Jones, J. v. Pine Creek Hills LLC

J-A13038-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

JEFFREY R. JONES : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

:

v. :

:

:

PINE CREEK HILLS LLC : No. 1256 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered September 19, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at

No(s): GD-21-012264

BEFORE: OLSON, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: JUNE 13, 2024

Appellant, Jeffrey R. Jones, appeals from the trial court’s September 19,

2023 order, which denied his Amended Petition for Confirmation of Expiration

of Recorded Easement in Equity after determining that the easement recorded

at the Recorder’s Office of Allegheny County in Deed Book Volume 10575,

Page 633 on or about September 11, 1998 (hereinafter, “Easement” or

“Sanitary Sewer Easement”), has not been abandoned, extinguished, or

otherwise terminated. After careful review, we affirm.

Appellant filed a Petition for Confirmation of Expiration of Recorded

Easement in Equity, followed by an Amended Petition for Confirmation of

Expiration of Recorded Easement in Equity, seeking to have the trial court

order and decree that the Easement is abandoned and extinguished.

Thereafter, the trial court entered an order stating that a rule is issued upon

Appellee, Pine Creek Hills LLC (“PCH”), the respondent below, to show cause

J-A13038-24

why Appellant is not entitled to the relief requested and advising that

Appellant’s petition would be decided under Pa.R.Civ.P. 206.7, among other

things.1 PCH then filed a response, in which it requested that the court deny

Appellant relief.

The parties subsequently filed a joint stipulation, in which they agreed

to the following facts:

a. This case involves a Sanitary Sewer Easement granted to an

undeveloped parcel of approximately 50 acres located in Indiana

Township, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.

b. The authenticity of the Sanitary Sewer Easement, as

documented in the attached Exhibit A, including the survey

showing the placement of the Easement, is undisputed.

c. The Easement was granted on September 11, 1998, by Robert

J. Jones, owner of property consisting of approximately three

acres, having an address of 3360 Saxonburg Blvd., Glenshaw, PA

15116 (the Servient Tenement, hereinafter “the Jones Property”),

to PARC Development, L.P., the then-owner of the adjoining

property located at Chapel Crest Terrace, Pittsburgh, PA 15238

(the Dominant Tenement, hereinafter “the Pine Creek Property”).

d. The Easement was sought to allow the land-locked Pine Creek

Property access to the municipal sewer system on Saxonburg

Blvd.

e. Robert J. Jones died on June 30, 1999. On August 2, 2001,

[Appellant], son of Robert J. Jones, became the sole owner of the

Jones Property as the beneficiary and heir of the Estate of Robert

J. Jones….

f. PARC Development, L.P., sold the Pine Creek Property to

Hillcrest Trust on July 9, 2007. On December 21, 2009, Hillcrest

Trust sold the Pine Creek Property to [PCH], the current owner….

____________________________________________

1 Rule 206.7 outlines the procedure to be followed after the issuance of a rule

to show cause.

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g. [PCH] is a Pennsylvania single-member limited liability

company whose sole member is James E. Rohr. James E. Rohr

and his wife reside in a residential property which adjoins the Pine

Creek Property.

h. The prior owners of the Pine Creek Property were developers

that planned to subdivide the [Pine Creek ]Property for

construction of multiple residences. A plan presented by PARC

Development to the Indiana Township Planning Commission to

erect 35 housing units on the Pine Creek Property was denied,

with the denial subsequently affirmed on appeal to the Allegheny

County Court of Common Pleas…. A subsequent plan by Hillcrest

Trust for the erection of 9 housing units was also denied by the

Planning Commission.

i. Neither the current nor prior owners of the Pine Creek Property

have made use of the Sanitary Sewer Easement to date, but

neither have they done any affirmative acts inconsistent with the

intention to make a future use of the Easement or to make it

impossible to use the Easement across the Jones Property.

Joint Stipulation, 3/3/23, at ¶¶ a-i (citation and brackets omitted).

