finding Title IX does support 2 individual claims
How later courts described this case
- finding Title IX does support 2 individual claims
- “As Plaintiffs concede, Title IX does 22 not create a private right of action against school 23 officials, teachers, and other individuals who are not 24 direct recipients of federal funding.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 JANE DOE, an individual; and No. 2:18-cv-02576-JAM-CKD
TIFFANY DOE, an individual;
12
Plaintiffs,
13 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
v. DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR
14 JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
EL DORADO UNION HIGH SCHOOL
15 DISTRICT; CHAS PRIOR,
Individually; STEPHEN WEHR,
16 Individually; TONY DEVILLE,
Individually; TARA GRUDIN,
17 Individually; JUSTIN GATLING,
Individually; and DOES 1
18 THROUGH 20,
19 Defendants.
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21 Jane Doe and Tiffany Doe (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a
22 complaint against El Dorado Union High School District, and
23 individual Defendants Chas Prior, Stephen Wehr, Tony Deville,
24 Tara Grudin, and Justin Gatling (collectively “Defendants”),
25 alleging Defendants violated Title IX and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by
26 failing to redress a hostile educational environment after
27 Plaintiffs were sexually assaulted at El Dorado High School
28 (“EDHS.”). Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1,4-5. Currently before this
1 Court is Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Mot.
2 for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Mot.”), ECF No. 35-1. In this
3 Motion, Defendants only seek judgment on the Title IX claims and
4 section 1983 claims asserted against the individual Defendants.
5 Id. at 1. Plaintiffs oppose this Motion. Opp’n, ECF No. 45.1
6 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS in part and
7 DENIES in part Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.
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9 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
10 Plaintiffs allege they were “repeatedly sexually harassed
11 and sexually assaulted” by their teacher Daniel Mummy at El
12 Dorado High School during the 2016-2017 school year. Compl. ¶ 4.
13 Plaintiffs were both minors when the assault took place; Jane Doe
14 and Tiffany Doe are fictitious names utilized to protect their
15 privacy. Id.
16 El Dorado High School is in the El Dorado Union High School
17 District (“School District”). Id. ¶ 4. Id. Accordingly,
18 Plaintiffs named the School District as a defendant in this case.
19 Id. ¶ 7. At issue in this motion are the claims against school
20 district employees—individual Defendants Chas Prior, Stephen
21 Wehr, Tony Deville, Tara Grudin, and Justin Gatling. Mot. at 2.
22 Defendant Chas Prior was the El Dorado High School Principal
23 during the school year Plaintiffs were sexually assaulted.
24 Compl. ¶ 8. Defendants Tara Grudin and Justin Gatling were the
25 Vice Principals. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Defendant Stephen Wehr was the
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27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
28 scheduled for February 25, 2020.
1 Superintendent of the School District and Defendant Tony Deville
2 was the Assistant Superintendent of Human Resources (“The Title
3 IX Coordinator”). Id. ¶¶ 9-10.
4 Plaintiffs allege they were sexually assaulted by Mummy “in
5 the classroom, hallway, doorway, and outdoor areas of the
6 schoolyard during school hours.” Compl. ¶ 36. Plaintiffs
7 maintain that individual Defendants, Prior, Grudin and Gatling
8 observed these actions. Id.
9 Mummy was convicted of sexual molestation on October 2017.
10 Id. ¶ 56. After he was arrested, Plaintiffs “were subjected to
11 bullying and unsympathetic conduct by teachers and students.”
12 Id. ¶¶ 57, 61-62. Plaintiffs’ parents attempted to address
13 these issues with Principal Prior and Vice Principals Grudin and
14 Gatling, yet they “took no actions to protect or support the
15 Plaintiffs.” Id. ¶¶ 61, 64-65, 93, 95. Plaintiffs allege the
16 other individual Defendants, School District’s Superintendent
17 Wehr and Title IX Coordinator DeVille, were also informed of the
18 sexual harassment but failed to investigate. Id. ¶¶ 83,86,89.
19 Defendants seek judgment on all claims against these five
20 individual Defendants. Mot. at 2. Plaintiffs are suing the
21 individual Defendants for alleged violations of Title IX and
22 Section 1983 in their individual capacities.
23 Compl. ¶¶ 128,142,148,161.
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25 II. OPINION
26 A. Legal Standard
27 A party may move for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the
28 pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed.
1 R. Civ. P. 12(c). “Rule 12(c) is ‘functionally identical’ to
2 Rule 12(b)(6) and . . . ‘the same standard of review’ applies to
3 motions brought under either rule.” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v.
4 Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n. 4 (9th Cir.
5 2011). Accordingly, the Court “must accept all factual
6 allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the
7 light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fleming v.
