no equitable tolling where petitioner failed to 7 show his auditory hallucinations, severe depression and anxiety “actually caused him not to be 8 able to file despite his diligence”
How later courts described this case
- no equitable tolling where petitioner failed to 7 show his auditory hallucinations, severe depression and anxiety “actually caused him not to be 8 able to file despite his diligence”
- pro se prisoner filing is dated from the date prisoner delivers it to prison authorities
- recognizing that the lack of access to library material does not 18 automatically qualify as grounds for equitable tolling
- without 19 demonstration of petitioner's diligence, lockdowns at prison allegedly eliminating access to law library were not extraordinary 20 circumstances warranting equitable tolling
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 FRANK RENE ROSILES, No. 2:17-cv-02600 KJM GGH P
12 Petitioner,
13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
14 C. PFEIFFER,
15 Respondent.
16
17 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 24. The matter was referred to the United States
19 Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 626(b)(1) and Local Rule 302(c).
20 Procedural Background
21 The court will provide the relevant background for context from its October 1, 2018
22 Findings and Recommendations:
23 On December 9, 2011, petitioner pled no contest in Yuba County
Superior Court to kidnapping (Pen. Code § 207(a)), robbery (Pen.
24 Code § 211), first degree burglary (Pen. Code §§ 459, 460), second
degree burglary (Pen. Code §§ 459, 460), and kidnapping to commit
25 robbery (Pen. Code § 209(b)(1)). Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. Nos. 1, 2. Two
sentencing enhancements (Pen. Code §667.5(b)) were also found to
26 be true. Id. Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of
eleven years and eight months to life. Id. On December 4, 2012, the
27 California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District affirmed in part
and reversed in part the judgment. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. No. 2.
28 Specifically, the California Court of Appeal remanded to the superior
1 court with directions to amend its records to reflect petitioner’s
presentence custody credits to 21 days of credit. Id. The remainder
2 of the judgment was affirmed. Id. Petitioner did not seek review with
the California Supreme Court.
3
Thereafter, petitioner filed subsequent state collateral challenges.
4 The first state habeas petition was filed in Yuba County Superior
Court on December 7, 2016, and denied on December 19, 2016.
5 Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. Nos. 3, 4.1 The second state habeas petition was
again filed in Yuba County Superior Court on January 16, 2017, and
6 denied on February 9, 2017. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. Nos. 5, 6. On
February 28, 2017, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from Yuba
7 County Superior Court’s denial in the California Court of Appeal.
Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. No. 7. The California Court of Appeal dismissed
8 the case after making the determination “that the order appealed from
[was] nonappealable.” Id. (citing to In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 767,
9 fn.7 (1993); In re Crow, 4 Cal.3d 613, 621, fn. 8 (1971). Petitioner
filed a subsequent state habeas petition again with the California
10 Court of Appeal on May 2, 2017, and was denied on May 12, 2017.
Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. Nos. 8, 9. Petitioner’s final state habeas petition
11 was filed with the California Supreme Court on June 12, 2017, and
was denied on September 20, 2017. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. Nos. 10, 11.
12 The California Supreme Court’s denial included a citation to People
v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995) for the proposition that “a
13 petition for writ of habeas corpus must include copies of reasonably
available documentary evidence.” See Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. No. 11.
14
15 ECF No. 20 at 2-3.
16 On December 7, 2017, petitioner filed the instant federal petition. ECF No. 1. On
17 February 12, 2018, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner was time-
18 barred by the one-year statute of limitations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). ECF No. 9. On
19 October 1, 2018, the court issued Findings and Recommendations recommending that
20 respondent’s motion to dismiss be granted and the petition be dismissed with prejudice based on
21 untimeliness. ECF No. 20. The undersigned later withdrew its October 1, 2018 Findings and
22 Recommendations after receiving petitioner’s objections stating he was entitled to equitable
23 tolling based on being an indigent litigant; lacking legal knowledge; having limited resources and
24 time in the law library; and having a mental impairment. ECF Nos. 23, 24. The court ordered
25
1 [Fn.1 in original] The court affords petitioner application of the mailbox rule as to all his habeas
26 filings in state court and federal court. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 275-76 (1988) (pro se prisoner
filing is dated from the date prisoner delivers it to prison authorities); Stillman v. Lamarque, 319 F.3d
27 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003) (mailbox rule applies to pro se prisoner who delivers habeas petition to prison
officials for the court within limitations period). In any event, the mailbox rule is inconsequential in this
28 case.
