Opinion

Frederick Banks v. Wedgewood Property Co.

Court
District Court, C.D. California
Filed
Jan 29, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 17.9%

Section 1654 “does not permit plaintiffs to appear 8 pro se where interests other than their own are at stake”

How later courts described this case

  • Section 1654 “does not permit plaintiffs to appear 8 pro se where interests other than their own are at stake”
  • a layperson acting in pro per may not 13 appear or seek relief on behalf of others
  • “courts have routinely 3 adhered to the general rule prohibiting pro se plaintiffs from pursuing claims on 4 behalf of others in a representative capacity”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 5 WOMEN IN OAKLAND Case No. 2:20-cv-00665-ODW (GJS)

CALIFORNIA HOUSE;

12 FREDERICK BANKS, as next ORDER DISMISSING PETITION

friend thereto; WITCHCRAFT

13 RIDDLER; & BLACK MAGICK

BEARS CULT,

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Petitioners

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v.

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WEDGWOOD PROPERTY CO., et

17 al.,

18 Respondents.

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21 On January 22, 2020, a putative 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition was filed in

22 this District [Dkt. 1, “Petition”]. The Petition was filed by Frederick Banks, a

23 convicted criminal incarcerated in Allegheny County Jail in Pittsburgh,

24 Pennsylvania. Banks purports to be acting as “next friend” on behalf of “5 Women

25 in Oakland California House,” “Witchcraft Riddler,” and “Black Magick Bears

26 Cult.” The only person who has signed the Petition is Banks, who mailed the

27 Petition to the Court from Allegheny County Jail and who seeks leave to proceed on

28 an in forma pauperis basis.

1 The Petition names as Respondents: Wedgwood Property Co.; the Central

2 Intelligence Agency (“CIA”); “County Sheriff” (no county specified); Gina Haspel;

3 Michael Atkinson, I.G.; and the House Intelligence Committee. The Petition raises

4 a single claim. Banks alleges that the CIA placed the Petitioners “under a FISA

5 warrant & FISA electronic surveillance using ‘Microwave Hearing’ Technology,”

6 which caused an “illegal eviction order to be lodged” against the Petitioners in

7 Oakland, California. Banks alleges that the CIA’s action violated 50 U.S.C. § 1801

8 et seq. As relief, Banks asks the Court to: “Discharge petitioners from FISA

9 electronic surveillance & restraint”; enjoin the CIA from further “manipulation of

10 petitioners”; and enjoin Respondents and unspecified “others” from evicting

11 Petitioners.1

12 Banks is not a stranger to this District, nor to District and Circuit Courts across

13 the United States. As the Court previously has noted (see, e.g., Case No. 5:19-cv-

14 00780-ODW (GJS), Dkt. 3; Case No. 2:19-cv-08514-ODW (GJS), Dkt. 3), Banks is

15 a well-known bringer of frivolous lawsuits across the country. Pursuant to Rule 201

16 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court has taken judicial notice of the federal

17 court case dockets and filings available through the PACER and Westlaw systems

18 relating to Banks, which show (without a precise count) many, many hundreds (if

19 not well over 1,000) of federal court proceedings initiated by Banks over the past

20 decade.

21 While Banks has a prior criminal history that the Court will not recount here, it

22 is significant that, recently, Banks was tried by jury in the United States District

23 Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania and was found guilty of multiple

24 counts of wire fraud and one count of aggravated identity theft on November 8,

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1 Banks asserts separately that the CIA recently used this same “Microwave Hearing”

27 technology to “remotely kill” the drummer for the band Rush and to down a Ukrainian airliner

carrying 130 “Iranian-Canadians,” which Banks labels as an act of war against Canada. Banks,

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however, does not appear to seek habeas relief on this basis.

1 2019. Banks is awaiting sentencing, which is scheduled for Spring 2020, and

2 remains in custody. See Docket in Case No. 2:15-cr-00168 (W.D. Pa.). Banks also

3 is “a notorious frequent filer” in the federal court system, who has had hundreds of

4 cases dismissed at the pleading stage as frivolous. Banks v. Song, No. 1:17-cv-

5 00339 (D. Haw. July 25, 2017) (Order Dismissing Action and Denying In Forma

6 Pauperis Application); see also Banks v. Cuevas, No. 4:17CV2460, 2018 WL

7 1942192, at *1 (N.D. Ohio April 25, 2018) (describing Banks as a “frequent filer of

8 frivolous actions in federal and state courts”); Banks v. Song, No. 17-00093, 2018

9 WL 3130940, at *1-*2 (D. Guam Jun. 26, 2018) (finding lawsuit filed by Banks

10 related to his Western District of Pennsylvania prosecution that essentially was the

11 same suit that he had filed in a number of other Districts in the United States to be

12 “malicious” and improperly filed in the District of Guam); Banks v. New York

13 Police Dept., No. 4:15-CV-75-RLW, 2015 WL 1414828, at *2-*3 (E.D. Mo. Mar.

14 26, 2015) (dismissing as legally frivolous and malicious mandamus action brought

15 by Banks seeking relief based upon, inter alia, the deaths of Eric Garner and

16 Michael Brown).

17 When federal courts began dismissing Banks’s civil cases under 28 U.S.C. §

18 1915(g) due to his numerous “strikes,” he began filing 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or other

19 types of petitions in an attempt to avoid the Section 1915(g) limitation on his ability

20 to file actions without prepayment of the filing fee. See Banks v. Valaluka, No.

