(SS) Sanchez v. Commissioner of Social Security

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9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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12 CATHLEEN SANCHEZ, No. 2:17-CV-2262-DMC

13 Plaintiff,

14 v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

15 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

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Defendant.

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19 Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action for judicial

20 review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

21 Pursuant to the written consent of all parties (ECF Nos. 14 and 16), this case is before the

22 undersigned as the presiding judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. See 28

23 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending before the court are the parties’ briefs on the merits (ECF Nos. 22 and

24 24).

25 The court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine whether it is:

26 (1) based on proper legal standards; and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

27 whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). “Substantial evidence” is

28 more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521

1 (9th Cir. 1996). It is “. . . such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

2 a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole,

3 including both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, must

4 be considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones

5 v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the Commissioner’s

6 decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v.

7 Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative

8 findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the

9 Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987).

10 Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of

11 which supports the Commissioner’s decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v.

12 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal

13 standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th

14 Cir. 1988).

15 For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner’s final decision is affirmed.

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17 I. THE DISABILITY EVALUATION PROCESS

18 To achieve uniformity of decisions, the Commissioner employs a five-step

19 sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R.

20 §§ 404.1520 (a)-(f) and 416.920(a)-(f). The sequential evaluation proceeds as follows:

21 Step 1 Determination whether the claimant is engaged in

substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is presumed

22 not disabled and the claim is denied;

23 Step 2 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity,

determination whether the claimant has a severe

24 impairment; if not, the claimant is presumed not disabled

and the claim is denied;

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Step 3 If the claimant has one or more severe impairments,

26 determination whether any such severe impairment meets

or medically equals an impairment listed in the regulations;

27 if the claimant has such an impairment, the claimant is

presumed disabled and the claim is granted;

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1 Step 4 If the claimant’s impairment is not listed in the regulations,

determination whether the impairment prevents the

2 claimant from performing past work in light of the

claimant’s residual functional capacity; if not, the claimant

3 is presumed not disabled and the claim is denied;

4 Step 5 If the impairment prevents the claimant from performing

past work, determination whether, in light of the claimant’s

5 residual functional capacity, the claimant can engage in

other types of substantial gainful work that exist in the

6 national economy; if so, the claimant is not disabled and

the claim is denied.

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See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)-(f) and 416.920(a)-(f).

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9 To qualify for benefits, the claimant must establish the inability to engage in

10 substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

11 has lasted, or can be expected to last, a continuous period of not less than 12 months. See 42

12 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The claimant must provide evidence of a physical or mental

13 impairment of such severity the claimant is unable to engage in previous work and cannot,

14 considering the claimant’s age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of

15 substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. See Quang Van Han v. Bower,

16 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The claimant has the initial burden of proving the existence

17 of a disability. See Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990).

18 The claimant establishes a prima facie case by showing that a physical or mental

19 impairment prevents the claimant from engaging in previous work. See Gallant v. Heckler, 753

20 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1984); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f). If the claimant

21 establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the claimant

22 can perform other work existing in the national economy. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d

23 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988); Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986); Hammock

24 v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1209, 1212-1213 (9th Cir. 1989).

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1 II. THE COMMISSIONER’S FINDINGS

2 Plaintiff applied for social security benefits on February 19, 2014. See CAR 15.1

3 In the application, plaintiff claims disability began on December 13, 2012. See id. Plaintiff

4 asserted that she became unable to work due to anxiety disorder and bipolar disorder. Plaintiff’s

5 claim was initially denied. Following denial of reconsideration, plaintiff requested an

6 administrative hearing, which was held on January 28, 2016, before Administrative Law Judge

7 (ALJ) Sara A. Gillis. In an April 11, 2016, decision, the ALJ concluded plaintiff is not disabled

8 based on the following relevant findings:

9 1. The claimant has the following severe impairment(s): anxiety

disorder and bipolar disorder (20 CFR 404.4520(c));

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2. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of

11 impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in

the regulations;

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3. The claimant has the following residual functional capacity: she

13 can understand, remember, and carry out simple and detailed job

instructions, but nothing complex. She can maintain concentration,

14 persistence, and pace for simple and detailed job tasks. She can

interact with supervisors and coworkers but should avoid

15 teamwork assignments with coworkers. She can occasionally

interact with the public;

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4. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience,

17 residual functional capacity, and vocational expert testimony, there

are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy

18 that the claimant can perform.

