holding TROs “should be 9 restricted to serving their underlying purpose of preserving the status quo 10 11 and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a 12 hearing, and no longer”
How later courts described this case
- holding TROs “should be 9 restricted to serving their underlying purpose of preserving the status quo 10 11 and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a 12 hearing, and no longer”
- “Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against 17 state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state 18 court action to proceed.”
- “We must conclude that a class of ‘handicapped 22 persons’ …was not included as a class in what is now § 1985(3).”
- “We note in 24 passing that most authorities have not considered disability to be a 25 26 suspect or quasi-suspect classification.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 BILL JOSEPH SERRIS, No. 2:22-cv-0434-JAM-CKD PS
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
14 SHAUNA CHASTAINE, et al.,
(ECF Nos. 2, 3, 4)
15 Defendants.
16
17 Plaintiff Bill Joseph Serris1 proceeds pro se with a complaint
18
asserting nine causes of action including multiple claims under the
19
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), civil rights conspiracy under
20
21 42 U.S.C. § 1985, claims for declaratory relief, and state-law claims.
22 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule
23
302(c)(21) and the district court’s order of referral (ECF No. 5). See 28
24
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
25
26 ////
27
1 At plaintiff’s request, the court uses a 16-point font to assist plaintiff to better read
28 this document.
1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in
2 forma pauperis proceeding and must order dismissal of the case if it is
3
“frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
4
granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
5
6 from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff’s complaint will
7 be screened in due course. Presently, plaintiff’s motion to proceed in
8
forma pauperis (ECF No. 2), motion for temporary restraining order
9
(ECF No. 3), and request to file case documents electronically (ECF No.
10
11 4) are before the court.
12 I. In Forma Pauperis
13
Plaintiff filed an application in support of his request to proceed in
14
forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff’s application makes the showing
15
16 required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The motion to proceed in forma pauperis
17 will be granted.
18
II. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
19
Plaintiff has filed a motion for a temporary restraining order
20
21 (“TRO”) to enjoin court proceedings in the Solano County Superior
22 Court case number FFL145060. (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff moves the court to
23
enjoin an imminent hearing in that case so the ADA accommodations he
24
seeks through this litigation can be sorted out prior to the hearing to
25
26 allow him to participate fully and fairly in that case. (Id. at 1.)
27 ////
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1 A. Background (Allegations in the Complaint)
2 Plaintiff is 79 years old and disabled. (ECF No. 1 at 6-7.) He is a
3
party in a divorce case pending in the Solano County Superior Court
4
since 2015. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff presumed that case would be over quickly
5
6 because it should have been “a simple asset matter” with no issue
7 pertaining to children from the marriage. (Id.) However, the case is still
8
on going and plaintiff has filed this complaint asserting various claims
9
against the judge, the judge’s clerk, the Solano County ADA coordinator,
10
11 a court appointed realtor, plaintiff’s former divorce attorney, plaintiff’s
12 ex-wife, and the attorney representing his ex-wife. (Id. at 6.)
13
During one or more prior hearings in the divorce case, plaintiff
14
could not understand or hear what was going on because he does not hear
15
16 well. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Throughout the case, plaintiff has not been given
17 adequate options for ADA accommodations and his former attorney
18
failed to ensure he would be able to actively participate in hearings and
19
make informed decisions relating to the case. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges
20
21 that, despite his physical limitations, the court ordered him to personally
22 perform physical labor to prepare his property for sale, without any
23
objection by his former attorney. (Id. at 3.) Eventually, plaintiff either
24
fired his attorney or the attorney was relieved, and plaintiff obtained
25
26 ADA advocates to assist him. (Id. at 4.) However, plaintiff still has not
27
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1 received all the accommodations he needs to properly participate in the
2 case. (Id. at 5.)
3
B. Legal Standard
4
The purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo pending the
5
6 complete briefing and thorough consideration contemplated by full
7 preliminary injunction proceedings. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v.
8
Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1974) (holding TROs “should be
9
restricted to serving their underlying purpose of preserving the status quo
10
11 and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a
12 hearing, and no longer”). In general, the showing required for a TRO and
13
a preliminary injunction are the same. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v.
14
John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). The
15
16 party requesting preliminary injunctive relief must show that “he is likely
17 to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
18
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his
19
favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural
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21 Res. Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky,
22 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). A TRO is an extraordinary remedy,
23
and plaintiff has the burden of proving the propriety of such a remedy.
24
See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).
25
26 ////
27 ////
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1 C. Discussion
2 Under the Anti-Injunction Act, “[a] court of the United States may
3
not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except [1] as
4
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or [2] where necessary in aid of
5
6 its jurisdiction, or [3] to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. §
7 2283. The Anti-Injunction Act “is an absolute prohibition against
8
enjoining state court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one
9
of three specifically defined exceptions.” Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co.
10
11 of N. Am., 523 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Atl. Coast Line
12 R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970)).
13
Courts construe the three exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act
14
narrowly. See Montana v. BNSF Ry. Co., 623 F.3d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir.
15
16 2010) (“Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against
17 state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state
18
court action to proceed.”) (quoting Blalock Eddy Ranch v. MCI
19
Telecommunications Corp., 982 F.2d 371, 375 (9th Cir. 1992)).
20
21 Moreover, even when the Anti-Injunction Act does not prohibit an
22 injunction, “[t]he decision to issue an injunction that does not violate the
23
Anti-Injunction Act... is committed to the discretion of the district court.”
24
Blalock, 982 F.2d at 375.
