Gantt v. Everett

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RACHEAL GANTT, }

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Plaintiff, }

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v. Case No.: 2:23-CV-648-RDP

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DEPUTY MONICA EVERETT, }

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Defendant. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on Defendant Deputy Monica Everett’s Motion for

Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 34). The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for review.

(Docs. # 36, 41, 43). For the reasons discussed below, the Motion (Doc. # 34) is due to be

granted in part and denied in part.

I. Factual Background

On or around February 4, 2023, Plaintiff Racheal Gantt was arrested, transported to the

Jefferson County Jail, and booked as a pretrial detainee. (Doc. # 1 ¶¶ 6-7). All female inmates at

the jail are housed on the fifth floor. (Doc. # 35-3 at 5). The fifth floor has seven total “blocks,”

each identified by a different letter from “A” to “G.” (Id. at 38).

Within a few days of being at the jail, Plaintiff disclosed to a mental health worker that

she was thinking of harming herself and was placed on suicide watch. (Docs. # 1 ¶ 11; 35-4 at

29-30). As a result, Plaintiff was transferred to “A Block,” one of the blocks on the fifth floor

designated for prisoners who pose a suicide risk. (Docs. # 1 ¶ 12; 35-3 at 8). The facility’s A

Block contains two stories of cells that open to a common area referred to as the “day space.”

(Docs. # 35-3 at 8; 35-4 at 16). For safety reasons, inmates on suicide watch are traditionally

housed in a cell by themselves on the bottom level of A Block, although occasionally they may

be housed on the top level as well. (Doc. # 35-3 at 8). Plaintiff was placed in Cell A11, which

was on the bottom level. (Id. at 9). In addition, because Plaintiff was on suicide watch, she had

her uniform taken and was issued a “suicide smock” – a green, thick Velcro blanket worn as

clothes so that an inmate cannot rip or tear it to hang herself. (Id.).

On February 8, 2023, Deputy Niyasmine Morgan and Deputy Jamie Yunker were the two

deputies assigned to the jail’s fifth floor for the morning shift. (Doc. # 35-6 at 5). In addition,

Control Room Operator Jamesanna Lovell (“CRO Lovell”) was stationed as the control room

operator (“CRO”) on that floor. (Doc. # 35-5 at 4-5). The control room, which is located at the

center of the fifth floor with glass windows overlooking each block, houses a large computer that

can remotely lock and unlock each individual cell door. (Docs. # 35-4 at 19; 35-3 at 7). When a

cell door is unlocked from the control room, it automatically swings open in the block. (Doc. #

35-4 at 25). Because the control room has an intercom system that connects to each block,

deputies can verbally request a certain cell door be unlocked while stationed in a particular block

and the CRO can remotely open it. (Id. at 9). Alternatively, deputies can travel between the

individual blocks and the control room by walking through a sliding glass door and down a

hallway. (Id. at 19-20; Doc. # 35-3 at 21).

Defendant Deputy Monica Everett (“Everett”) was assigned duties on the first floor of the

jail on the morning of February 8, 2023. (Id. at 10-11). Around mid-morning, Everett was

ordered to go up to the fifth floor to assist Deputies Morgan and Yunker with a shakedown in F

Block. (Id. at 12). During the shakedown, Everett and Deputy Jasmine McCants were instructed

to escort one of the female inmates in F Block to an individual cell in A Block. (Id. at 13).

When Everett and Deputy McCants entered A Block, Everett heard Plaintiff “screaming

and crying hysterically” from her cell. (Id. at 14). Everett, who had never met Plaintiff before

this point, walked over to Plaintiff’s cell and asked her what was wrong. (Id.; Doc. # 35-1 at

13:56:04-13:56:16). Plaintiff responded that she had hit her head.1 (Doc. # 35-3 at 14). Everett

asked to see Plaintiff’s head; although she saw no bleeding, she saw a large knot on the side of

her head. (Id.). In addition, Everett noticed that Plaintiff had a suicide smock instead of a

uniform, and realized at this point that she was on suicide watch. (Id. at 10). The video evidence

shows that Plaintiff was not actually wearing her suicide smock but was naked when the events

giving rise to this matter transpired. (Doc. # 35-2). Therefore, although Everett testified that she

noticed Plaintiff “wearing” a suicide smock, the court infers from the undisputed Rule 56

evidence that Everett actually noticed that Plaintiff had a suicide smock present with her in her

cell.

