“The district court 26 properly dismissed [plaintiff’s] . . . claims against defendants 27 in their official capacities because [he] failed to identify 28 5 1 . . . a policy or custom of the State that allegedly violated 2 federal law.”
How later courts described this case
- “The district court 26 properly dismissed [plaintiff’s] . . . claims against defendants 27 in their official capacities because [he] failed to identify 28 5 1 . . . a policy or custom of the State that allegedly violated 2 federal law.”
- allegations of inadequate training and hiring 21 insufficient because complaint did not identify what training and 22 hiring practices were, how they were deficient, or how training 23 practices caused plaintiff harm
- plaintiff must allege facts 16 to show that municipality disregarded known or obvious 17 consequence that particular omission in training program would 18 cause employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights
- “Absent allegations of 25 specific shortcomings in the training . . . or facts that might 26 place the City on notice that constitutional deprivations were 27 likely [to] occur, Plaintiff [cannot] adequately [plead] a § 1983 28 claim . . . for failure to train.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
RONALD PHILLIPS, ) Case No. CV 20-1858-FMO (JPR)
)
11
Plaintiff, ) ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH
) LEAVE TO AMEND
12
v. )
)
13
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et )
al., )
14
)
Defendants. )
15
)
16 On February 26, 2020, Plaintiff, a state inmate proceeding
17 pro se, filed a civil-rights action against Los Angeles County
18 and the Los Angeles County Public Defender in their official
19 capacity and Robert G. Noguchi, a deputy public defender, and
20 Does in their individual and official capacities, seeking
21 declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and costs.
22 (Compl. at 3, 6.)1 He was subsequently granted leave to proceed
23 in forma pauperis.
24 Plaintiff alleges “malpractice” and “negligence” by Noguchi
25 at his 2011 sentencing, resulting in a sentence of 32 months when
26
27 1 Because the Complaint is not consecutively paginated, the
Court uses the pagination generated by its Case Management/
28
Electronic Case Filing system.
1
1 it should have been 16. (Compl. at 5-8.) In 2017, the court
2 struck his prior juvenile misdemeanor adjudication and
3 resentenced him to 16 months. (Id. at 5, 11.)
4 After screening the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)
5 and 1915A, the Court finds that its allegations fail to state a
6 claim on which relief might be granted. Because some of the
7 claims might be cured by amendment, they are dismissed with leave
8 to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.
9 2000) (en banc). If Plaintiff desires to pursue any of his
10 claims, he is ORDERED to file a first amended complaint within 28
11 days of the date of this order, remedying the deficiencies
12 discussed below.
13 ALLEGATIONS
14 Public Defender Noguchi was appointed to represent Plaintiff
15 on or about January 20, 2011. (Compl. at 5.) He allegedly
16 “failed to exercise reasonable care and skill” by not asserting
17 during Plaintiff’s sentencing that because his prior juvenile
18 conviction was a misdemeanor, it should not have counted as a
19 prior-strike enhancement. (Id.) Plaintiff was sentenced to and
20 served 32 months. (Id.)
21 On June 28, 2017, his sentence was modified based on the
22 prosecutor’s motion to strike the prior-strike allegation. (Id.
23 at 12.) The court resentenced him to 16 months, with credit for
24 custody and good time. (Id. at 11.)
25 STANDARD OF REVIEW
26 A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure
27 to state a claim “where there is no cognizable legal theory or an
28 absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal
2
1 theory.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d
2 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (as amended) (citation omitted);
3 accord O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2008). In
4 considering whether a complaint states a claim, a court must
5 generally accept as true all the factual allegations in it.
6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Hamilton v. Brown,
7 630 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2011). The court need not accept
8 as true, however, “allegations that are merely conclusory,
9 unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In
10 re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008)
11 (citation omitted); see also Shelton v. Chorley, 487 F. App’x
12 388, 389 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that district court properly
13 dismissed civil-rights claim when plaintiff’s “conclusory
14 allegations” did not support it).
