referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
How later courts described this case
- referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
- holding that 25 there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 BERNARD GLEN TAYLOR, No. 2:19-CV-2375-DMC-P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 S. PALAGUMMI, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, ECF No.
19 16.
20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
21 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
22 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or
23 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
24 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,
25 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain
26 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This
27 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d
28 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the
1 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it
2 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege
3 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the
4 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is
5 impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague
6 and conclusory.
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8 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
9 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) S. Palagummi, a doctor at the
10 California Health Care Facility (CHCF); (2) N. Malakkla, a doctor at CHCF; and (3) J. Sonza, the
11 dialysis center manager at CHCF. See ECF No. 16, pg. 2.
12 Plaintiff states that his health care provider at CHCF was Defendant Palagummi.
13 See id. at 3. Plaintiff claims Defendant Palagummi failed to provide adequate treatment for his
14 kidney problems. See id. As a result, Plaintiff claims he has lost kidney function and requires
15 dialysis. See id. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Malakkla is responsible as a “supervising
16 physician.” Id. Plaintiff adds that Defendant Sonza failed to provide proper care while
17 performing a dialysis treatment procedure. See id. at 4.
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19 II. DISCUSSION
20 The Court finds that Plaintiff has stated sufficient facts to proceed on an Eighth
21 Amendment medical care claim against Defendants Palagummi and Sonza. Plaintiff has not,
22 however, alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against Defendant Malakkla, who is alleged to be
23 a “supervising physician.” Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the
24 actions of their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
25 there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the
26 constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations.
27 See id. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable
28 based on knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because
1 government officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her
2 own conduct and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
3 Supervisory personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation
4 of constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be
5 liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v.
6 Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
7 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such
8 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.
9 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.
10 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in
11 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th
12 Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
13 official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676.
14 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged personal conduct on the part of Defendant Malakkla
15 or that this defendant implemented a policy which violates Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
16 Plaintiff will be provided an additional opportunity to amend.
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18 III. CONCLUSION
19 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by
20 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
21 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an
22 amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,
23 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the
24 prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An
25 amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
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1 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the
2 | conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See
3 | Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
4 | each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection
5 | between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
6 | 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
7 Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended
8 | complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and
9 | recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such
10 | further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.
11 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
12 1. The Clerk of the Court is directed to update the docket to reflect that the
13 | following are named defendants to this action: S$. Palagummi, N. Malakkla, and J. Sonza; and
14 2. Plaintiff may file a third amended complaint within 30 days of the date of
15 | service of this order.
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17 | Dated: August 4, 2021
18 DENNIS M. COTA
19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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