Stevenson v. Martin County Board of Education

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ALEX STEVENSON, by and through his 

father and next friend, Elmer

William Stevenson; ELMER WILLIAM

STEVENSON, on his own behalf,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MARTIN COUNTY BOARD OF

EDUCATION; WILLIE C. PEELE,

Superintendent of Martin County  No. 99-2685

Schools, individually and in his

official capacity; HARRY D. RESPASS,

Principal of Williamston Middle

School, individually and in his

official capacity; SWANOLA CHANCE,

teacher at Williamston Middle

School, individually and in her

official capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.



Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern.

Malcolm J. Howard, District Judge.

(CA-99-84-4-H3)

Argued: September 25, 2000

Decided: February 6, 2001

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

2 STEVENSON v. MARTIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Robert John McAfee, MCCOTTER, MCAFEE & ASH-

TON, L.L.P., New Bern, North Carolina, for Appellants. Michael

Crowell, THARRINGTON SMITH, L.L.P., Raleigh, North Carolina,

for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Charles K. McCotter, Jr., MCCOTTER,

MCAFEE & ASHTON, L.L.P., New Bern, North Carolina; Stacey B.

Bawtinhimer, LAW OFFICE OF STACEY B. BAWTINHIMER,

New Bern, North Carolina, for Appellants. Lisa Lukasik, THAR-

RINGTON SMITH, L.L.P., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Alex Stevenson, by his father, Elmer William Stevenson, and the

senior Mr. Stevenson, on his own behalf, brought this action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against the Martin County Board of Education and sev-

eral school officials. Alex alleged that the defendants violated his lib-

erty interest in bodily integrity and his property interest in a public

education when they allowed his classmates to physically assault him

at school over a period of several weeks. Alex also alleged a violation

of the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act as well as

constitutional and common law claims under North Carolina law. The

district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law

claims. Because Alex has not alleged sufficient facts to hold the

school board or its officials liable for federal constitutional violations

and because a private right of action is not available under the Safe

Schools Act, we affirm the dismissal of the federal claims. We also

hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

STEVENSON v. MARTIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 3

I.

The complaint sets forth a disturbing set of facts, which we take as

true. In August 1998 ten-year-old Alex Stevenson began the sixth

grade at Williamston Middle School in Martin County, North Caro-

lina. He did not finish the year there, however. In November his

father had to remove him from Williamston Middle School and enroll

him in a private school because of the repeated assaults Alex suffered

at the hands of several of his classmates.

The abuse started as soon as the school year began. On August 7,

1998, the second day of school, Alex’s sixth-grade classmates Charles

McEachern and Kemadrick Terrell Sherrod robbed and assaulted

Alex in the lunch yard. Several days later on August 10 Sherrod threw

books at Alex, and Sherrod was subsequently suspended. On August

20 McEachern picked a fight with Alex in retaliation for Sherrod’s

suspension. The school suspended both McEachern and Alex because

of this fight.

On August 20 Alex’s father, Elmer William Stevenson

("Stevenson"), met with the principal of Williamston Middle School,

Harry Respass. At this meeting Stevenson told Respass that McEach-

ern was threatening Alex, and he (Stevenson) expressed his concern

that McEachern and his friends would seek revenge on Alex. Steven-

son then requested that the school remove Alex from McEachern’s

classes. Although Respass assured Stevenson that the boys would be

placed in separate classes, this was not done.

For the next month (from mid-August to mid-September) McEach-

ern continued to harass and intimidate Alex. As he walked past Alex’s

locker, McEachern would hit and kick Alex in the head, chest, and

back. Alex and his father complained to Principal Respass and school

counselor Babbie Mills about these assaults, but McEachern was nei-

ther disciplined nor removed from Alex’s classes.

The situation reached a new low on September 18. Alex and

McEachern were in Swanola Chance’s first-period art class, and

McEachern wrongly accused Alex of breaking his glasses. When

Alex denied it, McEachern began to punch Alex in the head. Alex

temporarily escaped from the attack and asked Chance for help, but

4 STEVENSON v. MARTIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION

she responded, "There isn’t anything I can do." She added, "You

probably deserved it anyway." Because he was receiving no help from

Chance, Alex told her that he was going to the principal’s office.

