Trustees of the Southern California IBEW-NECA Pension Plan v. Hackney

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’

2:20-cv-09312-CAS-GJSx Date April 19, 2021

Title TRUSTEES OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IBEW-NECA

PENSION PLAN ET AL V. HACKNEY

See CHRISTINAA SNYDER

Catherine Jeang Laura Elias N/A

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Michael Jung Not Present

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (Dkt. 12,

Proceedings: filed March 8, 2021)

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 9, 2020, plaintiffs Trustees of the Southern California IBEW-NECA

Pension Plan, Trustees of the Southern California IBEW-NECA Defined Contribution

Trust Fund, Trustees of the Southern California IBEW-NECA Health Trust Fund, Trustees

of the Southern California IBEW-NECA Supplemental Unemployment Benefit Trust

Fund, Trustees of the Los Angeles County Electrical Educational and Training Trust Fund,

Trustees of the National Electrical Benefit Fund (“NEBF”), Trustees of the Southern

California I]BEW-NECA Labor-Management Cooperation Committee (“So. Cal. LMCC”),

Trustees of the National NECA-IBEW Labor-Management Cooperation Committee Trust

Fund (“National LMCC’’) (collectively, “Trustees”), Administrative Maintenance Fund,

Contract Compliance Fund, and Los Angeles Electrical Workers Credit Union

(collectively, “plaintiffs”) brought this action against defendant Anthony Louis Hackney,

an individual doing business as “C & T Electrical and Communications” (“Hackney”).

Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”). The complaint asserts claims for (1) breach of written collective

bargaining agreements and related trust agreements; and (2) violation of section 515 of the

Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1145.

Plaintiffs served Hackney with the summons and complaint by personal service on

October 28, 2020, and by mail on November 3, 2020. Dkt. 9. Hackney failed to answer

the complaint, and on December 16, 2020, plaintiffs requested the Clerk of Court to enter

default against Hackney. Dkt. 10. Pursuant to plaintiffs’ request, the Clerk entered default

on December 18, 2020. Dkt. 11. On March 8, 2021, plaintiffs filed the instant motion for

default judgment. Dkt. 12 (“Mot.”). Plaintiffs served Hackney with the motion for default

judgment by mail on March 9, 2021. Dkt. 18. Plaintiffs’ motion was unopposed.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’

2:20-cv-09312-CAS-GJSx Date April 19, 2021

Title TRUSTEES OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IBEW-NECA

PENSION PLAN ET AL V. HACKNEY

Having carefully reviewed the motion and plaintiffs’ supporting declarations, the

Court finds and concludes as follows.

II. BACKGROUND

Trustees are trustees of express trusts (“Trusts”) that provide pension, health, and

other benefits to employees in the electrical industry. See Compl. § 5. Except for the

NEBEF and the National LMCC, the Trusts were created pursuant to written declarations of

trust between various chapters of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

(“IBEW”), including Local No. 11 (“Local 11”), and various chapters, including the Los

Angeles County chapter, of the National Electrical Contractors Association (“NECA”), an

employer association in the electrical industry in Southern California. Id. The NEBF and

the National LMCC were created pursuant to written declarations of trust between the

National Union of IBEW and the National NECA. Id. The written declarations are

collectively referred to as the “Trust Agreements.” The Trusts (except for the So. Cal.

LMCC and the National LMCC) are labor-management multiemployer trusts created and

maintained pursuant to section 302(c)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act

(“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5). Id. Trustees (except for the Trustees of the So. Cal.

LMCC and the National LMCC) are “fiduciaries” to the Trusts as defined in Section

3(21)(A) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). Id.

A. Hackney’s Contractual Obligations

On approximately August 14, 2019, Hackney executed a written letter of assent,

whereby he agreed to be bound by a collective bargaining agreement between the Los

Angeles County Chapter of NECA and Local 11 known as the Inside Wiremen’s

Agreement (“Master Agreement”). Id. § 7; Dkt. 13, Declaration of Raul Rodriguez

(“Rodriguez Decl.”) § 9. The terms and provisions of the Trust Agreements are

incorporated by reference into the Master Agreement, and pursuant to the terms of the

Master Agreement, Hackney expressly agreed to be bound by the written terms of the Trust

Agreements. Compl. § 11: Rodriguez Decl. § 9: see also Rodriguez Decl., Ex. F § 7.52

