Sanchez v. County of Sacramento

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 CRYSTAL R. SANCHEZ, No. 2:19-cv-01545-MCE-AC

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER

14 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al.,

15 Defendants.

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17 This case is before the court on plaintiff’s motion to compel responses to her requests for

18 production, and for expenses. ECF Nos. 13, 16 (joint statement). This discovery motion was

19 referred to the undersigned pursuant to E.D. Cal. R. 302(c)(1). The parties met and conferred but

20 were unable to reach an agreement. ECF No. 16 at 3. Plaintiff and defendants participated in a

21 hearing on February 5, 2020 at 10:00 a.m. For the reasons stated below, the court grants the

22 motion in part and denies it in part. The court further orders the entry of a stipulated protective

23 order. The court declines to award attorneys’ fees and costs.

24 I. Relevant Background

25 Plaintiff filed this case on August 12, 2019. ECF No. 1. The following is a summary of

26 plaintiff’s allegations. Plaintiff is a resident of the County of Sacramento who is a member of the

27 Sacramento Homeless Organizing Committee, the Sacramento Tenants’ Union, and the Poor

28 People’s Campaign. ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff also heads a non-profit organization whose

1 mission is to assist needy persons who suffer from homelessness. Id. For months prior to May

2 20, 2019, plaintiff had been assisting homeless persons who were living on an undeveloped lot

3 located in the 5700 block of Stockton Boulevard (“5700 lot”) in the County of Sacramento. Id. at

4 3.

5 On May 1, 2019, plaintiff was assisting homeless people on the 5700 lot who had been

6 given notice by the County of Sacramento that they would have to vacate their encampment, and

7 during that time, she came into contact several times with defendant “Allbee,” a law enforcement

8 officer employed by defendants the County of Sacramento and Sacramento County Sherriff’s

9 Department. Id. Plaintiff and about 50 other persons were protesting the clearing of homeless

10 people from the 5700 lot and the destruction of their belongings. Id. When plaintiff attempted to

11 help people pack up their belongings, she was barred from re-entering the property by Officer

12 Allbee and was told that she was “this close to being arrested.” Id.

13 On May 17, 2019, plaintiff was attending a meeting to discuss negotiations with the

14 County of Sacramento to permit homeless individuals to return to the 5700 lot. Id. She was

15 informed by one of the homeless persons who had previously resided at the 5700 lot that the

16 Sacramento County Sherriff’s Department deputies were arresting people. Id. Plaintiff went to

17 the location to observe and assist when she was confronted by Officer Allbee, who immediately

18 handcuffed her and accused her of driving without a valid California Driver’s License. Id.

19 Officer Allbee told plaintiff that her car would be towed. Id. Plaintiff responded that there were

20 persons ready to take custody of her vehicle so that the food and equipment in the vehicle would

21 not be spoiled or stolen, to which Officer Allbee responded that he was towing the vehicle and

22 would have it impounded for 30 days pursuant to Cal. Veh. Code § 14601. Id. at 4.

23 Officer Allbee stated to someone over the radio “I got one of the protestors” and

24 proceeded to search plaintiff’s vehicle, including plaintiff’s purse, which was closed. Plaintiff’s

25 vehicle was impounded. Plaintiff alleges Officer Allbee’s actions were intentional and malicious,

26 and that the Officer targeted plaintiff because of her leadership position in providing assistance to

27 the homeless persons at the 5700 lot.

28 ////

1 The parties have been engaging in discovery, and plaintiff served her first set of requests

2 for production (RFP’s) on defendant County of Sacramento (“the County”) pursuant to Fed. R.

3 Civ. P. 34 on October 11, 2019. ECF No. 16 at 2. The County served responses and objections

4 to the requests on November 15, 2019; no documents were produced. Id.

5 II. Motion

6 The parties represent in their joint statement that several previously disputed items have

7 been at least tentatively resolved by meet and confer efforts, including conflicts related to RFP

8 Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36. At

9 the hearing, plaintiff indicated production had not yet occurred. The court indicated at the

10 hearing that it would not address these RFPs substantively, but would deny the motion as to them,

11 without prejudice, in light of the tentative resolution.

12 Conflicts remain with respect to RFP Nos. 2 (Government Claim), 7 (Allbee Personnel

13 Files), 17 (First Affirmative Defense), 18 (Second Affirmative Defense), 19 (Third Affirmative

14 Defense), 20 (Fourth Affirmative Defense), 21 (Fifth Affirmative Defense), 22 (Sixth Affirmative

15 Defense), 23 (Seventh Affirmative Defense), 24 (Eighth Affirmative Defense). These disputed

16 requests are addressed individually below. Plaintiff further requests an award of expenses,

17 including attorneys’ fees, should her motion be granted in whole or in part.