McEachern and a friend, Broderick Jones, followed Alex out of the

classroom and chased him down the hallway. They knocked Alex to

the floor, and for about ten minutes proceeded to punch and kick him

in the head, throat, chest, arms, and legs. Adele Dees, a teacher in a

nearby classroom, tried to stop McEachern and Jones, but they

assaulted her as well. Several students eventually restrained the two

attackers.

McEachern and Jones were suspended, and for several weeks they

attended a school for students with disciplinary problems. Principal

Respass did not, however, report the assaults to the juvenile authori-

ties. On September 21 Stevenson filed juvenile petitions against

McEachern and Jones, alleging assault with infliction of serious bod-

ily injury. In January 1999 McEachern and Jones admitted the

charges and received sentences of twelve-months probation and com-

munity service.

While the juvenile proceedings were pending, the assaults on Alex

continued. On September 22 three of McEachern’s friends threatened

Alex during his first-period class. Alex promptly reported the threats

to Principal Respass, but that did not prevent McEachern and his

friends from assaulting Alex later in the day during lunch. One of the

lunchtime attackers was suspended from school. On September 25

McEachern and several of his friends harassed Alex and his father

while they were at a music festival in Williamston. The police inter-

vened and escorted McEachern from the scene. Stevenson finally

decided that because of the assaults and harassment, Alex would have

to transfer to private school.

Alex suffered physical and emotional problems because of the

repeated assaults and harassment. After the September 18 assault a

doctor treated him for contusions, lacerations, and temporary eye dys-

function. A psychologist diagnosed Alex with major depression and

attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and Alex began taking medi-

cation. He continues to receive counseling for his psychological prob-

lems.

STEVENSON v. MARTIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 5

Alex, through his father as next friend, and his father sued the Mar-

tin County Board of Education, Superintendent Willie Peele, Principal

Respass, and Chance (the teacher) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state

law. Alex alleged that by failing to prevent McEachern and his fellow

ruffians from attacking Alex, the defendants deprived him of his lib-

erty interest in bodily integrity and his property interest in a public

education, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Alex also alleged that

the defendants violated the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Commu-

nities Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. § 7101-7104, 7111-7143. The state law

counts asserted claims of negligence, assault, negligent infliction of

emotional distress, and violations of the North Carolina Constitution

and the North Carolina Safe Schools Act. The district court granted

the defendants’ motion to dismiss, disposing of the federal claims

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and the state law claims under 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Alex and his father appeal.

II.

We review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6), "accepting as true the well-pleaded facts in the com-

plaint and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."

Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996).

Because this is a civil rights case, we are also guided by the following

additional principles. In testing the sufficiency of a civil rights com-

plaint, "we must be especially solicitous of the wrongs alleged," and

we "must not dismiss the complaint unless it appears to a certainty

that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any legal theory

which might plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged." Edwards v.

City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Harri-

son v. United States Postal Serv., 840 F.2d 1149, 1152 (4th Cir.

1988)) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Furthermore,

"claim[s] under the Fourteenth Amendment merge[] into [a] § 1983

claim because § 1983 merely creates a statutory basis to receive a

remedy for the deprivation of a constitutional right." Hughes v. Bed-

sole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1383 n.6 (4th Cir. 1995). Finally, we must keep

in mind the difference between individual-capacity and official-

capacity suits under § 1983. A suit against a government official in

his individual capacity for deprivation of federal rights seeks to

impose personal liability upon the official. See Kentucky v. Graham,

6 STEVENSON v. MARTIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION

473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). In contrast, a suit against a government

official in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the govern-

ment entity of which the official is an agent. See id. at 165-66. Local

government units are liable only if an official’s execution of a munici-

pal policy, practice, or custom caused the injury. See Monell v. Dep’t

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

Reading the complaint with these principles in mind, we conclude

that Alex intended to make the following three § 1983 claims; first,

that Peele, Respass, and Chance deprived him of his constitutional

property interest in a public education because the continued attacks

forced him to leave Williamston Middle School; second, that the

school officials deprived him of his constitutional liberty interest in

bodily integrity by failing to stop the attacks by his fellow students;

and third, that the Martin County Board of Education contributed to

the violence by failing to develop appropriate school safety plans and

by failing to train its school personnel in how to respond to violent

students.

