The opinion
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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 CHRISTOPHER DALE STAFFIN, No. 2:19-CV-1058-KJM-DMC
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 TOM BOSENKO, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending before the
18 court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, ECF No. 7.
19 The court is required to screen complaints brought by litigants who have been
20 granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under this screening
21 provision, the court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious;
22 (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a
23 defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(A), (B). Moreover,
24 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), this court must dismiss an action if the court
25 determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Because plaintiff has been granted leave to
26 proceed in forma pauperis, the court will screen the complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). Pursuant
27 to Rule 12(h)(3), the court will also consider as a threshold matter whether it has subject-matter
28 jurisdiction.
1 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
2 Plaintiff named the following as defendants in the original complaint: (1) Tom
3 Bosenko, the Sheriff of Shasta County; (2) Roger Moore, the Chief of Police for the City of
4 Redding; (3) Jim Milestone, the former Superintendent of the Whiskeytown National Recreation
5 Area; (4) the Shasta Inter-Agency Narcotics Task Force; (5) Leonard Moty, a member of the
6 Shasta County Board of Supervisors; (6) Lester Baugh, a member of the Shasta County Board of
7 Supervisors; (7) the California Highway Patrol; and (8) the United States Drug Enforcement
8 Administration. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff continues to name the following as defendants in the
9 first amended complaint: (1) Tom Bosenko; (2) Roger Moore; (3) James Milestone; (4) the Shasta
10 Inter-Agency Narcotics Task Force; (5) Lenoard Moty; (6) Lester Baugh; and (7) the United
11 States Drug Enforcement Administration. See ECF No. 7. Newly named in the first amended
12 complaint are the following additional defendants: (1) Shasta County; (2) the Shasta County
13 District Attorney’s Office; (3) the Shasta County Sheriff’s Office; (4) Shasta County Code
14 Enforcement; (5) the City of Redding; (6) the Redding Police Department; and (7) the National
15 Park Service. See id. Plaintiff no longer names the California Highway Patrol as a defendant.
16 See id.
17 Plaintiff now claims:
18 1. Plaintiff was a “merchant” running the Medicine Man Dispensary
beginning in 2009 and, from 2010 through 2012 was sole
19 proprietor of the Medicine Man Collective. See id. at 2.
20 2. According to plaintiff, rather than pay for a business permit in
2009, which he says would have cost him $3,600.00 “upfront,”
21 plaintiff “. . .chose to receive up to three citations in a year which
then entails a misdemeanor and take the matter to jury trial and
22 allow the people to decide.” Id.
23 3. Plaintiff states that he was issued “no more than” two citations “in
a year” and that unpaid fines and attorney’s fees cost him
24 $14,000.00. Id. at 3.
25 4. In early spring of 2011, Shasta County Sheriff’s deputies executed
a warrant at the Medicine Man Collective to search for unpermitted
26 interior build-outs and modifications to the premises. According to
plaintiff, the warrant was invalid because it was for a different
27 address. See id.
28 / / /
1 5. Plaintiff claims sheriff’s deputies “continued to park on, two and
up to three vehicles in and around the facility to harass myself and
2 patrons.” In mid-2011, plaintiff was evicted from his place of
business and plaintiff “closed Medicine Man and proceeded to
3 engage a legal medical 24 plant cooperative grow in McArthur,
California.” Id.
4
6. Next, plaintiff claims he first “engaged” with defendant Bosenko,
5 the Shasta County Sheriff, at a park in the town of Fall River Mills
in Shasta County, when Bosenko “was standing in the middle of
6 the road facing me glaring with his hand on his service weapon
standing in an aggressive posture.” Id. at 4.
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7. According to plaintiff, “the property” – presumably referring to the
8 location of plaintiff’s 24-plant grow operation in McArthur – was
raided by Shasta County Sheriff’s deputies “soon thereafter.”
9 Plaintiff was not present during this “raid,” which resulted in the
confiscation of firearms from the property owner.
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8. Plaintiff states that, later that night, he drove to McArthur to
11 “recover cannabis product” and was subsequently pulled over in
Burney, California, and held at gunpoint, arrested, and interrogated
12 for several hours. Plaintiff further states that 33 pounds of
cannabis was seized and destroyed. Id.
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9. Next, plaintiff states he encountered defendant Bosenko again at a
14 meeting of the Shasta County Board of Supervisors and that a
medical cannabis activist, Rodney Jones, handed Bosenko a copy
15 of a lawsuit. Plaintiff states Bosenko read through the first two
pages and then “bolted out the front doors of the building in a
16 huff.” Id. at 5.
