Opinion

Tracy Lashawn Mathis v. Andrew Saul

Court
District Court, C.D. California
Filed
Nov 6, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 17.9%

an 24| error “is harmless where it is inconsequential to the ultimate non- 25 |

How later courts described this case

  • an 24| error “is harmless where it is inconsequential to the ultimate non- 25 |
  • an ALJ who is “not qualified as a medical expert” 16] cannot make “his [or her] own exploration and assessment as to [the] claimant’s physical condition”
  • reversal with a 15| directive for the immediate calculation of benefits is a “rare and prophylactic exception to the well-established ordinary remand rule”
  • “[T]he ALJ has a special duty to fully and fairly develop the 3] record to assure the claimant’s interests are considered. This duty 4|| exists even when the claimant is represented by counsel.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 TRACY L. M., ) NO. CV 20-2127-E

)

12 Plaintiff, )

)

13 v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

)

14 ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of ) AND ORDER OF REMAND

Social Security Administration, )

15 )

Defendant. )

16 ____________________________________)

17

18 Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), IT IS

19 HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s motions for summary

20 judgment are denied, and this matter is remanded for further

21 administrative action consistent with this Opinion.

22

23 PROCEEDINGS

24

25 Plaintiff filed a complaint on March 4, 2020, seeking review of

26 the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. The parties consented to

27 proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on March 31, 2020.

28 Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on September 3, 2020.

1 Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on November 4, 2020.

2 The Court has taken the motions under submission without oral

3 argument. See L.R. 7-15; “Order,” filed March 9, 2020.

4

5 BACKGROUND

6

7 Plaintiff initially asserted disability since January 5, 2013,

8 based on alleged mental impairments (depression, hearing voices, and

9 memory issues associated with treatment for stage four ovarian

10 cancer) and alleged left hip arthritis (Administrative Record

11 (“A.R.”) 240-52, 273, 287, 309, 318).1 An internal medicine

12 consultative examiner and the state agency physicians opined in 2016

13 that Plaintiff was capable of medium work with some postural

14 limitations (A.R. 81, 96-112, 411-16).

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16 The focus of Plaintiff’s arguments for disability appear to have

17 changed after May of 2017, when Plaintiff suffered a fall. Plaintiff

18 alleges that this fall significantly worsened her physical condition.

19 See A.R. 50-51, 446-47, 612, 623-27; see also Plaintiff’s Motion, pp.

20 5-12 (asserting that the medical record prior to the May, 2017 fall

21 concerns Plaintiff’s ovarian cancer and resultant brain fog, and that

22 Plaintiff’s shoulder, back and hip condition “did not materialize to

23 a debilitating factor until after the May, 2017 slip and fall”).

24 ///

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1 Plaintiff reported to her treating providers that she

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1 The only medical opinion post-dating May of 2017 is from

2 treating Physician’s Assistant (“P.A.”) Jennifer Chun, who answered a

3 “Physical Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire,” dated

4 September 26, 2018 (A.R. 1154-57). Therein, P.A. Chun opined that

5 Plaintiff has lumbar disc herniation, a right shoulder “SLAP tear”

6 for which Plaintiff had undergone surgery, and left hip

7 osteoarthritis (A.R. 1154-55). According to P.A. Chu, these

8 conditions cause constant pain and likely would cause Plaintiff to

9 miss more than four days of work per month (A.R. 1154-57). P.A. Chun

10 further opined that Plaintiff was capable of only low stress work,

11 limited to: (1) lifting less than 10 pounds rarely; (2) sitting no

12 more than 30 minutes at a time; (3) standing no more than 30 minutes

13 at a time; (4) sitting and standing/walking for a total of less than

14 two hours each in an eight-hour day with breaks every hour; and

15 (5) rarely twisting, stooping/bending, crouching, and never climbing

16 ladders or stairs. Id.

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18 The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found Plaintiff has severe

19 impairments: lumbar radiculitis, post right shoulder surgery, left

20 hip osteoarthritis, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and

21 depression (A.R. 15-18). However, the ALJ also found: (1) Plaintiff

22 retains the residual functional capacity to perform a range of light

23 work; and (2) there exist significant numbers of jobs Plaintiff can

24 perform (A.R. 18-25 (adopting vocational expert testimony at A.R. 59-

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1 62)).2 The ALJ accorded “little weight” to the pre-May, 2017

2 opinions of the consultative examiner and the state agency physicians

3 as “not consistent with the evidence of record” (A.R. 22). The ALJ

4 also accorded “little weight” to P.A. Chun’s opinions as “not

5 supported by the evidence of record” (A.R. 22-23).3 The Appeals

6 Council denied review (A.R. 1-3).

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2 Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a

9 time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects

weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted

10 may be very little, a job is in this category when it

requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it

11 involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and

pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered

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capable of performing a full or wide range of light

13 work, you must have the ability to do substantially all

of these activities.