1 The Court notes that several plaintiffs—namely, the Trustees of the So. Cal. LMCC, the

Trustees of the National LMCC, the Los Angeles Electrical Workers Credit Union, the

Administrative Maintenance Fund, and the Contract Compliance Fund—are not labor-

management multiemployer trusts created and maintained pursuant to section 302(c)(5) of

the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’

2:20-cv-09312-CAS-GJSx Date April 19, 2021

Title TRUSTEES OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IBEW-NECA

PENSION PLAN ET AL V. HACKNEY

(Master Agreement). The Master Agreement and Trust Agreements are collectively

referred to as the “Agreements.”

The Agreements obligate Hackney to prepare and deliver monthly fringe benefit

contribution reports to plaintiffs on a timely basis and to pay said contributions on a

monthly basis at the appropriate hourly rates for all applicable employees. Compl. § 15;

Rodriguez Decl. § 10. Contributions are delinquent if they are not received by the Trusts

by the 15th day of each month following the month in which the contributions accrued.

Compl. § 15; Rodriguez Decl. § 11.

Pursuant to the Agreements, delinquent employers who fail to timely pay

contributions are required to pay the Trusts liquidated damages, interest, legal and auditing

fees, attorneys’ fees, and court costs. Compl. □□ 20, 22-24; Dkt. 16, Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment (“Memo.”’)

at 5. Pursuant to the Agreements, in the event of a delinquency, liquidated damages are to

be assessed at 1.5% of the delinquent fringe benefit contributions for the first 30 days of

the delinquency; 3% of the delinquent contributions for the next 30 days; and an additional

1.5% per month of the delinquent contributions thereafter up to a maximum of 18% or

$10.00 for each month late, whichever is greater. Memo. at 9; Rodriguez Decl. { 16. The

Trust Agreements further provide that in the event a lawsuit is filed to collect the delinquent

contributions, liquidated damages are to be assessed at 20%. Rodriguez Decl. { 16. The

Agreements also obligate Hackney to pay interest on unpaid contributions at 8% per

annum,” Memo. at 8; Rodriguez Decl. § 14, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs, Memo. at

5.

B. Hackney’s Delinquent Contributions

Based on Hackney’s monthly reports for the months of August 2019, September

2019, February 2020, March 2020, and May 2020, Hackney owes the Trusts $9,865.90 in

fringe benefit contributions. Rodriguez Decl. 4 13; see also id. Ex. G (Hackney’s monthly

reports).

Though the Master Agreement is silent as to the exact interest rate to be assessed in the

event of delinquency, as noted supra, the Master Agreement incorporates by reference the

Trust Agreements. Accordingly, the Court will consider interest at 8% per annum,

pursuant to the Trust Agreements.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’

2:20-cv-09312-CAS-GJSx Date April 19, 2021

Title TRUSTEES OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IBEW-NECA

PENSION PLAN ET AL V. HACKNEY

Plaintiffs brought suit to recover this delinquent amount, plus associated damages,

fees, and costs. Plaintiffs now move for entry of default judgment on these claims.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, when a party against whom a

judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and the

plaintiff does not seek a sum certain, the plaintiff must apply to the court for a default

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55.

As a general rule, cases should be decided on the merits as opposed to by default,

and, therefore, “any doubts as to the propriety of a default are usually resolved against the

party seeking a default judgment.” Judge William W. Schwarzer et al., California Practice

Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 6:11 (The Rutter Group 2015) (citing Pena

v. Seguros La Comercial, $.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1985)). Granting or denying a

motion for default judgment is a matter within the court’s discretion. Elektra Entm’t Grp..,

Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 392 (C.D. Cal. 2005); see also Sony Music Ent. Inc. v.

Elias, No. CV03-6387DT(RCX), 2004 WL 141959, at *3 (C_D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2004).

The Ninth Circuit has directed that courts consider the following factors in deciding

whether to enter default judgment: (1) the possibility of prejudice to plaintiff; (2) the merits

of plaintiff's substantive claims; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money

at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning the material facts; (6)

whether defendant’s default was the product of excusable neglect: and (7) the strong policy

favoring decisions on the merits. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir.

1986); see also Elektra, 226 F.R.D. at 392.

