Opinion

(PC) Garza v. CDCR Appeals

Court
District Court, E.D. California
Filed
Aug 8, 2019
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 17.3%

“A district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be 5 futile.” (citation omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • “A district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be 5 futile.” (citation omitted)
  • holding that district court properly 20 dismissed at screening plaintiff’s claim that California Department of Corrections’ ban on 21 sexually explicit materials containing frontal nudity was unconstitutional
  • prison policy restricting receipt of images 17 depicting sexual penetration did not violate First Amendment
  • affirming dismissal of complaint on screening because policy 23 banning materials with full frontal nudity and language advocating violence was reasonably 24 related to legitimate penological interests

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 RAUL GARZA, No. 2:17-cv-0516 AC P

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

14 CDCR APPEALS, et al.,

15 Defendants.

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17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

18 has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

19 I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

20 Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C.

21 § 1915(a). ECF Nos. 2, 6. Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted.

22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C.

23 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in

24 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct

25 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and

26 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments

27 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account.

28 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time

1 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C.

2 § 1915(b)(2).

3 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

4 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

5 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

6 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are

7 “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[]

8 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

9 A claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

10 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th

11 Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss . . . claims which are ‘based on indisputably meritless legal

12 theories’ or whose ‘factual contentions are clearly baseless.’” Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639,

13 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327), superseded by statute on other grounds as

14 stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The critical inquiry is whether a

15 constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis.

16 Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227-28 (citations omitted).

17 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the

18 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of

19 what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

20 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

21 “Failure to state a claim under § 1915A incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context

22 of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman,

23 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). In order to survive dismissal for failure

24 to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

25 cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the

26 speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). “‘[T]he pleading must contain

27 something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally

28 cognizable right of action.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur

1 R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)).

2 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

3 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

4 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

5 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

6 misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint under this

7 standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hosp. Bldg.

8 Co. v. Trs. of the Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), as well as construe the pleading in the

9 light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v.

10 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted).

11 III. Complaint

12 The complaint names Chief of Appeals R.C. Briggs, Appeals Examiner J. Benavidez, and

13 Warden Jeff Macomber as defendants. ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff alleges that his rights under the

14 First and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when defendants denied him the ability to

15 receive or purchase “xxx-rated magazines” on the grounds that the magazines are disturbing and

16 offensive. Id. at 3-4. He further asserts that defendants have failed to explain how the magazines

17 pose a danger to the safety or security of the prison. Id.

18 IV. Failure to State a Claim

19 A. First Amendment

20 “A prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his

21 status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell

22 v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Accordingly, “challenges to prison restrictions that are

23 asserted to inhibit First Amendment interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies

24 and goals of the corrections system.” Id. Prison restrictions are valid when they are “reasonably

25 related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).

26 Plaintiff appears to be challenging the constitutionality of title 15, section 3135 of the

27 California Code of Regulations, titled “Disturbing or Offensive Correspondence.” The regulation

28 prohibits inmates from receiving mail that contains “obscene material,” which is defined as

1 catalogs, advertisements, brochures, and/or material taken as a

whole, which to the average person, applying contemporary

2 statewide standards, appeals to the prurient interest. It is material

which taken as a whole, depicts sexual conduct, and lacks serious

3 literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Additionally, material

is considered obscene when it appears from the nature of the matter

4 or the circumstances of its dissemination, distribution or exhibition

that it appeals to deviant sexual groups.

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6 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3135(d). The regulation further contains a non-exhaustive list of types

7 of images that are subject to the test above, including sexually explicit materials, defined as

8 materials showing frontal nudity, and depictions of sexual penetration. Id. Though plaintiff does

9 not specifically identify the magazines he has been unable to purchase or describe their content,

10 his identification of the magazines as “xxx-rated” and “adult” indicates that the magazines are

11 specifically intended to appeal to prurient interests and include the types of sexual images

12 specifically prohibited by § 3135.

