finding that even where Rule 20 requirements for joinder are satisfied, the court may 28 exercise its discretion “to sever for at least two reasons: (1) to prevent jury confusion and judicial 1 inefficiency, and (2) to prevent unfair prejudice to the [defendants]”
How later courts described this case
- finding that even where Rule 20 requirements for joinder are satisfied, the court may 28 exercise its discretion “to sever for at least two reasons: (1) to prevent jury confusion and judicial 1 inefficiency, and (2) to prevent unfair prejudice to the [defendants]”
- finding that the district court did not 21 abuse its discretion when it severed certain plaintiff’s claims without finding improper joinder
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 KEENAN WILKINS, also known as No. 2:16-CV-0475-TLN-DMC-P
Nerrah Brown,
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Plaintiff,
13 ORDER
v.
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JEFF MACOMBER, et al.,
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Defendants.
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18 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
19 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion, ECF No. 57, to sever
20 improperly joined claims and/or parties. Defendants contend Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
21 claims and religious practice claims, each asserted against numerous defendants, should be
22 severed based on improper joinder pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20.
23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) limits the joinder of claims, whereas Federal
24 Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) limits the joinder of parties in a single lawsuit. Rule 18(a) states:
25 “A party asserting a claim . . . may join, as independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it
26 has against an opposing party.” Rule 20(a)(2) states: “[p]ersons . . . may be joined in one action
27 as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the
28 alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
1 transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will
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arise in the action.” Courts have recognized that when multiple parties are named, the analysis
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under Rule 20 precedes that under Rule 18. See Herndon v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 2021 WL
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1559156 at *2 (W.D. Mich. April 12, 2021).
5
Rule 20 deals solely with joinder of parties and becomes
6 relevant only when there is more than one party on one or both
sides of the action. It is not concerned with joinder of claims,
7 which is governed by Rule 18. Therefore, in actions involving
multiple defendants Rule 20 operates independently of Rule 18 . . . .
8 Despite the broad language of Rule 18(a), plaintiff may join
multiple defendants in a single action only if plaintiff asserts at least
9 one claim to relief against each of them that arises out of the same
transaction or occurrence and presents questions of law or fact
10 common to all.
11 Id. (citing 7 Charles Allen Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1655 (3d ed. 2001), quoted in Proctor v.
12 Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d 743, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2009), and Garcia
v. Munoz, No. 08-1648, 2008 WL 2064476, at *3 (D.N.J. May 14,
13 2008); see also United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 142–43
(1965)).
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15 Permissive joinder under Rule 20 “is to be construed liberally in order to promote
16 trial convenience and to expedite the final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple
17 lawsuits.” League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 914, 917 (9th
18 Cir. 1997). The purpose of Rule 20 is to address the “broadest possible scope of action consistent
19 with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties, and remedies is strongly encouraged.”
20 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966). Rule 20 sets forth two specific
21 requirements for permissive joinder: “(1) a right to relief must be asserted by, or against, each
22 plaintiff or defendant relating to or arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of
23 transactions or occurrences; and (2) some question of law or fact common to all parties must arise
24 in the action.” Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 623 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980)
25 (citing League to Save Lake Tahoe, 558 F.2d at 917).
26 / / /
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1 As to the first requirement, courts assess the facts of each case individually to
2 determine whether joinder is sensible in light of the underlying policies of permissive party
3 joinder. Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997). “The ‘same transaction’
4 requirement of Rule 20 refers to ‘similarity in the factual background of a claim; claims that arise
5 out of a systematic pattern of events’ and have a ‘very definite logical relationship.’” Hubbard v.
6 Hougland, 2010 WL 1416691, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2010) (quoting Bautista v. Los Angeles
7 County, 216 F.3d 837, 842-843 (9th Cir. 2000)). Additionally, “the mere fact that all [of a
8 plaintiff’s] claims arise under the same general law does not necessarily establish a common
9 question of law or fact.” Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1351.
10 As to the second requirement, commonality under Rule 20 is not a particularly
11 stringent test. See Johnson v. Shaffer, 2013 WL 140115, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2013) (citing
12 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 11 C Music, 202 F.R.D. 229, 231 (M.D. Tenn. 2001)). The Rule
13 requires only a single common question, not multiple common questions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20
14 (“any question of law or fact common to . . .”). “The common question may be one of fact or of
15 law and need not be the most important or predominant issue in the litigation.” Johnson, 2013
16 WL 140115, at *2 (citing Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974)).
17 And even if a court finds that the requirements have been met, “a district court must examine
18 whether permissive joinder would ‘comport with principles of fundamental fairness’ or would
19 result in prejudice to either side.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Company, 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th
20 Cir. 2000) (citing Desert Empire Bank, 623 F.2d at 1375 (finding that the district court did not
21 abuse its discretion when it severed certain plaintiff’s claims without finding improper joinder)).
