Judith Locke v. Dennis Massie

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JS-6

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES -- GENERAL

Case No. CV 19-10413-JFW(ASx) Date: January 17, 2020

Title: Judith Locke -v- Dennis Massie, et al.

PRESENT:

HONORABLE JOHN F. WALTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Shannon Reilly None Present

Courtroom Deputy Court Reporter

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS: ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:

None None

PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO SAN LUIS OBISPO

SUPERIOR COURT

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On March 27, 2018, Plaintiff Judith Locke (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants

Dennis Massie and Samantha Massie in San Luis Obispo Superior Court. In her Complaint,

Plaintiff alleges that she and Dennis Massie each have a fifty percent ownership interest in

property located at 30 2nd Street, Templeton, California (the “Property”). Plaintiff also alleges that

there are several liens and encumbrances, including federal tax liens, on the Property which affect

Dennis Massie’s one-half interest. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Dennis Massie is denying her

access to the Property and has refused her demand to sell the Property or to otherwise

communicate with her regarding the Property. Plaintiff seeks, amongst other remedies, partition by

sale of the Property.

On August 7, 2019, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint to Substitute True Names for

Fictitious Names Pursuant to [California] Code of Civil Procedure Section § [sic] 474 (“Amendment

to the Complaint”), which substituted United States of America Department of the Treasury Internal

Revenue Service, CitiBank, N.A., State of California Franchise Tax Board, Cavalry SPV I, LLC,

and R. Michael Devitt for Does 1 through 5. On December 9, 2019, Defendant United States of

America filed a Notice of Removal, alleging that “[t]his action may be removed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1444 and 2410 because it requests the partition of property against which the United

States holds federal tax liens.” Notice of Removal, ¶ 4. On January 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Notice

of Dismissal Pursuant to Federal Rules fo Civil Procedure 41(a) or (c), dismissing the United

States of America Department of Treasury Internal Revenue Service from the Complaint. On

January 13, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Rule 26(f) Report, in which she “respectfully request[ed] that the

Court remand the action sua sponte back to Superior Court” in light of the dismissal of the United

States. Rule 26(f) Report, 2:20-21. Plaintiff also represented that both the now-dismissed United

States and R. Michael Devitt “support the remand of this matter by the Court sua sponte.” Rule

26(f) Report, 3:1-2.

II. Legal Standard

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction only over

matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School

District, 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). “Because of the Congressional purpose to restrict the

jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal, the statute is strictly construed, and federal jurisdiction

must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Duncan v.

Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations and quotations omitted). There is a strong

presumption that the Court is without jurisdiction unless the contrary affirmatively appears. See

Fifty Associates v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 446 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir.

1990).

III. Discussion

Section 1444 provides that “[a]ny action brought under § 2410 of this title against the

United States in any State court may be removed by the United States to the district court of the

United States for the district and division in which the action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1444

(emphasis added). Section 2410 provides, in part, that:

(a) Under the conditions prescribed in this section and section 1444 of this title for the

protection of the United States, the United States may be named a party in any

civil action or suit in any district court, or in any State court having jurisdiction of the

subject matter-

(1) to quiet title to,

(2) to foreclose a mortgage or other lien upon,

(3) to partition,

(4) to condemn, or

(5) of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader with respect to,

real or personal property on which the United States has or claims a mortgage or

other lien.

28 U.S.C. § 2410 (emphasis added)

In this case, because the United States was named as a defendant in an action to partition

real property on which the United States has tax liens, the United States removed this action

pursuant to Section 1444 and 2410. However, Plaintiff has dismissed the United States from this

action as a party defendant and “it is only the presence of the United States as a party defendant

herein which made [this action] removable from state court.” Kasdon v. G.W. Zierden

Landscaping, Inc., 541 F.Supp. 991 (D. Colo. 1982) (remanding action after the United States was

dismissed from action and holding that “plaintiffs’ claims against the other defendants may be

better litigated in” state court); see also Chicago Title Co. v. Morris, 2007 WL 4239505 (E.D. Cal.

Nov. 30, 2007) (remanding action removed pursuant to Sections 1444 and 2410 after the court

granted the United States’ claim for judgment because “the Court no longer has a basis for

jurisdiction”). Accordingly, this action is REMANDED to San Luis Obispo Superior Court.

Rostykus v. Rostykus, 352 F.Supp. 62 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (holding that divorce case in which the

United States had intervened had been properly removed to federal court for the limited purpose of

determining the validity and application of alleged tax liens on certain property of the parties, but

holding that once the tax lien issues were resolved, “the case will be remanded to the State Court

for further proceedings”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.