Everett left Plaintiff in her cell and walked from A Block to the control room to contact

the jail nurse and inform her of Plaintiff’s head injury. (Id. at 19). The nurse instructed Everett to

bring Plaintiff down to the third level. (Id.). A few other officers, including CRO Lovell and

Deputy Yunker, were present in the control room during this interaction. (Id.; Doc. # 35-6 at 6).

Everett asked one of the officers to grab Plaintiff a uniform to wear while she was being

transported. (Doc. # 35-3 at 19). She then unlocked the door to Plaintiff’s cell from the computer

in the control room, before heading down the hallway to A Block to retrieve her. (Id. at 20; Doc.

# 35-1 at 14:00:43). No deputies were present in A Block when Everett unlocked Plaintiff’s cell

door. (Doc. # 35-1 at 14:00:43).

1 The parties dispute how Plaintiff told Everett that she had injured herself. Everett testified that Plaintiff

told her she injured her head by falling and hitting it on the toilet. (Doc. # 35-3 at 14). CRO Lovell testified that

Everett told her the same when she came into the control room to call the nurse. (Doc. # 35-5 at 8). But, according to

Deputy Morgan, Everett told her she was taking Plaintiff to the nurse because she had been hitting her head against

the wall of her cell. (Doc. # 35-4 at 16). And, the reports from the emergency room and the paramedics say that

Plaintiff’s head injuries came from “[b]anging head against wall.” (Docs. # 39-3 at 2; 39-4 at 2).

When her cell door unlocked and swung open, Plaintiff immediately sprinted out of her

cell and across the day space toward a set of stairs leading to the upper level of A Block. (Docs.

# 35-3 at 21; 35-1 at 14:00:50-14:01-00). As Everett entered A Block, she saw Plaintiff run in

front of her and up the stairs. (Docs. # 35-3 at 21; 35-1 at 14:01:02). Everett instructed her to

come back down; however, Plaintiff ignored the order. (Doc. # 35-3 at 21-22). Everett then

realized that Plaintiff had her hand on the second story railing and was planning to jump. (Id. at

22). Everett ran up the stairs and attempted to grab Plaintiff from the railing, but before she could

do so, Plaintiff jumped from the balcony and landed at the bottom level of the day space. (Id.;

Doc. # 35-1 at 14:01:02-14:01:06). A total of 23 seconds elapsed from the time Plaintiff’s cell

door was unlocked until the time she jumped from the second level railing. (Doc. # 35-1 at

14:00:43-14:01:06).

Other deputies saw Plaintiff jump from afar and issued a “Code White,” the jail’s signal

for a medical emergency. (Doc. # 35-3 at 26). While the deputies were waiting on the

paramedics to arrive on the scene after Plaintiff’s suicide attempt, a deputy emerged from

Plaintiff’s cell holding her suicide smock and used it to cover Plaintiff’s body. (Doc. # 35-1 at

14:03:06-14:03:15). Birmingham Fire and Rescue arrived on the scene and transported Plaintiff

from the jail to the emergency room, where she was treated for ankle fractures from her jump as

well as the injury to her head. (Id. at 26-27; Doc. # 39-10 at 2). Plaintiff was released from the

custody of the Jefferson County Jail after this incident. (Doc. # 35-3 at 31).

Plaintiff filed the current action on May 22, 2023. (Doc. # 1). The Complaint asserts a

single cause of action against Everett under the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. (Id.).

II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper “if … there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and … the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary

judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion

and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden,

Rule 56 requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.

The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts

and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Allen v. Bd. of Pub.

Educ. for Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir. 2007); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d

1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the evidence is

merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. See id. at

249.