8 Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court can
9 properly grant judgment on the pleadings “when there is no issue
10 of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to
11 judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
12 B. Judicial Notice
13 In deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the
14 Court is generally limited to the pleadings and may not consider
15 extrinsic evidence. Shame On You Productions, Inc. v. Elizabeth
16 Banks, 120 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1143-44 (C.D. Cal. 2015). However,
17 the Court may consider “documents referenced extensively in the
18 complaint, documents that form the basis of plaintiff's claims,
19 and matters of judicial notice, when determining whether the
20 allegations of the complaint state a claim upon which relief can
21 be granted.” Lopez v. Regents of University of California, 5 F.
22 Supp. 3d 1106, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2013). The Court may take
23 judicial notice of a fact that “is not subject to reasonable
24 dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily
25 determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably
26 questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).
27 Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of the
28 Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial filed on
1 September 18, 2018. Defs’ Req. for Judicial Notice, ECF 35-2.
2 Plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial notice of Defendants’
3 Answer to the Complaint, ECF No. 16. Plfs’ Req. for Judicial
4 Notice, ECF No. 46, Exh. A. Neither party objects to the
5 others’ requests but both requests are unnecessary since both of
6 these documents are court filings of which the Court already has
7 knowledge. Moreover, the Court can only take judicial notice of
8 the existence of these pleadings. As noted above, for purposes
9 of this Motion, the Court must accept all factual allegations in
10 the Complaint as true.
11 C. Analysis
12 1. Title IX Individual Liability
13 Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ First and Second claims
14 against the individual Defendants fail as a matter of law,
15 because Title IX does not support claims against individuals.
16 Mot. at 3.
17 Title IX provides in relevant part:
18 [N]o person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be
19 excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
20 of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
21 educational program or activity receiving financial
22 assistance.”
23 20 U.S.C. § 1681. Whether Title IX supports individual
24 liability claims is not well-established. The Supreme Court
25 has yet to directly address this question, leaving other
26 courts divided on the issue. Compare Doe v. Petaluma, 830
27 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (finding individuals may not
28 be held liable under Title IX), with Mennone v. Gordon, 889
1 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1995) (finding Title IX does support
2 individual claims).
3 Defendants ask the Court to adopt the reasoning in
4 Petaluma. Reply at 4. In their opposition, Plaintiffs’
5 request the Court to instead adopt the reasoning in Mennone.
6 Opp’n at 5-6. Plaintiffs overlook however, that only five
7 years after Mennone was decided, the District of Connecticut
8 found its reasoning in Mennone to be flawed when confronted
9 with the same issue. See Norris v. Norwalk Public Schools,
10 124 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797. Notably, the District of
11 Connecticut found the analysis in Petaluma, to be far more
12 persuasive than its own previous ruling. Id. at 796. While
13 neither case is binding authority, the Court is persuaded by
14 the reasoning in Petaluma, especially since it is consistent
15 with statements made by the Supreme Court and the Ninth
16 Circuit. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 528 U.S.
17 629 (Supreme Court observed it had yet to “exten[d] damages
18 liability under Title IX to parties outside the scope of
19 [the government’s enforcement] power.” Id. at 641) and Al-
20 Rifai v. Willows Unified School Dist., 469 Fed. Appx. 647,
21 649 (9th Cir. 2012) (“As Plaintiffs concede, Title IX does
22 not create a private right of action against school
23 officials, teachers, and other individuals who are not
24 direct recipients of federal funding.”)
25 In Petaluma, a student attempted to hold her principal
26 and counselor liable under Title IX for allegedly failing to
27 protect her from sexual harassment by another student. 830
28 F. Supp. at 1565, 1577. The court ultimately dismissed the
1 individual claims against the principal and counselor,
2 finding that “individuals may not be held personally liable
3 under Title IX.” Id. at 1577. The court found that
4 “[s]ince the Act prohibits discrimination against
5 beneficiaries in programs and activities that receive
6 federal financial assistance . . . it is the educational
7 institution that must be sued for violations of Title IX.”
8 Id. at 1576-1577. Further, it found its conclusion was
9 reinforced by the statutory provision for administrative
10 enforcement, since it only refers to “actions federal
11 agencies may take against institutions.” Id. The court was
12 likewise persuaded by the Ninth Circuit’s holding that
13 individuals may not be liable for discrimination under Title
14 VII. Id. (citing Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d
15 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993)). It found that since the
16 “evils [these two amendments] attack are so intimately
17 related . . . it would make little sense to interpret Title
18 IX to permit individual liability absent clear direction
19 from Congress.” Id.
20 Adopting the reasoning in Petaluma, this Court finds
21 that the five individual Defendants in this case may not be
22 held personally liable under Title IX. The Court therefore
23 GRANTS judgment for these Defendants on Plaintiffs’ First
24 and Second claims under Title IX, finding that they fail as
25 a matter of law.