21 1:15-cv-01935 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 2015) (Order denying leave to proceed in forma

22 pauperis and dismissing purported mandamus action).) As one District Court

23 described him:

24 Banks is a well-established, multi-district, frequent filer,

who has brought over 350 cases in the Northern District

25 of Ohio, the District of Massachusetts, the Southern

District of Mississippi, the District of Columbia, the

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Southern District of New York, the Western District of

27 New York, the District of Colorado, the District of

Arizona, the Southern District of Florida, the Middle

28 District of Florida, the Eastern District of North Carolina,

1 Eastern District of Missouri, the Eastern District of New

2 Jersey, the Eastern District of Arkansas, the Western

District of Oklahoma, the District of Utah, and the

3 District of Alaska. All of these cases were dismissed as

frivolous. He has been declared to be subject to three

4 strike provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) on numerous

occasions. Undeterred, Banks utilizes § 2241 to

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circumvent the application of § 1915(g).

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Banks v. Greene, No. 4:18-cv-0884, 2018 WL 4615938, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ohio, Sept.

7 25, 2018).2

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In addition to numerous courts having found Banks’s case-initiating filings to be

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frivolous, Banks has been designated as a vexatious litigant. See, e.g., Banks v.

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Pope Francis, No. 2:15-cv-01400 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2015) (Order designating

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Petitioner as a vexatious litigant). That vexatious litigant designation has been

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ordered extended to cover filings made by Banks on behalf of any other persons,

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whether as a purported “next friend” or otherwise, unless and until he has complied

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with the requirements of the original vexatious litigant designation order. See

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United States v. Miller, 726 Fed. App’x 107 (June 7, 2018) (affirming district court

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order so extending scope of vexatious litigant order entered against Banks).

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As even the most cursory review of his cases available through the PACER

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system shows, Banks has a history of filing delusional and meritless actions on his

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own behalf or on behalf of others with whom he has no connection, often (as here)

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alleging electronic surveillance by the CIA or others. See, e.g., Banks v. Crooked

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Hilary, No. 2:16-cv-07954 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2016) (Order denying leave to

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proceed in forma pauperis and discussing some of the prior decisions finding

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Petitioner’s actions to be frivolous and delusional); Schlemmer v. Central

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Intelligence Agency, No. 2:15-cv-01583 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2015) (Order dismissing

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26 2 Banks also has filed a number of actions in this District that have been summarily

dismissed as frivolous. See Case Nos.: 2:15-cv-04225-ODW (GJSx); 2:16-cv-05544-JAK (KSx);

27 2:16-cv-07398-R (JPSx); 2:16-cv-07954-ODW (GJS); 2:17-cv-05412-GW (JPRx); 5:18-cv-

00526-ODW (GJS); 5:19-cv-00780-ODW (GJS); 2:19-cv-06748-JAK (JC); 2:19-cv-07428-ODW

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(GJS); 2:19-cv-08514-ODW (GJS); and 2:19-cv-10468-ODW (GJS).

1 with prejudice a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition filed by Petitioner as purported

2 “next friend” on behalf of a criminal defendant with whom he had no relationship);

3 Valaluka, supra (Order at 2: “Banks has not limited his frivolous filings to cases he

4 files in his own name, but has expanded his efforts by filing cases and motions on

5 behalf of other prisoners, often without their knowledge or consent.”). The instant

6 Petition is yet one more in his ongoing series of vexatious and improper litigation.

7 The claim alleged in the Petition is facially frivolous but particularly so to the

8 extent that it purports to be raised under the guise of a habeas action.3 No

9 cognizable and viable theory of habeas relief has been stated as to anyone, much

10 less as to the named Petitioners on whose behalf this habeas petition purportedly is

11 brought, none of whom appear to be in custody in the United States.4 There is no

12 habeas relief that any federal court could provide anyone based on the allegations of

13 the Petition. The matters alleged in the Petition simply do not involve situations in

14 which 28 U.S.C. § 2241 federal habeas jurisdiction properly can be invoked.