1 briefing on petitioner’s equitable tolling issue, which is now fully submitted before the court.
2 ECF Nos. 25 (respondent’s opposition), 33 (Petitioner’s reply), 39 (respondent’s reply), 43
3 (petitioner’s sur-reply).
4 After carefully reviewing the filings, and application of the applicable law, the court now
5 issues the following Findings and Recommendations.
6 Legal Standards
7 On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
8 1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), AEDPA imposes a one-year
9 statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides, in
10 pertinent part:
11 A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ
of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
12 a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of–
13 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
14 seeking such review;
15 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws
16 of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
17
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
18 initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
19 retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review;
20 (D) or the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
21 exercise of due diligence.
22 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
23 Notwithstanding petitioner’s collateral state habeas petitions, petitioner’s conviction
24 became final for purposes of AEDPA forty days after the Court of Appeal’s decision on January
25 13, 2013.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Cal. Rules of Court 8.264(b)(1) (Court of Appeals
26 decision is final 30 days after filing); Cal. Rules of Court 8.500(e)(1) (Petition for review with the
27
2 The fortieth day is a Sunday. However, because the last day ended on a Sunday, the period
28 continues to run to the next day. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
1 California Supreme Court must be served and filed 10 days after the Court of Appeal’s decision is
2 final). Petitioner did not submit a petition for review with the California Supreme Court.
3 Accordingly, the statute of limitations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) commenced the
4 following day on January 14, 2013. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1244 (9th Cir.
5 2001) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)). Petitioner had until, January 14, 2014, that is until one year
6 after finality of conviction, to file a timely federal petition absent applicable tolling. This instant
7 action filed December 12, 2017 is barred as untimely unless petitioner is entitled to statutory or
8 equitable tolling. Here, petitioner does not propose he is entitled to statutory tolling, only
9 equitable tolling. Nevertheless, the court provides its discussion on statutory tolling, which is
10 relevant here, from its October 1, 2018 Findings and Recommendations:
11 Respondent argues petitioner’s subsequent state post-conviction
collateral actions do not entitle petitioner to statutory tolling. ECF
12 No. 9 at 4-5. The court agrees. Petitioner filed his first state habeas
petition beyond AEDPA’s one-year statute on December 7, 2016,
13 approximately two years and 11 months after the statute of
limitations expired. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to
14 statutory tolling. A state court habeas post-conviction process
commenced beyond the expiration of AEDPA’s statute of limitations
15 does not toll or revive the limitations period under section
2244(d)(1). See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.
16 2003); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, this petition is untimely unless petitioner can show
17 equitable tolling exists.
18 ECF No. 20 at 4.
19 A habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year statute of
20 limitations only if he shows: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently; and (2) that some
21 extraordinary circumstances stood in his way and prevented timely filing. See Holland v. Florida,
22 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010); Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009). The diligence
23 required for equitable tolling purposes is “reasonable diligence,” not “maximum feasible
24 diligence.” See Holland, 560 U.S. at 653. See also Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.
25 2010).
26 As to the extraordinary circumstances required, the Ninth Circuit has held that the
27 circumstances alleged must make it impossible to file a petition on time, and that the
28 extraordinary circumstances must be the cause of the petitioner’s untimeliness. See Bills v. Clark,
1 628 F.3d at 1097 (citing Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003)). This is a very high
2 threshold, “lest the exception swallow the rule.” See Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th
3 Cir. 2002). In addition, ‘[w]hen external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence,
4 account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling may be appropriate.” Loft v.
