taking judicial 25 notice of opinion and briefs filed in another proceeding
How later courts described this case
- taking judicial 25 notice of opinion and briefs filed in another proceeding
- courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and 27 without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to 28 matters at issue” (citation omitted)
- declining to consolidate federal habeas and civil rights actions, 7 stating that “the risk of confusion of the issues inherent in consolidation of the 8 habeas and civil rights cases weighs against consolidation”
- explaining that “prisoners may not 13 challenge mere conditions of confinement in habeas corpus”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10 WESTERN DIVISION
11 KING SOL OM ON SEKHEMRE ) Case No. 2:20-cv-00542-JFW-JDE
)
12 EL NETER, )
) AMENDED ORDER TO SHOW
13 Petitioner, ) CAUSE WHY THE PETITION
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14 v. ) SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED
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15 ALEX VILLANUEVA, Sheriff, )
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16 Respondent. )
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18 I.
19 BACKGROUND
20 On January 17, 2020, the Court received a Petition for Writ of Habeas
21 Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, purportedly on behalf of King Sol Om On
22 Sekhemre El Neter (“Petitioner”). Dkt. 1 (“Petition” or “Pet.”). On the
23 Petition form, Petitioner did not check boxes indicating he was in custody as a
24 pretrial detainee or having been sentenced; instead, Petitioner checked “other”
25 and explained “under threat duress and coercion of an involuntary
26 commitment to a state hospital.” Pet at 1 (CM/ECF pagination is used herein
27 to page references in the Petition). He further asserts the sole challenge raised
28
1 by the Petition is to “the validity of lawful jurisdiction.” Id. at 2. According to
2 other allegations in the Petition and state court records available
3 electronically,1 Petitioner is a pretrial detainee at Twin Towers Correctional
4 Facility (“Twin Towers”) on state criminal charges in Los Angeles County
5 Superior Court Case No. TA147092, with “further proceedings” having taken
6 place as recently as January 16, 2020. Pet. at 1, 6; Los Angeles County
7 Superior Court (“Superior Court Website”) at www.lacourt.org. The Petition
8 asserts constitutional violations arising from Petitioner’s arrest, detention, and
9 the conditions of his confinement in four grounds. Pet. at 4-7. Petitioner
10 separately filed a document entitled “Additional Ground” which purports to
11 assert a fifth ground. Dkt. 3 (“Supp. Pet.”).
12 A habeas petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is subject to the same
13 screening requirements that apply to habeas petitions brought under 28 U.S.C.
14 § 2254. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
15 Courts (“Habeas Rules”), Habeas Rule 1(b) (providing that district courts may
16 apply the Habeas Rules to habeas petitions that are not brought under 28
17 U.S.C. § 2254). Accordingly, a district court “must promptly examine” the
18 petition and, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition . . . that the petitioner is
19 not entitled to relief,” the “judge must dismiss the petition.” Habeas Rule 4;
20 Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656 (2005).
21 The Court has reviewed the Petition under Rule 4 of the Habeas Rules
22 and finds it is subject to dismissal for the reasons explained below.
23
24 1 Courts may take judicial notice of the existence of court filings and another court’s
orders. See Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 866 (9th Cir. 2002) (taking judicial
25
notice of opinion and briefs filed in another proceeding); United States ex rel.
26 Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir.
1992) (courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and
27
without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to
28 matters at issue” (citation omitted)).
1 II.
2 PETITIONER’S CLAIMS
3 1. Petitioner is “unlawfully restrained as a foreigner to the State of
4 California ‘Diversity of Citizenship’ (28 USCA 1332) 13TH AMEND.” Pet. at
5 4. In support, Petitioner alleges that the “complaint” by Plaintiff against
6 Defendant, which the Court interprets to refer to the underlying state criminal
7 action, names “merely a fictitious party whom no cause of action can be
8 validly alleged”; there is no “legitimate proof” that “Petitioner is a contractor
9 in the State of California”; and the “state proceedings are being undertaken in
bad faith with intentions to harass and trespass on the Petitioner[’]s estate
10
when there is no valid commitment, an invalid plea was procured by fraud
11
after . . . [a] special appearance to challenge jurisdiction. Id.