A.

Alex’s first § 1983 claim is that the defendants deprived him of his

property in violation of the Due Process Clause. When school offi-

cials suspend or expel a student, it triggers the student’s property

interest in a public education. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-

76 (1975). However, a student is not deprived of his property interest

when school officials engage in conduct such as reasonable corporal

punishment, even though it has "the unintended effect of temporarily

removing a child from" class. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,

674 n.43 (1977). In this case, Williamston Middle School officials did

not suspend or expel Alex. Alex’s father voluntarily withdrew Alex

from school.

Alex argues, however, that the school "constructively expelled"

him by fostering a climate of violence. Even though Alex failed to

raise this argument to the district court, "we may consider such an

issue if the error is ‘plain’ and our refusal to consider it would result

in a miscarriage of justice." Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d

313, 318 (4th Cir. 1988).

STEVENSON v. MARTIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 7

Alex’s constructive expulsion argument is a novel theory that has

not yet been accepted by any court. It is inspired by constructive dis-

charge cases arising under the employment laws. These cases hold

that an employer constructively discharges an employee when the

employer "deliberately makes an employee’s working conditions

intolerable and thereby forces him to quit his job." Bristow v. Daily

Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted); see also Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N.

Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 244 (4th Cir. 1997); Martin v. Cavalier Hotel

Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1353-55 (4th Cir. 1995). In the school violence

context, the theory would mean that a student’s property interest in

public education is triggered when school officials deliberately make

the learning environment so dangerous or intolerable that the student

is forced to transfer to another school.

The question of whether we should accept the constructive expul-

sion theory is purely academic, however, because Alex’s complaint

does not allege sufficient facts to support the theory. There is no alle-

gation that the school officials acted deliberately to force Alex out of

Williamston Middle School or that they singled him out in their fail-

ure to control the hooliganism. In fact, the school took some steps,

although without success, to remedy the problem. Moreover, because

of the novelty of the theory, it cannot be plain error for the district

court to conclude that the school officials did not deprive Alex of a

property interest in public education when he voluntarily withdrew

from school.

B.

Alex’s second § 1983 claim is that the defendants violated his lib-

erty interest in bodily integrity. In this case, the perpetrators of the

attacks against Alex were private individuals, not the school officials.

The law is clear that "a State’s failure to protect an individual against

private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Pro-

cess Clause." DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). There are, however, two exceptions to this

general rule.

First, if the state has a special relationship with an individual, the

state has an affirmative duty to protect the individual from harm

8 STEVENSON v. MARTIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION

inflicted by third parties. The Supreme Court has defined a "special

relationship" in the following way:

[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so

restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to

care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his

basic human needs — e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical

care, and reasonable safety — it transgresses the substantive

limits on state action set by . . . the Due Process Clause. .

. . [I]t is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individ-

ual’s freedom to act on his own behalf — through incarcera-

tion, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of

personal liberty — which is the "deprivation of liberty" trig-

gering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its

failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms

inflicted by other means.

Id. at 200. Several circuits have been faced with the issue of whether

a school-student relationship is a special relationship triggering the

protections of the Due Process Clause. They have held uniformly that

no special relationship exists because the student is not in physical

custody and, along with parental help, is able to care for his basic

human needs. See Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412,

1415 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d

495, 510 (6th Cir. 1996); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d

729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993); Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 731

(10th Cir. 1992); D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical

Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1372 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc); J.O. v. Alton

Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990). This cir-

cuit has also recognized that "incarceration, institutionalization, or the

like" is needed to "trigger the affirmative duty" under the Due Process

Clause. Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175 (4th Cir. 1995) (en

banc).