5 Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th
6 Cir. 1999)). Determining whether equitable tolling is warranted is a “fact-specific inquiry.”
7 Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799 (citing Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001)).
8 Petitioner contends equitable tolling is applicable based on the following four grounds: (1)
9 petitioner is an indigent litigant; (2) petitioner lacks legal knowledge; (3) petitioner had limited
10 resources and time in the law library; and (4) petitioner’s mental impairment.
11 Discussion
12 Indigent Litigant
13 First, petitioner claims he is entitled to equitable tolling because he “is indigent and has
14 not been able to hire an attorney which has forced petitioner to seek assistance from fellow
15 inmates/jail house lawyers.” ECF No. 23 at 3. However, petitioner’s indigency fails to constitute
16 as an extraordinary circumstance, especially considering petitioner’s capability of filing
17 subsequent state habeas petitions prior to filing his federal habeas petition. Bermudez v. Lewis,
18 58 F. App'x 268, 269 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2010)
19 (petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling based on his reliance on other inmates who were
20 transferred or too busy to attend to petitioner’s petition.) The undersigned recommends denial of
21 equitable tolling on this ground.
22 Lack of Legal Knowledge
23 Secondly, petitioner argues he lacks the “the legal knowledge and training necessary to
24 comprehend law and the legal process.” ECF No. 23 at 3. However, the Ninth Circuit has clearly
25 held that “a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary
26 circumstance warranting equitable tolling.” Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.
27 2006). Therefore, the undersigned recommends denial of equitable tolling on this ground as well.
28 ////
1 Limited Resources and Time in Law Library
2 Next, petitioner claims he should be entitled to equitable tolling on the basis that he has
3 “woefully deficient time available in the library” and has scarce “legal materials available.” ECF
4 No. 23 at 3. Specifically, petitioner alleges the following examples demonstrate extraordinary
5 circumstances entitling him to equitable tolling; inmates are only given 18-24 hours a year to
6 conduct legal research; “law library staff and workers” are unable to provide advice or direction
7 on how to address legal questions; and several transfers and lockdowns have prevented
8 petitioner’s ability to conduct proper research. Id. at 3-4; see also ECF No. 33 at 4-5. Petitioner
9 does not provide specific details regarding the period of time in which his access to the law
10 library, lockdowns and transfers prevented him from filing timely. Instead, petitioner alleges the
11 limited time inmates in general have when it comes to visiting the law library; such as the amount
12 of time it takes to enter the library, to fill out a request to return and receive legal materials and
13 log off computers. ECF No. 33 at 4-5. However, the fact that petitioner was able to work on his
14 state habeas petitions prior to the filing of his federal habeas petitions cuts against petitioner’s
15 argument that he is entitled to equitable tolling on this basis.
16 Lockdowns, however, and resulting restricted access to the prison
law library are not, by themselves, extraordinary circumstances for
17 prisoners. See e.g. Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.
2002) (recognizing that the lack of access to library material does not
18 automatically qualify as grounds for equitable tolling); United States
v. Van Poyck, 980 F.Supp. 1108, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (without
19 demonstration of petitioner's diligence, lockdowns at prison
allegedly eliminating access to law library were not extraordinary
20 circumstances warranting equitable tolling); Rosati v. Kernan, 417
F.Supp.2d 1128, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“[P]etitioner's complaints
21 about limited access to the law library and legal materials at various
state prisons and occasional prison lockdowns do not warrant
22 equitable tolling since petitioner has not shown any causal
connection between these events and his failure to timely file his
23 habeas corpus petition.”); see also Corrigan v. Barbery, 371
F.Supp.2d 325, 330 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (“In general, the difficulties
24 attendant on prison life such as transfers between facilities, solitary
confinement, lockdowns, restricted access to the law library, and an
25 inability to secure court documents, do not by themselves qualify as
extraordinary circumstances.”). In sum, Petitioner does not explain
26 how any lockdowns constituted extraordinary circumstances that
prevented him from timely filing his federal petition.