17 10. Ten minutes later, Bosenko returned to the meeting room with
numerous deputies who proceeded to line themselves at intervals
18 along three walls of the Board Chambers.” According to plaintiff,
defendant Bosenko “spent his entire morning glaring at me the
19 same as he did on the road to the park in Fall River Mills earlier. . .
.” Id.
20
11. Plaintiff next alleges improper wireless surveillance by Bosenko.
21 According to plaintiff, he possesses evidence indicating that his
computer and cell phone were both hacked and accessed,
22 apparently by the Shasta Inter-Agency Narcotics Task Force. See
id. at 6.
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12. Plaintiff alleges that, two years prior, he encountered defendant
24 Bosenko at a Chevron station on Eureka Way in Redding,
California, and noticed Bosenko putting fuel in a “low profile
25 unmarked white Dodge Charger. . . .” According to plaintiff, when
Bosenko first saw him Bosenko “displayed immediate anger in his
26 facial expressions and dropped his hand to his service weapon. . .”
and glared at plaintiff while plaintiff walked into the convenience
27 store. Id. at 7.
28 / / /
1 13. According to plaintiff, in February 2019 he went to Castle Crags
State Park in Castella, California, to monitor weather conditions
2 and map the landscape using Google Earth “for purposes of
maximizing my mountain bike adventures. . . .” Id.
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14. Plaintiff states that whenever he parks at a given trailhead location
4 for the purpose outlined above, a short time later there is evidence
that people had been there, such as gum wrappers and cigarette
5 butts. See id.
6 15. Plaintiff claims that, one unspecified day when he was descending
the mountain he came out of the forest to see defendant Bosenko’s
7 “distinctive white Dodge Charger” parked at the park headquarters
in Castella. Plaintiff suspected that Bosenko was stalking him. Id.
8 at 8.
9 16. Next, plaintiff claims that in October 2016 someone working for
the Shasta Inter-Agency Narcotics Task Force moved in to
10 plaintiff’s neighborhood “two doors up.” In September someone
named “Brook Lynn” appeared at plaintiff’s door stating: “Hey,
11 I’m your new neighbor and my husband is SINTF and he doesn’t
like your plants,” referring to plaintiff’s six-plant “legal medical
12 cannabis garden.” Plaintiff alleges that he was surveilled in the
time period immediately after this. Id. at 8-9.
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17. Plaintiff next claims:
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Within a few months a Redding Police Department
15 Detective followed me from my neighborhood into
Whiskeytown National Recreation Area in a tan colored
16 suburban before sunrise in early spring of 2016. I
parked at the Visitors Center and watched him drive
17 toward Whiskeytown Headquarters in the tan colored
older model SUV likely Chevrolet Blazer. He has dark
18 colored short hair, tan leather sports jacket, white shirt
and multi colored striped tie. I recognized him from an
19 activist event at Redding City Hall in 2014. I had
actually spoken to him at a stop light before he and
20 another detective drove into RPD Headquarters. I
prepared my bike and gear, hiked the two point five
21 miles to the Shasta Divide Trail summit, rested and then
descended the mountain to Shasta Mine Loop parking
22 lot and then took the road back up the dam and
Kennedy Memorial Highway back to my vehicle at the
23 visitors center approximate total duration 75 minutes.
The sun had rose and it was a cool morning.
24 Whiskeytown HQ had all their people lined up with
their backs facing me near the flagpole when I rode past
25 up the hill. The man in a ranger suit with hat stopped
speaking and just stared at me when I went past and it
26 reminded me of the incident earlier when I was
followed into the park. From that day on anytime I
27 went into the park, Keswick/Iron Mountain Road, Iron
Mountain, Trinity Divide adjacent to the backside of
28 the park at Buckhorn Summit or Mad Mule mountain
1 areas I was followed, watched and traced as described
above prior, during and post mountain biking. . . .
2
Id. at 9-10.
3
18. Plaintiff states that from the time periods referenced above to
4 February 2018 he could not go to Village Cycle in Redding,
California “without Shasta County Code Enforcement vehicles and
5 personnel, Shasta County Animal Control (Sheriff’s Deputies) and
or detectives stalking the location both inside and outside.” Id. at
6 11.
7 19. Plaintiff states that he was “followed for miles from this location”
by Code Enforcement and “by undercover police. . . .” Id. at 12.