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2. “Petitioner’s [First] Amendment, Right to Privacy, Freedom of
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Choice, Free Exercise, and Faith and Healing Exemption is invaded by an
14
invalid civil commitment.” Pet. at 5. In support, Petitioner alleges jurisdiction
15
is lacking for his detention as he does not have a mental health disorder and is
16
not a danger to himself of others and, as a foreign national, is entitled to “faith
17
healing exemption without interruption or the invasion of privacy rights.” Id.
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3. Petitioner’s “unlawful detention is a result of a repetitive ‘breach of
19
due process’ though a defective pleading and procedural requirements.” Pet. at
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6. In support, Petitioner alleges that after his Fifth Amendment due process
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rights were violated by an unlawful seizure, “a continuing breach became a
22
pattern” due to coercion during the booking process and his “invalid
23
commitment” to a state hospital stemming from a void indictment procured by
24
fraud. Id. Petitioner further claims that at his arraignment, he filed a demurrer
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while overcoming an attempt by a bailiff to swindle him, part of a court
26
conspiracy against him. Id. Petitioner further claims he entered an involuntary
27
plea to charges unsupported by a probable cause determination and was
28
fraudulent denied a timely preliminary hearing. Id.
1 4. “Petitioner is falsely imprisoned as a result of a malicious arrest
2 without probable cause by deadly force (unlawful seizure 4th Am.).” Pet. at 7.
3 In support, Petitioner references various “reports” regarding investigations of
4 “the malicious arrest by way of deadly force” and testimony at “the
5 preliminary hearing” regarding the use of a taser ten time upon Petitioner, five
6 times with a “dry stun.” Id.
7 5. “Petitioner was denied the right to an impartial jury, adequate or
self-representations, and the means to prepare and present an affirmative
8
defense (6th Amendment) Speedy Trial Act (1974). Supp. Pet. at 1. In support,
9
Petitioner seeks “to have a jury present during the incompetency hearing” and
10
a “criminal suspension” of a public defender who alleged has a conflict of
11
interest. Id. Petitioner also states he has been incarcerated for 17 months, 10 of
12
which in “criminal suspension,” which constitute extraordinary circumstances
13
and have caused irreparable injury, including loss of law books, exculpatory
14
evidence and private foreign documents. Id. at 2.
15
III.
16
DISCUSSION
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A. The Court Must Abstain from Interfering with Petitioner’s Ongoing
18
State Prosecution
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Many of Petitioner’s claims challenge aspects of his ongoing state
20
criminal proceedings. Petitioner appears to challenge whether there was
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probable cause for his arrest on the pending charges, whether he received
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appropriate due process protections in ongoing state criminal proceedings, a
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state court mental competency determination and what Petitioner, who resides
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at Twin Towers, calls the “threat, duress and coercion of an involuntary
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commitment to a state hospital,” and the use of force during his arrest, which
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would potentially implicate the charges against him for assault with a deadly
27
weapon or by means likely to produce great bodily injury upon the person of a
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1 peace officer or firefighter in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 245(c). See
2 Superior Court Website. To the extent Petitioner challenges ongoing state
3 criminal proceedings, the Court must abstain from hearing such challenges.
4 “Only a limited number of pre-trial challenges have been found
5 cognizable under Section 2241. Generally, pre-trial habeas challenges have
6 been allowed only when a state defendant contends he is being deprived of his
7 right to a speedy trial or the Double Jeopardy Clause will be violated if he is
8 tried.” Fritz v. Cty. of Los Angeles CA, 2012 WL 5197971, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
9 Oct. 18, 2012) (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S.
10 484, 488-93 (1973)); McNeely v. Blanas, 336 F.3d 822, 824 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003)
11 (as amended). However, as the Supreme Court has explained, “federal habeas
12 corpus does not lie, absent ‘special circumstances,’ to adjudicate the merits of
13 an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior to a judgment of
14 conviction by a state court.” Braden, 410 U.S. at 489.