As mentioned supra, attached to the joint stipulation as Exhibit A is the

Grant of Easement, dated September 11, 1998. It states, in relevant part:

GRANT OF EASEMENT

IT IS HEREBY agreed that Robert J. Jones, unmarried, (hereinafter

called Grantor) for the sum of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND FIVE

HUNDRED AND NO/100 ($17,500.00) DOLLARS AND OTHER

GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, paid by PARC

Development, L.P., a Pennsylvania limited partnership,

(hereinafter called Grantee), does grant, sell, and convey unto

Grantee an easement and right-of-way upon and across the

following described property of the Grantor:

ALL that certain piece, parcel or tract of land situate in the

Township of Indiana, County of Allegheny and

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, consisting of three (3)

acres, more or less, having erected thereon a dwelling

house known as 3360 Saxonburg Boulevard, Glenshaw, PA

15116.

DESIGNATED Block and Lot No. 523-H-103.

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TITLE REFERENCE: Deed Book Volume 5601, Page 911, and

Deed Book Volume 9687, Page 118.

The easement and right-of-way hereby granted shall benefit the

adjacent property of Grantee, located in Indiana Township,

Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, more fully described as Exhibit

“A” attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. The

location of the easement and right-of-way hereby granted is

shown on the Plan, attached hereto as Exhibit “B” and

incorporated herein by reference, the legal description of which is

set forth on Exhibit “C”, attached hereto and incorporated herein

by reference. The easement granted hereunder shall also include

these areas outside of the right-of-way reasonably necessary for

Grantee to complete its work in the right-of-way.

The right-of-way, easement, rights and privileges herein granted

shall be used only for the purpose of placing, constructing,

operating, repairing, maintaining, rebuilding, replacing,

relocating, and removing a pipeline, manholes, and

appurtenances for sanitary sewer purposes.

The easement, rights and privileges herein granted shall be for so

long as Grantee, its successors and assigns, shall operate a

sanitary sewer pipeline within said easement. The easement,

rights and privileges herein granted shall terminate when or at

such time as the purposes hereof cease to exist, are abaondoned

[sic] by Grantee or become impossible of performance.

The easement, rights and privileges granted herein are exclusive,

and Grantor covenants that it will not convey any other easement

or conflicting rights within the area covered by this grant[.]

Should Grantee fail to perform any covenant, undertaking or

obligation arising hereunder, if Grantor engages counsel to

recover damages or to enforce performance of this agreement,

Grantor’s costs, expenses and reasonable counsel fees, whether

or not suit is instituted and in addition to all other legal damages,

shall be paid by Grantee.

Grantor also retains, reserves, and shall continue to enjoy the use

of the surface of such property for any and all purposes which do

not interfere with and prevent the use by Grantee of the within

easement.

Grantee, its agents, employees or contractors, shall use all

reasonable means to avoid inconvenience to Grantor, or damage

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to or injury to Grantor’s real property, or any property of Grantor

located thereon, during the course of construction, repair or

maintenance of the contemplated improvements. Upon

completion of such construction, repair or maintenance, Grantee

shall restore the Grantor’s property to its prior condition, repairing

any damage caused by the work, replant with grass seed any

exposed earth, clean the site, and generally leave the area in good

condition, all at Grantee’s sole cost and expense.

Grantee shall have the right to assign, convey and dedicate the

easement, rights and privileges granted hereunder to the Deer

Creek Drainage Basin Authority.

This instrument shall be binding on the heirs, executors,

administrators, successors and assigns of the parties hereto.

Joint Stipulation at Exhibit A (“Grant of Easement”) at 1-3 (unnumbered;

capitalization in original).

Following the filing of the joint stipulation, both parties filed briefs in

support of their positions. In Appellant’s brief, among other things, he argued

that — under the Grant of Easement — the Easement terminated when no

sewer line was installed or even commenced, and PARC Development

conveyed the Pine Creek Property to Hillcrest Trust. He also asserted that the

Easement ended because of, inter alia, impossibility of performance and/or

abandonment.

In response, PCH argued, inter alia, that the Easement qualifies as an

easement appurtenant and passed by operation of law and by deed to PCH,

and that the failure of PARC Development to use the Easement by installing a

sewer line prior to its transfer to Hillcrest Trust cannot be construed as a basis

for termination. It also contended that nothing in the Grant of Easement

demonstrates an intent to deprive PARC Development of the ability to convey

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the Easement to subsequent purchasers, refuted that the Easement has been

abandoned, and claimed that no conditions exist which make use of the

Easement impossible.