22 Under Rule 20(b), the district court may sever claims or parties in order to avoid
23 prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(b). Courts have also exercised their discretion to sever where
24 “[i]nstead of making the resolution of [the] case more efficient . . . joinder would instead confuse
25 and complicate the issues for all parties involved.” Rodriguez v. Tilton, 2013 WL 1163796, at *6
26 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2013) (quoting Wynn v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1088 (C.D.
27 Cal. 2002) (finding that even where Rule 20 requirements for joinder are satisfied, the court may
28 exercise its discretion “to sever for at least two reasons: (1) to prevent jury confusion and judicial
1 inefficiency, and (2) to prevent unfair prejudice to the [defendants]”)) (citing Coleman, 232 F.3d
2 at 1350).
3 In their motion to sever, Defendants contend generally:
4 . . . Wilkins alleges that he was subjected to unconstitutional living
conditions in the cell in which he was housed while at CSP-Sacramento
5 from April 2014 to his transfer in June 2016. Separately, Wilkins alleges
that, from May 2015 until April 2016, while housed at CSP-Sacramento,
6 he was denied equal access to Jewish religious services because of his
participation in the Enhanced Outpatient Mental Health program. In that
7 same vein, Wilkins alleges that, from the time of his arrival at CSP-
Sacramento until his transfer in June 2016, he was denied access to Jewish
8 services, despite his numerous requests and inmate grievances.
Wilkins’ allegations regarding these two disparate events do not
9 arise out of the same transaction or occurrence and there are no common
questions of law or fact shared by the two events. For these reasons,
10 Plaintiff has misjoined the Defendants, and the Court should sever the
Defendants involved in the Eighth Amendment living conditions claim
11 from the Defendants involved in the equal protection and religious
practice claims. (footnote 1 omitted).
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ECF No. 57-1, pgs. 1-2.
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14 More specifically, Defendants allege they will suffer prejudice absent an order
15 severing Plaintiff’s claims. According to Defendants:
16 Here, as presently comprised, a jury will hear allegations that
Wilkins was housed in an unsafe cell with no privacy, the ever-present
17 threat of harm from potentially violent cellmates, unsanitary conditions,
and inadequate amenities—conditions all known to, and ignored by, the
18 then-serving warden, Defendant Macomber, and two other ranking CDCR
officials, Defendants Harrington and Lockwood. In the same case, the jury
19 will hear allegations that Wilkins was denied access to Jewish services by
CDCR personnel at CSP-Sacramento due to his EOP status, which is to
20 say, due to his mental health condition. The jury will hear further
allegations that, despite his repeated requests and inmate appeals, Wilkins
21 was denied access to Jewish services by those same CDCR personnel at
CSP-Sacramento—Defendants Macomber, David, Stewart, and Giannelli.
22 In a single trial, a jury will be required parse out Plaintiff’s distinct
claims against numerous and unrelated defendants. All of these defendants
23 are employed by CDCR, and there is a substantial risk that, by virtue of
the fact that all of Plaintiff’s allegations arise from the same institution,
24 the fact finder may infer liability by association without more, even
though these claims are legally and factually discrete and require
25 individualized determinations. The risk of substantial prejudice weighs
heavily against any judicial economy that may be had by keeping
26 these Defendants joined in the same action. See Funtanilla v. Tristan, No.
1:02-cv-06001-OWW-GSA-PC, 2010 WL 1267133, at *7-8 (E.D. Cal.
27 March 30, 2010).
28 ECF No. 57-1, pg. 8.
1 In evaluating Defendants’ motion, the Court notes the procedural posture of this
2 | case. Specially, with the exception of Plaintiff's pending motion to compel, which will be
3 | addressed separately, and any limited additional discovery which be permitted by the court’s
4 | ruling thereon, discovery is closed and a dispositive motion filing deadline has been set. See ECF
5 | No. 59. Additionally, the docket reflects that since appearing in the action with their answer filed
6 | on September 17, 2020, Defendants did not raise the issue of misjoinder until the date set for the
7 | close of discovery — June 21, 2021. See ECF No. 57 (Defendants’ motion to sever, filed on June
8 | 21, 2021); see also ECF No. 51 (order modifying schedule).
9 The record thus reflects that Defendants have been able to conduct discovery
10 | without prejudice due to misjoinder which would warrant Court intervention. Indeed, Defendants
11 | do not by way of the pending motion argue any prejudice related to pre-trial preparations,
12 | including dispositive motions. Rather, Defendants complain exclusively of potential prejudice at
13 | trial. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, under which Defendants’ motion to sever is brought,
14 | the Court may permit separate trials to protect against prejudice which may result from
15 || misjoinder. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(b). Given that Defendants’ objections relate to trial, the Court
16 | will deny Defendants’ current motion to sever, which proceeds under Rule 20, without prejudice
17 || to renewing their arguments in the context of a motion for separate trials under Federal Rule of
18 | Civil Procedure 42(b) made at such time as the Court may direct submission of trial readiness
19 | status reports.
20 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to sever, ECF
21 | No. 57, is denied without prejudice.
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23 | Dated: February 11, 2022 Sx<o_-
24 DENNIS M. COTA
25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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