15 Principles of comity and federalism require federal courts to abstain from
16 intervening in pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary
17 circumstances. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971). Younger
18 abstention applies to both attempts to preclude and/or stay criminal
19 prosecutions and attempts to obtain more limited or piecemeal intervention in
20 state criminal actions. See, e.g., Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 130 (1975)
21 (explaining that Supreme Court precedent establishes that “at least in the
22 absence of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ federal courts must refuse to
23 intervene in state criminal proceedings to suppress the use of evidence claimed
24 to have been obtained through unlawful means”); Dubinka v. Judges of the
25 Superior Court of Cal. for the Cty. of L.A., 23 F.3d 218, 223-26 (9th Cir. 1994)
26 (concluding that a request to enjoin enforcement of a criminal discovery statute
27 and to suppress evidence obtained under that statute could not be entertained).
28 Abstention principles generally require federal courts to abstain from
1 exercising jurisdiction over a habeas petition in which the petitioner raises an
2 affirmative defense to a state prosecution unless (1) the state proceedings are
3 being undertaken in bad faith or to harass, where there is no “hope of
4 obtaining a valid conviction,” or (2) “in other extraordinary circumstances
5 where irreparable injury can be shown.” Brown v. Ahern, 676 F.3d 899, 903
6 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v.
7 Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 435-37 (1982). Irreparable injury alone,
8 however, is insufficient to warrant federal intervention unless the irreparable
9 injury is both great and immediate. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 46.
10 In this case, abstention appears appropriate because all the Younger
11 abstention requirements are met. As noted, Petitioner’s state criminal
12 proceedings are ongoing. Petitioner is in pretrial custody on the criminal
13 charges for which he is detained. Second the state’s task of enforcing its laws
14 against socially harmful conduct is “important and necessary,” Younger, 401
15 U.S. at 51-52, and as such, the state proceedings implicate important state
16 interests. Third, Petitioner has an adequate opportunity to raise his federal
17 habeas claims in his pending state proceedings. Finally, there is nothing to
18 indicate the circumstances of Petitioner’s case fall within any recognized
19 exception to the Younger doctrine.
20 To the extent Petitioner asserts his speedy trial argument creates an
21 “extraordinary circumstance,” the Ninth Circuit has explained that a claimed
22 violation of the Speedy Trial Clause in and of itself is not an independent
23 “extraordinary circumstance” necessitating pre-trial habeas consideration.
24 Brown, 676 F.3d at 901. “[A]bsent specifically defined extraordinary
25 circumstances, principles of federalism and comity prohibit a federal district
26 court from entertaining a pre-conviction habeas petition that raises a Speedy
27 Trial claim as an affirmative defense to state prosecution.” Id. at 900. In
28 Braden, the petitioner sought habeas relief, claiming a denial of his
1 constitutional right to a speedy trial and requesting an order directing the
2 respondent to afford him an immediate trial on his then three-year old
3 Kentucky indictment. 410 U.S. at 486. The Supreme Court held that the
4 petitioner was entitled to raise his speedy trial claim at that time because: (1)
5 he was in custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241; (2) he exhausted all
6 available state remedies; and (3) he did not seek to litigate a defense to a
7 criminal charge, but instead, sought a prompt trial. Id. at 488-90. Under these
8 limited circumstances, no “legitimate interest of federalism” was jeopardized
9 by allowing the petitioner to seek Section 2241 relief. Id. at 492. The Supreme
10 Court emphasized, however, that nothing in its decision “would permit the
11 derailment of a pending state proceeding by an attempt to litigate
12 constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court.” Id. at 493.