Following the lead of our sister circuits, we hold that the Martin

County School officials did not have a "special relationship" with

Alex that triggered the protections of the Due Process Clause in this

case. When a student attends public school, his liberty is not

restrained to the extent contemplated in DeShaney. Attending school

is not the equivalent of incarceration or institutionalization. See

STEVENSON v. MARTIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 9

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (Fourteenth Amendment

imposes a duty upon the state to protect involuntary committed, men-

tally ill patients); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (the state’s

deliberate indifference to prisoners’ medical needs violates the Eighth

Amendment). Although a student must remain in school during the

day and the school functions much as a parent during that time, the

state has not assumed total responsibility for the student’s care. The

student’s parents retain the ability to provide for his basic human

needs, and the child remains free to seek their help and protection. See

Claiborne County, 103 F.3d at 509-10; D.R., 972 F.2d at 1371-73.

Therefore, the state, simply by virtue of its maintenance of a public

school system, does not become constitutionally liable for failing to

prevent all student-on-student violence. Although the school officials

here may have been irresponsible and ineffective in not heeding the

warnings that Alex was helpless at the hands of bullies, they have not

committed a constitutional violation.

The second exception to the general rule that a state is not liable

for the acts of third parties occurs when the state itself creates the

danger. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201. In order to create a danger,

the state has to take some affirmative steps. Liability does not arise

when the state stands by and does nothing in the face of danger. See

id. at 203. Failing to provide protection from danger does not impli-

cate the state in the harm caused by third parties. See Pinder, 54 F.3d

at 1175.

In Pinder this court was faced with a case in which it had to decide

the contours of DeShaney’s state-created danger exception. Pinder’s

ex-boyfriend, Pittman, broke into her home, assaulted her, and threat-

ened to kill her and her three children. Pinder called the police, and

when an officer arrived, she told him about the attack and the threats.

The officer arrested Pittman and assured Pinder that she could safely

leave her children at home alone while she went to work because Pitt-

man would be in custody. However, because the police charged Pitt-

man with misdemeanor offenses, he was released almost immediately.

While Pinder was at work, Pittman set fire to her house, killing her

three children who were asleep. Pinder sued the arresting officer,

claiming that he had created the danger. See id. at 1172. This court

dismissed her suit because it was "purely an omission claim" where

all that could be said was that the officer "‘stood by and did nothing

10 STEVENSON v. MARTIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION

when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role.’" Id. at

1175 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203). The state’s conduct was

not on that "point on the spectrum between action and inaction" such

that it was implicated in the injury. Id.

The facts in DeShaney are equally disturbing. Randy DeShaney

beat his four-year-old son Joshua so severely that Joshua suffered per-

manent brain damage. This tragic incident came after the Winnebago

County Department of Social Services (DDS) in Wisconsin had been

informed of child abuse. In fact, DDS had obtained a court order plac-

ing Joshua in the temporary custody of a hospital after DeShaney’s

beatings put Joshua there, but thereafter DDS released Joshua into his

father’s custody. Caseworkers had also made monthly visits to the

DeShaney home, in which they observed suspicious injuries on Josh-

ua’s body. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192-93. The Court nevertheless

held that the state was not liable for a constitutional violation. The

facts only amounted to a failure of the DDS to protect Joshua from

private violence and the state had no constitutional duty to protect

Joshua. See id. at 202-03.

Given the rejection of the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims in DeShaney

and Pinder, we have to conclude in this case that the school officials

did not create the danger that Alex faced at the hands of his class-

mates. In fact, the school did more than just stand by while Alex was

being brutalized. The school took some measures to remedy the situa-

tion. Principal Respass met with Alex’s father to discuss the problem.

In addition, the school suspended McEachern twice and eventually

sent him to a special disciplinary program. Two other attackers,

including Jones, were also suspended. The school surely could have

done more to protect Alex, given the frequent and brutal attacks by

McEachern and others. But the failure to protect by itself is not suffi-

cient to trigger constitutional liability in this situation.