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20. According to plaintiff, in late 2014 Shasta County Marshalls were
9 “triangulating in my vicinity” on several occasions near Pleasant
Drive in West Redding, California. Plaintiff states that, while
10 speaking with AT&T to change his billing address, “interference
was so bad I couldn’t receive their texts with password updates to I
11 went mobile to the power lines which scramble stingray signals
from my research.” Suddenly, texts came through and Plaintiff
12 told the AT&T agent with whom he was speaking that “it’s gotten
so bad around here with cannabis activism I expect the Marshall’s
13 to drive by any second.” According to Plaintiff, within 30 seconds
a Marshall’s vehicle passed from the north heading south. See id.
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21. Plaintiff states that he “identified all the ‘normal user’ signals in
15 the immediate vicinity” of his home. He states there are times
when “other” signals appear. Plaintiff states he “went mobile”
16 with a laptop as a “wifi monitor exclusively.” Plaintiff states that
this is when he discovered “signals” with names like “Hidden
17 Network,” “Hidden Network Open Link,” “and SUPER PIG Open
Link.” Id. at 13.
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22. Plaintiff claims these same networks would appear, disappear, and
19 reappear as he traveled around the valley in as much as a 30-mile
radius. According to Plaintiff, the same wifi signals are apparent
20 at the Shasta County Sheriff’s Office at 300 Park Marina Circle in
Redding, California. See id.
21
23. Plaintiff states that “Hidden Network” and others were following
22 him between Buenaventura Ave. and Mt. Gate via South
Bonnyview Blvd. and I-5 in Redding, California. See id.
23
24. Plaintiff states that he has “clearly and unequivocally identified”
24 “Hidden Network” as being used by Sheriff’s Department
personnel and the “MIT” – Marijuana Investigation Team – the
25 “MET” – Marijuana Eradication Team – and/or “SINTF” – the
Shasta Interagency Narcotics Task Force. Id. at 14.
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25. Plaintiff next outlines what he calls “frenetic” activity by the
27 United States DEA in Northern California and Southern Oregon in
2017 and 2018. According to Plaintiff, he was being tracked by
28 government vehicles. See id.
1 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Bosenko is liable for the conduct of the officers under
2 his command. See id. at 16. Plaintiff further alleges violations of his constitutional rights under
3 the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Ninth
4 Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to a policy or custom implemented and
5 followed by unspecified defendants. See id. at 17-18. Plaintiff states that the policy or custom
6 “is reflected in the proposed initiative for 2014, Measure A.” Id. at 16.
7
8 II. DISCUSSION
9 In considering whether a complaint states a claim, the Court must accept all
10 allegations of material fact in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94
11 (2007). The Court must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
12 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp.
13 Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per
14 curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v.
15 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by
16 actual factual allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50
17 (2009). In addition, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by
18 lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement
20 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair
21 notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly,
22 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, in order
23 to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic
24 recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to
25 raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555-56. The complaint must contain
26 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has
27 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
28 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more
2 than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
3 at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability,
4 it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility for entitlement to relief.” Id.
5 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
6 Having carefully considered Plaintiff’s lengthy and detailed statement of facts, the
7 Court finds the first amended complaint fails to satisfy the plausibility standard. Plaintiff simply
8 has not explained how the sequence of events he outlines in the first amended complaint suggests
9 any violation of his constitutional or statutory rights. Plaintiff’s allegations are not even “merely
10 consistent” with liability as no theories of liability are set forth.
11 The Court further finds Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is deficient for the
12 same reasons outlined in the Court’s prior screening order addressing the original complaint,
13 reasons the Court will not repeat here. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint continues to suffer
14 from the same defects. Prior to recommending dismissal of the entire action, however, and in the
15 interest of justice, the Court will provide Plaintiff with one final opportunity to amend to allege
16 facts which show how each of the named defendants is liable.
17
18 III. CONCLUSION
19 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by
20 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire
21 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is
22 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See
23 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to
24 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended
25 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if
26 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make
27 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be
28 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
1 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the
2 | conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See
3 | Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
4 | each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection
5 | between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
6 | 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
7 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the
8 | time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at
9 | 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply
10 | with Rule 8 may, in the court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).
11 | See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).
12 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
13 1. Plaintiff's first amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and
14 2. Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the date
15 | of service of this order.
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17 | Dated: August 9, 2021
18 DENNIS M. COTA
19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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