actively resisting by, you know, pulling his body, you know,
22 not following directions, moving around, pulling away from our grasp, stuff like that, but
23 not violent.”); Ex. C, Ranum Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 93 (“There wasn’t any violent
24 encounter with him. It was just him being verbally uncooperative at the beginning. . . .
25
9 Hopeck explained that a “control hold” such as the one described by Plaintiff is used to prevent
an arrestee from spinning around if the arrestee does not comply. See Ex. B, Hopeck Dep., ECF No. 53-
26
5, at 62.
27 10 According to Defendants, Safety Cell #2 has a padded floor. Pl.’s Response Defs.’ Statement
of Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 57-1 ¶ 26. However, Plaintiff asserts that “the floor has nominal padding
28 that does not prevent him from receiving a concussion and other injuries.” Id.
1 He kept turning around on us. So we grabbed ahold of him and assisted him to the
2 ground and grabbed the evidence.”), 94 (“We don’t place people on the ground that are
3 cooperative. . . . He turns around on us multiple times, and that is . . . directly against
4 what we tell him to do for our safety and his safety.”); Ex. D, Gonzales Dep., ECF
5 No. 53-5, at 123–24 (“[Plaintiff’s] just basically being passive resistive at that point. We
6 have them face the wall for everyone’s safety. . . . And then pushing back into us and
7 not facing the wall, not following directions is just – it’s a sign of being uncooperative,
8 which it looks like is going on in the [Safety Cell Video].”). Hopeck initially retained
9 control of Plaintiff’s thumbs but as Plaintiff fell, Hopeck let go. Ex. A, Predybaylo Dep.,
10 ECF No. 53-5, at 32. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to put his hands out in front of him
11 to block his fall. Plaintiff believes he “blacked out for a little bit” because he cannot
12 remember Hopeck shifting his knee from Plaintiff’s temple to back. Id. at 33.
13 Hopeck, Ranum, and Gonzales then removed Plaintiff’s pants and underwear. It
14 is undisputed that during this entire process, which lasted approximately four minutes,
15 Plaintiff was not punched or kicked by any of the deputies. Gonzales eventually
16 removed the post-it note from the surveillance camera, which captured Plaintiff lying
17 naked and face down on the ground with Hopeck holding Plaintiff’s arms and placing his
18 right leg on Plaintiff’s upper back. See Safety Cell Video at 4:43–49. Ranum meanwhile
19 is holding Plaintiff’s legs, with Plaintiff’s ankles crossed and his lower legs bent towards
20 his head. Id. It is undisputed that Wilson never touched or was involved in any control
21 holds on Plaintiff.11 After the deputies left Safety Cell #2, Plaintiff put on a paper suit,
22 was placed into a holding cell, and eventually was moved into a housing unit at the Main
23 Jail.
24 ///
25 ///
26
11 What the parties dispute is whether Wilson only stood in the doorway of Safety Cell #2 or if he
27
entered the room. See Pl.’s Response Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 57-1 ¶ 64; see
also Ex. N, ECF No. 53-5 (surveillance video of hallway outside Safety Cell #2) (only depicting Plaintiff and
28 the deputies entering Safety Cell #2).
1 STANDARD
2
3 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment when “the
4 movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
5 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.
6 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to
7 dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
8 Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary judgment on part of a claim or
9 defense, known as partial summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party may
10 move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each
11 claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v.
12 Madan, 889 F. Supp. 374, 378–79 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The standard that applies to a
13 motion for partial summary judgment is the same as that which applies to a motion for
14 summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); State of Cal. ex rel. Cal. Dep’t of Toxic
15 Substances Control v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying summary
16 judgment standard to motion for summary adjudication).
17 In a summary judgment motion, the moving party always bears the initial
18 responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying the
19 portions in the record “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
20 material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial
21 responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine
22 issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
23 Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co.,
24 391 U.S. 253, 288–89 (1968).
25 In attempting to establish the existence or non-existence of a genuine factual
26 dispute, the party must support its assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in
27 the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
28 affidavits[,] or declarations . . . or other materials; or showing that the materials cited do
1 not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party
2 cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The
3 opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that
4 might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
5 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251–52 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and
6 Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992). The opposing party must also
7 demonstrate that the dispute about a material fact “is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is
8 such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson,
9 477 U.S. at 248. In other words, the judge needs to answer the preliminary question
10 before the evidence is left to the jury of “not whether there is literally no evidence, but
11 whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the
12 party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251
13 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)) (emphasis in original).
14 As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under
15 Rule [56(a)], its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some
16 metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Therefore,
17 “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
18 non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 587.
19 In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to
20 be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed
21 before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
22 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s
23 obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn.