18 III. Analysis

19 A. Legal Standard

20 “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any

21 party’s claim or defense . . . Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the

22 discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R.

23 Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make

24 a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of

25 consequence in determining the action. Fed. R. Evid. 401. Relevancy to the subject matter of the

26 litigation “has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably

27 could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.”

28 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). Relevance, however, does not

1 establish discoverability; in 2015, a proportionality requirement was added to Rule 26. Under the

2 amended Rule 26, relevance alone will not justify discovery; discovery must also be proportional

3 to the needs of the case.

4 A party seeking to compel discovery has the initial burden to establish that its request is

5 proper under Rule 26(b)(1). If the request is proper, the party resisting discovery has the burden

6 of showing why discovery was denied; they must clarify and support their objections.

7 Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir.1975). General or boilerplate objections,

8 without explanation, are not prohibited but are insufficient as a sole basis for an objection or

9 privilege claim. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States Dist. Court, 408 F.3d 1142,

10 1149 (9th Cir.2005).

11 B. RFP No. 2 (Government Claim)

12 Plaintiff’s FRP No. 2 (Government Claim) reads as follows: “All DOCUMENTS relating

13 to the ‘Claim Against the County of Sacramento & Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department’

14 submitted by Plaintiff CRYSTAL R. SANCHEZ to Defendants COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

15 and SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT concerning the subject of the

16 instant action—including, but not limited to, interviews conducted, statements received,

17 correspondence sent or received, reports and memos prepared.” ECF No. 16 at 7. Defendant

18 responded as follows: “Objection. Vague as to the phrase ‘all documents relating to’ as calls for

19 speculation, and such is not reasonably limited in context, scope or time, assumes facts, and seeks

20 to invade the Attorney-Client Privilege and/or Work-Product Doctrine insofar as it is not

21 reasonably limited in time. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1070-71 (9th Cir.

22 1992); United States v. Christensen (9th Cir. 2016) 828 F.3d 763, 805. Defendants further object

23 that the request seeks documents which are protected by County employees’ Constitutional right

24 to privacy in medical records. Without waiver of said objections, and insofar as this request seeks

25 the documents constituting the underlying investigation, Sheriff’s Department Report Case No.

26 2019-0171120, and excluding attorney client communications and/or work product related to this

27 litigation, Defendant responds as follows: See documents previously produced as COUNTY

28 000001-0000017.” Id.

1 Defendant’s objections that this RFP is vague and overbroad are valid, and the court

2 rejects plaintiff’s argument that the objections should be disregarded as mere boilerplate.

3 “[G]eneral or boilerplate objections such as ‘overly burdensome and harassing’ are improper—

4 especially when a party fails to submit any evidentiary declarations supporting such objections.”

5 A. Farber & Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 188 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (internal citations

6 omitted). However, while boilerplate objections not tied to any particular issue are unacceptable,

7 a particularized objection on the basis of overbreadth or vagueness is permissible. Defendant’s

8 objection that the “all documents relating to” language is vague and overbroad is a sufficiently

9 particularized objection, and it is not without merit. Though plaintiff specifies “interviews

10 conducted, statements received, correspondence sent or received, reports and memos prepared,”

11 she also uses “including, but not limited to” language. Aside from document type, the “relating

12 to” language is vague in this context because the scope of what could “relate to” plaintiff’s

13 complaint, unconstrained by time, content, authorship, or any other limiting factor, could include

14 a huge quantity of documents, much of which would likely not be relevant to this case. The court

15 agrees with defendants that plaintiff’s full request is vague and overbroad as framed, and declines

16 to compel production as to this RFP.

17 C. RFP No. 7 (Allbee Personnel Files)

18 Plaintiff’s RFP No. 7 (Allbee Personnel Files) reads as follows: “All DOCUMENTS

19 relating to Defendant ALLBEE’s personnel files - including, but not limited to educational

20 records, employee performance appraisals, training records, employment applications, letters of

21 recommendation, letters of commendation, discipline records, employee orientation records,

22 records of promotion; and memoranda regarding any changes in assignment.” ECF No. 16 at 15-

23 16. Defendant responded as follows: “Objection. Defendant objects to this request to the extent it

24 seeks documents in violation of the right to privacy guaranteed under the Constitution of the State

25 of California. Defendant further objects that this request is overbroad, harassing, and not

26 reasonable calculated to lead to discoverable information to the extent it seeks documents

27 pertaining to, among other things, health insurance, retirement, banking, and medical information.