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs seek default judgment against Hackney for unpaid fringe benefit

contributions, prejudgment interest, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees (including

litigation expenses) and costs, plus post-judgment interest. Memo. at 21.

A. Application of the Eitel Factors

1. Risk of Prejudice to Plaintiff

The first Eitel factor considers whether a plaintiff will suffer prejudice if a default

judgment is not entered. PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’

2:20-cv-09312-CAS-GJSx Date April 19, 2021

Title TRUSTEES OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IBEW-NECA

PENSION PLAN ET AL V. HACKNEY

(C.D. Cal. 2002); see also Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. Given Hackney’s failure to pay the

contributions due, the Trustees will suffer prejudice because they “will likely be without

other recourse for recovery” if default judgment is not entered. PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d

at 1177; see also Bd. of Trustees of the Clerks v. Piedmont Lumber & Mill Co., No. C 10-

1757 MEJ, 2010 WL 4922677, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2010) (plaintiffs would suffer

prejudice in the absence of a default judgment because if the “contributions are not covered,

future benefits for Plan participants and their beneficiaries may be put at risk if the Plan is

under funded”). Accordingly, the first Eitel factor weighs in favor of entering default

judgment against Hackney.

2. Sufficiency of the Complaint and the Likelihood of Success on the

Merits

Courts often consider the second and third Eitel factors together. See PepsiCo, 238

F. Supp. 2d at 1175; HTS, Inc. v. Boley, 954 F. Supp. 2d 927, 941 (D. Ariz. 2013). The

second and third Eitel factors assess the substantive merits of the movant’s claims and the

sufficiency of its pleadings, which “require that a [movant] state a claim on which [it] may

recover.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (quotation marks omitted); see also Danning

v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that the issue is whether the

allegations in the pleading state a claim upon which plaintiff can recover). For the purposes

of default judgment, all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, except those relating to

damages, are assumed to be true. Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir.

1977). However, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are

legally insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980

F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992). The Court separately addresses the substantive merits

and sufficiency of plaintiffs’ two claims.

i. Breach of Contract Claim

Plaintiffs seek entry of default judgment against Hackney as to their breach of

contract claim. See Memo. at 3-4, 21. To prevail on a claim for breach of contract,

plaintiffs must establish: “(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff]s’ |] performance or

excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the

plaintiff.” Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51 Cal. 4th 811, 821 (2011) (citations

omitted). A valid contract requires capable, consenting parties, a lawful object, and

sufficient cause or consideration. Mountain View Surgical Ctr. v. Cigna Health Corp., No.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’

2:20-cv-09312-CAS-GJSx Date April 19, 2021

Title TRUSTEES OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IBEW-NECA

PENSION PLAN ET AL V. HACKNEY

2:13-cv-08083-DDP-AGR, 2015 WL 519066, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2015) (citing Cal.

Civ. Code § 1550).

Plaintiffs sufficiently allege the existence of contracts, attaching to the Rodriguez

Declaration a copy of Hackney’s letter of assent to be bound by the Master Agreement and

the various Trust Agreements incorporated by reference into the Master Agreement, all of

which: (1) bind Hackney to collective bargaining agreements; and (2) obligate Hackney to

pay fringe benefit contributions to the Trusts. See Ex. E (Hackney’s letter of assent); Ex.

F (Master Agreement); Exs. A, B, C, D (Trust Agreements). Plaintiffs also allege that

“there 1s no pending unsatisfied condition subsequent or legal excuse for [Hackney’s]

violation” of his contractual obligations. Compl. § 32. Plaintiffs further allege that

Hackney has failed to comply with his obligations under the Agreements by “failing to pay

or timely pay ... to Plaintiffs fringe benefit contributions ... as required by” the

Agreements. Id. § 16. According to plaintiffs, Hackney’s failure to perform has caused

resulting damages to plaintiffs in the form of unpaid fringe benefit contributions, liquidated

damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and other costs. Id.

at 11-12. There is no indication of lack of consent or any other grounds for excusing

Hackney’s nonperformance. Taking these allegations as true, plaintiffs have stated a claim

for breach of contract on which they may recover. Accordingly, these factors weigh in

favor of entry of default judgment against Hackney on the breach of contract claim.

iii ERISA Claim

Plaintiffs also assert that Hackney’s failure to report and pay contributions to the