27
28 Robinson v. Marshall, No. CV-07-1606-GHK (JWJ), 2008 WL 2156745, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May
1 18, 2008), aff'd, 405 F. App'x 241 (9th Cir. 2010). Similarly, petitioner’s argument that prison
2 staff were not able to provide legal advice on how to address legal questions also fails. See Lewis
3 v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996) (the court rejected the argument that the “State must enable
4 the prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in court” because to “demand
5 the conferral of such sophisticated legal capabilities upon a mostly uneducated and indeed largely
6 illiterate prison population is effectively to demand permanent provision of counsel, which we do
7 not believe the Constitution requires.”) Moreover, petitioner’s alleged reliance on the assistance
8 of other inmates to timely file his habeas petition fails to demonstrate extraordinary circumstance
9 entitling petitioner to equitable tolling. See Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1049. Accordingly, the
10 undersigned recommends denial of equitable tolling on these grounds.
11 Mental Impairment
12 Lastly, petitioner claims his mental impairment constitutes as an extraordinary
13 circumstance entitling him to equitable tolling. Petitioner states “[d]uring the period of time
14 between 2012 through 2016 Petitioner has been a patient of the mental health system and has
15 been prescribed several types of medications which has effects on petitioner’s ability to perform,
16 and hindered ability to conduct research and has made it difficult to find assistance in this legal
17 matter.” ECF No. 23 at 4. Petitioner further states that he does not know “what his mental
18 diagnosis is” and “partially recollects discussing bi-polar disorder, depression, paranoia and
19 hearing voices.” ECF No. 33 at 6. Ultimately, petitioner maintains his “mental defect” prevented
20 him from understanding “his need to timely file a habeas petition” and his ability to “effectuate
21 that filing.” ECF No. 33 at 10; see also ECF No. 43 at 3.
22 Under limited circumstances, a petitioner’s mental impairment may represent an
23 extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling for the period he was incompetent. Laws
24 v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit in Bills determined a two-part
25 test to evaluate whether equitable tolling applies in cases where petitioner suffers from a mental
26 impairment. In Bills, the Ninth Circuit stated, in pertinent part:
27 (1) First, a petitioner must show his mental impairment was an
“extraordinary circumstance” beyond his control, see Holland, 130
28
1 S.Ct at 2562, by demonstrating the impairment was so severe that
either
2
(a) Petitioner was unable to rationally or factually to
3 personally understand the need to timely file, or
4 (b) Petitioner’s mental state rendered him unable personally
to prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing.
5
(2) Second, the petitioner must show diligence in pursuing the claims
6 to the extent he could understand them, but that the mental
impairment made it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the
7 totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available access
to assistance. See id.
8
9 Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100. “The mental impairment must be so debilitating that it is the but-for
10 cause of the delay, and even in cases of debilitating impairment the petitioner must still
11 demonstrate diligence.” Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing
12 Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100).
13 Petitioner and respondent provide documentation for petitioner’s medication and
14 treatment notes for the relevant limitations period. However, review of the documentations show
15 that petitioner’s mental impairments were not “so severe” as to prevent petitioner from being able
16 to “rationally or factually to personally understand the need to timely file,” nor render him
17 “unable personally to prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1100.
18 Although treatment notes indicate that petitioner was suffering from paranoia, anxiety, auditory
19 hallucinations, and depression, they also show that petitioner reported having a stable mood (ECF
20 No. 40-1 at 15, 23, 27, 29), being stable on medications (ECF No. 40-1 at 15, 23, 28), and not
21 experiencing side effects in medication (ECF No. 40-1 at 23, 29, 38). Treatment notes further
22 indicate that even when petitioner had stopped or refused to take his medications as prescribed, he
23 would report having a stable mood. ECF No. 40-1 at 15, 27. See also Martinez v. Hedgpeth, No.
24 1:11-cv-01661-DLB HC, 2012 WL 1076260, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012) (citing McCall v.