28 ////

1 In addition, this request seeks information that is irrelevant or subject to privacy as provided by

2 federal and state law. The defects in this request preclude defendant from responding.” Id.

3 1. Overbreadth and Relevance Objections

4 Defendant’s objection on the basis of overbreadth and vagueness, specifically to the “all

5 documents relating to” language of this RFP, is legitimate—but unlike RFP No. 2, this RFP can

6 be fairly construed as limited to Officer Allbee’s personnel file to resolve any concerns regarding

7 vagueness and overbreadth. Defendants’ relevance objection is meritless; the arresting officer’s

8 personnel file is clearly relevant to plaintiff’s claims of constitutional violations regarding her

9 interactions with the Officer. Indeed, personnel files are routinely requested in cases where

10 officers are alleged to have violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Courts in the Ninth Circuit

11 have routinely held that personnel files are discoverable in federal cases, despite claims of

12 privilege. Garrett v. City & County of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1519, n.6 (9th Cir. 1987)

13 (“This court has held that personnel files are discoverable in federal question cases, including

14 Title VII actions, despite claims of privilege.”); Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 615

15 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (personnel files of defendant-officers in excessive force cases contain a variety

16 of relevant information, and are discoverable over claims of privilege); Myles v. City of San

17 Diego, No. 15CV1985-BEN (BLM), 2016 WL 2343914, at *12 (S.D. Cal. May 4, 2016) (“citizen

18 complaints against law enforcement involving excessive force are relevant in civil rights

19 cases[.]”).

20 2. Privacy Right Objection

21 As to the defendant’s contention that disclosure will violate Officer Allbee’s privacy

22 rights, the court is not persuaded. It is true that federal courts recognize a constitutionally-based

23 right of privacy that may be asserted in response to discovery requests. Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 616.

24 However, privacy objections are subject to balancing the need for the requested information

25 against the asserted privacy right. Id. “In the context of the disclosure of police files, courts have

26 recognized that privacy rights are not inconsequential . . . However, these privacy interests must

27 be balanced against the great weight afforded to federal law in civil rights cases against police

28 departments.” Id. “Current case law suggests the privacy interests police officers have in their

1 personnel files do not outweigh plaintiff's interests in civil rights cases.” Dowell v. Griffin, 275

2 F.R.D. 613, 617 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 617; Hampton v. City of San Diego,

3 147 F.R.D. 227, 230 (S.D.Cal.1993); Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 301 (C.D.Cal.1992)

4 Privacy concerns with respect to Officer Allbee’s personal information can be addressed

5 with appropriate redaction of irrelevant personally identifying information (e.g. social security

6 number) and with the entry of a standard stipulated protective order. The court notes that no

7 stipulated protective order has been entered in this case. Production responsive to this RFP will

8 be conditioned on the entry of a stipulated protective order, which shall be filed with the court.

9 Plaintiff’s counsel also acknowledged at the hearing that the Officer’s medical records are not

10 sought, so privacy concerns specific to medical information are moot. With the above described

11 limitations, plaintiff’s motion is granted as to RFP No. 7.

12 D. Affirmative Defense Objections (RFP Nos. 17-24)

13 Plaintiff’s RFP’s related to defendant’s affirmative defenses, and the associated responses

14 from defendant, are identical, save for the affirmative defense number. They read as follows:

15 “RFP No. [17-24] ([First-Eighth] Affirmative Defense) “All DOCUMENTS supporting the

16 alleged ‘[First-Eighth] Affirmative Defense’ contained in YOUR Answer.” ECF No. 16 at 23-29.

17 Defendant County responded: “Objection. Assumes facts, calls for speculation. Without waiver:

18 All documents produced by any party in this case.” Id.

19 Plaintiff argues that defendant’s conditional response of “[a]ll documents produced by any

20 party in this case” is unacceptable because a response must specifically identify responsive

21 documents by bates number for each document request. ECF No. 16 at 21. Defendant responds

22 that each question is not narrowly tailored to the defense at issue, and therefore necessarily

23 invokes “any and every possible document in the case.” See Id. at 25. Defendant’s affirmative

24 defenses are as follows: (1) qualified immunity; (2) California Government Code §§ 815 (public

25 entity liability and limitations) and 815.2 (public entity not liable for employee conduct where

26 employee is immune from suit); (3) California Government Code § 820.2 (public entity not liable

27 for employee conduct); (4) California Government Code § 820.4 (public entity not liable for

28 employee conduct because employees exercised due care in execution of law enforcement); (5)

1 California Government Code § 820.8 (public entity not liable for acts of employees because

2 employee cannot be liable for the acts or omissions of another person); (6) comparative

3 negligence; (7) failure to mitigate damages; and (8) unclean hands. See ECF No. 7 (Answer).