19 See id. at 17-24.

20 After the Appeals Council declined review on August 22, 2017, this appeal followed.

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1 Citations are the to the Certified Administrative Record (CAR) lodged on February

28 26, 2019 (ECF No. 18).

1 III. DISCUSSION

2 In her opening brief, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide clear and

3 convincing reasoning in finding that plaintiff’s statements were not credible.

4 The Commissioner determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the

5 court defers to the Commissioner’s discretion if the Commissioner used the proper process and

6 provided proper reasons. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996). An explicit

7 credibility finding must be supported by specific, cogent reasons. See Rashad v. Sullivan, 903

8 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). General findings are insufficient. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

9 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). Rather, the Commissioner must identify what testimony is not credible

10 and what evidence undermines the testimony. See id. Moreover, unless there is affirmative

11 evidence in the record of malingering, the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting testimony as not

12 credible must be “clear and convincing.” See id.; see also Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d

13 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lingenfelter v Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1936 (9th Cir. 2007),

14 and Gregor v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006)).

15 If there is objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the

16 Commissioner may not discredit a claimant’s testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely

17 because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d

18 341, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Smolen v. Chater:

19 The claimant need not produce objective medical evidence of the

[symptom] itself, or the severity thereof. Nor must the claimant produce

20 objective medical evidence of the causal relationship between the

medically determinable impairment and the symptom. By requiring that

21 the medical impairment “could reasonably be expected to produce” pain or

another symptom, the Cotton test requires only that the causal relationship

22 be a reasonable inference, not a medically proven phenomenon.

23 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to the test established in

Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986)).

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25 The Commissioner may, however, consider the nature of the symptoms alleged,

26 including aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and functional restrictions. See Bunnell,

27 947 F.2d at 345-47. In weighing credibility, the Commissioner may also consider: (1) the

28 claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements, or other inconsistent

1 testimony; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a

2 prescribed course of treatment; (3) the claimant’s daily activities; (4) work records; and (5)

3 physician and third-party testimony about the nature, severity, and effect of symptoms. See

4 Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (citations omitted). If the claimant testifies as to symptoms greater than

5 would normally be produced by a given impairment, the ALJ may disbelieve that testimony

6 provided specific findings are made. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161 (citing Swenson v.

7 Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)).

8 Regarding reliance on a claimant’s daily activities to find testimony of disabling

9 pain not credible, the Social Security Act does not require that disability claimants be utterly

10 incapacitated. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit has

11 repeatedly held that the “. . . mere fact that a plaintiff has carried out certain daily activities . . .

12 does not . . .[necessarily] detract from her credibility as to her overall disability.” See Orn v.

13 Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Vertigan v. Heller, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th

14 Cir. 2001)); see also Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986) (observing that a

15 claim of pain-induced disability is not necessarily gainsaid by a capacity to engage in periodic

16 restricted travel); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that the

17 claimant was entitled to benefits based on constant leg and back pain despite the claimant’s

18 ability to cook meals and wash dishes); Fair, 885 F.2d at 603 (observing that “many home

19 activities are not easily transferable to what may be the more grueling environment of the

20 workplace, where it might be impossible to periodically rest or take medication”). Daily

21 activities must be such that they show that the claimant is “. . .able to spend a substantial part of

22 his day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are transferable

23 to a work setting.” Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. The ALJ must make specific findings in this regard

24 before relying on daily activities to find a claimant’s pain testimony not credible. See Burch v.

25 Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005).

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1 A. The ALJ’s Finding

2 At Step 4, the ALJ assessed the credibility of plaintiff’s statements and testimony.

3 See CAR 20-22. As to the credibility of plaintiff’s statements and testimony, the ALJ found:

4 The claimant testified that she was unable to work because of anxiety

attacks and bipolar disorder. She stated that her anxiety attacks do not

5 have specific triggers. She indicated that she has had panic attacks for

many years, but that stresses at home and work worsened the anxiety

6 attacks in 2012. She described symptoms including racing heart, desire to

run out, and sweating. She stated that she has panic attacks two or three

7 times a week and that she feels the effects of a panic attack last for up to

two hours after the panic attack has ended. She related that she has panic

8 attacks on buses and in cars going over bridges. The claimant testified that

she does not think that her medications prevent her panic attacks and that

9 the severity of the attacks has not improved. She indicated that she has

good days and bad days, and on a bad day, she does not leave her house.