The trial court held argument, and directed the parties to file

supplements to the stipulated record and reply briefs.2 In Appellant’s reply

brief, among other things, he asserted that the Easement is an easement in

gross, as the easement was personal and limited to PARC Development unless

and until a sewer line was constructed. On the other hand, PHC argued in its

reply brief, inter alia, that the Grant of Easement contains no language

imposing upon PARC Development an obligation to install a sewer line prior to

transferring the Pine Creek Property in order to maintain the Easement.

On September 19, 2023, the trial court filed an opinion and order,

denying Appellant’s petition. It determined, inter alia, that the Easement is

an easement appurtenant that passes by operation of law, and that the factual

record does not demonstrate that the purposes of the Easement ceased to

exist, that performance is impossible, or that PARC Development took

affirmative steps to abandon the Easement. It also concluded that the fact

that the sanitary sewer pipeline has not been constructed to date does not

warrant relief for Appellant.

____________________________________________

2 It appears that the record was supplemented with the 2007 deed conveying

the Pine Creek Property from PARC Development to Hillcrest Trust, the 2008

deed conveying the Pine Creek Property from Hillcrest Trust to PCH, an

affidavit from James Rohr, and the deposition of Appellant.

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Appellant thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court did

not direct Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement, and it

indicated that the reasoning for its decision was set forth in its September 19,

2023 opinion.

On appeal, Appellant raises a single question for our review:

Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err by finding that the [E]asement in this

matter was not extinguished, since the original grantee did not

develop the [E]asement and subsequently conveyed its rights to

another entity?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant argues that this matter is controlled by the following two

paragraphs in the Grant of Easement:

The easement, rights and privileges herein granted shall be for so

long as Grantee, its successors and assigns, shall operate a

sanitary sewer pipeline within said easement. The easement,

rights and privileges herein granted shall terminate when or at

such time as the purposes hereof cease to exist, are abaondoned

[sic] by Grantee or become impossible of performance.

***

Grantee shall have the right to assign, convey and dedicate the

easement, rights and privileges granted hereunder to the Deer

Creek Drainage Basin Authority.

Grant of Easement at 2, 3 (unnumbered); see also Appellant’s Brief at 8.

Based on this language, Appellant contends that the Easement

terminated when PARC Development conveyed the Pine Creek Property to

Hillcrest Trust, the sewer line was not developed, and PARC Development did

not convey its rights under the Grant of Easement to Deer Creek Drainage

Basin Authority. Appellant’s Brief at 9. Appellant argues that “the Grant of

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Easement clearly provides … any sewer line, installed by PARC[ Development],

is assignable but, if no sewer line is installed, PARC[ Development] cannot

assign this unused right.” Id. at 10.3 To further support this reading, he says

that PARC Development “was able to assign its easement right to Deer Creek

Drainage Basin Authority, but that did not occur. The assignment to Deer

Creek was the only assignment so provided for.” Id.

As such, Appellant claims that the Easement “was an easement in gross

that could have, but did not, ripen into an easement appurtenant.” Id.

(citation omitted). He advances that the Easement “was created considering

two eventualities, that is, if the sewer line was developed, the [E]asement

would clearly be an easement appurtenant.” Id. at 11. However, he says, “if

the [E]asement were not developed, the [E]asement would be limited to (or

personal to) PARC[ Development] and would expire when PARC[

____________________________________________

3 Appellant further explained his interpretation below as:

Drawing the [c]ourt’s attention to the first excerpted paragraph,

that paragraph permits the easement rights and privileges to

continue “… for so long as Grantee, its successors and assigns,

shall operate a sanitary sewer pipeline within said easement[.]”

…

However, the parties agree that no such easement was installed

and exists. As a result, the controlling sentence is the following

sentence which states, “the easement … shall terminate when or

at such time as the purposes hereof cease to exist, are abandoned

by Grantee or become impossible of performance[.]” … This

sentence does not extend any rights to “successors or assigns[.”]

This is a significant, crucial and dispositive difference.

Appellant’s Trial Court Brief, 3/22/23, at 3 (emphasis in brief).

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Development] conveyed the property, which otherwise would be the dominant

estate.” Id.

This Court has previously explained that “[t]he same rules of

construction apply to deeds granting easements as to contracts generally.”

Southall v. Humbert, 685 A.2d 574, 577 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation

omitted). Further,

[i]n construing a deed or a contract, certain general principles

must be kept in mind. First, it is the intention of the parties at

the time of entering in thereto that governs, and such intention is

to be gathered from a reading of the entire contract. In addition,

[c]ontracts must receive a reasonable interpretation, according to

the intention of the parties at the time of executing them, if that

intention can be ascertained from their language….