Furthermore, in the school violence context, some courts have

required that school officials must act with deliberate indifference

before there is liability for student-on-student attacks. See Sutton v.

Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1238 (10th Cir.

1999); Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir.

1994). These courts have said that the school must engage in inten-

tional or reckless affirmative conduct that shocks the conscience of

STEVENSON v. MARTIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 11

federal judges. See Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1238-39. Alex has not alleged

that the school officials intentionally or recklessly took steps to con-

tribute to the violence. Teacher Chance’s response when Alex

reported being punched in the head does not amount to deliberate

indifference when considered in context. Chance said, "There isn’t

anything I can do. You probably deserved it anyway." This statement

appears to express frustration and resignation more than anything

else. While Chance might have tried harder to help Alex, this does not

mean that she deprived Alex of his constitutional rights.

For all of the above reasons, this case does not fall into the state-

created danger exception to DeShaney.

C.

Alex’s final § 1983 claim is against the Martin County Board of

Education. He alleges that the board was responsible for his brutaliza-

tion because it failed to develop adequate school safety plans and

failed to train teachers and administrators in proper techniques for

controlling violence in school. Local government units are subject to

§ 1983 liability for the unconstitutional acts of their employees when

the employee acts pursuant to a municipal policy, practice, or custom.

See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818-19 (1985);

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). In addition,

a municipal entity can be liable if its failure to train its employees

leads to some unconstitutional conduct. See City of Canton v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). The failure to train must amount to "delib-

erate indifference to the rights of persons with whom [the employees]

come into contact." Id.

We do not have to reach the question of whether the school offi-

cial’s conduct in this case arose from a municipal policy or custom,

nor do we have to determine whether the board’s failure to train the

teachers and administrators amounted to deliberate indifference. An

award of damages against a municipality based on the actions of its

officers is not available unless the officers’ conduct amounted to a

constitutional injury. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796,

799 (1986) ("[N]either Monell . . . nor any other of our cases autho-

rizes the award of damages against a municipal corporation based on

the actions of one of its officers when in fact the jury has concluded

12 STEVENSON v. MARTIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION

that the officer inflicted no constitutional harm."); S.P. v. City of

Takoma Park, 134 F.3d 260, 274 (4th Cir. 1998) (a municipality "nec-

essarily is not liable for any alleged injuries" where "no constitutional

violation occurred"); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 36 (4th Cir.

1990) ("Plaintiff’s effort to turn this lawsuit into one for inadequate

training of personnel . . . is unavailing where there has been no under-

lying constitutional infraction."). Because we have already deter-

mined that Alex’s allegations do not amount to a § 1983 violation on

the part of the school officials, it follows that the school board like-

wise cannot be held constitutionally liable.

III.

Alex also argues that the defendants violated the Safe and Drug-

Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994 (Safe Schools Act), 20

U.S.C. §§ 7101-7104, 7111-7143, by failing to develop an appropriate

school safety plan that would help control student-on-student vio-

lence. The Safe Schools Act is a federal grant program that aims to

prevent violence and drug abuse in schools. These goals are accom-

plished through federal assistance to states so that they can make

grants to local educational agencies and community organizations.

Federal money also goes to fund private, non-profit organizations and

colleges and universities that develop anti-violence and anti-drug ini-

tiatives. See 20 U.S.C. § 7103. The Act does not expressly create a

private right of action. Therefore, we must determine whether Alex

has an implied right to maintain a Safe Schools Act claim.

In answering this question, we must first decide if the Act grants

Alex any substantive rights. For a person to bring a claim under con-

ditional spending legislation, the statute must confer substantive

rights in favor of the class to which the person belongs. See Pennhurst

State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). Substantive

rights are created only if Congress provided the recipients of federal

funding clear notice that by accepting funds, they have chosen to par-

ticipate in a statutory scheme under which private individuals gain

enforceable rights. See id. at 24-25. Because the Safe Schools Act was

enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, Alex’s claim will be

allowed only if the statute puts funding recipients on notice of a pri-

vate right of action.