15 Although a complaint need not include detailed factual
16 allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
17 as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
18 face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
19 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d
20 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2017). A claim is facially plausible when it
21 “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
22 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
23 at 678. “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’
24 and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
25 to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
26 lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
27 curiam) (citations omitted); Byrd v. Phx. Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d
28 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
3
1 DISCUSSION
2 I. The Complaint Does Not State Any Official-Capacity Claim
3 Plaintiff sues Los Angeles County and the Los Angeles County
4 Public Defender in their official capacity and Noguchi in his
5 individual and official capacities. (Compl. at 3.) The Supreme
6 Court has held that an “official-capacity suit is, in all
7 respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the
8 entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); see also
9 Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985). Such a suit “is
10 not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in
11 interest is the entity.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (emphasis in
12 original). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Noguchi in his
13 official capacity are redundant to his claims against the LACPD.
14 Municipalities and local-government entities are considered
15 “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore may be liable for
16 causing a constitutional deprivation. See Monell v. Dep’t of
17 Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 694 (1978); see also Long v.
18 Cnty. of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). Because no
19 respondeat superior liability exists under § 1983, a municipality
20 is liable only for injuries that arise from an official policy or
21 longstanding custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; City of Canton v.
22 Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385-87 (1989). A plaintiff must show “that
23 a [municipal] employee committed the alleged constitutional
24 violation pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a
25 ‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard
26 operating procedure of the local governmental entity.’” Gillette
27 v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)
28 (citation omitted).
4
1 A plaintiff may also establish municipal liability by
2 demonstrating that the alleged constitutional violation was
3 caused by a failure to train municipal employees adequately. See
4 Harris, 489 U.S. at 388. A plaintiff claiming failure to train
5 must allege facts demonstrating the following:
6 (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right, (2) the
7 [County] had a training policy that amounts to deliberate
8 indifference to the constitutional rights of the persons
9 with whom its [employees] are likely to come into
10 contact, and (3) his constitutional injury would have
11 been avoided had the [County] properly trained those
12 [employees].
13 Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007)
14 (citations and alterations omitted); see also Lee v. City of
15 L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir. 2001).
16 Nowhere in the Complaint does Plaintiff identify an
17 “official policy or longstanding custom” that caused a
18 deprivation of his constitutional rights or refer to any events
19 other than his own resentencing. Thus, any Monell claim for
20 damages necessarily fails. See Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764, 767
21 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating in overdetention case that local-
22 government body may be liable if it has policy of inaction and
23 such inaction amounts to failure to protect constitutional
24 rights, but policy must be more than merely negligent); Hayes v.
25 Voong, 709 F. App’x 494, 495 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The district court
26 properly dismissed [plaintiff’s] . . . claims against defendants
27 in their official capacities because [he] failed to identify
28
5
1 . . . a policy or custom of the State that allegedly violated
2 federal law.”).
3 Alleging only that Defendant LACPD “has a duty to properly,
4 hire, train, oversee, supervise, and discipline its employee”
5 (Compl. at 7), Plaintiff does not state municipal liability on a
6 failure-to-train theory either. “A municipality’s culpability
7 for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim
8 turns on a failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,
9 61 (2011). To be an actionable “policy or custom” under § 1983,
10 the failure must amount to “deliberate indifference to the rights
11 of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into
12 contact.” Id. (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 388). Plaintiff’s
13 generic allegation of failure to train without any underlying
14 facts does not meet this standard. See Flores v. Cnty. of L.A.,
15 758 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014) (plaintiff must allege facts
16 to show that municipality disregarded known or obvious
17 consequence that particular omission in training program would
18 cause employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights); see
19 also Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149 (E.D.
20 Cal. 2009) (allegations of inadequate training and hiring
21 insufficient because complaint did not identify what training and
22 hiring practices were, how they were deficient, or how training
23 practices caused plaintiff harm); Bini v. City of Vancouver, 218
24 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1203 (W.D. Wash. 2016) (“Absent allegations of
25 specific shortcomings in the training . . . or facts that might
26 place the City on notice that constitutional deprivations were
27 likely [to] occur, Plaintiff [cannot] adequately [plead] a § 1983
28 claim . . . for failure to train.”).
6
1 For all these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state any
2 official-capacity claim.
3 II. Defendant Noguchi Is Not a State Actor
4 Plaintiff alleges that Noguchi was employed by the LACPD and
5 “acted within the course and scope of his employment.” (Compl.
6 at 3.) Noguchi allegedly did not argue at Plaintiff’s sentencing
7 that his misdemeanor juvenile adjudication was not a strike;
8 thus, he was sentenced to 32 months instead of 16. (Id. at 5.)