Id. (cleaned up). “[W]hether a trial court properly interpreted a contract is a

question of law and our scope of review is plenary.” PARC Holdings, Inc. v.

Killian, 785 A.2d 106, 112 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted).

“An easement is defined as: an interest in land owned by another

person, consisting in the right to use or control the land, or an area above or

below it, for a specific limited purpose.” Stanton v. Lackawanna Energy,

Ltd., 886 A.2d 667, 676 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation, brackets, and

quotation marks omitted). See also Morning Call, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic-

Pennsylvania, Inc., 761 A.2d 139, 142 (Pa. Super. 2000) (“An easement

has been defined as a liberty, privilege or advantage which one may have in

the lands of another without profit….”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Here, the parties dispute whether the Easement is an easement

appurtenant or an easement in gross. “An easement is appurtenant when a

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servient estate exists for the beneficial use of a dominant estate.” Southhall,

685 A.2d at 578 (citation omitted). See also Brady v. Yodanza, 425 A.2d

726, 727 (Pa. 1981) (“Existence of a servient tenement for the beneficial use

of a dominant tenement is a prerequisite to the creation of an easement

appurtenant.”) (citation omitted). “Many cases recognize that where an

easement is annexed as an appurtenance to land…, it passes with a transfer

of the land although not specifically mentioned in the instrument of transfer.”

Brady, 425 A.2d at 728 (citations omitted). See also id. (noting that an

easement appurtenant “passes by operation of law” and that “[u]nless the …

grantors limit or make personal the right of way, it is an appurtenance to the

land it benefits”) (footnote omitted). Further, “[a]n expressly created

easement appurtenant can conceivably last forever[,]” and “[m]ere non-use,

no matter how long extended, will not result in extinguishment of an easement

created by deed.” Id. at 727, 727 n.2 (citations omitted).

In contrast, “[a]n easement in gross is a mere personal interest in, or

right to use the land of another.” Loughran v. Matylewicz, 81 A.2d 879,

881 (Pa. 1951) (emphasis omitted). “An ‘easement in gross’ benefits a

particular entity rather than a particular piece of land. An ‘easement in gross’

is an easement with a servient estate but no dominant estate.” 7 Summ. Pa.

Jur. 2d Property § 18:3 (2d ed. 2024) (footnote omitted). See also

Lindenmuth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp., 163 A. 159, 160 (Pa.

1932) (“The easement is in gross, and personal to the grantee, because it is

not appurtenant to other premises.”). An easement in gross “is generally held

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to be nonassignable[,] unless it is made assignable by the instrument creating

it.” Rusciolelli v. Smith, 171 A.2d 802, 806 (Pa. Super. 1961) (citations

omitted). Accord Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass’n, 200 A.

646, 651 (Pa. 1938) (“There does not seem to be any reason why the law

should prohibit the assignment of an easement in gross if the parties to its

creation evidence their intention to make it assignable.”).

This Court has recognized that “[a]n easement will never be presumed

to be a mere personal right when it can fairly be construed to be appurtenant

to some other estate.” Rusciolelli, 171 A.2d at 806 (citation omitted).

Moreover, “[w]hether an easement is in gross or appurtenant must be

determined by the fair interpretation of the grant or reservation creating the

easement, aided if necessary by the situation of the parties and the

surrounding circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted).

In the case sub judice, we conclude that the Easement can fairly be

construed as an easement appurtenant. See Rusciolelli, supra. The Grant

of Easement states, “The easement and right-of-way hereby granted shall

benefit the adjacent property of Grantee….” Grant of Easement at 1

(emphasis added; unnumbered); see also Joint Stipulation at ¶ a (“This case

involves a Sanitary Sewer Easement granted to an undeveloped parcel of

approximately 50 acres located in Indiana Township, Allegheny County,

Pennsylvania.”) (emphasis added). Further, in the parties’ joint stipulation,

they recognized that “[t]he Easement was sought to allow the land-locked

Pine Creek Property access to the municipal water system on Saxonburg

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Blvd.[,]” and that the Pine Creek Property was the dominant tenement and

the Jones Property was the servient tenement. Joint Stipulation at ¶ d; see

also id. at ¶ c. As discussed supra, these are characteristics of an easement

appurtenant, not an easement in gross, as a dominant estate exists, and the

Easement benefits a particular piece of land.