STEVENSON v. MARTIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 13

Stevenson relies on Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.

629 (1999), to argue that the Safe Schools Act puts schools receiving

federal funds on notice that their students can sue them for failing to

implement school safety plans. In Davis the plaintiff, on behalf of her

minor daughter, sued a school board under Title IX of the Education

Amendments Act of 1972, see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688, after her

daughter was sexually harassed by one of her classmates when she

was in fifth grade. The plaintiff alleged that the school failed to take

any measures against the harasser even though her daughter repeat-

edly reported the incidents to teachers and to the principal, asking

them for help. See id. at 633-35. The Court held that Title IX sup-

ported a private damages action against a school for severe student-

on-student harassment because the statutory scheme put schools on

notice that they could be held liable for their failure to respond to stu-

dents’ discriminatory acts, if the failure amounted to deliberate indif-

ference. The Court pointed to the language of the statute itself, which

makes schools liable if they subject persons to discrimination under

their programs or activities or deny students educational benefits. In

addition, the Court relied on the fact that the Department of Education

had promulgated regulations requiring recipients of federal funds to

monitor third-party discrimination. See id. at 643-45. The Court added

that the common law puts schools on notice because it allows "claims

alleging that schools have been negligent in failing to protect their

students from the torts of their peers." Id. at 644.

Unlike Title IX, the Safe Schools Act does not put schools on

notice that they can be sued for failing to implement anti-violence

programs. Alex has not pointed to anything in the language or pur-

pose of the Act that would suggest otherwise. The Department of

Education has not promulgated any regulations pursuant to the Act.

Furthermore, no court has held that the Safe Schools Act creates a pri-

vate right of action in any situation, whereas for Title IX, it had

already been established before Davis that Title IX creates a cause of

action for damages when the school officials themselves engage in the

discriminatory conduct. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs.,

503 U.S. 60 (1992); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677

(1979).

The fact that the common law might allow suits against schools for

student-on-student violence does not help Stevenson either. The Court

14 STEVENSON v. MARTIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION

in Davis placed little, if any, emphasis on the common law in reach-

ing the conclusion that Title IX gave schools notice of a private right

of action for student-on-student harassment. It only mentioned the

common law after discussing the language, purpose, and regulations

of Title IX. There is nothing in Davis to suggest that the common law

alone could put the recipient of federal funds on notice that a Spend-

ing Clause statute creates a private right of action. We hold that

because the Safe Schools Act does not put schools on notice of the

creation of an enforceable substantive right, Alex cannot bring a Safe

Schools Act claim.

IV.

Alex also brought several state law claims against the defendants,

alleging negligence, assault, and negligent infliction of emotional dis-

tress, violations of North Carolina’s constitutional right to an educa-

tion, N.C. Const. art. 1, § 15, art. 9, § 2, and violations of the North

Carolina Safe Schools Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-105.45. Once the

district court dismissed the federal claims, it exercised its discretion

to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. See 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c). We review a district court’s decision not to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. See Jordahl v. Dem-

ocratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 203 (4th Cir. 1997). The district

court did not abuse its discretion in this case. It made a prudent deci-

sion in light of the fact that Stevenson had not stated a claim under

§ 1983.

V.

To summarize, we hold that all three of Stevenson’s § 1983 claims

were properly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The school

officials did not deprive Alex of his property interest in a public edu-

cation because they did not expel or suspend him. The officials like-

wise did not deprive him of his liberty interest in bodily integrity

because they did not prevent him from taking care of himself, nor did

they create the dangerous situation he found himself in. The school

board cannot be held liable where there was no underlying constitu-

tional violation. We also hold that there is no private right of action

under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act, nor is

it possible to assert the statutory claim through § 1983 because the

STEVENSON v. MARTIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 15

Act does not put schools on notice that they are open to suit by private

parties. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declin-

ing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

The judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED