Jason Loyd Ross v. Barbara Von Blanckensee

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SACV 20-00772-PSG (PD) Date: June 8, 2020

Title Jason Loyd Ross v. Barbara Von Blanckensee

Present: The Honorable: Patricia Donahue, United States Magistrate Judge

Isabel Martinez N/A

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder

Attorneys Present for Petitioner: Attorneys Present for Respondents:

N/A N/A

Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order to Show Cause Why Petitioner’s

28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition Should Not be Dismissed

Petitioner is a federal prisoner who is confined at the United States

Penitentiary in Tucson, Arizona. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In his Petition, he contends that criminal charges

have been lodged against him in Orange County, California, and that an

arrest warrant for him was lodged with the Bureau of Prisons.1 Petitioner

alleges that he “sought a speedy disposition” of the charges, “but the Orange

County DA [] refused to prosecute or remove the warrant/detainer.” [Dkt. No.

1 at 4.] As a result, Petitioner alleges that his rights under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments have been violated, as well as his rights under the

Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, and that he is unable to qualify for

1 Petitioner references Orange County Superior Court of California case

no. 15 CF 1980. According to the docket for that case, Petitioner was charged

in that court with two counts of bringing or selling a controlled substance into

jail/prison, and one count of sale or transport of a controlled substance. See

docket available at https://www.occourts.org/online-services/cases-access/.

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SACV 20-00772-PSG (PD) Date: June 8, 2020

Title Jason Loyd Ross v. Barbara Von Blanckensee

halfway house placement and other prison programs because of the warrant.

[Dkt. No. 1 at 4.]

As to relief sought, Petitioner states the following: “Writ of habeas

corpus that (1) quashes the Orange County/California warrants [;] and (2)

enjoins the respondent from adverse classifications relating to the warrant.”

[Dkt. No. 1 at 9.]

On April 20, 2020, the United States District Court for the District of

Arizona transferred the petition to the United States District Court for the

Central District of California. [Dkt. No. 5.]

DISCUSSION

Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United

States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (“Habeas Rules”), permits this

Court to “apply any or all of these rules” to any habeas petition, even if the

petition is not filed pursuant to Section 2254. Rule 4 of the Habeas Rules

requires a district court to dismiss a petition, without ordering a responsive

pleading, when “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached

exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Habeas Rule 4.

The Petition raises significant screening concerns regarding whether

Petitioner exhausted available state remedies, whether he complied with the

procedural requirements of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act

(“IAD”), and whether this Court has jurisdiction over the Bureau of Prison’s

(“BOP”) determinations concerning Petitioner’s participation in rehabilitative

programs and placement in a halfway house.

First, although there is no exhaustion requirement for a petition

brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), principles of federalism and comity

require that a district court abstain until all state criminal proceedings are

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SACV 20-00772-PSG (PD) Date: June 8, 2020

Title Jason Loyd Ross v. Barbara Von Blanckensee

completed and the petitioner exhausts available judicial state remedies,

unless the petitioner can show that special circumstances warrant federal

intervention prior to the state criminal trial. See Braden v. 30th Judicial

Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973); Carden v. Montana, 626

F.2d 82, 83-84 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980); see also Younger

v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1971) (under principles of comity and

federalism, a federal court should not intervene in a pending state criminal

prosecution absent extraordinary circumstances where the danger of

irreparable harm is both great and immediate, and cannot be eliminated by

defense against the prosecution). “[O]nly in the most unusual circumstances

is a defendant entitled to have federal interposition by way of injunction or

habeas corpus until after the jury comes in, judgment has been appealed from

and the case concluded in the state courts.” Drury v. Cox, 457 F.2d 764, 764-

65 (9th Cir. 1972).

