(SS) Stone v. Commissioner of Social Security

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 MELVA STONE, No. 2:18-cv-02862 CKD

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER

14 ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social

Security,

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Defendant.

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18 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

19 (“Commissioner”) denying an application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title

20 XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”). The parties have consented to Magistrate Judge

21 jurisdiction to conduct all proceedings in the case, including the entry of final judgment. For the

22 reasons discussed below, the court will grant plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and deny

23 the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

24 BACKGROUND

25 Plaintiff, born in 1980, applied on July 9, 2012, for SSI, alleging disability beginning

26 January 1, 1989. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 106. Plaintiff alleged she was unable to work

27 due to narcolepsy. AT 106. Following a hearing in April 2014, an ALJ issued a decision dated

28 October 7, 2014, finding plaintiff not disabled. AT 40, 153-70. The Appeals Council reviewed

1 the decision and remanded the case, stating in part:

2 The [ALJ] found that the claimant’s narcolepsy was not medically

determined and was thus not a severe impairment. However, the

3 claimant has a long established history of narcolepsy. The claimant’s

narcolepsy was previously found to be disabling as a child and later

4 under the adult standard from 1999 to 2006. She has managed the

condition with medication. As recently as June 2014, the claimant’s

5 neurologist, Robin Soffer, M.D., diagnosed her with excessive

daytime sleepiness and noted possible obstructive sleep apnea.

6 Further, the claimant testified at the hearing that she often falls asleep

and it prevents her from cooking, driving, using mass transit and

7 social engagement. The record establishes that the claimant’s

narcolepsy causes more than a minimal effect on her ability to

8 perform basic work activities. Interestingly, the [ALJ] considered

listing 11.03 regarding the claimant’s narcolepsy despite finding a

9 non-medically determinable impairment at step two which is

inconsistent. Considering the de minimis standard at step two,

10 further evaluation is necessary.

11 AT 172-173 (record citations omitted). The Appeals Council issued specific instructions for the

12 ALJ on remand. AT 173.

13 After a second hearing on remand in July 2017, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not

14 disabled1 in a decision dated December 15, 2017. AT 20-31. The ALJ made the following

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16 1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to

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disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in

part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically

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determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A).

19 A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.

20 137, 140-142, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation:

21 Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to

22 step two.

23 Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If

so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is

24 appropriate.

25 Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt.

26 404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically determined

disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

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Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past

28 work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

1 findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

2 1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

July 9, 2012, the application date.

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2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: narcolepsy2,

4 sleep apnea, obesity, and depressive disorder.

5 3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed

6 impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

7 4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform

8 light work, except occasionally climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds; avoid

concentrated use of hazardous machinery; avoid concentrated

9 exposure to unprotected heights; capable of simple routine and

repetitive tasks; and capable of low stress work with occasional

10 decision making and occasional changes in the work setting.

11 5. The claimant has no past relevant work.

12 6. The claimant was born on XX/XX/1980, which is defined as a

younger individual age 18-49 on the date the application was filed.

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7. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate

14 in English.

15 8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because the

claimant does not have past relevant work.

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9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and

17 residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant

numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.

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10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the

19 Social Security Act, since July 9, 2012, the date the application was

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21 Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not

22 disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

23 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation

24 process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. at 2294 n.5. The Commissioner bears the

burden if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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2 Narcolepsy is “a sleep disorder that causes extreme sleepiness and uncontrollable sleep attacks,

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making a person fall asleep at inappropriate times during the day.” Harvard Medical Dictionary of

27 Health Terms, https://www.health.harvard.edu/medical-dictionary-of-health-terms/j-through-

p#N-terms (last visited March 20, 2020).

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1 filed.

2 AT 20-31.

3 ISSUES PRESENTED

4 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed the following errors in finding plaintiff not

5 disabled: (1) the ALJ improperly discounted plaintiff’s credibility as to the intensity, persistence,

6 and limiting effects of her symptoms; (2) the ALJ erred in weighing the medical opinion

7 evidence; (3) the ALJ erred in determining that plaintiff did not equal Listing 11.02; (4) the RFC

8 was not based on substantial evidence and fails to include all limitations.

9 LEGAL STANDARDS

10 The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on

11 proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record

12 as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial

13 evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340

14 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

15 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th

16 Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is

17 responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving

18 ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

19 “The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one

20 rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

21 The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th

22 Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s

23 conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not

24 affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see

25 also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the

26 administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability

27 or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226,

28 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in

1 weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

2 ANALYSIS

3 A. Credibility

4 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in discounting her credibility as to the intensity,

5 persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms.

6 The ALJ summarized plaintiff’s testimony as follows:

7 The claimant testified that due to her narcolepsy, she has not been

hired due to falling asleep during her job interviews or orientations.