13 Here, unlike the petitioner in Braden, Petitioner has not exhausted his state
14 remedies, as discussed further below, and, in challenging the constitutionality
15 of the superior court’s jurisdiction, does seek to litigate a defense to the
16 criminal charge. Thus, here, a claim of a speedy trial violation alone does not
17 appear to constitute an extraordinary circumstance.
18 Although there is no statutory exhaustion requirement for Section 2241
19 actions, federal courts have imposed a prudential exhaustion requirement. See
20 Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). “The rule of exhaustion
21 in federal habeas corpus actions is rooted in considerations of federal-state
22 comity” and is “not limited to challenges to the validity of state court
23 convictions.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973). Here, it appears
24 Petitioner has not sought any relief in the California Court of Appeal or
25 California Supreme Court. See Pet. at 3-4 (identifying only “appeals” or
26 grievances sent to the ALCU, this Court, and the State Bar of California).
27 Given Petitioner’s failure to seek any relief in the state courts, considerations of
28 comity and federalism preclude Petitioner from proceeding to federal court
1 without first exhausting his claims in state court. See Fritz, 2012 WL 5197971,
2 at *4 (“Federalism and comity concerns preclude Petitioner’s attempt to
3 proceed in federal court without first affording the state courts the opportunity
4 to consider his claims and provide any relief that is appropriate.”).
5 Thus, Younger abstention is appropriate to the extent the Petition
6 challenges an aspect of Petitioner’s underlying state criminal proceedings.
7 When Younger applies, and the petitioner seeks injunctive relief, as the
8 Petition does here by challenging “lawful jurisdiction” of the state court, the
9 Court has no discretion to grant such relief. See Colorado River Water
10 Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 n.22 (1976); Garrison
11 v. California, 2018 WL 2106488, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2018).
12 B. Petitioner’s Civil Rights Claims Should Be Dismissed
13 The remaining claims in the Petition (and to the extent the excessive
14 force claim does not challenge Petitioner’s underlying criminal proceedings) do
15 not fall within “the core of habeas corpus,” and as such, they are properly
16 raised, if at all, in a civil rights action, not a habeas petition.
17 Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to
18 imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus and a civil rights complaint. See
19 Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam). Challenges to the
20 validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration fall within
21 the “core” of habeas corpus. Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006);
22 Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004). “By contrast, constitutional
23 claims that merely challenge the conditions of prisoner’s confinement, whether
24 the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside of that core and may
25 be brought pursuant to § 1983 in the first instance.” Nelson, 541 U.S. at 643;
26 Hill, 547 U.S. at 579; Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en
27 banc) (concluding that “a § 1983 action is the exclusive vehicle for claims
28 brought by state prisoners that are not within the core of habeas corpus”).
1 Thus, if success on a habeas petitioner’s claim would not necessarily lead to his
2 immediate or earlier release from confinement, the claim does not fall within
3 “the core of habeas corpus” and thus, must be pursued, if at all, under 42
4 U.S.C. § 1983. Nettles, 830 F.3d at 935 (citing Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S.
5 521, 535 n.13 (2011)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir.
6 2003).
7 Here, although it is not entirely clear, it appears Petitioner’s claims
8 regarding the denial of his First Amendment rights, right to privacy, freedom
9 of choice, free exercise, and “faith healing exemption” all relate to the
10 conditions of his confinement. Success on these claims would not result in an
11 immediate or speedier release from custody, despite the relief being sought in
12 the Petition. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 933 (explaining that “prisoners may not
13 challenge mere conditions of confinement in habeas corpus”); Shook v. Apker,
14 472 F. App’x 702, 702-03 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding claims on conditions of
15 confinement were properly brought in a civil rights action despite the relief
16 sought); Stephens v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 2019 WL 1412123, at *1 (C.D.
