Opinion

(PS) Dewey v. Regents of University of California

Court
District Court, E.D. California
Filed
Mar 19, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 17.4%

“If a public entity denies an otherwise ‘qualified individual’ ‘meaningful access’ to its 18 ‘services, programs, or activities’ ‘solely by reason of’ his or her disability, that individual may 19 have an ADA claim against the public entity.”

How later courts described this case

  • “If a public entity denies an otherwise ‘qualified individual’ ‘meaningful access’ to its 18 ‘services, programs, or activities’ ‘solely by reason of’ his or her disability, that individual may 19 have an ADA claim against the public entity.”
  • to establish diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must specifically allege the diverse citizenship 9 of all parties, and that the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000.
  • “the [Act] cannot support an action for damages”
  • finding that a 19 plaintiff has protected property interest in diploma which arises when requirements for graduation 20 are completed

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 MELIKE DEWEY, No. 2:18-cv-3235-MCE-EFB PS

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER

14 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY

OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915.1 Her

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declaration makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1) and (2). See ECF No. 2.

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Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.2 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

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Determining that plaintiff may proceed in forma pauperis does not complete the required

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inquiry. Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), the court must dismiss the case at any time if it determines the

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allegation of poverty is untrue, or if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on

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24 1 This case, in which plaintiff is proceeding in propria persona, was referred to the

undersigned under Local Rule 302(c)(21). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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2 Plaintiff has also filed a request to file documents electronically. ECF No. 4. Local

Rule 133 requires pro se parties to file and serve paper documents unless the assigned district

27 judge or magistrate judge grants permission to file electronically. E.D. Cal. L.R. 133(a), (b)(2).

Here, plaintiff has demonstrated an ability to file documents conventionally, and there are no

28 circumstances warranting a deviation from the local rule. Accordingly, the request is denied.

1 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. As

2 explained below, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

3 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

4 520-21 (1972), a complaint, or portion thereof, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it

5 fails to set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.

6 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41

7 (1957)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of

8 his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

9 a cause of action’s elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to

10 relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are

11 true.” Id. (citations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate based either on the lack of cognizable

12 legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support cognizable legal theories.

13 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

14 Under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

15 question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

16 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor,

17 Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). A pro se plaintiff must satisfy the pleading

18 requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a

19 complaint to include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

20 to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon

21 which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v.

22 Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).

23 The complaint alleges that plaintiff was previously a student at the University of

24 California, Davis. ECF No. 1 at 2. During the 2017 spring quarter, plaintiff enrolled in a

25 chemistry class taught by defendant Matthew Augustine. Id. at 2-3. Augustine often attended

26 conferences and, in his absence, would leave his teaching assistant, defendant Trisha Wong, in

27 charge of teaching the course. Id. at 2. Plaintiff’s relationship with Wong was hostile. Wong

28 allegedly singled out plaintiff and subjected her to harassment and discrimination on account of

1 “plaintiff’s age, pace, and accent.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff also claims that Wong wrongly accused

2 plaintiff of misconduct, denied her access to the chemistry lab and its equipment, and provided

3 preferential treatment to other students. Id. at 10-11, 14.

4 As part of the course, plaintiff submitted an assignment that focused on how to use a

5 computer program called Matlab. Id. at 12-13. Wong, who was responsible for grading student’s

6 work, gave plaintiff an “F” grade and wrote “re-write” on plaintiff’s assignment. Id. at 14. After

7 plaintiff questioned some of the other notations Wong wrote on plaintiff’s submitted assignment,

8 Wong became very agitated and told plaintiff she “was too old and did not belong in this class.”

9 Id. Thereafter, Wong wrongfully accused plaintiff of plagiarizing an assignment3 and reported

10 the alleged conduct to the Office of Student Support and Judicial Affairs (“OSSJA”). Id.

11 Plaintiff also claims that Wong intentionally gave her a “C-” grade, which is the lowest grade a

12 student can receive without being able to retake the course. Id. at 15. As a result, plaintiff’s

13 grade point average dropped below a 2.0, which precluded her from graduating. Id. at 15-16.

14 In July 2017, a hearing concerning the plagiarism accusation was held before a student

15 panel comprised of defendants Thomas McAllister, Stephanie Peralta, and Niels Gronbech-

16 Jensen. Id. at 4, 16. The following month, defendant Donald Dudley, an inactive attorney4,

17 issued a Notice of Decision finding that plaintiff had plagiarized her assignment. Id. at 16.