8 She stated that her narcolepsy has affected her since she was

diagnosed at the age of 10. She testified that once she was placed on

9 medication her symptoms were better but she continued to fall asleep

but just not as much. She stated that she has not been on medication

10 for a number of years due to funds; however, she is currently on

Medicare. Despite being on Medicare, she still has not received any

11 medication due to her primary care physician requesting a recent

sleep study to confirm her diagnosis before prescribing any

12 medication.

13 The claimant testified that her narcolepsy is the primary reason she

is unable to work; however, she did state that she has problems

14 standing and that one of her legs gives her problems. She also said

she has difficulty with shortness of breath. In addition to the physical

15 condition, she testified that her narcolepsy has caused depression due

to her inability to live life as a normal 36 year old and the feeling that

16 she needs to have a babysitter. She said she is unable to cook, drive,

or take public transportation due to falling asleep.

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The claimant testified that she currently lives with her sister. She

18 says she has a 5-month-old son. She testified that during the summer

months there are family members around to help her watch her son;

19 however, during the school year she is home alone during the day

with her son. She said that she is able to care for her son; however,

20 she has to take precautions so when she falls asleep her son would

not get hurt. She testified that in a typical day, she falls asleep

21 approximately every 20 minutes.

22 The claimant testified that she could stand and walk a short period

because her leg gives her problems. She said she is able to go to the

23 grocery store with her sister, who helps her with her activities of daily

living, but she has to lean on the walls and only shop for short

24 periods. She said she is able to lift her son who is approximately 20

pounds and she is able to carry groceries that weigh approximately 5

25 pounds.

26 AT 26; see AT 64-102 (July 31, 2017 hearing testimony).

27 As to credibility, the ALJ wrote:

28 As for the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and

1 limiting effects of her symptoms, they are inconsistent because as

observed during the hearing, despite the claimant testifying that she

2 falls asleep every 20 minutes, she was able to attend the entire

hearing, which took longer than 20 minutes, and did not fall asleep.

3 Additionally, she is capable of taking care of an infant by herself

albeit there are a lot of family around. Furthermore, she has not

4 really sought medical treatment since her SSI ceased in 2006 despite

her testifying that she had improvement with medication but did not

5 seek to refill the medication.

6 AT 27.

7 The ALJ then reviewed the medical evidence of physical impairment, noting that plaintiff

8 “has a history of narcolepsy since the age of 9 or 10 and was found to be disabled by the [SSA];

9 however, by June 1, 2006, the claimant was no longer considered disabled[]” as her narcolepsy

10 responded to medication. AT 27 (record citations omitted). Prior to 2012, when plaintiff applied

11 for disability benefits in the instant case, there was “a significant gap in the treatment record”;

12 however, plaintiff underwent a December 2012 neurological examination and sought treatment in

13 May 2013, when she was diagnosed with narcolepsy by treating physician Dr. Crumpler. AT 27

14 (record citations omitted).

15 The ALJ summarized plaintiff’s medical history as to physical impairments in 2013 and

16 2014, noting examining physician Dr. Cohen’s August 2013 diagnosis of “severe narcolepsy with

17 multiple daily episodes of sleep and likely cataplexy,” but also noting plaintiff’s reported daily

18 activities, including cleaning, grocery shopping, and taking walks. AT 27 (record citations

19 omitted). The ALJ summarized a June 2014 neurological examination where plaintiff showed

20 “evidence of sleepiness after 30 minutes, . . . falling into a slight sleep, and 3 or 4 occasions

21 where she closed her eyes,” and was diagnosed with “excessive daytime sleepiness not

22 successfully treated.” AT 28 (record citations omitted). The ALJ found “a significant gap in the

23 treatment record from June 2014 through 2017,” though plaintiff was diagnosed with narcolepsy

24 and other conditions in June 2017. AT 28 (record citations omitted).

25 The ALJ also summarized the relevant medical opinions, issued after plaintiff’s

26 application date. AT 28-30. The ALJ assigned various weights to these opinions, but did not

27 relate them back to plaintiff’s testimony or explain how the credited opinions undercut plaintiff’s

28 statements about her symptoms. AT 28-30.

1 After weighing the medical opinions, the ALJ stated: “[C]onsidering the claimant’s

2 medical records as a whole, her testimony concerning her alleged functional limitations, and the

3 opinion evidence, I conclude the claimant’s subjective complaints and alleged limitations are not

4 entirely consistent with the medical evidence of record. Accordingly, I find that the claimant

5 retains the capacity to perform less than the full range of light, as described in the residual

6 functional capacity assessment above.” AT 30 (emphasis added).