When faced with a “properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the nonmoving

party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting more than mere

allegations.” Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997). As Anderson

teaches, under Rule 56(c) a plaintiff may not simply rest on his allegations made in the

complaint; instead, as the party bearing the burden of proof at trial, he must come forward with

at least some evidence to support each element essential to his case at trial. See Anderson, 477

U.S. at 252. “[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not

rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 248 (citations omitted).

Summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “Summary judgment may be

granted if the non-moving party’s evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative.”

Sawyer v. Sw. Airlines Co., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (D. Kan. 2003) (citing Anderson, 477

U.S. at 250-51). “[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh

the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

Although the court must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the non-movant, this

does not mean the court cannot rely on objective videotape evidence. “When opposing parties

tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no

reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of

ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Thus, if a

videotape clearly depicts events and leaves no material factual disputes, the “view[s] the facts in

the light depicted by the videotape.” Id. at 380-81.

III. Discussion

On January 18, 2024, Everett filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 34). In the

Motion, Everett argues that summary judgment in her favor is proper because she is entitled to

qualified immunity. In addition, she argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. The court examines both arguments, below.

A. Qualified Immunity Analysis

Qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The court determines whether a

defendant is entitled to qualified immunity by engaging in a three-step analysis. See Skop v. City

of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136-37 (11th Cir. 2007). The initial burden is on the official claiming

qualified immunity to establish that she was acting within her discretionary authority. Id. at 1136.

When the plaintiff does not dispute the defendant was operating within her discretionary

authority (and that is the case here), the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the

“defendant’s conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right,” id. at 1137 (citing Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)), which was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged

violation. Id. If the plaintiff cannot satisfy both prongs, the defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004).

Because the parties do not dispute that Everett was acting in her discretionary authority at

the time of Plaintiff’s attempted suicide, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to prove that Everett

violated one of her constitutional rights and that the constitutional right was clearly established at

the time of the violation. Everett argues that she is entitled to summary judgment because

Plaintiff cannot satisfy either requirement. That is, she argues that (1) Plaintiff cannot show that

any violation of a constitutional right occurred, and (2) even if she could, Plaintiff cannot show

that the constitutional right at issue was clearly established. (Doc. # 36 at 9). The court examines

each argument, in turn, below.

1. Whether Everett Violated a Constitutional Right

The court first analyzes “whether [the] plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a

constitutional violation.” Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002)). Plaintiff alleges that Everett’s actions violated her

Fourteenth Amendment rights. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial detainees have a due

process right to be protected from self-inflicted injuries, including suicide. Greenway v. So.

Health Partners, Inc., 827 F. App’x 952, 958 (11th Cir. 2020).

Everett first argues that, because Plaintiff did not actually succeed in taking her own life

during her suicide attempt, there can be no constitutional violation. This argument misses the

mark. It is well-established that a detainee does not actually have to succumb to her self-inflicted

injuries to advance a Fourteenth Amendment claim; instead, a prisoner may succeed on a

Fourteenth Amendment claim involving injuries short of death so long as she can show that an

official “ha[d] subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm and ‘deliberately disregard[ed] a

strong likelihood rather than a mere possibility that the self-infliction of harm [would] occur.’”

Garner on behalf of R.C. v. Jamerson, 2023 WL 4927250, at *2 (11th Cir. Aug. 2, 2023)

(quoting Snow ex rel. Snow v. City of Citronelle, Ala., 420 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2005)); see

also Schmeltz v. Monroe Cnty., 954 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1992) (analyzing a Fourteenth

Amendment claim under an unsuccessful suicide attempt).

“In a prisoner suicide case, to prevail under section 1983 for violation of substantiative

rights, under the…[F]ourteenth [A]mendment, the plaintiff must show that the jail official

displayed deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s [attempted] taking of [her] own life.” Jackson

v. West, 787 F.3d 1345, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271,

1274-75 (11th Cir. 1989)). “To establish a defendant’s deliberate indifference, the plaintiff

[must] show that the defendant had (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2)

disregard[ed] … that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Snow, 420 F.3d at

1268 (quoting Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092,

1115 (11th Cir. 2005)). “Absent knowledge of a detainee’s suicidal tendencies, … failure to

prevent suicide has never been held to constitute deliberate indifference.” Greenway, 827 F.