18 Plaintiff subsequently appealed that decision and requested a recording of the hearing, which was

19 never provided. Id. Plaintiff’s appeal was ultimately denied by defendant Maribeth Kane, “a

20 third-party decision-maker” acting on behalf of defendant the Regents of the University of

21 California. Id. 5. Plaintiff contends that the defendants who concluded she plagiarized her work

22 “did not know the meaning of plagiarism in science.” Id. at 5, 12-13.

23 The complaint alleges claims for violation of the Age Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C.

24 §§ 6101, et seq.; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000d; Section 504 of the

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3 It is unclear whether plaintiff was accused of plagiarizing the “Matlab” assignment or a

subsequent assignment.

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4 Plaintiff claims that inactive attorneys are not permitted to issue decisions on behalf of

28 OSSJA.

1 Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.

2 §§ 12131, et seq.; and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

3 Under the Age Discrimination Act, “no person in the United States shall, on the basis of

4 age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination

5 under, any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 6102. The

6 Age Discrimination Act only permits a plaintiff to obtain injunctive relief and does not allow for

7 the recovery of monetary damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 6104(e)(1) (creating private right of action

8 “to enjoin a violation of this Act by any program or activity receiving Federal financial

9 assistance”; Steshenko v. Gayrard, 44 F. Supp. 3d 941 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (damages are not

10 recoverable under the Age Discrimination Act); Montalvo-Padilla v. University of Puerto Rico,

11 498 F. Supp. 2d 464, 468 (D. Puerto Rico 2007) (the Age Discrimination Act “is limited to

12 injunctive relief and the recovery of attorney’s fees”); Tyrrell v. City of Scranton, 134 F. Supp. 2d

13 373, 383 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (“the [Act] cannot support an action for damages”)); Marin v. Eidgahy,

14 2011 WL 2446384, at *7-8 (S.D. Cal. June 17, 2011) (same). Because plaintiff only seeks

15 damages (ECF No. 1 at 20), her Age Discrimination Act claim fails.

16 Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

17 42 U.S.C § 2000d. To state a claim under Title VI, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) the entity

18 involved is engaging in racial discrimination; and (2) the entity involved is receiving federal

19 financial assistance.” Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir.

20 1994). “Because Title VI is directed at programs that receive federal assistance, there is no right

21 of action against individual employees or agents of those entities.” Aguirre v. San Leandro

22 Police Dept., 2011 WL 738292, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011). Although plaintiff claims that

23 she was subjected to discrimination on account of her national origin and accent, the complaint is

24 devoid of any specific factual allegation supporting that conclusion. See Clegg v. Cult Awareness

25 Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The court is not required to accept legal

26 conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be

27 drawn from the facts alleged.”). Accordingly, she fails to adequately allege a Title VI claim.

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1 Plaintiff’s claims for violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the

2 Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) are similarly deficient. To state a disability

3 discrimination claim under Section 504, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) he is an ‘individual with a

4 disability’, (2) he is ‘otherwise qualified’ to receive the benefit; (3) he was denied the benefit of

5 the program solely by reason of his disability; and (4) the program receives federal financial

6 assistance.” Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 114 F.3d 976, 978

7 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original). Under the Rehabilitation Act, “disability” is defined as

8 “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life

9 activities of such individual, (B) a record of such an impairment, or (C) being regarded as having

10 such an impairment.” Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007).

11 In order to state a claim that a public program or service violated Title II of the ADA, a

12 plaintiff must show: (1) she is a “qualified individual with a disability”; (2) she was either

13 excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or

14 activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion,

15 denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. McGary v. City of Portland,

16 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 691 (9th

17 Cir. 2001) (“If a public entity denies an otherwise ‘qualified individual’ ‘meaningful access’ to its

18 ‘services, programs, or activities’ ‘solely by reason of’ his or her disability, that individual may

19 have an ADA claim against the public entity.”). Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims

20 rests solely on her conclusory allegation that she was subjected to discrimination based on her

21 disability. But she does not provide any factual allegations demonstrating such discrimination,

22 nor does she provide any specific allegations demonstrating that she is a person with a disability.

23 The complaint also fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that

24 defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by unlawfully seizing her diploma. ECF No. 1 at 2,

25 15-16. The Fourth Amendment guarantees the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.

26 U.S. CONST., amend. IV. “Violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition

27 of physical control. A seizure occurs . . . when . . . [a] person or thing is the object of the

28 detention or taking . . . .” Brower v. Cty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (internal citations

1 omitted). Plaintiff’s alleges that defendants’ actions precluded her from completing the

2 requirements for completing her degree. ECF No. 1 at 15-16. But she does not allege that any of

3 the defendants took physical control of her diploma or any other property. Accordingly, she fails

4 to state a Fourth Amendment claim.