7 The ALJ determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the court defers to the

8 ALJ’s discretion if the ALJ used the proper process and provided proper reasons. See, e.g.,

9 Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1995). If credibility is critical, the ALJ must make an

10 explicit credibility finding. Albalos v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 871, 873-74 (9th Cir. 1990); Rashad v.

11 Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring explicit credibility finding to be

12 supported by “a specific, cogent reason for the disbelief”).

13 In evaluating whether subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ should first consider

14 objective medical evidence and then consider other factors. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341,

15 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). If there is objective medical evidence of an impairment, the ALJ

16 then may consider the nature of the symptoms alleged, including aggravating factors, medication,

17 treatment and functional restrictions. See id. at 345-47. The ALJ also may consider: (1) the

18 applicant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent

19 testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a

20 prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the applicant’s daily activities. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d

21 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); see generally SSR 96-7P, 61 FR 34483-01; SSR 95-5P, 60 FR 55406-

22 01; SSR 88-13. Work records, physician and third party testimony about nature, severity and

23 effect of symptoms, and inconsistencies between testimony and conduct also may be relevant.

24 Light v. Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). A failure to seek

25 treatment for an allegedly debilitating medical problem may be a valid consideration by the ALJ

26 in determining whether the alleged associated pain is not a significant nonexertional impairment.

27 See Flaten v. Secretary of HHS, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ may rely, in part,

28 on his or her own observations, see Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir.

1 1989), which cannot substitute for medical diagnosis. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 177 n.6

2 (9th Cir. 1990). “Without affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the

3 Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.”

4 Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).

5 In Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015), the Ninth Circuit held that

6 an ALJ’s failure “to identify the testimony she found not credible” and “link that testimony to

7 particular parts of the record supporting her non-credibility determination” was legal error. See

8 also Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102-1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (ALJ’s failure

9 to “specifically identify the testimony” he found not credible was error; boilerplate statement that

10 symptoms were not credible to the extent they were inconsistent with the RFC was insufficient);

11 Morsea v. Berryhill, 725 Fed. Appx. 463, 465 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2018) (unpublished) (ALJ “failed

12 to identify the testimony from the claimant found not credible and explain what evidence

13 undermined his testimony. Although the ALJ summarized claimant’s testimony and also

14 summarized the medical evidence in the record, the findings were general in nature, which is

15 insufficient for an adverse credibility determination.”), citing Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1102.

16 Here, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff’s subjective statements about her symptoms were

17 “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence of record.” AT 30. But “[a]n ALJ’s vague

18 allegation that a claimant’s testimony is not consistent with the objective medical evidence,

19 without any specific findings in support of that conclusion is insufficient[.]” Treichler, 775 F.3d

20 at 1103 (internal quotations and citation omitted). “The ALJ must identify the testimony that was

21 not credible, and specify what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Id., citing

22 Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the

23 ALJ’s general references to the medical record and opinion evidence, at least some of which

24 could be read to support plaintiff’s testimony, are not legally sufficient reasons to discount her

25 credibility.

26 The ALJ did supply three specific reasons: First, plaintiff’s statements were inconsistent

27 with the ALJ’s observation that, despite her testimony that she falls asleep every 20 minutes,

28 plaintiff did not fall asleep during the hearing, which “took longer than 20 minutes.” AT 27.

1 Under Ninth Circuit law, an ALJ may rely, in part, on his or her own observations in

2 assessing a claimant’s credibility. See Quang Van Han, 992 F.2d at 1458. While the Ninth

3 Circuit has discouraged reliance on a claimant’s demeanor at testimony as support for an ALJ’s

4 conclusions, Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1455 (9th Cir. 1984), if there is other support for

5 an ALJ’s decision, then “[t]he inclusion of the ALJ’s personal observations does not render the

6 decision improper.” Morgan v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966

7 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming negative credibility finding where “the ALJ’s personal

8 observation was only one factor taken into consideration”); Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531

9 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding inclusion of ALJ’s personal observations not improper where ALJ also

10 considered claimant's testimony, doctors’ opinions, objective medical evidence, and demeanor).

11 Here, the ALJ’s mere observation that plaintiff did not fall asleep during the July 2017

12 hearing does not meaningfully address plaintiff’s testimony that her narcolepsy symptoms

13 interfered with her ability to find work and perform daily activities. See AT 68-70 (testimony

14 that plaintiff fell asleep during job interviews and a job orientation session); AT 74 (testimony

15 that plaintiff had to put pillows around herself while sitting and holding her baby “because I know

16 I’m going to fall asleep” and let go of the baby); AT 77-78 (testimony that plaintiff fell asleep in

17 the middle of conversations); AT 81 (testimony that plaintiff had fallen asleep while cooking and

18 while taking a bath); AT 82 (testimony that plaintiff had fallen asleep on public transit and no

19 longer took public transit, drove, or ran errands by herself due to symptoms).