App’x at 958 (internal citations omitted). But, “[w]here prison personnel directly responsible for

inmate care have knowledge that an inmate has … threatened … suicide, their failure to take

steps to prevent that inmate from committing suicide can amount to deliberate indifference.”

Jamerson, 2023 WL 4927250, at *2 (quoting Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 935-36 (11th Cir.

1990)).

Here, a reasonable juror could find that Everett had subjective knowledge that Plaintiff

was suicidal and posed a risk of seriously harming herself if given the opportunity. To be sure,

Everett was not one of the deputies assigned to Block A, nor had she ever met Plaintiff before

she approached her cell on the afternoon of the suicide attempt. But, Everett admitted that she

was made aware that Plaintiff was on suicide watch as soon as she walked up to her door and

noticed her suicide smock. (Doc. # 35-3 at 10). Further, Everett understood that Plaintiff must

have threatened to commit suicide for her to have been placed on suicide watch. (Id. at 23) (“I

knew that at some point, she had to have told somebody she wanted to kill herself to be on

suicide watch.”). And, although Everett states that Plaintiff told her she injured her head by

falling and hitting it on the toilet, other evidence in the Rule 56 record supports a finding that

Everett knew Plaintiff had been banging her head against the wall of her cell. For example,

Deputy Morgan remembers Everett saying that she was taking Plaintiff to get medical attention

because “she was hitting her head on the wall.” (Doc. # 35-4 at 16). This evidence, when viewed

in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, could allow a reasonable juror to find that Everett had

subjective knowledge that Plaintiff posed a serious risk of attempting to harm herself.

A reasonable juror could similarly find that Everett disregarded the risk of Plaintiff

attempting to harm herself when she unlocked her cell door from the control room – without a

deputy being present in Block A. This allowed Plaintiff the opportunity to gain access to the

second story balcony. A prison guard disregards a risk of suicide when she gives a known

suicidal inmate access to something that could be used to do self-harm. See Turner v. Phillips,

547 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1205 (N.D. Ala. 2021), aff’d, 2022 WL 458238 (11th Cir. 2022)

(concluding officers were deliberately indifferent to the strong likelihood that an inmate would

harm himself when they witnessed him attempt to hang himself and allowed him to be placed in

an isolated cell with bedsheets that same day); see also Cole v. Jones, 2024 WL 1601210, at *7

(M.D. Ala. Mar. 13, 2024) (finding that an officer disregarded a risk by giving a suicidal inmate

access to a razor).

That is precisely what occurred here. Officers at the Jefferson County Jail were trained to

always accompany an inmate on suicide watch when she was out of her cell because “they’re

liable to hurt themselves if they’re out in the day space….” (Doc. # 35-4 at 6). In fact, Everett

testified that an inmate jumping off the second-floor balcony in the day space was an “obvious”

suicide risk, and that, for this reason, inmates under suicide watch were typically assigned to

cells on the bottom floor of A Block. (Doc. # 35-3 at 8). Further, in the time she had been

working at the facility, Everett was aware of at least two other occasions where inmates had

jumped off the top level of their units. (Id. at 24). Finally, Everett understood that she personally

did not have to unlock Plaintiff’s cell door from the control room, but instead could have used

the intercom to call for the CRO to do it when she was safely stationed outside the cell door. (Id.

at 26). Despite this knowledge, Everett made the choice to remotely unlock the cell of an inmate

she knew was on suicide watch and allow her access to an “obvious” suicide risk even though no

deputies were near her (or even present in A Block).