To the extent Appellant says that the Grant of Easement limits the

development of the sanitary sewer line to PARC Development, we disagree.

Initially, there is no explicit language in the Grant of Easement to this end.

Accord PCH’s Brief at 18-19 (“Where does the [Grant of ]Easement state that

it terminates if PARC[ Development] conveys the dominant tenement without

installing a sewer line?”). As PCH observed below,

the express terms of the [Grant of ]Easement do not support

[Appellant’s] request that the Easement be read as terminating

when PARC[ Development] transferred the dominant estate to

Hillcrest[ Trust] before installing and operating a sewer line. Such

a result would stand in direct conflict with the well-established rule

that an easement appurtenant is transferred to the subsequent

purchaser of the dominant tenement by operation of law.

Therefore, if the parties intended this Easement to operate outside

the normal framework of Pennsylvania law, they had the

opportunity to identify those intentions by including clear and

unambiguous language. However, no such language exists in the

Easement…. The simple fact is that the [Grant of ]Easement

contains no language imposing upon PARC[ Development] an

obligation to install and operate a sewer line immediately, by a

specific date or prior to transferring the dominant estate in order

to maintain the Easement….

PCH’s Trial Court Reply Brief, 7/7/23, at 10-11 (citations omitted). We agree.

Furthermore, the Grant of Easement specifically states that “[t]he

easement rights and privileges herein granted shall terminate when or at such

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time as the purposes hereof cease to exist, are abaondoned [sic] by Grantee

or become impossible of performance.” See Grant of Easement at 2

(unnumbered). None of these termination events have occurred.

First, the purpose of the Easement continues to exist, as the Pine Creek

Property is land-locked, access to the municipal sewer system is on Saxonburg

Boulevard, and the owners of Pine Creek Property have not affirmatively acted

in a way inconsistent with the intention to use the Easement in the future.

See Joint Stipulation at ¶ d (“The Easement was sought to allow the land-

locked Pine Creek Property access to the municipal sewer system on

Saxonburg Blvd.”); see also id. at ¶ i (stipulating that neither the current nor

prior owners of the Pine Creek Property have done any affirmative acts

inconsistent with the intention to make a future use of the Easement).

Second, the Easement was not abandoned by PARC Development or any

subsequent owner for that matter. With respect to abandonment, our

Supreme Court has explained:

In Pennsylvania, the law requires that there be showing of intent

of the owner of the dominant tenement to abandon the easement,

coupled with either (1) adverse possession by the owner of the

servient tenement; or (2) affirmative acts by the owner of the

easement that renders … use of the easement impossible; or (3)

obstruction of the easement by the owner of the easement in a

manner that is inconsistent with its further enjoyment.

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Ruffalo v. Walters, 348 A.2d 740, 741 (Pa. 1975) (citation omitted).4 As for

the first prong, no one has argued that Appellant has adversely possessed the

Easement. Regarding the second prong, the parties stipulated that “[n]either

the current nor prior owners of the Pine Creek Property have … done any

affirmative acts … to make it impossible to use the Easement across the Jones

Property.” Joint Stipulation at ¶ i.5 With respect to the third prong, the parties

also stipulated that “[n]either the current nor prior owners of the Pine Creek

Property have … done any affirmative acts inconsistent with the intention to

make a future use of the Easement….” Id. As such, the record supports that

neither PARC Development nor any subsequent owners obstructed the

Easement in a manner that is inconsistent with its further enjoyment.

____________________________________________

4 See also Sabados v. Kiraly, 393 A.2d 486, 487-88 (Pa. Super. 1978) (“It

is well established in Pennsylvania law that in order to show an abandonment

of a right-of-way or easement created by deed, the evidence must clearly

show some conduct on the ground by the holder of the right-of-way which

manifests that he [i]ntended to abandon and give up permanently his right to

use it. Such conduct must consist of some [a]ffirmative act [o]n his part which

renders use of the easement impossible, or of some [p]hysical obstruction of

it by him in a manner that is inconsistent with its further enjoyment. Mere

nonuse of the right-of-way by its holder, no matter how long continued,

cannot manifest an intention to abandon the right, because there is no legal

obligation upon the right-of-way owner to use it in order to keep his title to

it.”) (citation omitted).