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20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b). A full range of light work requires six

15 hour of standing or walking in an eight-hour day. See Social

Security Ruling 83-10.

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3 The ALJ stated:

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18 Specifically, a lumbar spine MRI showed no significant

spinal canal or foraminal narrowing at L2-L3. There

19 was only a mildly dislocated disc at L3-L4 with a three

mm-right foraminal protrusion and a [four] mm foraminal

20 protrusion on the left and mild facet joint hypertrophy

and mild bilateral foraminal narrowing. At L4-L5,

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there was disc dessication and a disc bulge, but only

22 moderate spinal canal narrowing and mild bilateral

foraminal narrowing [A.R. 1115]. A left hip MRI[]

23 revealed severe degenerative changes and the right hip

was noted to have mild to moderate degenerative changes

24 [A.R. 1159]. Despite these abnormal findings, the

claimant has not required surgical intervention and her

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pain symptoms are medically managed.

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(A.R. 22-23; see also A.R. 21 (discussing evidence post-dating

27 the May, 2017 fall in more detail and reaching conclusion that

light work with postural/reaching limitations is assertedly

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1 STANDARD OF REVIEW

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3 Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the

4|| Administration’s decision to determine if: (1) the Administration’s

5| findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the

6| Administration used correct legal standards. See Carmickle v.

Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue,

499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner,

9] 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence is “such

10] relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

11] support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

12] (1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see also Widmark v.

13] Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).

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15 If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may

16 not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. But the

17 Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by

18 isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.

19 Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole,

20 weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that

21 detracts from the [administrative] conclusion.

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23|| Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and

quotations omitted).

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26] ///

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1 DISCUSSION

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3 Plaintiff asserts that, in assessing Plaintiff’s post-May, 2017

4 residual functional capacity, the ALJ erred by rejecting P.A. Chun’s

5 opinions in favor of the ALJ’s own interpretation of the medical

6 record. See Plaintiff’s Motion, pp. 13-17.4 The Court agrees.

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8 I. Summary of the Medical Record for the Period After Plaintiff’s

9 May, 2017 Fall

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11 Plaintiff presented for an orthopedic surgery consultation with

12 Dr. Vlad Gendelman in August of 2017, complaining of moderate to

13 severe pain in the neck, right shoulder, lower back and left hip

14 following her May, 2017 fall (A.R. 446-47). Plaintiff then

15 reportedly was taking Norco up to three times a day. Id. Clinical

16 examination immediately after Plaintiff’s fall reportedly had

17 revealed no fractures or evidence of acute injury (A.R. 446; see also

18 A.R. 612-44 (emergency room records)). Plaintiff said she had

19 undergone chiropractic treatment and physical therapy, and she sought

20 an interpretation of a July, 2017 lumbar spine MRI (A.R. 447, 451-

21 52).

22 ///

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4 Plaintiff does not appear to challenge the ALJ’s

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decision as to the time period from the alleged onset date

26 through May 28, 2017. See Plaintiff’s Motion, pp. 13-14 (arguing

only that the ALJ did not properly evaluate the period after May

27 of 2017). Accordingly, the Court only addresses the ALJ’s

decision for the time period from May 28, 2017 through the date

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1 On examination by Dr. Gendelman, Plaintiff reportedly had

2 tenderness to palpation, as well as pain on range of motion in the

3 lumbar spine and in the hips (A.R. 448-51). The July, 2017 lumbar

4 spine MRI showed, inter alia, a 5-mm left foraminal protrusion at L2-

5 L3 moderately narrowing the left foraminal zone with mild facet joint

6 hypertrophy, mild dessication at L3-L4 with a 3-mm right foraminal

7 protrusion and a 4-mm left paracentral through left foraminal

8 protrusion and mild facet joint hypertrophy, mild bilateral foraminal

9 narrowing, dessication at L4-L5 with a 3-mm asymmetric disc bulge and

10 moderate facet joint hypertrophy with small right-sided facet joint

11 effusion, moderate spinal canal narrowing and mild bilateral

12 foraminal narrowing, and a 2-to-3-mm broad-based posterior protrusion

13 at L5-S1 with mild facet joint hypertrophy (A.R. 451-52; see also

14 A.R. 732-33 (MRI report)). A June, 2017 cervical spine x-ray

15 reportedly showed reversal of the normal cervical lordosis and grade

16 I anterolisthesis of C3 on C4 (A.R. 452).

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18 Dr. Gendelman diagnosed cervical and lumbar musculoligamentous