24 Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d,
25 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///
1 ANALYSIS
2
3 A. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
4 1. First Cause of Action against Hopeck, Gonzales, Ranum, and
Wilson
5
6 “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
7 secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the
8 alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”12
9 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “In addressing an excessive force claim brought
10 under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly
11 infringed by the challenged application of force.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394
12 (1989) (citation omitted). “The validity of the claim must then be judged by reference to
13 the specific constitutional standard which governs that right, rather than to some
14 generalized ‘excessive force’ standard.” Id. (citations omitted). In this case, the parties
15 agree that “the Fourth Amendment sets the applicable constitutional limitations for
16 considering claims of excessive force during pretrial detention.” Lolli v. Cnty. of Orange,
17 351 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Pierce v. Multnomah Cnty., Or.,
18 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the Fourth Amendment governs the
19 treatment of an arrestee up until arraignment).
20 Excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment are analyzed under the
21 “objective reasonableness” standard. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395; Drummond v. City
22 of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). The crucial inquiry in such cases is
23 “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and
24 circumstances confronting [the officers], without regard to their underlying intent or
25 motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397; Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463,
26 477 (9th Cir. 2007).
27
12 There is no dispute that Hopeck, Gonzales, Ranum, and Wilson were acting under color of state
28 law.
1 Calculating the reasonableness of the force used “requires a careful balancing of
2 the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests
3 against the countervailing government interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396;
4 Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 477. The court “first assess[es] the quantum of force used,”
5 then “measure[s] the governmental interests at stake by evaluating a range of factors.”
6 Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007). These factors include,
7 but are not limited to, “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
8 immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
9 resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see
10 also Young v. Cnty. of L.A., 655 F.3d 1156, 1163 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that “the most
11 important [factor] is whether the individual posed an immediate threat to officer or public
12 safety.”). “These factors, however, are not exclusive” as the court must “examine the
13 totality of the circumstances and consider ‘whatever specific factors may be appropriate
14 in a particular case, whether or not listed in Graham.’” Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d
15 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994)).
16 “Because the excessive force inquiry nearly always requires a jury to sift through
17 disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom . . . summary judgment or
18 judgment as a matter of law in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.”
19 Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation
20 marks and citation omitted). The Court will first address whether Hopeck, Ranum, and
21 Gonzales’ use of force was objectively reasonable, then whether Wilson had a duty to
22 intervene.
23 a. Hopeck, Ranum, and Gonzales13
24 Regarding the type and amount of force inflicted, it is undisputed that Hopeck
25 used a control hold by grabbing Plaintiff’s thumbs and Ranum and Gonzales grabbed
26 Plaintiff’s pant legs and pulled him to the ground. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 9; Pl.’s Response
27
13 As previously stated, Plaintiff does not object to the strip search itself, “only to the violent force
28 used against him” during said search. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 16.
1 Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 57-1 ¶¶ 41, 46, 53 (undisputed that
2 Defendants did not kick or punch Plaintiff during their encounter). In the Ninth Circuit,
3 the uses of pepper spray, batons, and police service dogs are regarded as forms of
4 “intermediate force that, while less severe than deadly force, nonetheless present a
5 significant intrusion upon an individual’s liberty interests.” Young, 655 F.3d at 1161
6 (describing pepper spray and baton blows as “forms of force capable of inflicting
7 significant pain and causing serious injury.”); see also Smith v. City of Hemet,
8 394 F.3d 689, 701–02 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the police department’s use of force
9 policy “classifies the use of both pepper spray and a police service dog as ‘intermediate’
10 force.”). Here, the control hold, grabbing Plaintiff’s pant legs, and pulling him to the
11 ground are not, on their own, equivalent to the intermediate uses of force described
12 above. As such, the Court finds that the force used in this case was de minimis.
13 Next, the Court must examine the governmental interest at stake, including the
14 Graham factors. In this case, Defendants concede that, throughout their encounter,
15 Plaintiff was never physically violent or combative. Defs.’ Reply at 3. Instead,
16 Defendants assert that, during the strip search, Plaintiff failed to comply with verbal
17 commands to face the wall and attempted to turn his body away from the wall. Defs.’
18 Mot. at 17, 19. Plaintiff disputes that he engaged in any threatening or uncooperative
19 behavior; for example, Plaintiff points out that he removed his shirt, socks, and shoes
20 without incident and that he relaxed his thumbs when ordered to do so by Hopeck. See