Finally, a reasonable juror could find that Everett’s conduct was not mere negligence, but

instead rose to the level of deliberate indifference. The court acknowledges that deliberate

indifference is an “exacting standard” that requires showing more than gross negligence. See

McCullum v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 768 F.3d 1135, 1147 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal

citations omitted). “Under this circuit’s precedent, in a prison suicide case, deliberate

indifference requires that the defendant deliberately disregard a strong likelihood rather than a

mere possibility that the self-infliction of harm will occur.” Cook, 402 F. 3d 1115 (emphasis in

original) (internal citations omitted). To be deliberately indifferent to a “strong likelihood” that

the prisoner will commit suicide, “the official must be subjectively aware that the combination of

the prisoner’s suicidal tendencies and the feasibility of suicide in the context of the prisoner’s

surroundings creates a strong likelihood that the prisoner will commit suicide.” Gish v. Thomas,

516 F.3d 952, 954 (11th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original).

As discussed above, a reasonable juror could find that Everett was subjectively aware of

Plaintiff’s suicidal tendencies. She knew Plaintiff was on suicide watch. And, although Everett

maintains that Plaintiff told her she injured herself by accidentally slipping and hitting her on her

toilet, other evidence in the Rule 56 record supports a finding that Everett told officers that she

was taking Plaintiff to get medical attention because “she was hitting her head on the wall.”

(Doc. # 35-4 at 16). Of course, a jury could accept as true Everett’s testimony that she believed

Plaintiff’s head injuries were accidental and that she was not aware of the extent of Plaintiff’s

suicidal tendencies. But, at this stage of the case, the evidence must be viewed in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff – not Everett. In doing so, the court concludes that a reasonable juror could

find that Everett was subjectively aware that Plaintiff was actively trying to harm herself mere

moments before she unlocked her cell door. This is especially true when considering that Everett

herself testified that inmates on suicide watch regularly bang their heads against their cell walls

in efforts to harm themselves. (Doc. # 35-3 at 26).

Similarly, a reasonable juror could find that a suicide attempt was more than feasible if

Plaintiff was left alone in A Block. “When analyzing the likelihood of suicide, courts look at the

inmate’s environment at the time the suicide or the attempt occurred and what tools [she] had

that could make suicide likely.” Cole, 2024 WL 1601210, at *5. In doing so, courts in this circuit

have made clear that when an officer gives a suicidal inmate access to an obvious instrument of

suicide, it creates a strong likelihood -- not just a mere possibility -- that a suicide attempt will

follow. Id. (giving razors to a suicidal inmate created a strong likelihood of attempted suicide);

Allen v. Freeman, 2013 WL 3356040, at *10 (S.D. Ga. 2013) (giving an inmate access to a bar

and a sheet “strengthens the likelihood of suicide”).

That is essentially what occurred here. Everett personally knew of two other instances

where inmates had attempted to harm themselves by jumping from the second story of their cell

block areas. (Doc. # 35-3 at 24). Further, Everett was aware that opening the door of a suicidal

inmate’s cell without supervision would give the inmate access to the second story landing,

which she herself acknowledged was an “obvious suicide risk.” (Id. at 8, 20-21). Despite the

presence of this risk, a jury could conclude that Everett made a conscious -- and, as indicated by

this record, unnecessary -- decision to open the door of Plaintiff’s cell without any personnel in

that vicinity. Indeed, both Deputy Morgan and Deputy Yunker testified that they would not have

opened Plaintiff’s door from the control room if they had been in Everett’s shoes, but instead

would have requested the CRO unlock the cell while they were present in the block. See (Doc. #

35-4 at 12) (“I probably would just call, ‘Roll Cell 11,’ and I’ll be standing somewhere in the

block … where I could clearly see what [the inmate’s] doing”); (Doc. # 35-6 at 11) (Deputy

Yunker stating that standing by the cell of an inmate on suicide watch when it is unlocked is

“common sense” because “you don’t want them given the opportunity to be by themselves in

[an] area especially that has a second floor”).

In the court’s view, there is little difference between allowing a suicidal inmate 23

seconds of access to a razor or a rope and Everett’s conscious decision here to allow Plaintiff 23

seconds of unsupervised access to a staircase leading up to the second floor, which in her own

words was an “obvious suicide risk.” A reasonable juror could find the same. Therefore, Plaintiff

has carried her burden in proving that Everett “deliberately disregard[ed] a ‘strong likelihood

rather than a mere possibility’” that harm would occur if she let Plaintiff out of her cell

unsupervised, and she has satisfied the first prong of her burden of the qualified immunity

analysis. Snow, 420 F.3d at 1268.