25 Wyoming Attorney General, 339 Fed. Appx. 848, 850, 2009 WL 1803281, at *2 (10th Cir. 2009)
26 for the proposition that “the mere fact that defendant was under influence of medication
27 insufficient to warrant equitable tolling because he failed to explain how the prescription
28 medication prevented him from bringing his claim.”) Moreover, during the relevant limitations
1 period and after, petitioner reported “no impairment of memory or concentration,” his ability to
2 maintain his interests such as reading, writing, working out. ECF No. 40-1 at 39, 41.
3 Review of the record demonstrates that petitioner has failed to show that his mental
4 impairments were the but-for cause for his delay in filing a timely federal habeas petition. See
5 Taylor v. Knowles, No. CIV S-07-2253 WBS EFB P, 2009 WL 688615, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13,
6 2009), aff'd, 368 Fed. Appx. 796 (9th Cir. 2010) (no equitable tolling where petitioner failed to
7 show his auditory hallucinations, severe depression and anxiety “actually caused him not to be
8 able to file despite his diligence”). Further, respondent also provides petitioner’s education record
9 that demonstrates petitioner’s enrollment from December 10, 2012 to April 19, 2013 in the
10 prison’s computer literacy program. ECF No. 40-3 at 1-8. Petitioner successfully completed the
11 program with a “behavior/assessment” marked as satisfactory in “adaptability,” “conduct,”
12 “cooperation,” “dependability,” and “initiative.” Id. at 3-5. Accordingly, the undersigned finds
13 petitioner’s alleged mental impairments do not meet Bills two-part test and accordingly do not
14 persist throughout the relevant limitations period.
15 Because petitioner has not demonstrated an extraordinary circumstance that would entitle
16 him to equitable tolling, the court need not address whether petitioner was diligent in pursuing his
17 rights in relation to each of the grounds raised. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that petitioner
18 has not met his burden of demonstrating the existence of grounds for equitable tolling. See Pace
19 v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating grounds
20 for equitable tolling).
21 Evidentiary Hearing
22 Petitioner has failed to meet his burden in establishing that an extraordinary circumstance
23 prevented him from diligently pursuing his rights within the limitations period. The medical
24 records submitted by both the petitioner and respondent do not show that petitioner is entitled to
25 an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his mental impairment warrants equitable tolling.
26 See Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2003) (Further factual development may
27 be required when a petitioner alleges a “good faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to
28 equitable tolling” when the record is “patently inadequate”); Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969,
1 975 (9th Cir. 2006) (The district court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether
2 equitable tolling is warranted if petitioner makes “a good-faith allegation that would, if true
3 entitle him to equitable tolling” and there “are only conflicting affidavits in the record regarding
4 the facts underlying the issue of cause.”) Here, on the contrary, the medical records establish that
5 petitioner was sufficiently competent and capable of managing his affairs before, after and during
6 the relevant limitations period. “Where the record is amply developed, and where it indicates that
7 the petitioner's mental incompetence was not so severe as to cause the untimely filing of his
8 habeas petition, a district court is not obligated to hold evidentiary hearings to further develop the
9 factual record, notwithstanding a petitioner's allegations of mental incompetence.” Roberts v.
10 Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 773 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Orthel v. Yates, 795 F.3d 935, 939-41 (9th
11 Cir. 2015) (When the existing record is “amply developed,” “a district court need not hold
12 evidentiary hearings to further develop the factual record.”) Accordingly, the undersigned finds
13 petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
14 Conclusion
15 For the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends dismissing petitioner’s habeas
16 petition as untimely and that petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling.
17 Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, this court must
18 issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. A
19 certificate of appealability may issue only “if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the
20 denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). For the reasons set forth in these findings
21 and recommendations, a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right has not been
22 made in this case.
23 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
24 1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 9) be granted;
25 2. The petition be dismissed with prejudice for untimeliness; and
26 3. The District Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability.
27 These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
28 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days
1 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
2 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
3 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the
4 objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The
5 parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to
6 appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
7 Dated: August 22, 2019
/s/ Gregory G. Hollows
8
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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