10 As to her bipolar disorder, she stated she had mood swings. She indicated

that her bipolar disorder is stabilized on medication. The claimant testified

11 that she has issues with her memory and concentration. She indicated that

she often forgets things and sometimes forgets to take her medications. In

12 terms of her activities of daily living, she testified that she does not shop

but she does all the cooking and cleaning at home. She indicated she could

13 go with a friend to a restaurant if there were not too many people. As to

her functional capacity, the claimant testified that she would miss four

14 days of work a month because of symptoms. She indicated that she would

have difficulty focusing for about two hours out of an eight-hour day.

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After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the

17 claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be

expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s

18 statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of

these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and

19 other evidence in the records for the reasons explained in this decision.

20 In terms of the claimant’s mental impairments, the medical evidence does

not support any greater limitation than the residual functional capacity

21 determined herein. Though the claimant alleged an onset date in

December 2012, it appears from the record that the claimant did not seek

22 treatment for nearly a year, until November 2013 (Exhibit 1F, p. 2). The

claimant was initially prescribed citalopram for her anxiety, and a month

23 later was prescribed lithium for her bipolar disorder (Exhibit 1F, pp. 1, 2).

In March 2014, the claimant reported to her psychiatrist that her

24 medication helped her anxiety “a lot” (Exhibit 4F, p. 2). The claimant’s

treatment records from June 2014 on indicate the claimant was doing well

25 and was stable on her medications (Exhibits 4F, p. 1; 6F, pp. 2-3, 6).

Mental status examinations in November 2014 and December 2015 note

26 that the claimant was neat, clean, and had good grooming. She was

cooperative, had adequate eye contact, normal speech, engaging mood,

27 and stable affect. Her though process was linear, she was oriented, had

intact judgment and cognition, and good insight (Exhibit 7F, pp. 2, 7)

28 There is no indication in the record that the claimant has required

1 emergency room treatment or psychiatric hospitalization for her mental

impairments. Given the claimant’s reported symptomology and treatment,

2 the undersigned finds that the claimant’s mental impairments cause the

claimant limitations that are reasonably accommodated by the residual

3 functional capacity determined herein.

4 On April 4, 2014, Richard Hicks, M.D., Board certified in psychiatry,

conducted a complete consultative psychiatric evaluation of the claimant

5 (Exhibit 2F). The claimant’s chief complaints were anxiety and panic

attacks. Positive findings from the mental status examination included:

6 some pressured speech when talking about her panic attacks, some

loosening of associations, some tangentiality, and some circumstantiality.

7 The claimant had a labile affect but was mainly appropriate and had

difficulty with similarities and differences. Significantly, the claimant

8 made good eye contact, was cooperative, and had normal speech. She was

able to interpret proverbs, had adequate concentration, and was able to do

9 serial seven subtractions. Based on the examination, Dr. Hicks assessed a

Global Assessment of Function (GAF) score of 55, indicating moderate

10 symptoms or difficulty functioning. Dr. Hicks opined the claimant would

have difficulty doing any kinds of work or being consistent and regular.

11 He further opined that the claimant could interact with coworkers and the

public, though she is uncomfortable with crowds.

12

As for the opinion evidence, the undersigned has given significant weight

13 to the opinions of the State agency psychological consultants. On initial

review and reconsideration, he concluded the claimant was capable of

14 recalling simple routine tasks, with limited public contact (Exhibits 1A;

3A). As set forth in Social Security Ruling 96-6p, State agency medical

15 and psychological consultants are highly qualified physicians and

psychologists who are experts in the Social Security disability programs,

16 the rules in 20 CFR 404.1527(e), and in the evaluation of the medical

issues in disability claims under the Act. As members of the teams that

17 make determinations of disability at the initial and reconsideration levels

of the administrative review process (except in disability hearings), they

18 consider the medical evidence in disability cases and make findings of fact

on the medical issues. The findings made by the consultants include, but

19 are not limited to, the existence and severity of an individual’s

impairments and/or symptoms, whether the individual’s impairments

20 meets or is equivalent in severity to the requirements for any impairment

listed in 20 CFR part 404, subpart P, appendix 1 (the Listing of

21 Impairments), and the individual’s residual functional capacity. These

opinions are consistent with the claimant’s longitudinal treatment records,

22 which document no more than moderate findings and show improvement

with medication. Their opinions are also consistent with the claimant’s

23 reported activities of daily living, as described above. Accordingly, the

undersigned has given significant weight to these opinions and the residual

24 functional capacity determined herein accommodates the findings of the

State agency psychological consultants. However, as will be discussed

25 below, the claimant’s treating physician has reported she maintains the

ability to not only perform simple tasks but that that her memory was good

26 and could perform a variety of technical or complex instructions. Only

mild difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence and pace were

27 noted. (Exhibit 3F) The claimant’s physician further reported she had mild

restriction in understanding, remembering and carrying out technical

28 and/or complex job instructions. (Exhibit 5F) As such, the undersigned

1 finds that a limitation to simple detailed job instructions and task would

adequately accommodate her mental impairments.