Trusts violates section 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1145.° Id. §§ 27-34. To prevail on their

ERISA claim, plaintiffs must establish that: “(1) the Trusts are multi-employer plans under

U.S.C. § 1002(37); (2) the collective bargaining agreement obligated Defendant to make

the employee benefit contributions; and (3) Defendant failed to make the contribution

payments pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement.” Bd. of Trustees of the Laborers

3 Plaintiffs bring suit pursuant to section 502(g)(2) of ERISA, Compl. § 33, which provides

a private right of action for fiduciaries of ERISA employee benefit funds, 29 U.S.C. §

1132(g)(2).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’

2:20-cv-09312-CAS-GJSx Date April 19, 2021

Title TRUSTEES OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IBEW-NECA

PENSION PLAN ET AL V. HACKNEY

Health v. Aparicio, No. 15-CV-04131-TEH, 2016 WL 806307, at *3 (N_D. Cal. Mar. 2,

2016) (punctuation and citation omitted).

Here, plaintiffs allege that (1) the Trusts qualify as multiemployer plans within the

meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37); (2) the Trusts were established pursuant to a series of

collective bargaining agreements, which required Hackney to make fringe benefit

contributions: and (3) Hackney breached those agreements by failing to timely pay

contributions, as outlined supra. See Compl. F§ 5, 7, 11, 15-17. Taken as true, these

allegations are sufficient for plaintiffs to state a claim for violation of ERISA. See Trustees

of S. Cal. IBEW-NECA Pension Plan v. Pro Tech Eng’g Corp., No. SACV 150637-DOC

(Ex), 2017 WL 10573806, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2017) (finding default judgment

appropriate as to applicant’s section 515 claim because “[p|laintiff has sufficiently alleged

that defendant] was obligated to, and failed to, make contributions to multiemployer plans

under the terms of the [t]rust [a]greements”). Accordingly, these factors also weigh in

favor of default judgment against Hackney as to plaintiffs’ ERISA claim.

3. Sum of Money at Stake in the Action

Pursuant to the fourth Eitel factor, the Court balances “the amount of money at stake

in relation to the seriousness of the [defaulting party’s] conduct.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp.

2d at 1176; see also Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. “This determination requires a comparison

of the recovery sought and the nature of defendant’s conduct to determine whether the

remedy is appropriate.” United States v. Broaster Kitchen, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-09421-

MMM-PJW, 2015 WL 4545360, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2015); see also Walters v.

Statewide Concrete Barrier, Inc., No. 3:04-cv-02559-JSW, 2006 WL 2527776, *4 (N_D.

Cal. Aug. 30, 2006) (“If the sum of money at issue 1s reasonably proportionate to the harm

caused by the defendant’s actions, then default judgment is warranted.”).

Here, plaintiffs request a total of $19,874.09, consisting of $9,865.90 for unpaid

fringe benefit contributions, $1,172.91 for preyudgment interest, $1,973.18 for liquidated

damages, $6,372.10 for attorneys’ fees (including litigation expenses), and $490.00 for

costs, plus post-judgment interest. Memo. at 21. Accordingly, the amount requested does

not weigh against the entry of default judgment. See Pro Tech Eng’g Corp., 2017 WL

10573806, at *3 (finding requested award of $88,397.73 in ERISA case, including

“$54,391.26, interest of $7,006.98 on the unpaid contributions, liquidated damages of

$10,878.24, and audit fees of $16,121.2” did not weigh against entry of default judgment

because “[t]he damages Plaintiff seeks are proportional to the harm caused by Defendant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’

2:20-cv-09312-CAS-GJSx Date April 19, 2021

Title TRUSTEES OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IBEW-NECA

PENSION PLAN ET AL V. HACKNEY

... because [Defendant] was contractually obligated to pay the contributions, and payment

of the interest, attorney’s fees, costs, and liquidated damages are mandated by ERISA.”)

(citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of entering default

judgment against Hackney.

4. Possibility of a Dispute Concerning a Material Fact

The fifth Eitel factor considers the possibility that material facts are disputed.

PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177; see also Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. “Upon entry of

default, all well-pleaded facts in the complaint are taken as true, except those relating to

damages.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Here, plaintiffs “filed a well-pleaded

complaint alleging the facts necessary to establish [their] claims, and the court clerk entered

default against” Hackney. See Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prod. Inc., 219 F.R.D.