9 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that
10 a defendant acted under color of state law to deprive plaintiff
11 of a constitutionally protected right.2 West v. Atkins, 487
12 U.S. 42, 49 (1988); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir.
13 2001). A person acts under color of state law only when
14 exercising power “possessed by virtue of state law and made
15 possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
16 of state law.” United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
17 (1941). Whether a public defender acts under color of state law
18 depends on the nature of the duties he performs. Polk Cnty. v.
19 Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1981). A “public defender does not
20 act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s
21
22
2 Plaintiff repeatedly refers to Defendants as having acted
23 “negligently” or having committed “malpractice” (see, e.g., Compl.
at 5, 7), but such conduct does not rise to the level of a
24
constitutional violation. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
25 U.S. 833, 849 (1998) (“[T]he Constitution does not guarantee due
care on the part of state officials; liability for negligently
26 inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of
constitutional due process.”); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474
27 U.S. 327, 333 (1986) (injuries to life, liberty, or property
inflicted by governmental negligence not addressed by
28
Constitution).
7
1 traditional function as counsel to a defendant in a criminal
2 proceeding.” Id. at 325. Even though deficient performance may
3 cause the “trial process to deprive an accused of his liberty in
4 an unconstitutional manner, the lawyer who may be responsible for
5 the unconstitutional state action does not himself act under
6 color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.” Briscoe v.
7 LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329 n.6 (1983) (citations omitted).
8 Defendant Noguchi functioned as counsel to Plaintiff during
9 the 2011 proceeding. Thus, even though he was employed by a
10 public agency, he was not a state actor for purposes of § 1983
11 liability. See Miranda v. Clark Cnty., 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th
12 Cir. 2003) (en banc) (public defender is held to same standards
13 of competence and integrity as private lawyer and is not state
14 actor). Thus, Plaintiff’s individual-capacity § 1983 claims
15 against Noguchi necessarily fail.3
16 III. The Complaint Does Not Comply with Federal Rule of Civil
17 Procedure 10(a)
18 Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
19 that “[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties.”
20 The title of the Complaint is Ronald Phillips v. County of Los
21 Angeles, suggesting that Plaintiff sues only the County, but on
22
23 3 The Court “intimate[s] no views as to a public defender’s
liability for malpractice in an appropriate case under state tort
24
law.” See Polk Cnty., 454 U.S. at 325; see also Bassett v. Bailey,
25 No. CIV-S-07-1439-LKK-JFM-P., 2007 WL 2382098, at *2 n.1 (E.D. Cal.
Aug. 17, 2007) (public defender may be liable under state tort law
26 for malpractice), accepted by 2007 WL 2797388 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 26,
2007). As noted, Plaintiff seems to raise some state-law claims
27 based on malpractice and negligence. (See, e.g., Compl. at 5, 6.)
The Court declines to screen any such claims until he has stated a
28
federal constitutional claim.
8
1 || page three of the Complaint he names the County, the LACPD, and
2 || Noguchi as Defendants and mentions Doe Defendants throughout his
3] allegations. In any amended complaint, Plaintiff must list all
4||/ the Defendants in the caption or the amended complaint will be
5 || subject to dismissal on that basis alone. See Ferdik v.
6 | Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (as amended).
7 KO RRR RK
8 Tf Plaintiff desires to pursue any of his claims, he is
9 || ORDERED to file a first amended complaint within 28 days of the
10 |} date of this order, remedying the deficiencies discussed above.
11} The FAC should bear the docket number assigned to this case, be
12 |} labeled “First Amended Complaint,” and be complete in and of
13 ||} itself, without reference to the Complaint or any other pleading.
14 may not sue Noguchi under § 1983 because any official-capacity
15 |} claims are redundant of those against the municipal entities and
16 |} the individual-capacity claims are barred for the reasons
17 || discussed above. Plaintiff is warned that if he fails to timely
18 || comply with this order, the Court may dismiss this action on the
19 || grounds set forth above or for failure to prosecute.
20 IT IS SO ORDERED.
21 || DATED: April 1, 2020 [s/
FERNANDO M. OLGUIN
22 U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
23 || Presented by:
fo Brenblate~
Jean Rosenbluth
Magistrate Judge
26
27
28