Younger abstention is appropriate in favor of a state proceeding if three

criteria are met: (1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the proceedings

implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an

adequate opportunity to raise federal constitutional challenges. See

Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432

(1982); Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 331-32 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.

denied, 506 U.S. 1054 (1993). In Carden, the Ninth Circuit held that “[o]nly

in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in

bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other

extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown is federal

injunctive relief against pending state prosecutions appropriate.” Carden,

626 F.2d at 84 (citing Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971)).

Here, all three criteria for Younger abstention appear to be met with

respect to the criminal proceeding still pending against Petitioner in Orange

County Superior Court. Moreover, Petitioner has failed to allege the type of

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SACV 20-00772-PSG (PD) Date: June 8, 2020

Title Jason Loyd Ross v. Barbara Von Blanckensee

special circumstances that warrant federal intervention. Rather, it appears

that Petitioner’s speedy trial claim should be addressed in the first instance

by the trial court, and then by the state appellate courts, before Petitioner

seeks a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Second, Petitioner offers no indication that he complied with the

procedural requirements of the IAD, which provides a mechanism for the

expeditious and orderly disposition of untried charges pending in member

states other than the one in which a prisoner is presently incarcerated. See

Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719-720 (1985). The IAD, codified under

California statutory law by Penal Code section 1389, is “an agreement

between California, 47 other states, and the federal government,” facilitating

the resolution of detainers, based on untried indictments, informations or

complaints filed in one jurisdiction, against defendants who have been

imprisoned in another jurisdiction. People v. Lavin, 88 Cal. App. 4th 609, 612

(2001). Under the IAD, “[a] detainer is a notification filed with the

institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is

wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.” Id., at 612,

quoting United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 359 (1972). The lodging of a

detainer is more than mere notice that an inmate is wanted in another

jurisdiction. A detainer asks the institution to “hold the prisoner for the

agency or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is imminent.”

People v. Oiknine, 79 Cal. App. 4th 21, 23 (1999). A “formal detainer” must

be filed before an inmate may invoke the provisions of the IAD. People v.

Rhoden, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1242, 1251 (1989).

The IAD establishes a procedure under which a prisoner, against whom

a detainer has been lodged, may demand trial within 180 days of a written

request for final disposition properly delivered to the prosecutor and

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SACV 20-00772-PSG (PD) Date: June 8, 2020

Title Jason Loyd Ross v. Barbara Von Blanckensee

appropriate court of the prosecutor’s jurisdiction. Cal. Penal Code § 1389, Art.

III(a).2

“In order to take advantage of the sanction of dismissal, the prisoner

must comply with the procedural requirements of the IAD.” Lavin, 88 Cal.

App. 4th at 616; see also Johnson v. Stagner, 781 F.2d 758, 761-62 (9th Cir.

1986). The prisoner has the burden to show that a request for a speedy trial

has been made. See United States v. Moline, 833 F.2d 190, 192 (9th Cir.

1987).

Here, the Court cannot determine what steps, if any, Petitioner took to

comply with the procedural requirements of the IAD. Petitioner failed to

submit any evidence, declaration, or proof of any of the allegations.

Finally, to the extent Petitioner claims that his due process rights are

violated by the alleged adverse effects of the pending warrant on his ability to

participate in institutional or rehabilitative programs and/or placement in a

halfway house, that argument is rejected. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78,

88 n.9 (1976) (rejecting claim that pending warrant, which may carry adverse

2 A prisoner must also comply with Art. III, subdivision (b) which states

that “the prisoner shall give or send the notice and request to the warden,

commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner.”

[¶] The warden then prepares a certificate “stating the term of commitment

under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time

remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the

time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole

agency relating to the prisoner.” (See Cal. Penal Code § 1389, Art. III, subd.

(b).)

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SACV 20-00772-PSG (PD) Date: June 8, 2020

Title Jason Loyd Ross v. Barbara Von Blanckensee

consequences for prison inmate regarding prison classification or

qualification for institutional programs, automatically activates due process

rights).

To the extent Petitioner challenges the Bureau of Prison (“BOP’s”)

individualized determination regarding his placement in a residential drug

abuse program (“RDAP”), the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider such claims.

See Brown v. Ives, 543 Fed. Appx. 636, 637 (9th Cir. 2013) (district court

properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider BOP’s

individualized determination concerning placement).

Accordingly, on or before July 10, 2020, Petitioner is ordered to show

cause, in writing, (a) why this action should not be summarily dismissed; or

(b) file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of the action. The Court Clerk is

directed to provide Petitioner a copy of Form CV-09 – Notice of

Dismissal for his convenience.

Failure to file a timely response to this Order as directed above

will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed for

failure to prosecute and obey Court orders pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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