25
26 Plaintiff has not demonstrated the first exception for an injunction
27 authorized by an Act of Congress applies to any claims for which he is
28
1 likely to succeed on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283. As relevant to the
2 first exception, plaintiff alleges defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985
3
(fourth cause of action) and the ADA (first, second and sixth causes of
4
action).
5
6 Some civil rights actions fall within the first exception. For
7 example, claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are exempt from
8
the Anti-Injunction Act’s prohibitions because “[t]he very purpose of §
9
1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the
10
11 people, ... to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color
12 of state law[.]” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972); see also
13
Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court of State of Cal., 739 F.2d 466,
14
468 (9th Cir. 1984). However, the first exception comes into play only
15
16 when a statute “clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a
17 federal court of equity” could “be given its intended scope only by the
18
stay of a state court proceeding.” Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 239.
19
Here, plaintiff alleges the judge, court-appointed realtor, his former
20
21 attorney, and his ex-wife violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) through an
22 ongoing scheme to force him to perform physical labor on a house
23
through a court order, despite having knowledge that his disabilities
24
would prevent him from being able to carry out this duty. (ECF No. 1 at
25
26 22.) However, plaintiff has not explained how he will prevail on this
27
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1 claim, and the allegations in the complaint in support of the claimed
2 conspiracy are both insufficient and conclusory.
3
“A plaintiff alleging a conspiracy under [42 U.S.C.] § 1985(3)
4
must establish: [1] the existence of a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff
5
6 of the equal protection of the laws; [2] an act in furtherance of the
7 conspiracy; [3] and a resulting injury.” Scott v. Ross, 140 F.3d 1275,
8
1284 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Regarding the first element, the
9
plaintiff must establish some racial or otherwise class-based invidious
10
11 discriminatory animus for the conspiracy. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s
12 Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1993).
13
Here, plaintiff does not allege there was a class-based invidious
14
discriminatory animus for the conspiracy. Disabled individuals do not
15
16 constitute a “class” within the meaning of section 1985(3). See, e.g.,
17 D’Amato v. Wis. Gas Co., 760 F.2d 1474, 1486 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The
18
legislative history of Section 1985(3) does not suggest a concern for the
19
handicapped.”); Wilhelm v. Cont’l Title Co., 720 F.2d 1173, 1176-77
20
21 (10th Cir. 1983) (“We must conclude that a class of ‘handicapped
22 persons’ …was not included as a class in what is now § 1985(3).”); see
23
also Story v. Green, 978 F.2d 60, 64 (2nd Cir. 1992) (“We note in
24
passing that most authorities have not considered disability to be a
25
26 suspect or quasi-suspect classification.”).
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1 Similarly, even if equitable relief under the ADA falls within the
2 first exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, plaintiff has not demonstrated
3
his likelihood of success on any of those claims. Plaintiff names as
4
defendants only individuals, but individuals cannot be sued directly
5
6 under the ADA. See Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir.
7 2002).
8
In short, even if the first exception to the Anti-Injunction Act
9
applies, plaintiff has not demonstrated he is likely to prevail on his
10
11 claims and thus has not shown he is entitled to the extraordinary remedy
12 of a temporary restraining order. See Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972.
13
The remaining two exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act are
14
inapplicable here. While a federal court may enjoin a state proceeding
15
16 “to protect or effectuate the court’s judgment,” 28 U.S.C. § 2283, there is
17 no such judgment to protect in this matter. The third exception applies
18
when an injunction is “necessary in aid of a court’s jurisdiction.” 28
19
U.S.C. § 2283. This exception “is generally applied to in rem
20
21 proceedings where subsequent state court proceedings might interfere
22 with previously filed federal court jurisdiction over a res, in cases of
23
advanced federal in personam litigation, or where a case is removed
24
from state court.” Le v. 1st Nat. Lending Servs., No. 13–CV–01344–
25
26 LHK, 2013 WL 2555556, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2013) (citing Negrete,
27 523 F.3d at 1101).
28
1 Interfering with a state court proceeding is an extraordinary remedy
2 that this court applies only when necessary. Plaintiff has not
3
demonstrated such action is warranted here. Thus, the undersigned will
4
recommend the motion for temporary restraining order be denied without
5
6 prejudice.
7 III. Request to File Documents Electronically
8
Plaintiff has requested to file case documents electronically. (ECF
9
No. 4.) Generally, “[a]ny person appearing pro se may not utilize
10
11 electronic filing except with the permission of the assigned Judge or
12 Magistrate Judge.” See E.D. Cal. L.R. 133(b)(2) (emphasis in original).
13
Although plaintiff is disabled and his request to file case documents
14
electronically states he has a support person who helps him read email
15
16 correspondence, plaintiff does not otherwise set forth “an explanation of
17 reasons for the [requested] exception.” The court does not find good
18
cause for deviance from the general rule at this time. At the current stage
19
of this case, the motion will be denied.
20
21 IV. Conclusion
22 In accordance with the above, it is HEREBY ORDERED:
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1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is
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GRANTED.
25
26 2. Plaintiff’s request to file documents electronically (ECF No. 4)
27 is DENIED.
28
1 In addition, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's
* | motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 3) be denied without
3
prejudice.
4
5 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United
6 | States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of
7! 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days after being served with these
8
findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections
9
19 | with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be
11 | captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and
!2 | Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time
13
may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst,
14
15 | 251 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
16 | Dated: March 10, 2022 A gs fie
_MA'd fu LCA pa,
CAROLYN K. DELANEY P
18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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