17 Cal. Feb. 20, 2019) (concluding that conditions of confinement claims must be
18 brought in Section 1983 action regardless of the petitioner’s request for release
19 from custody), Report and Recommendation accepted by 2019 WL 1406954
20 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2019); Crane v. Beard, 2017 WL 1234096, at *4 (C.D.
21 Cal. Apr. 3, 2017) (finding that claims challenging the petitioner’s conditions
22 of confinement were not cognizable on federal habeas review). As such, these
23 claims do not fall within “the core of habeas corpus” and Petitioner must
24 instead pursue these claims, if at all, in a Section 1983 action.
25 C. Converting the Petition into a Civil Rights Complaint is Not
26 Warranted
27 The Court recognizes that there are some circumstances in which it may
28 be appropriate for a district court to convert a non-cognizable habeas petition
1 into a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at
2 935-36 (involving a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition). However, the Court finds that
3 this action is not amenable for such conversion for a number of reasons. First,
4 simultaneously proceeding with habeas and civil rights claims in a single
5 action likely is improper. See Malone v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1234, 1236-37 (9th
6 Cir. 1999) (declining to consolidate federal habeas and civil rights actions,
7 stating that “the risk of confusion of the issues inherent in consolidation of the
8 habeas and civil rights cases weighs against consolidation”). Here, the civil
9 rights claims relate to conditions of, and Petitioner’s treatment in, county jail,
10 while his potential habeas claims appear to relate to his ongoing state criminal
11 proceedings. The Court determines that proceeding in a single action with both
12 sets of claims is not warranted. See McGowan v. Hendrick, 2014 WL 791802,
13 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2014) (declining to convert habeas petition into civil
14 rights action where operative pleading contained both civil rights and habeas
15 claims). Second, prisoner civil rights actions are subject to different
16 requirements (and higher filing fees) than are federal habeas proceedings. The
17 petition must be amenable to conversion “on its face,” that is, it must name the
18 correct defendants and seek the correct relief. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 936. As
19 noted, Petitioner would not be entitled to the relief sought based on the
20 allegations regarding his conditions of confinement. See Stephens, 2019 WL
21 1412123, at *1 (explaining that an appropriate remedy on claims relating to the
22 conditions of confinement would be in the form of damages or a change in
23 conditions, not release). Further, the Petition names only the Sheriff Alex
24 Villanueva as the respondent. It is unclear whether the Sheriff would be the
25 appropriate defendant in a civil rights action based on the allegations in the
26 Petition. Third, as pled, Petitioner’s claims potentially would be subject to
27 dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, which
28 could subject him to a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
1 IV.
2 ORDER
3 Because the Court must abstain from hearing any habeas claims
4 || challenging Petitioner’s ongoing state criminal proceedings and should decline
5 ||to consider Petitioner’s civil rights claims in this action, it appears that the
6 || Petition is subject to dismissal. It also appears, for the reasons set forth above,
7 leave to amend is not warranted. See, e.g., Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp.,
8 ||284 F.3d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Because any amendment would be
9 || futile, there was no need to prolong the litigation by permitting further
10 |}amendment.”); Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1087-88 (9th Cir.
11 2002) (holding that there was no need to prolong litigation by permitting
12 |}amendment where the “basic flaw” in the pleading could not be cured).
13 Petitioner is therefore ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why this action
14 |/should not be dismissed without prejudice by filing a written response by no
15 than thirty (30) days from the date of this Order which sets forth any valid
16 || legal and/or factual reasons why the Petition should not be dismissed.
17 Instead of filing a written response to the matters addressed in this
18 || Order, Petitioner may voluntarily dismiss the action by filing a Notice of
19 || Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). The Clerk is
20 || directed to send Petitioner a Central District Request for Dismissal form.
21 The Court warns Petitioner that failure to timely file a response to
22 Order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed
23 || without prejudice for the reasons explained above, and for failure to
24 || prosecute and comply with Court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
25
Dated: January 24, 2020
21 het AF
28 nited States Magistrate Judge
11