20 The ALJ’s second stated reason for discounting plaintiff’s credibility was that “she is

21 capable of taking care of an infant by herself albeit there are a lot of family around.” AT 26.

22 This, too, is weak evidence for finding plaintiff’s testimony not credible. Plaintiff testified in July

23 2017 that she had a five-month-old baby and that her sister and high school-aged relatives were

24 “always around [to help] because it’s summer break.” AT 73-74. Plaintiff acknowledged that

25 when they went back to school and work, she would have to take care of the baby alone, which

26 was “really hard” because she could fall asleep while holding him, and this scared her. AT 74.

27 At most, therefore, plaintiff had proven capable of taking care of a newborn for a few months

28 without significant family support, and feared being alone with her son due to her tendency to fall

1 asleep without warning. It is not clear to what extent this undercuts her other testimony.

2 The ALJ’s third stated reason for discounting plaintiff’s credibility was that “she had not

3 really sought medical treatment since her SSI ceased in 2006 despite her testifying that she had

4 improvement with medication but did not seek to refill the medication.” AT 26-37. Certainly a

5 claimant’s “unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment” is a valid

6 consideration in assessing credibility. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. Here, plaintiff testified that she

7 stopped taking medication for narcolepsy in 2006, when her Social Security benefits were

8 discontinued and she didn’t have insurance, and that her current doctor was waiting for a sleep

9 study to confirm her diagnosis before prescribing medication for narcolepsy. AT 87-90. While

10 this was a proper consideration for the ALJ, without more support from the medical record or

11 other factors as discussed above, the ALJ’s stated reasons fall short of “clear and convincing”

12 evidence to discount plaintiff’s credibility.

13 In Treichler, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the ALJ’s failure to specify which parts of

14 plaintiff’s testimony were not credible, or to supply clear and convincing reasons for discounting

15 it, was not harmless error.

16 Because the ALJ set out his RFC and summarized the evidence

supporting his determination, the government argues that we can

17 reasonably infer that the ALJ rejected Treichler’s testimony to the

extent it conflicted with that medical evidence. But we cannot

18 substitute our conclusions for the ALJ’s, or speculate as to the

grounds for the ALJ’s conclusions. [Citation omitted.] Although the

19 ALJ’s analysis need not be extensive, the ALJ must provide some

reasoning in order for us to meaningfully determine whether the

20 ALJ’s conclusions were supported by substantial evidence. [Citation

omitted.] No such reasoning is present here.

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775 F.3d at 1103; see also Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494 (where ALJ “never identified which

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testimony she found not credible, and never explained which evidence contradicted that

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testimony,” decision fails to meet ALJ’s responsibility to provide reasons for her adverse

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determination); Powers v. Colvin, No. 1:15-cv-00077 EPG (E.D. Cal., Order dated June 21, 2016)

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(reversing and remanding for reassessment of claimant’s credibility where ALJ failed to specify

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clear and convincing reasons to discount it).

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1 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that plaintiff is entitled to summary

2 judgment on this claim.3

3 CONCLUSION

4 With error established, the court has the discretion to remand or reverse and award

5 benefits. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). A case may be remanded

6 under the “credit-as-true” rule for an award of benefits where:

7 (1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to

8 provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether

claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly

9 discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be

required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

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11 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). Even where all the conditions for the

12 “credit-as-true” rule are met, the court retains “flexibility to remand for further proceedings when

13 the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within

14 the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 1021; see also Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d

15 403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Unless the district court concludes that further administrative

16 proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with a direction to provide

17 benefits.”); Treichler, 775 F.3d at1105 (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is

18 uncertain and ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”).

19 Here, the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether plaintiff was disabled

20 during the relevant period. On remand, the ALJ is free to develop the record as needed, including

21 asking a vocational expert hypothetical questions about available jobs based on a revised RFC.

22 The court expresses no opinion regarding how the evidence should ultimately be weighed, and

23 any ambiguities or inconsistencies resolved, on remand. The court also does not instruct the ALJ

24 to credit any particular opinion or testimony. The ALJ may ultimately find plaintiff disabled

25 during the entirety of the relevant period; may find plaintiff eligible for some type of closed

26 period of disability benefits; or may find that plaintiff was never disabled during the relevant

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28 3 This decision does not reach the remaining claims.

1 | period, provided that the ALJ’s determination complies with applicable legal standards and is

2 || supported by the record as a whole.

3 Thus, the undersigned will order that this matter be remanded under sentence four of 42

4 | U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings.

5 For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

6 1. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 12) is granted;

7 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17) is denied;

8 3. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.

9 | Dated: March 23, 2020 dp. 7 fh | fe

10 CAROLYN K.DELANEY.

11 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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