5 Appellant argues that, under his reading of the Grant of Easement, it is

impossible for the Easement to be used because the Grant of Easement limits

development of the sewer line to PARC Development, and PARC Development

did not develop the sewer line before it conveyed the Pine Creek Property to

Hillcrest Trust. Appellant’s Brief at 5-6. As we do not agree with Appellant’s

contention that PARC Development had to develop the sewer line before

conveying the Pine Creek Property to Hillcrest Trust for the reasons set forth

in this writing, we reject this claim of impossibility.

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Finally, performance is not impossible. Again, the joint stipulation

entered by the parties states that “[n]either the current nor prior owners of

the Pine Creek Property have … done any affirmative acts … to make it

impossible to use the Easement across the Jones Property.” Joint Stipulation

at ¶ i. Additionally, although the Indiana Township Planning Commission has

denied prior owners’ plans to develop the Pine Creek Property, see id. at ¶ h,

Appellant points to no facts in the record establishing that development on the

property can never occur, rendering performance impossible. Accord PCH’s

Brief at 15 (“[N]o conditions exist which demonstrate that the intended

purpose of the Easement acting as a sanitary sewer conduit is impossible.”).

Thus, none of the events that would warrant termination of the Easement

under the Grant of Easement have occurred.

We recognize that the Grant of Easement also states, “The easement,

rights and privileges herein granted shall be for so long as Grantee, its

successors and assigns, shall operate a sanitary sewer pipeline within said

easement.” Grant of Easement at 2 (unnumbered). It is undisputed that

neither the current nor prior owners of the Pine Creek Property have used the

Easement to date. Joint Stipulation at ¶ i. Nevertheless, the current and prior

owners also have not done any affirmative acts inconsistent with the intention

to make future use of the Easement, see id., which suggests that a sewer

pipeline may operate within the Easement someday. In addition, the Grant of

Easement delineates the specific circumstances in which the Easement would

terminate, and as discussed supra, none of them have occurred. See pages

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12-15, supra. We also repeat that “[m]ere non-use, no matter how long

extended, will not result in extinguishment of an easement created by deed.”

Brady, 425 A.2d at 727 n.2.

As for Appellant’s argument that PARC Development was able to assign

the Easement to Deer Creek Drainage Basin Authority, but did not do so, and

that the assignment to Deer Creek Drainage Basin Authority was the only

assignment provided for if the sewer line was not developed, we likewise reject

this claim. While the Grant of Easement states that PARC Development “shall

have the right to assign, convey and dedicate the easement, rights and

privileges granted hereunder to the Deer Creek Drainage Basin Authority[,]”

see Grant of Easement at 3 (unnumbered), nowhere does the Grant of

Easement state that Deer Creek Drainage Basin Authority is the exclusive

transferee of the Easement. Accord PCH’s Brief at 19 (“Where does it state

that Deer Creek Drainage Basin Authority … is the exclusive transferee of the

Easement?”). We concur with PCH that “the appropriate interpretation is that

the Easement allowed for a transfer to Deer Creek[ Drainage Basin Authority]

but also permitted the normal transfer to a purchaser of the dominant

tenement.” Id. at 21.

In closing, we also point out that the Grant of Easement provides, “This

instrument shall be binding on the heirs, executors, administrators,

successors and assigns of the parties thereto.” Grant of Easement at 3

(unnumbered). As the trial court observed, Appellant’s interpretation of the

Grant of Easement ignores this express provision. See Trial Court Opinion,

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9/19/23, at 6. The trial court discerned that, “if each of the rights were so

carefully crafted and delineated as to which continued and which expired,

there would be no need for this final provision. … [Appellant’s] interpretation

would render this final provision meaningless.” Id. at 6-7. We also observe

that the Grant of Easement could have said that it is binding on the heirs,

executors, administrators, successors and assigns of the parties hereto if

PARC Development installed a sewer line or assigned the Easement to Deer

Creek Drainage Basin Authority. It does not. Instead, it puts no conditions

on when the Grant of Easement would be binding on future transferees. As

such, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Easement is an

easement in gross that could have, but did not, ripen into an easement

appurtenant.

Order affirmed.

DATE: 6/13/2024

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