19 injury, cervical and lumbar spine radiculopathy, multiple disc bulges

20 in the lumbar spine, right shoulder rotator cuff syndrome, right

21 shoulder acromioclavicular joint arthrosis, right shoulder

22 impingement syndrome, right shoulder biceps tendonitis, a resolved

23 wrist sprain/strain, and “left greater trochanteric bursitis,”

24 causally related to Plaintiff’s May, 2017 fall (A.R. 452, 454). Dr.

25 Gendelman requested a right shoulder MRI and prescribed Mobic, as

26 well as a home exercise and icing program (A.R. 453). Dr. Gendelman

27 indicated that, if Plaintiff continued to have cervical spine pain,

28 she should have a cervical MRI study, and, if her lumbar spine

1 symptoms worsened, perhaps epidural steroid injections (A.R. 453).

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3 Plaintiff saw Dr. Gendelman again in October of 2017,

4 complaining of worsening pain (A.R. 455). Examination revealed

5 tenderness and pain on palpation and positive Neer’s and Hawkins’

6 tests (A.R. 456). Plaintiff’s September, 2017 right shoulder MRI

7 reportedly showed, inter alia, diffuse rotator cuff tendinosis with

8 partial tearing of the supraspinatus tendon, focal concavity at the

9 posterior-superior aspect of the humeral head, a “SLAP tear” with

10 degeneration of the posterior superior through posterior-inferior

11 labra, a suspected tear of the inferior glenohumeral ligamentous-

12 labral complex anteriorally-inferiorly, moderate gelohumeral joint

13 effusion, and 1.7-mm chondral denudation of the superomedial humeral

14 head (A.R. 456-57; see also A.R. 891-93 (MRI report)). Dr. Gendelman

15 diagnosed a right shoulder partial rotator cuff tear and recommended

16 a right shoulder steroid injection, three lumbar epidural steroid

17 injections, a cervical spine MRI, and a home exercise and icing

18 program (A.R. 457-58).

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20 From October of 2017 through at least June of 2018, Plaintiff

21 was treated monthly by Dr. Arthur Kreitenberg with the Center for

22 Orthopedic & Sports Excellence (A.R. 691-733). Plaintiff initially

23 complained of moderate to severe right shoulder pain and low back

24 pain, worsened by movement and prolonged sitting (A.R. 691-93). Dr.

25 Kreitenberg examined Plaintiff, reviewed a lumbar spine MRI, and

26 recommended lumbar epidural steroid injections and a right shoulder

27 cortisone injection, as well as right shoulder arthroscopy (A.R. 698-

28 99, 723-29). Dr. Kreitenberg also prescribed Norco (A.R. 699-700).

1 When Plaintiff returned in November of 2017, she reported that

2 her shoulder pain was worsening and her lumbar spine pain and hip

3 pain were continuing (A.R. 701-02). She was prescribed a lumbar

4 epidural steroid injection and a refill of Norco (A.R. 701-02).

5 Plaintiff returned in December of 2017, reporting that the lumbar

6 epidural steroid injection had helped somewhat with her back pain and

7 hip pain, but she claimed that her shoulder was still very painful

8 (A.R. 703-04; see also A.R. 1148-52 (operative report for

9 injection)). Dr. Kreitenberg refilled the Norco and recommended

10 another lumbar epidural steroid injection, as well as a hip injection

11 and shoulder arthroscopy (A.R. 704).

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13 In January of 2018, Plaintiff reported constant shoulder pain

14 diagnosed as a “SLAP tear,” and she underwent right shoulder surgery

15 by Dr. Kreitenberg later that month, as well as a second lumbar

16 epidural steroid injection (A.R. 705-09, 721-22; see also A.R. 546-48

17 (surgery report)). She reported shoulder improvement at ensuing

18 visits in February, March, April and June of 2018 (A.R. 711-20).