494, 500 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Accordingly, “no dispute has been raised regarding the material

averment of the complaint, and the likelihood that any genuine issue may exist is, at best,

remote.” Id.; see also Elektra, 226 F.R.D. at 393. Accordingly, the Court concludes that

this factor favors entry of default judgment against Hackney.

5. Possibility of Excusable Neglect

The sixth Eitel factor considers whether the defendant’s default may have been the

product of excusable neglect. PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177; see also Eitel, 782 F.2d

at 1471-72. The possibility of excusable neglect here is remote. Hackney was served with

the summons and complaint by personal service on October 28, 2020, and by mail on

November 3, 2020. Dkt. 9. Default was entered on December 18, 2020. Dkt. 11. Hackney

was also served with plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment on March 9, 2021. Dkt. 18.

Hackney has neither responded to this action nor attempted to have the default set aside.

Where a defendant “[is] properly served with the Complaint, the notice of entry of default,

as well as the papers in support of the instant motion,” there is little possibility of excusable

neglect. Shanghai Automation Instrument Co. Ltd. v. Kuei, 194 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1005

(N.D. Cal. 2001). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of entry of default judgment

against Hackney.

6. Policy Favoring Decisions on the Merits

Under the seventh Eitel factor, the Court takes into account the strong policy

favoring decisions on the merits. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. Of course, “this preference,

standing alone, is not dispositive.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (citation omitted). A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘oO’

2:20-cv-09312-CAS-GJSx Date April 19, 2021

Title TRUSTEES OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IBEW-NECA

PENSION PLAN ET AL V. HACKNEY

party’s failure to answer or appear makes a decision on the merits impractical, if not

impossible. Id. “Notwithstanding the strong policy presumption in favor of a decision on

the merits, where a defendant’s failure to appear and respond “makes a decision on the

merits impractical, if not impossible,’ default judgment is appropriate. Constr. Laborers

Tr. Funds for S. Cal. Admin. Co. v. Black Diamond Contracting Grp., Inc., No. $8:17-cv-

00770-JLSDFM, 2017 WL 6496434, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2017). Hackney’s failure

to appear or otherwise respond makes a decision on the merits in this case “impractical, if

not impossible.” As a result, this factor does not preclude the entry of default judgment

against Hackney.

7. Conclusion Regarding Eitel Factors

Apart from the policy favoring decisions on the merits, all the remaining Eitel factors

weigh in favor of default judgment, including the merits of plaintiffs’ claims. See Federal

Nat. Mortg. Ass’n v. George, No. 5:14-cv-01679-VAP-SP, 2015 WL 4127958, *3 (C.D.

Cal. July 7, 2015) (“The merits of the plaintiff's substantive claim and the sufficiency of

the complaint are often treated by courts as the most important Eitel factors.”) (citation

omitted). Therefore, weighing all the Eitel factors, the Court finds that entry of default

judgment against Hackney is appropriate.

B. Relief Sought by Plaintiffs

“The general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint,

except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” TeleVideo Sys..

Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (quotation marks omitted). The

“Tp |laintiff has the burden of proving damages through testimony or written affidavit.” See

Bd. of Trustees of the Boilermaker Vacation Tr. v. Skelly, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1226

(N.D. Cal. 2005). Moreover, the movant seeking default judgment must prove the damages

sought, and although the Court may hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount

of damages, no hearing is necessary “if the amount of damages can be determined from

definite figures contained in the documentary evidence or in detailed affidavits.” Bravado

Grp. Merch. Servs.. Inc. v. Quintero, No. 2:13-cv-00693-SVW-SS, 2013 WL

12126750, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2013) (citation omitted). ERISA, however, mandates

an award of the following relief in cases where an employer fails to make contributions to

a plan:

(A) the unpaid contributions,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’

2:20-cv-09312-CAS-GJSx Date April 19, 2021

Title TRUSTEES OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IBEW-NECA

PENSION PLAN ET AL V. HACKNEY

(B) interest on the unpaid contributions,

(C) an amount equal to the greater of —

(1) interest on the unpaid contributions, or

(11) liquidated damages provided for under the plan in an amount not in excess

of 20 percent (or such higher percentage as may be permitted under Federal

or State law) of the amount determined by the court under subparagraph (A),

(D) reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the action, to be paid by the defendant,

and

(E) such other legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.