15 An equally critical, and obvious, defect in the Petition is that Banks has no right

16 or standing to seek habeas or any other type of relief as a representative acting on

17 behalf of anyone. There is no evidence before the Court that any of the named

18 Petitioners possibly would wish to have Banks – a pro se vexatious litigant and

19 convicted criminal awaiting sentencing, with a documented longstanding history of

20 filing utterly frivolous and delusional actions – act as his or her or its legal

21 representative in seeking any relief in federal courts. Indeed, no rational or sane

22 reason exists to believe that this is the case.

23 Apart from the factually frivolous nature of Banks’s assertion that he is entitled

24 to act on behalf of the named Petitioners, his attempt to do so is legally frivolous.

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26 3 The claim also is factually and legally frivolous within the meaning of Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-22 (1989), and Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

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4 Unlike in some of his other purported habeas actions, Banks here is appearing solely in his

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status as an asserted “next friend” for the named Petitioners. [Petition at 1.]

1 Generally, non-lawyers may not represent other persons in court. See, e.g., Simon v.

2 Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008) (“courts have routinely

3 adhered to the general rule prohibiting pro se plaintiffs from pursuing claims on

4 behalf of others in a representative capacity”); Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. Of Educ.,

5 161 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 1998). 28 U.S.C. § 1654 permits persons to appear on a

6 pro se basis only in their “own cases personally.” See Shephard v. Wellman, 313

7 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002) (Section 1654 “does not permit plaintiffs to appear

8 pro se where interests other than their own are at stake”). Local Rule 83-2.10.2

9 expressly prohibits a pro se litigant from delegating his representation to any other

10 person. Because Banks is not a lawyer authorized to practice in this Court, he may

11 not pursue relief on behalf of anyone else. See C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United

12 States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (a layperson acting in pro per may not

13 appear or seek relief on behalf of others). Banks has been told this time and time

14 again yet persists in bringing purported, and plainly improper, habeas actions on

15 behalf of others, further proving his inappropriateness to act as a representative of

16 anyone else.

17 While Banks asserts that he is acting as the “next friend” of the named

18 Petitioners, next friend status “is by no means granted automatically to whomever

19 seeks to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.

20 149, 163 (1990). There are two “‘firmly rooted prerequisites’” that must be met

21 before a next friend can be appointed: (1) the putative next friend must provide an

22 adequate explanation, such as mental incompetence or other disability, regarding

23 why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf; and (2) the putative

24 next friend must be “‘truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose

25 behalf he seeks to litigate,’” which requires the existence of a “‘significant

26 relationship’” between the two persons. Dennis ex rel. Butko v. Budge, 378 F.3d

27 880, 888 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The burden of establishing these two

28 requirements is on the putative next friend. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164. Because the

1 standing of a next friend is a jurisdictional issue, the Court lacks jurisdiction if these

2 requirements are not satisfied. Id.; see also Dennis, 378 F.3d at 888 n.5.

3 The Petition fails entirely to satisfy these requirements. Although Banks states

4 that he is entitled to act as the “next friend” for the named Petitioners, he proffers no

5 explanation of why, and none appears possible. The second Whitmore requirement

6 also plainly is not, and cannot be, satisfied. There is no declaration or other

7 evidence before the Court indicating that Banks has a “significant relationship” with

8 any of the named Petitioners, much less that Banks is truly dedicated to their

9 interests. As Banks is not a lawyer and has a long history of filing baseless and

10 nonsensical lawsuits, there is no basis for finding that he will be able to provide

11 these Petitioners – or indeed anybody – with adequate representation in a habeas

12 proceeding or any other type of proceeding, and his litigation history indicates

13 precisely the opposite, namely, summary dismissal after summary dismissal of the

14 actions he brings. Moreover, Banks is incarcerated in a Pennsylvania jail and is

15 awaiting sentencing on his federal criminal conviction, and he lacks the physical and

16 financial means to pursue this action on anyone’s behalf. Significantly, with the

17 Petition, Banks has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis in which he

18 states that he has no money.

19 “[I]ndividuals not licensed to practice law by the state may not use the ‘next

20 friend’ device as an artifice for the unauthorized practice of law.” Weber v. Garza,

21 570 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1978). Banks, an unlicensed, lay incarcerated person,

22 may not represent anyone else in this Court or elsewhere, nor may he sign pleadings

23 or receive court documents on behalf of anyone else. There is no basis for finding

24 that Banks may bring and pursue this habeas action on behalf of any other person,

25 whether as their “next friend” or otherwise. Plainly, he lacks standing to do so. As

26 a result, jurisdiction is lacking and the Petition must be dismissed.

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1 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: the Petition is dismissed; and Judgment

2 || shall be entered dismissing this action.

4 || DATED: _January 29, 2020

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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7 || Submitted by:

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10 || GAIL J. STANDISH

4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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