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20 Throughout this time period, i.e., from June of 2017 through at

21 least August of 2018, Plaintiff also was being treated monthly by

22 P.A. Chun for, inter alia, a history of ovarian cancer, left wrist

23 ganglion cyst,5 depression, lumbar disc herniation with

24 radiculopathy, low back pain, hip pain, right shoulder pain, and

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5 Plaintiff reportedly injured her left wrist in December

27 of 2016 (A.R. 594). She reinjured her left wrist from another

fall in June of 2018, which led to the development of a ganglion

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1 pulmonary emphysema (A.R. 43, 825-95). P.A. Chun prescribed

2 Gabapentin, Norco and Tramadol for pain (A.R. 827, 842, 848, 852,

3 855, 858, 860, 867).6 P.A. Chun reviewed the July, 2017 lumbar spine

4 MRI and September, 2017 right shoulder MRI reports, and a September,

5 2018 left hip MRI report (A.R. 887-93; see also A.R. 1159 (left hip

6 MRI report)). The left hip MRI revealed severe left hip degenerative

7 changes and findings consistent with mild to moderate right hip joint

8 degenerative changes (A.R. 1159).

9

10 As detailed above, the record contains opinions from P.A. Chun,

11 dated September 26, 2018, that Plaintiff is far more limited than the

12 residual functional capacity assessed by the ALJ (A.R. 1154-57).

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14 II. Substantial Evidence Does Not Support the ALJ’s Assessment of

15 Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity.

16

17 For the time period after May of 2017, the record contains no

18 medical opinion by any physician concerning Plaintiff’s functional

19 capacity. Only P.A. Chun offered any functional capacity opinion

20 after May of 2017 (A.R. 22-23). No physician critiqued P.A. Chun’s

21 opinions. Unaided by any medical opinion evidence, the ALJ purported

22 to determine that: (1) P.A. Chun’s opinions are “not supported by the

23 evidence of the record”; and (2) the objective clinical findings in

24 the record translate into a light work residual functional capacity

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6 Plaintiff also underwent pain management treatment with

27 Harbor UCLA Pain Management from April of 2018 through August of

2018, where she was prescribed Gabapentin, Norco and lumbar

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1 (A.R. 21).

2

3 To reject the testimony of a medically acceptable treating

4|| source, the ALJ must provide specific, legitimate reasons based on

5] substantial evidence in the record. Valentine v. Commissioner, 574

6] F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009). Under regulations applicable to

7| claims filed before March 27, 2017,’

8

9 only licensed physicians and certain other qualified

10 specialists[] are considered “[a]cceptable medical

11 sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a). Physician’s assistants

12 are defined as “other sources,” § 404.1513(d), and are not

13 entitled to the same deference, see § 404.1527; SSR 06-03p.

14 The ALJ may discount testimony from these “other sources”

15 if the ALJ “‘gives reasons germane to each witness for

16 doing so.’” See Turner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d

17 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lewis v. Apfel, 236

18 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir.2001)).

19

20] Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012); see also

Austin v. Saul, 818 Fed. App’x 725, 728 (9th Cir. 2020) (discussing

22| pre-2017 standard applicable to other source opinions).

23

24 While a conflict with treatment notes or the treatment record

25| may provide a germane reason for rejecting a treating provider's

26

27 ? Unless otherwise noted, the regulations cited in this

section are those applicable to claims filed before March 27,

28] 2017.

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1 opinion, see Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112, substantial evidence must

2 support such reasoning. See Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161

3 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing standard for reviewing treating

4 providers’ opinions and finding that substantial evidence did not

5 support the ALJ’s conclusion that the opinions were inconsistent with

6 treatment notes). Here, substantial evidence fails to support the

7 determination that P.A. Chun’s opinions are “not supported by the

8 evidence of the record.”

9

10 In some instances not present here, the failure of a record to

11 support a treatment provider’s opinion is readily apparent and does

12 not require any medical knowledge to discern or confirm. As an

13 obvious example, if a treatment provider opined that a patient could

14 not walk more than 20 minutes, but the provider’s own examination

15 findings reported that the patient had walked without discomfort for

16 40 minutes during a treadmill test, then a lay person properly could

17 discern a lack of record support. In other instances, a lack of

18 record support for a treatment provider’s opinion is not readily

19 apparent and will require medical knowledge to discern or confirm. A

20 review of the relevant medical record in this case persuades the

21 Court that any alleged failure of the record to support P.A. Chun’s

22 opinions is not readily apparent.