13 The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that policies prohibiting inmates from possessing

14 sexually explicit materials are valid. E.g., Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999)

15 (en banc) (prohibition on sexually explicit materials did not violate First Amendment); Frost v.

16 Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 358 (9th Cir. 1999) (prison policy restricting receipt of images

17 depicting sexual penetration did not violate First Amendment); Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d

18 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2004) (regulations prohibiting sexually explicit materials was constitutional);

19 Munro v. Tristan, 116 F. App’x 820, 821 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that district court properly

20 dismissed at screening plaintiff’s claim that California Department of Corrections’ ban on

21 sexually explicit materials containing frontal nudity was unconstitutional); Jost v. Lockyer, 127 F.

22 App’x 358, 359 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of complaint on screening because policy

23 banning materials with full frontal nudity and language advocating violence was reasonably

24 related to legitimate penological interests); Crozier v. Endel, 446 F. App’x 14, 14 (9th Cir. 2011)

25 (prison policy banning erotic magazine reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and

26 First Amendment claim was properly dismissed at screening). Because plaintiff’s claim is

27 foreclosed by binding precedent, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief for violation of his

28 First Amendment rights and the claims should be dismissed.

1 B. Fourteenth Amendment

2 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all

3 similarly situated people equally. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439

4 (1985) (citation omitted). “To state a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a

5 plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against him

6 based upon his membership in a protected class.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th

7 Cir. 2003) (citing Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). Prisoners are not a

8 protected class. Webber v. Crabtree, 158 F.3d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1998) (inmates denied tobacco

9 use based on housing location not a protected class). Alternatively, a plaintiff may state an equal

10 protection claim if he shows similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently

11 without a rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose. Vill of Willowbrook v. Olech,

12 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (citations omitted).

13 Plaintiff has failed to establish that he is a member of a suspect class, and has not alleged

14 facts demonstrating that similarly situated individuals are being treated differently. Indeed, he

15 asserts that all prisoners are prohibited from viewing or purchasing adult magazines. ECF No. 1

16 at 4. Accordingly, plaintiff’s allegations that defendants violated his rights protected under the

17 Equal Protection Clause also fail to state claims for relief.

18 V. No Leave to Amend

19 If the court finds that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, the court

20 has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130

21 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the defects

22 in the complaint could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130-31; Cato v.

23 United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A pro se litigant must be given leave to

24 amend his or her complaint, and some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that

25 the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (citing Noll v. Carlson, 809

26 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)). However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear that a

27 complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato,

28 70 F.3d at 1105-06.

1 Plaintiff’s allegations do not state viable claims for relief and, given the nature of the

2 claims, leave to amend would be futile and it will therefore be recommended that the complaint

3 be dismissed without leave to amend. Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114,

4 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be

5 futile.” (citation omitted)).

6 VI. Plain Language Summary of this Order for a Pro Se Litigant

7 Your request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted and you are not required to pay the

8 entire filing fee immediately.

9 The magistrate judge is recommending that your First Amendment claim be dismissed

10 without leave to amend because the Ninth Circuit has said that policies preventing inmates from

11 receiving sexually explicit materials are related to valid correctional goals. Existing legal

12 authority makes it clear that you cannot establish a violation of your First Amendment rights.

13 Because the policy applies to all inmates, your equal protection claim is also legally flawed in a

14 way that can’t be fixed by amendment. So it is being recommended that your case be dismissed.

15 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

16 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.

17 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff

18 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

19 § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the

20 Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently

21 herewith.

22 3. The Clerk of the Court shall randomly assign a United States District Judge to this

23 action.

24 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint (ECF No. 1) be dismissed

25 without leave to amend for failure to state a claim.

26 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

27 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days

28 after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections

1 | with the court. Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

2 || waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

3 || 1991).

4 | DATED: August 8, 2019 ~

5 Hthren— Lhar—e_

ALLISON CLAIRE

6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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