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CAR 20-22.

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4 B. The Plaintiff’s Contentions

5 Plaintiff alleges she suffers from severe anxiety attacks and bipolar disorder. At

6 plaintiff’s administrative hearing, she testified that her anxiety attacks had become worse due to

7 increased stress at home. See ECF No. 22, pg. 4. As a result, plaintiff would suffer multiple panic

8 attacks on a daily basis, be unable to travel, and only leave the house on “good days.” Id.

9 Additionally, plaintiff claimed to suffer from difficulty concentrating and a shortened attention

10 span. Id. As a result of these symptoms, plaintiff claimed to be unable to sustain employment. See

11 ECF No. 22, generally.

12 Plaintiff argues that:

13 In this case, the ALJ made no specific findings regarding

Plaintiff’s credibility. The only findings made by the ALJ was the general

14 finding that “the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely

15 consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for

the reasons explained in this decision”. Tr. 21. No further reasoning was

16 given by the ALJ. The ALJ failed to provide more than general findings in

contravention of the law. Orn v Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 636 (9th Cir 2007)

17 (“it is not sufficient for the adjudicator to make a single, conclusory

statement that `the individual's allegations have been considered' or that

18 `the allegations are [not] credible.’”)

19 ECF No. 22, pgs. 7-8.

20 To support this argument, plaintiff relies on two specific cases. First, plaintiff cites

21 to Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 2015). Specifically, plaintiff states that, in

22 that case:

23 . . .The ALJ made a general finding that the “functional limitations

from the claimant impairments were less serious than alleged”. Id. at 493

24 (9th Cir. 2015). The court concluded that this was not the kind of specific

reasons sufficient to determine that the Plaintiff’s “testimony was not

25 arbitrarily discredited”. Id. at 494. The court further found that “Because

the ALJ failed to identify the testimony she found not credible, she did not

26 link that testimony to the particular parts of the record supporting her

noncredibility determination” the ALJ had created legal error. Id.

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ECF No. 22, pg. 8.

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1 Plaintiff also references Henshaw v. Colvin, No. 1: 14-cv-01788-SKO (E.D. Cal.

2 Feb. 11, 2016), as an example where the recitation of the record without specific discussion of the

3 credibility finding was error. Quoting Henshaw, plaintiff argues:

4 . . .“None of the ALJ's discussion of this evidence specifically

related to Plaintiff's credibility or identified the grounds Defendant

5 asserted in her brief as support for the ALJ's adverse credibility finding”.

Id. The Defendant in this case was “only able to offer grounds in her brief

6 that were extrapolated from the ALJ's recitation of the medical evidence,

not grounds stated by the ALJ as supporting an adverse credibility

7 determination”. Id.

8 ECF No. 22, pg. 8.

9 According to plaintiff, the ALJ’s failure to provide specific reasoning for the

10 rejection of her statements and testimony resulted in reversable error.

11 Defendant argues that the ALJ properly discounted plaintiff’s testimony as to the

12 disabling severity of her symptoms. “With respect to [p]laintiff’s assertions that she was unable to

13 perform work activity, the ALJ found her testimony inconsistent and not fully supported by the

14 record.” ECF No. 24, pg. 6 (internal citation omitted). According to defendant:

15 In addressing Plaintiff’s subjective testimony the ALJ noted that

though her determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to

16 cause her alleged symptoms, that her symptoms were “not entirely

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for

17 the reasons explained in this decision” (AR 21).

18 ECF No. 24, pg. 7

19 The ALJ, according to defendant, found significant distinctions between plaintiff’s

20 disability claims and the information presented in three areas: 1) plaintiff’s ability to maintain

21 household chores and daily activities; 2) the testimony of medical and vocational experts

22 regarding her maintenance of cognitive function and rudimentary thinking skills; and 3) the

23 mental competence which the ALJ observed plaintiff present during her social security hearing.