26 2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
27 Defendants also seek judgment on Plaintiffs Third and Fourth
28 claims for violation of section 1983, claiming they are immune
1 from liability under the Eleventh Amendment. Mot. at 4.
2 Plaintiffs argue Defendants are not immune because their claims
3 are asserted against the individual Defendants in their
4 individual capacity, not in their official capacity.
5 Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to create a private cause
6 of action for violations of the United States Constitution.
7 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-691 (1978).
8 Local governing bodies are considered “persons” under the statute
9 and are therefore subject to liability under section 1983. Id.
10 However, “local governing units that are considered part of the
11 State for Eleventh Amendment purposes” are immune from liability.
12 Id. at 690 n. 54.
13 The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
14 provides that “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall
15 not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
16 commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
17 citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any
18 foreign state.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI. School districts are
19 considered a state agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.
20 Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248 (9th Cir.
21 1992). Official-capacity suits “generally represent only another
22 way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer
23 is an agent.” Monell, 436 U.S. 690, n.55. Since “[t]he State of
24 California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with
25 respect to claims brought under section 1983 in federal court,”
26 official-capacity suits against California school officials are
27 precluded under the Eleventh Amendment. Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of
28 Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009). Personal-capacity
1 suits, on the other hand, are not barred by the Eleventh
2 Amendment. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). This is so
3 even in personal-capacity suits attempting to hold a state
4 official liable for “actions taken in their official capacities.”
5 Id.
6 Plaintiffs do not dispute their suit would be barred had
7 they sued the Defendants in their official capacities. Opp’n at
8 8-9. They do dispute, however, Defendants’ attempt to
9 characterize their suit as an official-capacity suit. Id.
10 Plaintiffs maintain they are suing the individual Defendants in
11 their individual capacity. Id. Defendants argue that while it
12 may seem on its face that Plaintiffs have brought forth a
13 personal-capacity suit, they are merely using a pleading device
14 “to circumvent congressional intent” and hold the school
15 vicariously liable for alleged violations of Title IX. Reply at
16 6-7. The Court disagrees.
17 In determining whether a suit is an individual or official
18 capacity suit, the Court “must consider the ‘essential nature’ of
19 the proceeding.” Eaglesmith v. Ward, 73 F.3d 857, 860 (9th Cir.
20 1996) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dept of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459.
21 464 (1945)). “[W]hen the action is in essence one for the
22 recovery of money from the state, the state is the real,
23 substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its
24 sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are
25 nominal defendants.” Ford Motor Co., 323 at 464. However, when
26 an action “seeks damages against [defendants] personally, the
27 Eleventh Amendment does not restrict [plaintiffs] ability to sue
28 in federal court.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 31.
1 Here, the intent of the Third and Fourth causes of action
2 are to bring recourse on behalf of Plaintiffs against these five
3 individual Defendants. This is made explicit in their Complaint.
4 For example, in their Fourth cause of action, Plaintiffs allege
5 “the individual Defendants . . . are liable for compensatory and
6 punitive damages for their creation of an actual, particularized
7 danger that Plaintiffs would be sexually abused by a known,
8 sexual predator teacher, done in deliberate indifference. . . .”
9 Compl. ¶ 157. Plaintiffs’ Complaint shows that they seek redress
10 for the emotional and psychological damages they allegedly
11 suffered from the harassment fostered by the deliberate
12 indifference of these individually named Defendants. Compl ¶¶
13 153, 164.
14 Defendants’ contention that Plaintiffs’ allegation that
15 “individual defendants were acting within the course and scope of
16 their employment,” Compl. ¶ 13, is “clearly an attempt to hold
17 the School District vicariously liable.” is without merit. Reply
18 at 7-8. It is well-established that “state officers [are not
19 immune under the Eleventh Amendment] from personal liability
20 under section 1983 solely by virtue of the “official” nature of
21 their acts.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 31. Thus, that the individual
22 Defendants “acted pursuant to their respective capacities, or
23 ‘under color of state law’” does not imply they are being sued in
24 their official capacities. Opp’n at 11.
25 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have made clear the
26 “essential nature” of their Third and Fourth Claims as personal
27 capacity claims. Id. The Court therefore need not address
28 Plaintiffs’ argument regarding Defendants’ Answer to their
1 Complaint. Opp’n at 12. Based on the essential nature of their
2 claims alone, it is clear the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
3 these claims. The Court therefore DENIES judgment on these
4 claims.
5
6 Til. ORDER
7 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS in part
8 and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion for judgment on the
9 | pleadings.
10 IT IS SO ORDERED.
11 Dated: March 19, 2020
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