5 Plaintiff also claims that defendants violated her right to due process under the Fourteenth

6 Amendment by unlawfully seizing her diploma. ECF No. 1 at 7. She further alleges that

7 defendant Dudley violated her right to due process by failing to provide her with a copy of the

8 recording of the hearing before the OSSJA. Id. at 5. At a minimum, due process requires that the

9 government provide notice and “an opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a

10 meaningful manner.’” Brewster v. Bd. of Ed. of Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 984

11 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). The opportunity to be

12 heard must be provided at a “meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Logan v.

13 Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 450 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474

14 U.S. 327 (1986); see also August v. L.A. Comm. College Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 848 F.2d 1242 (9th

15 Cir. 1988) (unpublished) (College satisfied requirements of due process clause where student was

16 provided sufficient notice of the charges and a reasonable opportunity to be heard).

17 Assuming plaintiff has a protected property interest in completing her degree, cf. Swany v.

18 San Ramon Valley Unified School Dist., 720 F. Supp. 764, 774 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (finding that a

19 plaintiff has protected property interest in diploma which arises when requirements for graduation

20 are completed), plaintiff has failed to allege that she was not provided adequate procedural

21 safeguards. She does not allege defendants failed to provide adequate notice of the plagiarism

22 charge against her, nor does she allege that she was denied an opportunity to be heard on the

23 charge. Instead, the complaint’s allegations indicated that plaintiff was provided both notice and

24 an opportunity to be heard. ECF No. 1 at 4 (alleging defendants McAllister, Peralta, and

25 Gronbech-Jenson “were decision makers of the student panel at the plagiarism hearing.”).

26 Lastly, plaintiff also cites to California Education Code §§ 220, 233.5, 51500, and 66030.

27 To the extent plaintiff intends to allege state law claims for violation of these provisions, she has

28 failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. As explained above, she has yet

1 to assert a properly-pleaded federal cause of action which precludes supplemental jurisdiction

2 over the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (“The district courts shall have original

3 jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

4 States), 1367(a) (where the district court has original jurisdiction, it “shall have supplemental

5 jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original

6 jurisdiction . . . .”). Nor has plaintiff established diversity jurisdiction over her state law claims.

7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Bautista v. Pan American World Airlines, Inc., 828 F.2d 546, 552 (9th Cir.

8 1987) (to establish diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must specifically allege the diverse citizenship

9 of all parties, and that the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000.).

10 Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. However, plaintiff is granted leave

11 to file an amended complaint. Any amended complaint must allege a cognizable legal theory

12 against a proper defendant and sufficient facts in support of that cognizable legal theory. Lopez v.

13 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (district courts must afford pro se

14 litigants an opportunity to amend to correct any deficiency in their complaints). Should plaintiff

15 choose to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint shall clearly set forth the allegations

16 against each defendant and shall specify a basis for this court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Any

17 amended complaint shall plead plaintiff’s claims in “numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as

18 practicable to a single set of circumstances,” as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

19 10(b), and shall be in double-spaced text on paper that bears line numbers in the left margin, as

20 required by Eastern District of California Local Rules 130(b) and 130(c). Any amended

21 complaint shall also use clear headings to delineate each claim alleged and against which

22 defendant or defendants the claim is alleged, as required by Rule 10(b), and must plead clear facts

23 that support each claim under each header.

24 Additionally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to prior pleadings in order to

25 make an amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be

26 complete in itself. This is because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the

27 original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Accordingly, once

28 plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original no longer serves any function in the case.

1 | Therefore, “a plaintiff waives all causes of action alleged in the original complaint which are not

2 | alleged in the amended complaint,” London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir.

3 || 1981), and defendants not named in an amended complaint are no longer defendants. Ferdik v.

4 | Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Finally, the court cautions plaintiff that failure to

5 || comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this court’s Local Rules, or any court order

6 || may result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 110.

7 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

8 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.

9 2. Plaintiff’s request to file documents electronically (ECF No. 4) is denied.

10 3. Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed with leave to amend, as provided herein.

11 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended

12 | complaint. The amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned to this case and must

13 || be labeled “First Amended Complaint.” Failure to timely file an amended complaint in

14 | accordance with this order will result in a recommendation this action be dismissed.

15 | DATED: March 18, 2020.

16 tid, PDEA

U7 EDMUND F. BRENNAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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