21 Pl.’s Opp’n at 10–13, 15; Ex. A, Predybaylo Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 26–27.
22 Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, and taking all inferences
23 in his favor, the Court finds that the Graham factors weigh against a finding of excessive
24 force. Plaintiff does not explicitly dispute Defendants’ contentions that Plaintiff, who was
25 out of handcuffs, attempted to turn his body towards the deputies despite their repeated
26 instructions to face the wall. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 10–12, 15–16. Aside from stating that
27 he was not uncooperative or belligerent, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence
28 ///
1 contradicting Defendants’ safety concerns.14 On the other hand, Hopeck, Ranum, and
2 Gonzales have all testified that Plaintiff’s aforementioned actions led them to believe that
3 “Plaintiff posed a potential larger threat if they released their control hold on Plaintiff” and
4 that “Plaintiff may attempt to strike them because Plaintiff continued to turn around after
5 being told to face the wall.” Defs.’ Mot. at 17, 19; see Ex. B, Hopeck Dep., ECF No. 53-
6 5, at 60 (“I don’t know if he was dangerous, but he could possibly, you know, pose a
7 threat because he kept turning around. But he wasn’t saying ‘I’m going to punch you,’
8 anything like that. He just didn’t want to follow directions for our safety.”); Ex. C, Ranum
9 Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 103 (“[W]e want [Plaintiff] to face the wall for his safety and
10 ours.”); Ex. D, Gonzales Dep., ECF No. 53-5, at 123–24 (“We have them face the wall
11 for everyone’s safety. . . . And then pushing back into us and not facing the wall, not
12 following directions is . . . a sign of being uncooperative.”).
13 Plaintiff contends that the deputies “could have accomplished the collection of
14 Plaintiff’s clothing by simply placing Plaintiff in the room by himself and asking him to
15 take off his clothes, put them into a bag, and change into the jail uniform[.]” Pl.’s Opp’n
16 at 14–15. In response, Defendants explain that “deputies are hesitant to leave arrestees
17 alone in the safety cell if they are arrested for drug possession, have drugs in their anus,
18 and the bag breaks—causing the arrestee to [overdose].” Defs.’ Mot. at 17.
19 Furthermore, because Hall needed Plaintiff’s clothes for evidence, the “deputies were
20 concerned Plaintiff could damage the evidence in the safety cell if he were left alone.”
21 Id. Even if an arrestee was entitled to dictate the manner in which officers effectuate a
22 jail house search, which he is not, the Court finds Defendants’ explanations persuasive.
23 Finally, it is undisputed that Hopeck, Ranum, and Gonzales attempted other means
24 before deploying the force in question, specifically by first using verbal commands to
25
14 Plaintiff asserts that Hall testified at his deposition that Plaintiff was cooperative and non-violent.
See Pl.’s Opp’n at 11, 15 (citing Ex. 6, Hall Dep., ECF No. 55-4, at 344, 355). However, Hall stated that
26
he did not remember “very many details from” Plaintiff’s strip search, including why more than one officer
was required, whether a control hold was used, or even why Plaintiff ended up on the ground. Ex. 6, Hall
27
Dep., ECF No. 55-4, at 345, 349, 351, 355. Furthermore, Hall testified that, “if the person is not doing
what they’re told, that could be a reason to hold somebody and forcibly have to search them,” but again he
28 could not recall or remember whether Plaintiff resisted in such a way. Id. at 352–53, 355.
1 face the wall, then the control hold, to gain Plaintiff’s compliance before Plaintiff was
2 pulled to the ground. As explained above, Plaintiff has not expressly disputed that he
3 turned away from the wall despite instructions to do so.
4 In balancing the nature of the force with the governmental interests at stake, the
5 Court concludes that, based on the undisputed evidence and viewing it in a light most
6 favorable to Plaintiff, the force used by Hopeck, Ranum, and Gonzales was objectively
7 reasonable under the circumstances. As such, summary judgment is GRANTED as to
8 these three Defendants.
9 b. Wilson
10 It is undisputed that Wilson never touched or was involved in any control holds on
11 Plaintiff. Pl.’s Response Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 57-1 ¶ 64. As
12 a result, Plaintiff’s theory is that Wilson had a duty to intervene to stop the excessive
13 force against Plaintiff since he witnessed the strip search. Pl.’s Opp’n at 19 (citing
14 Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th Cir. 2000)). However, because there
15 was no predicate constitutional injury, the failure to intervene claim fails. Accordingly,
16 summary judgment is GRANTED as to Wilson.
17 2. Second Cause of Action against the County
18 Municipalities cannot be vicariously liable for the conduct of their employees
19 under § 1983, but rather are only “responsible for their own illegal acts.” Connick v.
20 Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011); see Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
21 658, 694 (1978) (stating a municipality may only be liable where it individually caused a
22 constitutional violation via “execution of government’s policy or custom, whether by its
23 lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
24 policy.”). Because there is no underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiff’s Monell claim
25 is foreclosed. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to this claim
26 is GRANTED.15
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15 Because the Court finds no constitutional violation, it is also unnecessary to reach the derivative
28 issue of qualified immunity.
1 B. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
2 Because the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
3 | both causes of action, Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED as moot.
4
5 CONCLUSION
6
7 For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF
g | No. 53, is GRANTED whereas Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 55, is
g | DENIED as moot. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of
10 | Defendants and to close the case.
11 IT |S SO ORDERED.
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43 | Dated: June 16, 2022
/y J
14 Aor, (.
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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