2. Whether Everett Violated Clearly Established Law

Next, the court must examine whether Plaintiff has shown that Everett violated a

statutory or constitutional right that that was clearly established when the violation occurred. A

right is clearly established if it would be clear to a reasonable official that his or her conduct was

unlawful. Leslie v. Hancock Cty. Bd. of Educ., 720 F.3d 1338, 1345 (11th Cir. 2013). As the

Eleventh Circuit recently summarized, there are three methods by which a right can be clearly

established:

Plaintiff[] can meet the clearly established requirement in one of three ways: (1)

by pointing to a materially similar decision of the Supreme Court, of this Court, or

of the supreme court of the state in which the case arose; (2) by establishing that

“a broader, clearly established principle should control the novel facts” of the

case; or (3) by convincing us that the case is one of those rare ones that “fits

within the exception of conduct which so obviously violates th[e] constitution that

prior case law is unnecessary.” Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1159

(11th Cir. 2005).

Under the first and second of these methods, the plaintiff must rely on decisional

law. See Vineyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that in

the first method “we look at precedent that is tied to facts” while in the second

method we look for “broad statements of principle in case law [that] are not tied

to particularized facts” (emphasis omitted). Under the second and third methods,

we look for “obvious clarity”: a principle or provision so clear that, even without

specific guidance from a decision involving materially similar facts, the

unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct is apparent. Id. at 1350-51 (nothing that

“broad statements of principle in case law … can clearly establish law applicable

in the future to different sets of detailed facts” and that the “words of the pertinent

federal statute or federal constitutional provision in some cases will be specific

enough to establish clearly the law applicable to particular conduct and

circumstances”); see also Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir.

2019); Fish v. Brown, 838 F.3d 1153, 1163 (11th Cir. 2016). In all three methods,

the “‘salient question’ is whether the state of the law at the time of the incident

gave [the officer] ‘fair warning’ that his conduct was unlawful.” Perez, 809 F.3d

at 1222 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 [] (2002)).

Powell v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912, 920-21 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 2022 WL 4652025 (2022).

In this circuit, “only Supreme Court cases, Eleventh Circuit caselaw, and [state] Supreme Court

caselaw can ‘clearly establish’ law…” Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 955

(11th Cir. 2003).

The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that “an officer’s deliberate indifference to the risk

of serious harm to a detainee is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Snow, 420 F.3d at

1270 (citing McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999)). For example, in Turner

v. Phillips, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed whether the grant of qualified immunity was

appropriate for two officers who knew that an inmate was suicidal and nonetheless gave him

access to items that could be used to harm himself. 2022 WL 458238 (11th Cir. 2022).

Specifically, the officers witnessed the inmate trying to attempt suicide by making a noose out of

his clothes when in the shower. Id. at 3. However, instead of transferring the inmate to the

behavioral unit where he would be isolated from dangerous objects, the officers left him in a cell,

unsupervised, with access to the bed sheets he used to hang himself. Id. The Eleventh Circuit

found that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because “the officers were aware

that Turner had a high risk of suicide and nonetheless kept him in a dorm where he would have

dangerous items at his fingertips,” despite there being a safer alternative: transferring him. Id. at

4.

The facts of Turner are materially similar to those here. Like in Turner, Everett knew that

Plaintiff was suicidal. Further, as discussed above, a material dispute of fact exists concerning

whether Everett was aware that Plaintiff had actively been trying to injure herself by banging her

head against her wall. Therefore, a reasonable juror could find that, like the officers in Turner,

Everett was aware that Plaintiff posed a high risk of suicide, knew that she was actively

attempting to harm herself, and nonetheless allowed her unsupervised access to a dangerous

item, despite there being a much safer alternative easily available. To be sure, the facts of the two

cases have a minor (but indistinguishable) difference: whereas the officers in Turner left the

suicidal inmate in a cell unsupervised with access to a dangerous object, Everett let Plaintiff out

of her cell unsupervised with access to a dangerous jumping spot. But, precedent “need not be

directly on point” to clearly establish a right; instead, it simply “must have placed the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.” JW ex rel. Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904

F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2018). Here, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Turner placed beyond

debate that an officer violates the Fourteenth Amendment when he or she gives an inmate who

poses a high risk of suicide unsupervised access to something that the inmate could use to harm

herself.