24 See ECF No. 24, generally.

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1 C. Disposition

2 According to plaintiff, the ALJ erred in this case because she “failed to provide

3 more than general findings in contravention of law.” ECF No. 22, pg. 8. Plaintiff states that the

4 “only” finding made by the ALJ regarding her credibility “was the general finding that ‘the

5 claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these

6 symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record

7 for the reasons explained in this decision.’” Id. at 7-8 (quoting hearing decision at CAR 21). The

8 gravamen of plaintiff’s sole argument is that the ALJ erred because “[n]o further reasoning was

9 given by the ALJ.” Id. at 8.

10 The court rejects this argument for the simple reason that plaintiff’s premise that

11 the ALJ failed to provide any further reasoning is false. As outlined in the hearing decision, the

12 ALJ provided a detailed analysis of plaintiff’s subjective statements concerning her alleged

13 mental impairments. See CAR 20-22. Specifically, the ALJ concluded plaintiff’s statements and

14 testimony were not entirely credible because: (1) plaintiff’s failure to seek medical treatment until

15 nearly a year after the alleged onset date; (2) reported improvement in symptoms with

16 medication; (3) inconsistent objective observations on mental status examinations; and (4) the

17 lack of evidence of hospitalization or emergency room treatment for mental impairments. See id.

18 Because the ALJ clearly provided more than just a “general finding,” the court does not agree

19 with plaintiff that the ALJ erred with respect to credibility.

20 With respect to the specific cases cited by plaintiff, Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806

21 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 2015) and Henshaw v. Colvin, No. 1: 14-cv-01788-SKO (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11,

22 2016), the Court is similarly unpersuaded that these authorities establish the ALJ made an

23 arbitrary or baseless determination.

24 Brown-Hunter v. Colvin is distinguishable from the case at issue because, here, the

25 ALJ does in fact identify the portions of plaintiff’s testimony found to be less-than-credible. In

26 Brown-Hunter, the court noted that “[the ALJ] did not specifically identify any [] inconsistencies;

27 she simply stated her non-credibility conclusion and then summarized the medical evidence

28 supporting her RFC determination.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494. By contrast, here, the ALJ

1 made specific references to the portions of plaintiff’s testimony and record that were found to be

2 inconsistent with the alleged disabilities. The ALJ recognizes plaintiff’s testimony as alleging, in

3 part, that: (1) she was unable to work because of anxiety attacks and bipolar disorder, (2) these

4 panic attacks occurred multiple times per week and went on for hours at a time, (3) she suffered

5 from mood swings, and (4) she had issues with her memory and concentration. AR 20. This

6 testimony is subsequently contrasted with a variable quantity of expert opinions, medical records,

7 and the general chronology of plaintiff’s claimed disability. AR 20-24.

8 For example, in her determination, the ALJ notes that “[t]hough the claimant

9 alleged an onset date in December 2012, it appears from the record that the claimant did not seek

10 treatment for nearly a year, until November 2013. . .” AR 21. Also, the ALJ notes that “[t]he

11 claimant testified that she has issues with her memory and concentration.” AR 20. Yet, despite

12 this, “the claimant’s treating physician has reported she maintains the ability to not only perform

13 simple tasks but that that her memory was good and could perform a variety of technical or

14 complex instructions.” AR 22. This juxtaposition between plaintiff’s testimony and conflicting

15 evidence illustrates a stark contrast to Brown-Hunter.

16 Henshaw v. Colvin is similarly distinguishable from the current case at issue. In

17 Henshaw, the court concluded that the defendant was “only able to offer grounds in her brief that

18 were extrapolated from the ALJ's recitation of the medical evidence, not grounds stated by the

19 ALJ as supporting an adverse credibility determination”. Henshaw v. Colvin, No. 1:14-cv-01788-

20 SKO, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17776, at *29 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2016). This is clearly contrasted

21 with the current case at issue. As discussed above, the ALJ made a credibility determination by

22 highlighting key inconsistencies between plaintiff’s testimony and the medical evidence

23 submitted for determination. The ALJ found her testimony inconsistent and not fully supported

24 by the record. See AR 20-24. Therefore, the ALJ’s findings here cannot be said to be “merely a

25 conclusion with no supporting reasons or bases cited.” Henshaw, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1776, at

26 *29-30.

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1 IV. CONCLUSION

2 Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the Commissioner’s final

3 | decision is based on substantial evidence and proper legal analysis. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY

4 | ORDERED that:

5 1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 22) is denied;

6 2. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 24) is granted;

7 3. The Commissioner’s final decision is affirmed; and

8 4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and close this file.

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11 | Dated: February 13, 2020 Ssvcqo_

12 DENNIS M. COTA

13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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