29 U.S.C. § 1132(g). The Court evaluates each form of plaintiffs’ requested relief in turn.

1. Unpaid Contributions

Plaintiffs seek a total of $9,865.90 in unpaid fringe benefit contributions owed by

Hackney for the months of August 2019, September 2019, February 2020, March 2020,

and May 2020. Memo. at 4-5; Rodriguez Decl. { 13. This amount is calculated based on

monthly reports authored by Hackney for the months at issue. Memo. at 4-5; Rodriguez

Decl. { 13; see also Ex. G. The Court finds this documentation sufficient to prove up the

amount requested.

2. Prejudgment Interest and Liquidated Damages

The Ninth Circuit has held that an award of liquidated damages pursuant to ERISA

§ 502(g)(2) is “mandatory and not discretionary.” Operating Eng’rs Pension Tr. v. Beck

Eng’g & Surveying Co., 746 F.2d 557, 569 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)).

A plaintiff is entitled to mandatory liquidated damages if the following requirements are

satisfied: (1) the fiduciary obtains a judgment in favor of the plan; (2) unpaid contributions

exist at the time of the suit; and (3) the plan provides for liquidated damages. Idaho

Plumbers & Pipefitters Health & Welfare Fund v. United Mech. Contractors, Inc., 875 F.2d

212,215 (9th Cir. 1989). As discussed supra, the Agreements were breached by Hackney;

unpaid contributions were owed to the Trusts when the action was filed on October 9, 2020;

and the Trust Agreements provide for liquidated damages calculated at 20% of the total

sum of contributions owed. Memo. at 9; Rodriguez Decl. § 16; see_also Exs. A—-D.

Accordingly, liquidated damages are mandatory. In addition, under ERISA, plaintiffs may

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’

2:20-cv-09312-CAS-GJSx Date April 19, 2021

Title TRUSTEES OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IBEW-NECA

PENSION PLAN ET AL V. HACKNEY

recover interest based on the rate set by the Trust Agreements. See Nw. Adm’rs, Inc. v.

AD Auto. Distributors Inc., No. C-05-2880 SC, 2006 WL 1626940, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June

12, 2006) (citing 29 U-S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(C)(a)).

Here, plaintiffs request $1,973.18 in liquidated damages based on the unpaid

contributions. Memo. at 9; Rodriguez Decl. § 17. Plaintiffs further seek preyudgment

interest on the unpaid contributions, calculated at 8% from the date the contributions

became due through April 19, 2021 (the date of the hearing on this motion), in the amount

of $1,172.91. Memo. at 8; Rodriguez Decl. § 15; see also Ex. H (spreadsheet of accrued

interest). The Court finds that plaintiffs have sufficiently proved the amount of liquidated

damages and accrued interest. Plaintiffs are thus entitled to $3,146.09 in total liquidated

damages and accrued interest.

3. Fees and Costs

Plaintiffs also seek $6,372.10 in attorneys’ fees, including hourly fees of $6,219.00

and litigation expenses of $153.10, plus court costs of $490.00, pursuant to the terms of

the Agreements. Memo. at 9. ERISA provides for a mandatory award of “reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs of the action, to be paid by the defendant[.]” 29 U.S.C. §

1132(g)(2)(D). Pursuant to Local Rule 55-3, however, attorneys’ fees awarded upon

default judgment are generally calculated according to a fee schedule based upon the

amount of the judgment awarded. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 55-3. For a judgment between

$10,000 and $50,000, the corresponding attorneys’ fees are $1,200.00 plus 6% of the

amount over $10,000. Id. Here, the Court has already determined that a judgment of

$19,874.09 is appropriate. Accordingly, the fee schedule set forth in Local Rule 55-3

would result in an award of $2,392.45 ($1,200.00 plus 6% of $19,874.09).

Plaintiffs, however, request that the Court fix fees in an amount in excess of this fee

schedule. See Memo. at 13-15. The Ninth Circuit has held that “[i]f a party seeks a fee

“in excess of the schedule and timely files a written request to have the fee fixed by the

court, then the court must hear the request and award a ‘reasonable’ fee.” Vogel v. Harbor

Plaza Ctr.. LLC, 893 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th Cir. 2018). “The Ninth Circuit has expressly

held that the standard for determining the amount of attorney’s fees in ERISA cases 1s the

lodestar/multiplier approach.” Motion Picture Indus. Pension Plan v. Klages Grp., Inc.,

757 F. Supp. 1082, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1991). Under this approach, the Court calculates the

attorneys’ fees “by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’

2:20-cv-09312-CAS-GJSx Date April 19, 2021

Title TRUSTEES OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IBEW-NECA

PENSION PLAN ET AL V. HACKNEY

by a reasonable hourly rate.” Vogel, 893 F.3d at 1160 (citation, emphases, and quotation

marks omitted).

Here, plaintiffs calculate the $6,219.00 in requested attorneys’ fees based on 23.10

hours of professional services rendered, using a range of $300.00 to $390.00 per hour for

attorneys, and a rate of $120.00 per hour for paralegals. See Dkt. 14, Declaration of

Michael Y. Jung in Support of Motion for Default Judgment (“Jung Decl.”) § 3. Plaintiffs

support these figures with evidence in the form of billing records. See Dkt. 14-1. In

connection with a default judgment in another ERISA case, another court in this district

recently approved an award of attorneys’ fees based on hourly rates of $300.00 for

attorneys and $115.00 for legal assistants, for 40.30 hours of professional services

rendered. See Teamsters Multi-Benefit Tr. Fund v. California Offset Printers, Inc., No.

2:18-cv-08996-AB-RAO, 2019 WL 3249605, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2019): see also

generally Dkt. 15, Declaration of Douglas Waite in Support of Motion for Default

Judgment. Accordingly, the Court finds reasonable plaintiffs’ request for $6,219.00 in

attorneys’ fees based on 23.10 hours of professional services rendered.

Plaintiffs also request an award of $153.10 in litigation expenses and $490.00 in

court costs. Memo. at 9, 13. The $153.10 in litigation costs correspond to $3.75 related to

copying, printing, and scanning costs; and $149.35 related to online research costs. Jung

Decl. § 6. The $490.00 in court costs correspond to $400.00 related to the filing of the

complaint: and $90.00 related to the service of the summons and complaint. Id. The Court

concludes that these fees are recoverable. See Harlow v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 379 F. Supp.

3d 1046, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (finding that “costs relating to the filing fee, service of

process|,] certain photocopies, and subpoena fees” were recoverable as part of fee award

in connection with default judgment in ERISA case).

4. Post-Judgment Interest

Plaintiffs also seek “post-judgment interest as provided by law from the date of entry

of [default] judgment ... until the date the judgment is paid in full.” Memo. at 21. Because

“ERISA does not expressly address the availability of post-judgment interest ... the federal

post-judgment statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1961, governs.” Bonilla v. Mutschler, No. C 03-5771

CW (JL), 2004 WL 2623922, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2004), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 03-05771 CW, 2004 WL 2623238 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2004) (citations

omitted); also Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. Of North America, 987 F.2d 1017, 1031

(4th Cir. 1993) (“While ERISA does not specifically address post-judgment interest, it does

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘O’

2:20-cv-09312-CAS-GJSx Date April 19, 2021

Title TRUSTEES OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA IBEW-NECA

PENSION PLAN ET AL V. HACKNEY

provide that the statute is not to be construed to ‘alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair,

or supersede any law of the United States.’”) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d)). Accordingly,

the Court finds the federal post-judgment statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1961, applicable in this case.

The federal post-judgment statute mandates an award of post-judgment interest in

civil cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (“Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a

civil case recovered in a district court.”). “Such interest shall be calculated from the date

of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity

Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for

the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment.” Id. (alteration omitted). Plaintiffs

are thus entitled to post-judgment interest calculated at the statutory rate.

V. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion for default

judgment.

The Court ORDERS that judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs. Hackney shall

be liable to plaintiffs in the amount of $19,874.09, which is comprised of $9,865.90 in

unpaid fringe benefit contributions, $1,172.91 in prejudgment interest, $1,973.18 in

liquidated damages, $6,219.00 in attorneys’ fees, $153.10 in litigation expenses, and

$490.00 in court costs, plus post-judgment interest in accordance with the rate set forth in

28 U.S.C. § 1961 (a).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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