United States v. Brown

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 00-4324

ROBERT LEROY BROWN,

Defendant-Appellant.



Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Benson E. Legg, District Judge.

(CR-99-232-L)

Submitted: October 17, 2000

Decided: October 30, 2000

Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL

James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Sasha Natapoff, Assistant

Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Lynne

A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, Lisa M. Turner, Assistant

United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

2 UNITED STATES v. BROWN

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

A routine traffic stop by a Baltimore City police officer led to Rob-

ert Leroy Brown’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a con-

victed felon. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g) (West Supp. 2000). Brown’s

motion to suppress evidence seized at the time of his arrest was

denied. He then pled guilty and the court sentenced him to fifty-seven

months in prison. Brown timely appealed, claiming that there was not

probable cause to arrest him and that the search under the hood of his

car was improper. We find that there was probable cause to arrest

Brown and that the search under the hood of his car, which ultimately

revealed a firearm, was proper. Consequently, we affirm his convic-

tion.

Brown was stopped by a police officer on April 26, 1999, after he

drove through a stop sign and traveled the wrong way down a one-

way road. Throughout the stop, Brown behaved belligerently. The

officer asked for Brown’s driver’s license and vehicle registration.

Brown reluctantly handed over his license. The police dispatcher

reported to the officer that Brown’s license was valid, but that there

was a possible outstanding warrant. Meanwhile, the officer had

placed the driver’s license on top of Brown’s car and it slid under the

hood. Brown refused to open the hood so the officer could retrieve the

license. Instead, he handed the officer a learner’s permit that had

someone else’s name on it. The officer arrested Brown and then

looked under the hood of the car for the driver’s license where he

found not only the license, but also a firearm. Brown was subse-

quently convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See

28 U.S.C.A. § 922(g).

Brown does not dispute that he drove the wrong way down a one-

way street and failed to stop at a stop sign. Nor does he claim that the

initial traffic stop was impermissible. He claims, however, that his

warrantless arrest was improper. We disagree.

Under Maryland law, a police officer may make a warrantless

arrest of a suspect who commits a moving violation and then fails to

furnish satisfactory identification. See Md. Code Ann. Transp. II § 26-

UNITED STATES v. BROWN 3

202(a)(2)(i) (1998). In this case, Brown presented his valid Maryland

driver’s license to the officer, but it slipped under the car hood. The

officer asked Brown to open the hood so he (the officer) could

retrieve the license in order to use the information on the license to

issue a citation. Brown refused to open the hood. Instead, he gave the

officer a learner’s permit with someone else’s name on it. We find

that under these circumstances, there was probable cause to arrest

Brown for violating § 26-202(a)(2)(i).

Brown argues that, under Benbow v. State, 587 A.2d 1110 (Md.

1991), he furnished satisfactory proof of his identity and therefore his

arrest was not legal. However, unlike the situation in Benbow, Brown

provided contradictory evidence concerning his identity and there was

no undisputed evidence that the arresting officer personally knew

him.

Finally, we find no merit to Brown’s claim that the search under

the hood of his car was improper. The arresting officer knew that evi-

dence of a crime, namely, possession of more than one driver’s

license, could be found under the hood of Brown’s car. Consequently,

he had probable cause to search under the hood for the driver’s

license where he then found the gun that formed the basis of Brown’s

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) conviction. See Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S.

938, 940 (1996) (allowing warrantless search of car if there is proba-

ble cause to believe car contains evidence of crime).

For these reasons, we affirm Brown’s conviction. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-

quately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED