The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 ALLEN DALE EPPERSON, III, No. 2:21-cv-00769-CKD P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 SOLANO COUNTY JAIL MEDICAL, et
al.,
15
Defendants.
16
17
18 Plaintiff is a county inmate proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42
19 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28
20 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
21 Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As plaintiff has submitted a
22 declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), his request will be granted.
23 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§
24 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the
25 initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court.
26 Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding
27 month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by
28 /////
1 the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account
2 exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
3 I. Screening Standard
4 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
5 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
6 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
7 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
8 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
9 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
10 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
11 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an
12 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
13 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully
14 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
15 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
16 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than
17 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
18 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words,
19 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
20 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim
21 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A
22 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
23 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
24 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted,
25 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and
26 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
27 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
28 /////
1 II. Allegations in the Complaint
2 At all times relevant to the allegations in the complaint, plaintiff was a county inmate at
3 either the Solano County Jail or the Stanton Correctional Facility. In this civil rights action, he
4 names the Stanton Correctional Facility and the Solano County Jail Medical staff as defendants.
5 The majority of the complaint consists of copies of inmate grievance forms submitted to jail staff
6 concerning his lack of medical care. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that there was a delay in
7 receiving medical attention when he was throwing up blood and for an unrelated “hernia issue.”
8 ECF No. 1 at 5.
9 III. Legal Standards
10 The following legal standards are being provided to plaintiff based on his pro se status as
11 well as the nature of the allegations in his complaint.
12 A. Linkage Requirement
13 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the
14 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See
15 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
16 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a
17 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates
18 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that
19 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th
20 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must
21 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of
22 plaintiff's federal rights.
23 A. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need
24 Denial or delay of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a
25 violation of the prisoner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
26 97, 104-05 (1976). An individual is liable for such a violation only when the individual is
27 deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.; see Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d
28 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez v.
1 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000).
2 In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. Jett, 439
3 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other
4 grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). First, the
5 plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s
6 condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
7 pain.’” Id., citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. “Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he
8 existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of
9 comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an
10 individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Lopez, 203 F. 3d
11 at 1131-1132, citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60.
12 Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately
13 indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This second prong is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act
14 or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the
15 indifference. Id. Under this standard, the prison official must not only “be aware of facts from
16 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but that person
17 “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This “subjective
18 approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was.” Id. at 839. A
19 showing of merely negligent medical care is not enough to establish a constitutional violation.
20 Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106. A
21 difference of opinion about the proper course of treatment is not deliberate indifference, nor does
22 a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials over the necessity for or extent of medical
23 treatment amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058
24 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, mere delay of
25 medical treatment, “without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical
26 indifference.” Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985).
27 Where a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the
28 prisoner must show that the delay caused “significant harm and that Defendants should have
1 known this to be the case.” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 745-46; see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
2 IV. Analysis
3 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state a claim upon
4 which relief can be granted under federal law. First and foremost, plaintiff has failed to name a
5 proper defendant in this action. The Stanton Correctional Facility is not a “person” under 42
6 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore cannot be sued. Additionally, plaintiff has not identified any medical
7 staff by name who are responsible for his delay in medical care. For all of these reasons,
8 plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended
9 complaint.
10 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions
11 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v.
12 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in
13 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C.
14 §1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the
15 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory
16 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of
17 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
18 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to
19 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended
20 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a
21 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375
22 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no
23 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original
24 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.
25 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
26 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 6) is granted.
27 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. All fees
28 shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Sheriff of Solano County
1 | filed concurrently herewith.
2 3. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.
3 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended
4 | complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil
5 || Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket
6 || number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” Failure to file an
7 || amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action
8 | be dismissed.
9 5. The Clerk of Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the form complaint for filing a
10 | civil nights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
11 | Dated: August 3, 2021 / aa / x ly a
2 CAROLYN K.DELANEY
13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
14
15
16
17
18 || 12/eppe0769.14.docx
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28