Against this backdrop, the court concludes that, on this record, the Fourteenth

Amendment right in this context was clearly established at the time of the incident, and, as

discussed above, a reasonable juror could find that Everett violated that right. Therefore, Plaintiff

has carried her burden and Everett is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified

immunity.2

B. Injunctive Relief

In addition to her qualified immunity argument, Everett also argues that she is entitled to

summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief because Plaintiff is no longer

incarcerated at the Jefferson County Jail. (Doc. # 36 at 22). Plaintiff’s request for injunctive

relief consists of a single sentence in the Complaint seeking that the court “grant injunctive relief

as necessary to effect this Court’s judgment and prevent the recurrence of the harms alleged

herein.” (Doc. # 1 at 7).

“The general rule in [the Eleventh] [C]ircuit is that a transfer or a release of a prisoner

from prison will moot that prisoner’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.” Smith v. Allen,

502 F.3d 1255, 1267 (11th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Sossamon v. Texas, 563

U.S. 277 (2011). This general rule applies when the plaintiff is a prisoner seeking injunctive

relief to remedy an allegedly unconstitutional condition existing at his or her place of

confinement and names as a defendant an official who works at that institution. See e.g.,

McKinnon v. Talladega Cnty., Ala., 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984); Wahl v. McIver, 773

F.2d 1169, 1173-74 (11th Cir. 1985); Robbins v. Robertson, 782 F. App’x 794, 799-800 (11th

Cir. 2019). This is so because an injunction directing a prison official to provide some sort of

2 Everett also spends a portion of her brief arguing that, to the extent Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a claim

for deliberate indifference to serious medical need, that claim is due to be dismissed because Everett is entitled to

qualified immunity. (Doc. # 36 at 20-22). However, Plaintiff’s response makes clear that she is not pursuing relief

under this theory. (Doc. # 41 at 20 n.3). Therefore, this memorandum opinion need not address Everett’s arguments

for summary judgment on that claim.

relief to the released prisoner “would be an empty order” when the official no longer has the

ability to provide any relief to the prisoner. Robbins, 782 F. App’x at 800. However, this general

rule does not apply where a prisoner challenges allegedly unconstitutional conditions as they

exist generally throughout a prison system. Barnes v. Dunn, 2022 WL 10264034, at *7 (N.D.

Ala. 2022).

Everett argues that, to the extent Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is related to

Plaintiff’s conditions at the Jefferson County Jail, the request should be denied as moot because

Plaintiff has been released. (Doc. # 36 at 22-24). The court agrees. As the Complaint reads now,

it is unclear just what manner of injunctive relief Plaintiff is seeking – or can seek. The

Complaint merely requests injunctive relief “as necessary to effect this Court’s judgment and

prevent the recurrence of the harms alleged herein” without any specificity. (Doc. # 1 at 7).

Because Plaintiff is no longer in jail, any injunctive relief directing Everett to provide some sort

of relief to her would be an “empty order.” Robbins, 782 F. App’x at 800. As a result, Everett is

entitled to summary judgment on this claim to the extent Plaintiff is requesting injunctive relief

related to her conditions at the Jefferson County Jail. Having said that, if the court has

misunderstood Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief unrelated to her confinement at the jail, she

may clarify her contention and raise it with the court.

Therefore, Everett’s motion for summary judgment on this issue is granted and Plaintiff’s

request for injunctive relief is due to be denied without prejudice.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, Everett’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 34) is

due to be granted in part and denied in part. An order consistent with this memorandum opinion

will be entered contemporaneously.

DONE and ORDERED this June 17, 2024.

R! DAVID 24 2

CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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