23

24 If a person has multi-level lumbar disc bulges with mild to

25 moderate foraminal narrowing and facet joint hypertrophy with

26 radiculopathy requiring repeated epidural steroid injections and

27 treatment with narcotic pain relievers, right shoulder injury

28 requiring surgery, and severe left hip degenerative changes and mild

1] to moderate right hip joint degenerative changes, would that person

2| necessarily be able to lift up to 20 pounds or stand and walk up to

six hours a day, as the ALJ found? To answer this question

4|| competently (and to answer competently other, similar questions

inherent in the ALJ’s evaluation of P.A. Chun’s opinions and the

6] ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity) one

would need the benefit of medical knowledge regarding the kinds of

8| impairments afflicting Plaintiff. How do these impairments typically

9) manifest themselves in symptomatology, and what do those

10] manifestations (or lack thereof) necessarily indicate with regard to

11] functional capacity? On the present record, this Court is not

12|| competent to say.

13

14 Neither was the ALJ. See Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156

15] (9th Cir. 1975) (an ALJ who is “not qualified as a medical expert”

16] cannot make “his [or her] own exploration and assessment as to [the]

claimant’s physical condition”); see also Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d

18] 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1998) (an “ALJ cannot arbitrarily substitute his own

19] judgment for competent medical opinion”) (internal quotation marks

20] and citation omitted); Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970-71 (7th Cir.

1996) (ALJ may not rely on his or her own lay opinion regarding

22|| medical matters); Ferguson v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir.

1995) (same). At a minimum, the ALJ should have consulted a medical

expert. See id.; Smith v. Astrue, 2009 WL 1322864, at *4 (E.D. Ky.

May 12, 2009) (where no physician had reviewed the complete records

of the treating physician, the ALJ erred by rejecting the treating

27|| physician’s opinion without having sought the advice of a medical

///

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1|| advisor) see also Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir.

1983) (“[T]he ALJ has a special duty to fully and fairly develop the

3] record to assure the claimant’s interests are considered. This duty

4|| exists even when the claimant is represented by counsel.”).

5

6 The regulations certainly vest in the ALJ the “responsibility

7| for assessing residual functional capacity.” 20 C.F.R. §

8] 404.1546(c). Just as certainly, however, an ALJ’s assessment must be

9|| supported by substantial evidence, i.e., “such relevant evidence as a

10] reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support” the assessment.

11] See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401. As

the above authorities demonstrate (and contrary to Defendant’s

apparent argument), substantial evidence does not support an

14] assessment predicated solely on an ALJ’s lay interpretation of

medical records where those records are of a type requiring medical

expertise competently to interpret.

17

18 The Court is unable to conclude that the ALJ’s errors in

evaluating the medical record were harmless. See Treichler v.

20] Commissioner, 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Where, as in this

21| case, an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain and

22| ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency”) ;

23| see also Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (an

24| error “is harmless where it is inconsequential to the ultimate non-

25 |) □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□

26 8 The consultative internal medicine examiner and the

state agency review physicians (on whom the ALJ did not rely in

27| the present case) rendered their opinions in 2016, and were not

asked to evaluate Plaintiff, or to review any treatment records,

28|| after Plaintiff's May, 2017 fall.

T/A

disability determination”) (citations and quotations omitted); McLeod

2) v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 887 (9th Cir. 2011) (error not harmless

3] where “the reviewing court can determine from the ‘circumstances of

4| the case’ that further administrative review is needed to determine

5| whether there was prejudice from the error”).

6

7| IIL. Remand is Appropriate

8

9 Remand is the appropriate remedy under the circumstances

presented. See McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d at 888; see also INS v.

11] Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (upon reversal of an administrative

12] determination, the proper course is remand for additional agency

investigation or explanation, except in rare circumstances); Leon v.

Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2017) (reversal with a

15| directive for the immediate calculation of benefits is a “rare and

prophylactic exception to the well-established ordinary remand

rule”); Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015)

18] (“Unless the district court concludes that further administrative

proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with a

direction to provide benefits”); Treichler v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d

21] at 1101 n.5 (remand for further administrative proceedings is the

22|| proper remedy “in all but the rarest cases”); Garrison v. Colvin, 759

23] F.3d at 1020 (court will credit-as-true medical opinion evidence only

24| where, inter alia, “the record has been fully developed and further

25| administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose”); Harman v.

Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1180-81 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1038

(2000) (remand for further proceedings rather than for the immediate

payment of benefits is appropriate where there are “sufficient

T06

1 unanswered questions in the record”). As discussed above, there

2 remain significant unanswered questions in the present record.

3

4 CONCLUSION

5

6 For all of the foregoing reasons,9 Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s

7 motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded

8 for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion.

9

10 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

11

12 DATED: November 6, 2020.

13

14 /S/

CHARLES F. EICK

15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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9 The Court has not reached any other issue raised by

27 Plaintiff except insofar as to determine that reversal with a

directive for the immediate payment of benefits would not be

28

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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