4 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, ‘which requires parties to have some factual basis for

5 their claims and allegations,’ allows for requests seeking documents to support a defendant’s

6 affirmative defenses.” Uribe v. McKesson, No. 08-cv-1285 DMS (NLS), 2010 WL 653975, at *4

7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2010) (citing Nat’l Acad. of Recording Arts & Scis., Inc. v. On Point Events,

8 LP, 256 F.R.D. 678, 682 (C.D. Cal. 2009)). Defendant is correct that most of its affirmative

9 defenses likely implicate a wide range of documents that are also responsive to other requests.

10 However, other courts have found in similar situations that an “all documents” response is not

11 entirely sufficient. “Simply stating that ‘all documents produced thus far support [our] good faith

12 affirmative defense . . .’ is vague. . . . Defendants have not unequivocally stated whether they

13 have produced all documents responsive[.] While defendants are correct that they are not

14 required to point to the individual documents or provide an index of documents as long as they

15 are produced as they are kept in the usual course of business, plaintiffs are entitled to an

16 unequivocal response that no additional responsive documents exist.” Kellgren v. Petco Animal

17 Supplies, Inc., No. 13-cv-644 L (KSC), 2016 WL 4097522, at *5 (S.D. Cal. July 7, 2016).

18 Plaintiff’s motion as to the affirmative defense RFPs is granted in part, as in Kellgren.

19 Defendant is not required to specifically link each produced document to an RFP insofar as

20 documents are produced as they are kept in the ordinary course of business, however, the court

21 will require that “defendant submit a written declaration signed under penalty of perjury by an

22 appropriate representative, other than outside counsel, stating that ‘to the best of [his or her]

23 knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry’ that defendant’s response

24 to this request is ‘complete and correct as of the time it is made.’” Id.

25 C. Request for Expenses and Fees

26 Plaintiff seeks an award of costs and fees in the event her motion is granted in whole or in

27 part; defendant opposes, arguing that where reasonable minds could differ, sanctions are not

28 appropriate. ECF No. 16 at 37-40. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A) provides that if a

1 motion to compel is granted, the court “must,” after providing an opportunity to be heard, require

2 the party whose conduct necessitated the filing of the motion to pay reasonable expenses

3 including attorney’s fees. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule (“Rule”) 37(a) (5)(A). However, the Court “must

4 not” order payment if the moving party filed the motion before attempting in good faith to resolve

5 the matter, if the nondisclosure was substantially justified or if other circumstances make an

6 award unjust. Rule 37(a)(5)(A) (i)-(iii).

7 An award of costs and fees is not appropriate here because nondisclosure was

8 substantially justified as to at least some of the disputed requests, and because although the

9 parties did meet and confer, it appears to the court that this motion was somewhat premature. The

10 prematurity is evidenced by the fact that, post-filing of this motion, the vast majority of disputed

11 items were resolved by tentative agreement of the parties. Further, the discovery deadline in this

12 case, which has never been extended, is still roughly six months in the future. An award of fees

13 and costs for a motion brought at such an early juncture would be unjust, particularly where the

14 motion is not granted fully as to any disputed item.

15 IV. Conclusion

16 Plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

17 1. DENIED without prejudice as to RFP Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,

18 16, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, as moot in light of the tentative agreement of the

19 parties;

20 2. DENIED as to RFP No. 2;

21 3. GRANTED as to RFP No. 7 insofar as defendant must produce Officer Allbee’s

22 personnel file subject to a stipulated protective order that shall be filed with the court no later than

23 February 19, 2020;

24 4. GRANTED in part as to RFP Nos. 17-24, insofar as defendant is required to

25 provide a sworn declaration addressing each RFP and attesting where appropriate that production

26 is complete; and

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1 5. DENIED as to the request for attorneys’ fees and costs.

2 | DATED: February 6, 2020 ~

3 Httven—

ALLISON CLAIRE

4 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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